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NUMBER I

THE EXISTENCE OF SOCIAL MINDS¹

JOHN E. BOODIN
Carleton College

TYPES OF THEORIES

In looking backward at the social theories of the past, it seems to me that they, practically at least, assume the subcranial point of view. Let us glance briefly at some of these theories. It is easy to place the old abstract individualism, with its practical egoism. For Hobbes the individual is himself and himself alone. Society is but an artificial addition, extraneous to human nature. While Hobbes regards the artificial addition as an indispensable means to peace and happiness, modern anarchy regards society as at best a necessary evil. For Herbert Spencer it is a temporary police supervision, until human nature shall have embodied within itself the necessary social instincts for unconstrained living together; for Nietzsche, it is but a philistine conspiracy on the part of the weak and cowardly to suppress the strong and fit.

The absorbing biological interest of the last generation could not help making itself felt in social theory. Society is fundamentally an organism, so the biological school tells us. The analogies between the organism and society have been worked out into striking and sometimes fantastic detail: The organism is the union of soul and

¹ Presidential address of the Western Philosophical Association delivered at Northwestern University, March 21, 1913.

body, we are told. Though an organism is a whole, it has parts animated in their own way and playing into the whole. The organism is developed from within outward in a life-history. If we transfer these analogies to the state, for example, we find that here too we have the union of soul and body, the body being the constitution with its articulate provisions. In the state, too, we have members, the officials and the offices with their varied spiritual functions, forming a coherent internal organization and acting as a unit in external relations. The state like the organism grows, though, since popular passion and strong individual interest may deflect the course, it may not grow quite so regularly as the organism. Such in brief is the brilliant sketch of Bluntschli in his *The Theory of the State*.¹ On the ethical side writers like Leslie Stephen emphasize that "the individual is moralized through his identification with the social organism"; and that "the conditions, therefore, of the security of morality are the conditions of the persistence of society."²

But after all the social organism is merely a metaphor, a vague analogy. Even if we should go so far on the biological side as to credit each cell of the complex organism with a mind of its own, still we should be entirely ignorant of the flow of energy from one cell to another; and our ignorance in the one case furnishes a poor explanation of the intimate relations which come within our experience in the other. The unity of society, as has often been pointed out, is not an organic but a psychological unity. It is a unity of value and not a mere unity of external continuity. In order to arrive at any intimate understanding of social relations we must use psychological and not biological tools.

More profound in its insight, and more genial to our thinking, is the attitude of speculative idealism. Here at least we have a recognition that the unity of society must be an intimate unity. It must figure somehow within the terms to be related. The social unity must be essentially psychological; and it must be more than the unity of each individual mind. This is as true in our theoretical relations as in our practical. In order to any common

¹ See especially pp. 16 ff.

² *Science of Ethics*, p. 454.

understanding, a supra-individual unity must somehow dip into our finite centers. It is this which makes us overlap and makes us imply more than we seem. In the words of Emerson: "Persons themselves acquaint us with the impersonal. In all conversation between two persons tacit reference is made to a third party, to a common nature. That third party or common nature is not social; it is impersonal; is God."¹ How intimate this unity is to our own individuality is also emphasized by Emerson: "Ineffable is the union of man and God in every act of the soul. The simplest person who in his integrity worships God becomes God; yet forever and forever, the influx of this better and universal self is new and unsearchable." This intimacy of life enables the finite person to say: "Behold I am born into the great, the universal mind. I the imperfect adore my own Perfect. I am somehow receptive of the great soul." Of this union the world itself is the "perennial miracle which the soul worketh." On the basis of such intimacy with the absolute, Green can tell us "the true good is and in its earlier form was a social good,"² in which the permanent self and others are not to be distinguished.

The difficulty with the above theory of social relations is of course its abstractness. The unity of each and all of the personal selves with the absolute is so intimate that social finite relations disappear altogether in the abstract background. An entity, however, which in this abstract way explains all unity does not make us any wiser as regards the various types of concrete unity with which we are concerned in our practical social relations. There is a great difference between social mind as an abstract, permanent idea and social mind as an existing living unity, as warm and real as individual mind. To show that the individual and society mutually imply each other or that we are socially minded is a different thing from showing that social minds exist. Hegel has come nearer than anyone else of the speculative idealists to recognizing the reality of the various types of social mind. For Hegel, indeed, the ethical life means precisely this adjustment to social institutions. Man is not a stranger in an artificially superimposed

¹ From *The Oversoul*.

² *Prolegomena to Ethics*, sec. 232.

society. Social institutions are the concrete embodiments of his own deeper will. In his own words: "The various social forces are not something foreign to this subject, his spirit bears witness to them as to his own being. In them he feels that he is himself, and in them too he lives as in an element indistinguishable from himself. This relation is more direct and intuitive than even faith and trust."¹ And again: "Spirit has actuality, and the accidents or modes of this actuality are individuals. Hence as to the ethical there are only two possible views. Either we start from the substantive social system, or we proceed atomically and work up from a basis of individuality. This latter method, because it leads to mere juxtaposition, is void of spirit, since mind or spirit is not something individual, but the unity of the individual and the universal."²

When Hegel, however, tries to make clear what he means by this spiritual unity, his bias for the abstract and formal vitiates his treatment. Thus in discussing the types of social unity he places the family lowest, as the unity of feeling; the civic community he defines as "an association of members or independent individuals in a formal universality. Such an association is occasioned by needs, and preserved by law." But a final type of unity is "the substantive universal, and the public life dedicated to the maintenance of the universal. This is the state constitution." Thus Hegel's abstract method loses the social mind in the mere external form and expression of society. To be sure he tells us: "The state is the divine will as a present spirit which unfolds itself in the actual shape of an organized world."³ But the state remains a juristic abstraction to the end. Mind is finally vested in the absolute self-consciousness; and persons and institutions alike must be understood as expressions of this self-consciousness. The new discovery of history is "the unity of the divine and the human"; and this unity comes to a focus in each self-conscious personality. Institutions are but the expression of this independent self-consciousness. As he puts it: "In the state, self-consciousness finds the organic development of its real substantive knowing and will; in religion

¹ *The Philosophy of Right*, par. 147.

² *Ibid.*, par. 156.

³ *Ibid.*, par. 270.

it finds, in the form of ideal essence, the feeling and the vision of this its truth; and in science it finds the free conceived knowledge of this truth, seeing it to be one and the same in all its mutually completing manifestations, viz., the state, nature, and the ideal world."¹ But they are after all only manifestations—the Self writ large; and Hegel in spite of all his efforts to take the social point of view, as a result of his abstract method, ends in being a rational individualist. The difficulty with idealistic theories in general, in spite of the fruitfulness of their empirical intuitions, is that they have been so anxious to arrive at the Absolute that they have slighted the concrete problems of continuity. The abstract Absolute becomes an immense solipsist, with no alter.

Recent theories of society may perhaps be characterized, in contrast with abstract individualism on the one hand, and abstract universalism on the other, as functional theories. As against abstract individualism they emphasize the qualifications in human nature for social relations. As against abstract universalism, they emphasize that mind is essentially individual and deny the reality of a supra-individual consciousness. In the words of Giddings: "The social mind is a concrete thing. It is more than any individual mind and dominates every individual will. Yet it exists only in individual minds, and we have no knowledge of any consciousness but that of individuals. The social consciousness, then, is nothing more than the feeling or the thought that appears at the same moment in all individuals, or that is propagated from one to another through the assembly or the community. The social mind is the phenomenon of many individuals in interaction, so playing upon one another that they simultaneously feel the same sensation or emotion, arrive at one judgment and perhaps act in concert."² In the same spirit we are told by Ward: "There are none so simple as literally to personify society and conceive it endowed with wants and passions. By the improvement of society they only mean such modifications in its constitution and structure as will in their opinion result in ameliorating the conditions of its individual members."³ In spite of this, society "should imagine itself an

¹ *Ibid.*, par. 360.

² Giddings, *The Principles of Sociology*, p. 134.

³ Ward, *The Psychic Factors of Civilization*, pp. 99 and 100.

individual, with all the interests of an individual; and becoming fully conscious of these interests, it should pursue them with the same indomitable will with which the individual pursues his interest."¹ Still we are dealing with an aggregate of individuals, even if such individuals should base their actions upon "the science of sociology." As Spencer puts it: "By social laws are meant the principles of human action in collectivity."

We may distinguish three types of this functional theory of society. The first type of theory starts from the economic division of labor, as the complement of the varieties of human needs. This type has been stated in an immortal way by Plato in *The Republic*. Plato recognizes here the variety of capacities of human nature, as well as the variety of its complex needs. Society must be so organized, and education must be so specialized, as to make it possible for each human unit to fill its specific function, to do what it can do best in the economy of the whole. For Plato and Aristotle alike the conception of society is instrumental. Its purpose is the education of the individual in virtue, the attainment of the highest possible measure of insight into the meaning of life. This is even more strikingly brought out in Plato than in Aristotle, as with Plato the doctrine of immortality plays an essential part in the redemptive scheme of life.

Another type of theory has its basis in individualistic psychology. Its problem is: What are the individual processes or qualifications by means of which we come to share in a common social life? The classical statement of this type of approach goes back to Adam Smith: "How selfish, soever, man may be supposed to be, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when either we see it or are made to conceive it in a lively manner."² His conception of mind, however, remains strictly individual: "As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel we can form no idea of the manner in which

¹ Ward, *The Psychic Factors of Civilization*, p. 324.

² *The Theory of the Moral Sentiments*, Part I, chap. i.

they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation." We put ourselves in the other man's place in our imagination, and thus share with him what he must feel. We also learn to regulate our own conduct by what we represent to ourselves as his attitude toward us. This representative theory of social relations has been formulated more recently by William James: "A man's social self is the recognition which he gets from his mates. We are not only gregarious animals, liking to be in the sight of our fellows, but we have an innate tendency to get ourselves noticed, and noticed favorably by our kind. . . . Properly speaking a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind. To wound one of these images is to wound him."¹

Other writers of this psychological school have emphasized imitation, as the process by means of which social unity is brought about. Says Tarde: "Society may therefore be defined as a group of beings who are apt to imitate one another, or who without actual imitation are alike in their possession of common traits as an ancient copy of the same model."² He even goes so far as to say: "What is society? I have answered society is imitation."³ In the same spirit, Baldwin suggests that the social self may be likened roughly to a composite photograph: "The variety of personalities about him, each impressing him with some one or more peculiarities, exaggerations, deficiencies, inconsistencies or law-observing regularities, gradually leave upon him a certain common impression, which, while getting application to all personalities as such, yet has to have supplementing in the case of any particular individual. . . . He ejects it into all the fellows of his social group. It becomes then a general social alter."⁴ Professor Royce, carrying out the same method with his own idealistic background, comes to regard nature itself as the system of our social agreements, and thus only a more comprehensive social unity.

Still a third type of functional theory takes its start from our practical social situation. It assumes at the outset that all our

¹ *The Principles of Psychology*, I, 292 f.

² *The Laws of Imitation* (Eng. trans.), p. 68.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

⁴ Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 292 f.

consciousness is, as a matter of fact, social. This has been strikingly expressed by Professor A. W. Moore, a member of the Dewey school. In his own words: " 'My' consciousness is a function of a social process, in which my body or brain or mind is only one factor. . . . My thinking and feeling may be as truly a function of 'your' brain or mind as of my own. My thinking of sending for you as a physician to treat my headache is as truly a function of your medically trained brain as of my own aching one."¹ Moore thinks rightly of this "private consciousness" not only as born of, but as growing up in and therefore continuing all the while vitally and organically related to, its matrix. Not only in its origin but in its continual development and operation it must always be a function of the whole social situation of which it is born. It is never to be regarded as *wholly* or *merely* the function of an individual mind or soul or of a single organism or brain. It is always a readjustment within a social situation.

The theory thus baldly stated does not try to define the nature of the social situation, neither does it discriminate between situations where the motive is individual, and where the social aspects, such as language, science, etc., are strictly instrumental and the situations where the motive is consciously social. In so far as we use the concept social to characterize all our experience, we have obviously failed to give the differentia between what we may term the individual consciousness on the one hand and the group mind on the other. Moreover, the word "function" is ambiguous. Are my thinking and the physician's thinking in regard to my headache, identical states of consciousness? Or do they merely figure with reference to a common problem? Evidently the latter is all that can be meant in this case. It still remains, therefore, to explain the nature of that social context in which both our minds figure. Does this amount to a common social unity, including both minds and having an existence of its own, or are we simply two numerically distinct minds thinking of the same object?

The value of the above psychological type of treatment lies in emphasizing the fact, that there must be certain qualifications on the part of the individuals, taken as abstractions, in order for

¹ *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, p. 275.

social communion to take place. Such qualifications are partly instinctive and partly intellectual. On the *instinctive* side, we must distinguish certain specific instincts, such as a tendency toward gregariousness, and the parental instinct, from the more general innate tendencies such as imitation and sympathy. Without such native qualifications social life would of course be an impossibility. Lacking those we should have merely artificial restrictions superimposed on atomic units. We should have no genuine social life. These innate tendencies are further complicated and enhanced by the *intellectual* processes which are grafted upon them. These intellectual qualifications may be broadly stated as association and suggestion. By means of imagination we can imitate, and sympathize with, not only the immediate perceptual situations but the secondary inner situations of the other person's experience. A similar experience suggests to us similar trains of ideas and similar types of conduct. But these qualifications, whether instinctive or intellectual, are mere abstractions or potentialities looked at from the individual point of view. Their function is to *canalize* or make definite the intersubjective continuities, as do the terminal instruments in wireless telegraphy. They are no more social than oxygen and hydrogen, when taken separately, are water. Our *knowledge* of social mind may depend upon imitation and suggestion, it may involve inferences of the most complicated kind; it certainly presupposes language for any definiteness of mutual understanding. But this does not prove that the existence of a social mind consists of those cognitive processes, any more than the existence of a chemical compound depends upon our methods of studying it. The existence of a new reality in each case must be ascertained through the pragmatic attitude which we must take toward the specific type of unity.

What I wish to show is that there is a genuine social unity, distinct from what we call the unity of individual experience, and if not more real, at least more self-sufficient than this. The latter may be considered as a group of constant traits which we identify in a variety of situations. What we have in reality is dynamic situations. Some of these situations we come to recognize as physical, i.e., as having no meaning or value of their own; others again

we come to acknowledge as social with their own psychological unity. In each case we are able to follow the individual factors within the varying dynamic situations by virtue of certain constant traits which we can identify in the situations, such as the ions in chemical compounds, the Mendelian units and the chromosome characters in the organic situations, and the personal traits which constitute the individual's unique marks of identification in the various social unities.

INTERSUBJECTIVE CONTINUITIES

Instead of starting with the postulate of isolated minds, as psychology has done in the past, and then trying to explain how one mind can take cognizance of another by means of analogical inference, we must start with the postulate of intersubjective continuity as an elementary fact. Without this immediate continuity of minds—the unique consciousness of mental presence—we should have no incentive for our attempts to know about other minds. It is the fact that we meet in a common continuum that makes us conscious of the need for intersubjective adjustment. Mind, like matter, must be conceived as existing in constellations with their own continuities and with their own play of parts. We know each other, as we know physical things, through common situations. And in these social situations, whatever the physical medium or symbol, mind is aware of mind; else each mind would lead an ego-centric, solipsistic, and unconscious existence to the end. It is usually assumed that social communication means the transformation or correspondence of thought to nervous energy, this to muscular, this to physical stimuli, these again to physiological changes, terminating somehow in the other person's thought. This implies complete discontinuity as between these subcranial patches of mind. All continuity becomes material continuity. There can here be no direct acquaintance. The other mind comes to be regarded as an *eject*, inferred by analogy. That we as a matter of fact do not so infer it, that we respond to the voluntary reactions within the total situation as immediately as to the physical, does not trouble the theorist. Minds are isolated by hypothesis and so made private.

It is one of the paradoxes of history that mind should thus have

socialized itself into privacy. It was the emphasis on the physical sense-world—an emphasis made necessary through primitive man's direct and largely individual struggle with the physical environment—that gradually brought this about. As a result of this emphasis individuals came to be looked upon as primarily bodies with a "breath" inhabiting them; and in a more sophisticated age mind is reduced to a function of the brain, an accident in its activity. Thus mind, by its extreme emphasis of the instrument, not only socializes itself into isolation but actually socializes itself out of existence. Social communication becomes merely the polar relation between organic contexts of a certain complexity. But this emphasis is itself the product of social interaction. It was because of our practical social demands that the physical world became differentiated from our states of consciousness whether in the earlier animistic form or the more abstract psychological form. In the earliest primitive life there seems to be no such differentiation. Here mind is intuited as an ingredient in our common concrete situations. The earliest distinction is not between mind and body, but between animated bodies and those not animated. Such a distinction, preceding, as it does, all inference, must be intuitive, the result of the direct commerce of mind with mind. That such a distinction exists even on the animal level; that animals do as a matter of fact react differently upon animated things from those not animated; and that such an intuition is of fundamental importance in the economy of animal life is amply evidenced by animal conduct. That there should be illusions in animal life, extending this intuition to non-animated things, as in the case of the fish and the fisherman's artificial fly, is easily explained, once we grant the existence of the intersubjective intuition. The wholesale extension of this intuition to nature, however, as in the animistic philosophy, cannot be regarded as a primitive reaction, but is due to more advanced experience with its abstractions and inference, based upon sleep, dreams, etc., as shown by Herbert Spencer.

The general pragmatic significance of this intersubjective continuum is the sympathetic furtherance or the thwarting of individual desire. This even for the animal has a different intuitive value from the furtherance or hindrance by the inorganic processes

of nature. It makes a difference whether it is another living dog which is contending for the bone or whether the obstacle is merely mechanical. The sex instinct takes peculiar account of complementary desire or the absence of it. The gregarious instinct implies an intuition of kind as well as of animated things in general. And no learning process seems to precede such intuitive recognition. Even if this intuition is sometimes made negatively definite by the index of smell, as it seems to be in certain species of ants where a difference in smell makes them attack a certain other species, this does not account for the positive intuition of kind. Where the special index occurs it is probably due to special survival reasons.

Throughout the process of imitation and accommodation in which the individual translates his tendencies into terms of himself, there is present the immediate intuition of other minds. They are reacted on differently from things. It is possible for us to become aware of our own purposes only through the consciousness of conflict and co-operation with our fellows. In this we do not first have the consciousness of the physiological correspondence of our bodies with each other and then deduce internal correspondence from it. But the whole problem of psycho-physical correspondence is the outcome of our social interest—our practical need for intersubjective correlation and correspondence. We discovered the fundamental laws of language, logic, and ethics long before we had discovered even the existence of a nervous system. It is true that we come to take a certain bodily behavior as the sign of intersubjective relations, but they would not even have been signs except in the service of the things signified—the evidence of things not seen. It is because we are immediately conscious of the reality of other selves that we try to understand them and devise instruments for adjusting ourselves to them. Whether on the level of instinctive affection and rivalry or on the level of purposive co-operation, we imply the first-hand acquaintance of mind with mind. In our vices as in our moral evaluations, in our selfish striving for wealth and power as in our seeking for individual or social salvation, we imply the sharing of a common life with others, and their reciprocal response to our aims.

The whole procedure of supposed inference from analogy is

inverted. We start with a common intuitive life, and through the demands of this common life, matter comes to have its instrumental significance. Intuitive living and faith come before analogical inference. Unless intersubjective continuities were thus directly felt, we should have neither basis nor motive for inferences about other minds. We no more reason by analogy from our mind to other minds than from our body to other bodies. Indeed the basis for our arriving at an objective physical world is the practical necessity of our common intuitive life.

The prejudice against social continuities is part of a larger prejudice, pointed out by William James—the prejudice against conjunctive relations and the emphasis on disjunctive. In the socializing process of civilization the world becomes crystallized into diverse concepts or terms; these come to seem more and more fixed and exclusive and as having only external relations to each other. Language gives the illusion of substance to our intellectual abstractions, whether physical or psychological. And so it comes to pass that while it seems clear enough that there are disparate terms or entities—qualities, atoms, and what not—it is hard to find the glue that binds the terms together in a common flow of experience. This intellectual despair leads men like Bradley to mysticism, which, however, is a hopeless surrender rather than a solution. What we must do instead is to take a fresh start in the intuitions of concrete experience and to realize that what we start with is not terms—these are instrumental abstractions—but that we start with integral situations. In these concrete situations the conjunctive relations have an equal claim with the disjunctive. It is our intellectual one-sidedness merely that makes the world absurd. For a logic hopping on one leg, we must substitute a logic of the concrete.

While William James emphasized admirably the need of our taking the conjunctive relations of the physical world at their face value, he still clung to the social discontinuities.¹ Here we are supposed to have complete insulation, abstract ejects. I insist that the prejudice against social continuities is as unwarranted as

¹ In *A Pluralistic Universe* he does indeed, under the influence of Fechner, break away from this view of privacy, but the application is to the supposed hierarchy of cosmic consciousness rather than to society.

our prejudice against physical. In each case we must get away from our intellectual abstraction and return to the concrete situation. The agnostics are at least consistent in holding that mind and matter are equally inaccessible and unknowable. But this is a gratuitous assumption. In each case we enter into common situations. In each case we can regulate our conduct by the properties discriminated in such situations. And these common situations, experience teaches us, may be mental as well as physical. We must learn to take the social continuities at their face value, as James has insisted that we must take the physical continuities. Isolation and parallelism are of our conceptual making. The real world overflows and ignores them.

It is true that our imagination encounters several obstacles to admitting such social continuities. We have become accustomed to look upon mental communication as mediated by a nervous system and an intervening physical world. But even if this should turn out to be always true, it is nothing against intersubjective continuities. Electricity, too, is mediated, as we familiarly know it, through wires; and even in the case of wireless, we find it convenient as an aid to our imagination to conceive a medium that facilitates its spreading through space. Still, whether electricity in the last analysis radiates through empty space or rides over a medium, there can be no doubt that the electrical continuities, when they are established, are real. They are not material conjunctions but immaterial conjunctions. And so with mind. Why should we conceive mind as pushing molecules or being insulated by them? Why may not neural processes act as conductors instead of insulators? But however mind may be mediated, whatever intervening processes it may ride over, when the continuities are established they are recognized as psychological, not as material, confluences. They are unique and not to be confused with chemical or electrical. Conative co-operation must be recognized as different from mechanical reaction. And this, we have seen, is done immediately and intuitively in the animal world long before inference is known. It is as immediate a discrimination as that of quantitative and qualitative difference in physical stimuli and as necessary to survival.

The discovery of the immaterial continuity of electricity helps at any rate to emancipate our imagination from the grosser continuities of our senses and of molecular physics. We know that electricity in its free form possesses remarkable power of intersecting our seemingly solid world in all sorts of ways as illustrated in X-rays, violet rays, etc. Here the difference in wave-length as well as intensity must be taken into account. So, for example, what is opaque to X-rays may be translucent to violet rays. The thickness to be interpenetrated must also be taken into account. Here, as in the case of mental continuities, our practical knowledge of the results is clear and definite, while our knowledge of the descriptive side, i.e., the means of spreading, is largely speculative. What is certain is that there *are* these immaterial continuities and that they have their predictable practical effects. There is nothing contradictory, therefore, in material and immaterial continuities occupying the same space, and in the end the material may have to find their explanation in the immaterial. As is the case in electrical continuities, some psychic states seem more contagious than others; and high psychic potentials, in the intenser forms of crowds, make minds interpenetrate more fully the enveloping material husk and lose themselves in the temporary continuum of mind. At any rate, the sense of comradeship is too convincing and absorbing in its own right to be reduced to the abstract logic of analogy. The intuition of a common life precedes theory. Privacy in our world, in so far as there is such a thing—and there evidently is for special purposes—means isolation or disconnectedness for the time being. It means the failure to figure in a certain dynamic situation.

Another difficulty which the imagination encounters lies in the customary conception of mind. If we identify mind primarily with sensations, their persistence and combination by means of mechanical association, we have a difficulty, but it is a physical, not a mental difficulty. These facts, while instrumental to will and closely bound up with the realization of its tendencies; and while in a sense existing in the mind—inlaid in its interests, as a diamond in its gold setting—yet are primarily physical facts. Mind, however, is primarily a matter of will and affective value.

Hence telepathy as a communication of ideas is quite distinct from what we mean by mental continuity. The former presupposes analogous cerebral situations. Mental continuity has reference to common will attitudes, common moods, and these may have widely different intellectual coloring, as music may have different meaning to different listeners.

This difficulty is closely bound up with another—the failure to distinguish between acquaintance and description, intuition and knowledge. While the distinction within our experience is purely logical, it is none the less important. What we share immediately, in social situations, is the acquaintance or intuition, the consciousness of mental presence. The knowledge about the situation is bound up largely with the physical aspect of the mind—the associative contexts of content. It turns out then that the so-called privacy, which merely means indirectness of communication, pertains primarily to the physical contents of the mind. Even in the direct sharing of physical situations we are as it were one remove from the certainty of a common world, for here we imply a faith in analogous sense organs and nervous systems and here we have to allow for pathological instances. Physical sharing can only be guaranteed through serial construction and intersubjective comparison and so presupposes social communication.

In studying social facts, therefore, as in studying other domains of fact, we must start with intuition. Intuition is not truth, nor a substitute for truth, but it is the starting-point and terminus of truth. This is the case in all our investigations. Even mathematics, as Poincaré has shown, must start with intuition, however much it refines upon it in the process. Our intuitions of social continuities are at least as convincing as the intuitions of perceptual continuities. And the former, as we have seen, have at any rate genetic priority, as it is through our social relations that we come to differentiate the world of things and the world of minds.

The convincingness of social companionship, moreover, has nothing to do with our theory as to how it may be brought about. The theory is an afterthought and may undergo all sorts of transmutations. In our blindness we may seek to theorize the facts away even while we are assuming them. Thus the solipsist must

try to convince his fellows. Fortunately the transitions in nature do not depend upon our understanding them. We are not able to follow even the simplest of them point for point. We perform the juxtapositions but nature establishes the continuity under its own selective conditions. Nor does energetic continuity involve identity in space. If so, it is hard to see what interaction could mean. Instead of starting with conceivability or inconceivability, as based upon previous custom, we now believe in regulating conceivability with reference to the facts which we must meet.

If the theory of social atomism, with its assumption of absolute discontinuity, fails to meet the demands of experience, so does the theory of absolute continuity. The absolute, since, like the ether, it explains all continuity in advance, explains no concrete relations. The discontinuities must be taken at their face value as must the continuities. Like other energies, such as electricity, mind obeys certain definite laws of spreading. It is conditioned by interferences. It can establish continuity only when the proper conditions exist.

This conception of social continuity differs, therefore, from that of monistic idealism as expressed by Hugo Münsterberg and von Hartmann. Says Münsterberg: "In real life spirit touches spirit and what mysticism ingeniously unites is in truth not at all sundered. The sundering follows first in the service of psychological and physical description."¹ But the sundering is a real part of our mundane practical life; and a theory which fails to account for it is practically useless. In the case of von Hartmann it is the Unconscious which exercises clairvoyant power (*Hellsehen*) as between part and part. Whether the parts thus abstracted are higher or lower in the scale does not alter their clairvoyant insight which belongs to the unconscious cosmic will itself.

If the unconscious soul in the separate portions of an insect, or in the stem and the detached buds, is still one, must it not be the same also in the insects separate by nature of a community of bees or ants, which even without union of the organisms in space still act as harmoniously on one another as the several parts of the same organism? Should not the clairvoyance which we have found everywhere recurring in the invasions of the Unconscious, and which is so supremely astonishing in the limited individual, should not it alone invite this

¹ *Grundzüge der Psychologie.*

solution, that the individual acts of clairvoyance are simply announcements of the everywhere identical Unconscious, wherewith at once everything miraculous in clairvoyance disappears since now the seer is also the soul of the seen? What opposes this is only the prejudice that the soul is the consciousness.¹

Yes, everything miraculous does disappear on such a hypothesis, but also everything interesting for our practical purposes. What we require for our purposes is a hypothesis which will account for both the practical discontinuities and the continuities. The hypothesis of a transcendental, timeless and spaceless unity fails to meet our needs as truly as that of abstract atomism. In the case of intersubjective relations, as in the case of chemical and electrical energies, continuities are established under certain conditions, as there are discontinuities under other conditions. We are not dealing with continuity in the abstract, but with the differences made when concrete continuities do take place. The continuities and discontinuities are on the same level with the finite individuals involved, not on a transcendental level, whatever that may mean.

We cannot, finally, deduce other minds from the implications of self-consciousness as a priori philosophers have attempted to do. Self-consciousness itself, on the contrary, is the outgrowth of the demands for readjustment and adaptation within the social situation in which we live and move and have our being. All deliberate differentiation and identification, whether of selves or of things, mental or physical, is the outcome of the pressure of social interest. Selves are known by their context or function in this common experience.

We must rid our minds of the intellectualism which has so long pervaded all our thinking. We have made our convenient abstractions from the dynamic stream of reality, and then we have imagined that these abstractions exhausted reality. More and more, however, we have come to realize that these abstractions, real as they are when taken as aspects of reality, must, when they are taken apart, be regarded as instrumental. They are conceptual tools by means of which we can predict, and dip into, the stream of reality at definite points. They are "leadings" in our experience by means of which we are guided to the creative processes of nature.

¹ *Philosophy of the Unconscious* (Eng. trans.), II, 225, 226.

The dynamic situation is never a mere addition of certain entities with their separate characteristics. The situation has always its own atmosphere; we must discover its own individual traits.

Even in the inorganic field we have long ago ceased to believe that the reality of water consists in the addition of the two gases, hydrogen and oxygen, in the abstract numerical proportion of H_2O , with their separate characters. The formula merely furnishes the leading toward nature's creative process. Water is a unique individual and satisfies new wants. While it has some of the properties of the so-called elements, it also has new properties which cannot be found in those elements taken separately. You must, besides the abstract factors, take account of a third fact, the creative process of nature from which they are abstractions. We are in the habit, it is true, of identifying creativeness with the freakish and unpredictable. These have always appealed to man as more or less miraculous. As a matter of fact all happenings, all arising of individual compounds must be regarded as creative. The elements are real only as they move within a field of energy. The negative charges within the atom are conceived as moving within a field of positive electricity. We can understand the life of the complex organism only when we take account of the vital stream of impulse which guides and controls its development and its division of labor. And within social unities, we must not stop with the abstract factors of the situation, but we must try to appreciate the soul of the situation itself, the creative contribution of the spiritual process.

Creative synthesis seems to be of the very nature of reality. Out of some eighty elements inorganic nature creates endless unique situations; out of only four elements arises the variety of organic situations. In ideal creativeness, few themes suffice for infinite creative production. In any case, the universe gives back more than we seem to put in—more than our abstract elements or abstract individuals. In any case the properties we select for prediction are abstractions from the continuities or possible continuities in the flow of reality.

It will be seen that this theory of creative evolution is practically the opposite of that of Bergson. For him evolution means division.

case, while we can discriminate complexity within the fusion, the whole is one unique individual; and the qualities which we discriminate within the situation owe their character in part to the fusion. While we can identify them, they are not a mere repetition of the qualities in their separateness. The social fusion seems as much a new unity as the individual state of consciousness. We must be pragmatic. If the facts indicate such social fusion, we must acknowledge it. We may not understand the how of it—the spatial and other metaphysical conditions of this continuity. But we must remember that we have the same problem in regard to physical interaction. Spatial continuity has not been proved for any energetic interaction. Atoms or electrons are not absolutely contiguous. An absolutely continuous and fluid ether is indistinguishable from empty space. A rigid ether is only another name for a dynamic field. Somehow, in the situation of sympathetic abandon, fruitful as love's embrace, there is created a new soul—an inter-individual mind, which, once it is born, is more than, or at any rate different from, the factors which are its antecedents and which blend into it.

Instead of taking as our illustration a specific type of elementary state, we might have taken the individual mind as such, which may be considered as a fusion of various fields, bound up with different neural substrates. In the various pathological cases of divided selves we see what happens when there is functional or organic disconnectedness of centers. The continuum of the individual mind offers the same problems as we find in intersubjective continuity. It is just as great a mystery that part-minds within the individual organism can fuse into one as that these individuals can become part-minds within the larger social situation. In each case the part-minds must overflow, and ride over, intervening processes. In each case the part-mind must be more than itself in order to function within a common unity. The fact that the fusion is more constant and intense within the individual mind is a matter of degree, not of difference in kind. What the pathological cases bring out is that normally the so-called individual self is in reality a colony of selves, an integration of systems of tendencies, fusing more or less into a common field and to a greater or less extent dominated by a common purpose.

If we now take account of the individual components of the fusion, we find in social fusions as in those of the particular consciousness that the *quality* of the components makes a difference. You get a different result in a French fusion from what you get in an Anglo-Saxon fusion; in a feminine fusion from a masculine fusion, given a similar situation. A ladies' tea-party is different from a men's smoker, though each may discuss the same subject. Race and sex seem to furnish different overtones, even as different clangs bring a different character to the compound musical result. Different individuals too bring a different quality to the combined result. This is true particularly in deliberative groups, where the individual give-and-take is more prominent in the situation.

Further, we must take account of the *intensity* of the factors in the fusion. In the simple musical clang, the fundamental by its greater intensity gives the key to the new individual unity. In the case of social fusions, too, there is generally some one element that furnishes the character to the whole; some volitional factor by its strength of affirmation, its faith in the issue, counts for more than the other confluent factors and gives the key to the whole. This dominant factor we call the leader of the situation. When his will overshadows the other factors, when he attracts a large number to himself and sways them for a sustained period, when he furnishes the enthusiasm which makes the others willing to follow blindly for weal or woe and to the extent of any personal sacrifice, we may call the leader a superman. It is not the quality of the will that makes the superman, but the intensity of his affirmation. The superman, like Napoleon, has often been madly selfish. He may employ widely different means: he may use striking metaphors; he may argue; he may dogmatically repeat; he may simply hurl his emotional weight against the future. In any case it is his dominant will that wins. Whatever means he uses—bullying or argument or sympathetic suggestion—he somehow possesses the mystic power of making solvent the other wills in the situation.

The social fusion, however, like the compound clang may be too complex for this single dominance. In a deliberative assembly, such as our Continental Congress or Constitutional Assembly, a group of minds may combine on the basis of abstract principles to mold the whole into unity with themselves.

In social, as in tonal fusion, the *number* of components must be taken into account. A certain social fusion of an intimate kind takes place when two sympathetic souls meet in friendship or love. Such a fusion is impossible with additional individual factors, however congenial otherwise. Three make a different crowd. On the other hand, when the appeal is to certain fundamental instincts, such as pugnacity, anger, emulation, or pity, and where the overtones of human nature, instead of fusing, are inhibited, the release becomes only more effective, the abandon and fusion greater, the volume of feeling larger for the larger number that participates. The city baseball crowd, grown enthusiastic over its side or indignant at the umpire, all the more completely forgets itself for the immensity of the number that touch elbows; the solemnity and suggestion of the religious occasion only gathers impetus and devotion from the number of those similarly bent. The fundamental tendency here, so strong and so invariant in quality, more than grows by addition of separate wills. The latent energy of each is released by the presence of the other in increasing ratio with the confluence of the tendencies in the common sea of interest. The fundamental is not a limited quantity in such cases, as it is in music. The result is more than the fusion of a vast number of identical or similar pre-existent tones.

Finally, in order to understand the social fusion we must take account of the dominant interest, the ruling passion or set of the group. Leader and led alike are part of this passion. It may be the illusion of military power and glory as in the Napoleonic age; it may be a religious passion as in the case of the Crusades; it may be a sense of outraged justice as in the case of the Declaration of Independence. But in any case the leader as well as the led are held in the dynamic circuit of one field of interest. They are swayed by the same fundamental emotion, tapped by the same situation. If the crowd is the victim of an illusion, so is the leader and with far greater abandon. It is the fact that he liberates this fundamental sentiment, that he voices the passion or rationality of the group, that makes him a leader. The strongest individual affirmation, even with divine inspiration, is dashed aside for the time being, when it runs counter to this dominant tendency.

The fact that the leader is a function of the situation, as well as a dominant exponent of it, gives rise to the wide divergence of interpretation as regards leadership or prestige. To some he seems a mere cork floating on the current of the common will; to others he seems the entire situation, and they would write history as the biography of great leaders. Both are partly wrong and partly right. He does indicate the set, which holds him in the same grasp as it holds the others. He expresses a situation. But he is not a mere cork. He contributes volitional definiteness and precipitating energy to the set to a greater extent than the other factors. He is important, therefore, in the effectiveness and organization of the common will. Whether he is a creative or merely explosive factor depends upon what he brings in the way of fundamental insight, with his strength of affirmation.

Since the social situation is thus analyzable into certain conditions—quality, intensity, and number, with the set or field of passionate interest in which they figure—we can to a certain extent predict social fusions as we can predict tonal fusions. But only empirically and partially. In tonal harmonics all a priori theories have failed. We must take account of the creative result, the new individual unity in each case, and this can be done only by direct intuition. Our prediction, therefore, can go no farther than our empirical control of the situations. In the case of the social situations the complexity is so great and the factors so variant that such control and prediction is at best merely approximate. We may have bodily the same people, the same leader, the same issue, yet time may entirely alter the result. Some great personalities and some permanent issues are pretty sure, however, to produce an intense social fusion. Religion and the great ethical issues of the race, when strongly represented, cannot fail to produce a result. Fads again require a very special time and audience to get a sympathetic hearing. As the mood or set here is transient, so is the fusion contingent and ephemeral.

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self-conscious social deliberation to the hypnotic abandon of the mob or the entrancing ecstasy of the aesthete or mystic. The activity in the former case, the solemn argumentation of the master-minds who decided on the Declaration of Independence, is a socially centered activity, a self-conscious social situation, as the hypnotic case is a passive abandon to the situation. The factors in each case, however, are quite oblivious of themselves—their own interest or danger—they are dominated by the common situation. It was this which in the former case argued through each, cast about for ways and means, held them in complete subjection to its own intensely active purpose.

This variation in the type of attention has led to diverging theories as to what constitutes social unity. Hegel can see the social only in the rational, the common burden of thought, the articulate sharing of a common plan. For him social consciousness must finally be actively focalized or self-conscious. The immediate, the merely felt or sensed, is for Hegel the private and particular. On the other hand, Tarde and Le Bon identify the social fusion with the passive abandon of the crowd, with the immersed and immediate hypnotic fusion, with its exaggerated suggestibility. We must recognize that these are extreme types while there exist, between them, all the variations with which individualistic psychology has made us familiar. As over against the tendency today to call upon the subconscious to solve all knotty problems, Hegel's emphasis shows at least that the social consciousness need not be hopelessly vague and diffuse in order to master our ideas and set free our energies. We may be socially active as well as individually active. Indeed, individual activity resolves itself largely into the particular pull and emphasis which we exercise in the variety of social situations in which we figure or at any rate that dominate our thinking as to how we would want to figure. Whether either thinking or feeling particularize or socialize depends upon the motive or situation which dominates them.

In producing the hypnotic fusion, certain conditions have been pointed out as favorable, such as the inhibition of the large voluntary movements, the control of breathing, the monotonous fixing of attention, etc. These conditions have been systematized in the

mystic oriental religions in order to bring about union with Brahm or disappearance in Nirvana. But these are merely instruments after all and rather variable instruments at best. They do not account for the fusion. Religiously speaking, the external conditions are but outward and visible signs. The inward and spiritual grace of union, whether friendship, or communion with God, is a creative gift which we must acknowledge and appreciate as such. The conditions seem, moreover, to conflict. In football enthusiasm and religious revivals, free play of reflexes seems to give an even more complete fusion than their inhibition.

We must remember finally in our discussion of this social fusion that it is not a mere intellectual fusion of sensations and ideas. It may not be this at all. At any rate, it is primarily a voluntaristic fusion—a creative unification of conative tendencies, whether of the instinctive or the ideal order. These voluntaristic tendencies we have indeed come to recognize as the fundamental aspect of mind, individual or social. It matters not how many eyes may be looking, how many ears may be hearing, or even how many intellectual mechanisms may be working at various points of space and in connection with various brains, if there is the identical tendency, the coalescing in one dynamic field of the various conative energies. When minds recognize each other's presence and abandon themselves to a common direction, a new will comes into existence which is a different individual from the personal wills.

This difference shows itself, on the one hand, in certain releases of energies and, on the other hand, in certain inhibitions. The releases are along the impulsive tendencies which have to do with the common object. New levels of energy are tapped by the intensity of the common abandon. With this goes the absence of any sense of personal responsibility. Inhibitions are swept away which have held these tendencies in age-long subjection. With the impulsive releases, there go, on the intellectual side, greater suggestibility and credulity along the common direction. These may even take the form of social illusions and hallucinations under intense conditions. With the releases, too, there follow the emotional elation of invincible power and the feeling of intolerance and dictatorialness as regards any interference with the realization of the heightened

tendency—a dogmatism which is only equaled by the suggestibility and mobility within the accepted direction. The same impulse, which releases the tendencies that are germane to its success, closes the channels which are antagonistic, so far as the fitness of the end itself, with the means it involves, wins unqualified approval. What in the usual enumeration seem conflicting and unrelated qualities thus become functions of the same conative control.

Whether we take social fusions, therefore, from the intuitional point of view of the participant or of the analysis of the spectator, we must recognize that they are not mere collections of individual entities, but that, on the contrary, they very much exaggerate the facts of interest and unity as we find them in personal experience. From the point of view of psychology we must, therefore, take account of social minds as being distinct from personal and as having their own characteristics.

We have dwelt particularly on the phenomena of fusion, because they seemed to furnish the most important case for our purpose. But we might have taken other characteristics. In short, whatever can be said of so-called individual minds in the way of characteristics can be said of the social mind. It is uniquely selective in the particular situation and so can be treated as a subject. It has its own identity of traits from moment to moment and from age to age. It has its own unique type of unity, whether external or internal—association by contiguity or purposive coherence. We must recognize its own degree of freedom or restraint under varying situations, according as it acts out its own character or is the victim of external circumstances. Instead of the analogy of the organism, therefore, we would substitute the analogy of the individual as known to us through psychological analysis. This analogy can be worked out into such detail that we believe that whatever reality can be accorded to the abstract particular mind can be accorded to the social mind.

Another way of approaching the reality of the social mind is from the practical relations which it invites or which it makes obligatory upon us. We have to deal in a very different way with a social group from the way in which we deal with single individuals.

As a member of a family, a state or a church we have to deal with a man differently from what we deal with him in his abstract isolation. We must take account of the common bond of which he is a part, of a larger will which will approve or resent the conduct toward a member as a conduct toward its own united self. Except for this respect for group solidarity, history, both personal and national, would be written entirely otherwise from what it is now. From our own practical dealings, therefore, we can gain insight into the reality of the social mind, as we thus gain insight into the individual. We must apply our pragmatic principle that social minds are real, if we must take them as real in the practical situations of life. What does the business of human life reveal? What is implied in our fundamental attitudes, our practical faith toward the world? We must follow the leading of experience and regard that as real which practical human experience proves real.

Professor Royce has shown in a beautiful and convincing way how our *spontaneous loyalty* may be the means of gaining insight into reality. This is true, at any rate, in so far as we can take that reality as a social situation and can recognize its spiritual direction. Loyalty is not merely a complex of emotions, but a method of conduct, where the intention is being continually tested by its results. "The central characteristic of the loyal spirit," says Royce, "consists in the fact that it conceives and values its cause as a reality."¹ But we must examine carefully the implications of this loyalty as regards the causes which it aims to realize and which fulfil its practical and affectional intent. What causes are those that we can love, hate, and be loyal to, as genuine psychological unities? How is man's instinctive need for intimacy made objective in his environment?

In so examining the implications of our practical attitudes, we find that some involve mutual sharing or overlapping of souls—a unique common life which is something different from individuals as taken in their abstract separation, in so far as that is possible, or at any rate as taken in other social contexts. Take loyalty to friendship as an example: "Loyalty to a friendship," says Royce "involves your willingness actively and practically to create and

¹ *William James and Other Essays*, p. 71.

maintain a life which is to be the united life of yourself and your friend—not the life of your friend alone, nor the life of yourself and your friend as you exist apart, but the common life, the life above and inclusive of your distinctions, the one life that you are to live as friends.”¹ Such a sacrament of friendship, while it lasts, is indeed a new life, a spiritual person. Whether it is better or worse than either individual which enters into the fusion depends upon the dominant motive or character which is brought out in this common life.

The attitude of loyalty may be illustrated in various unities of ever-increasing concreteness—the family, the community, the class, the state, the church, etc. In each case, where there is the concrete spirit of loyalty, we have faith in, and evidence of, this larger unity which is something different from the loyalty to the composing individuals and where conflicts of loyalty are no longer mere individual preferences or dislikes. Family love or honor, natural patriotism, religious devotion imply spiritual unities, with the unique restraints and inspirations of a new and unique life.

We must be careful, however, not to confuse mere conventional or legal unity with the sacrament of a common life. People may be formally married without being a family; they may live in a country and even hurrah for it without any sense of its common responsibilities and ideals; they may belong to one church without entering into a unity of devotion. We must be able to trace a living consciousness of loyalty in order to be warranted in holding to one life, just as an individual is not one for inhabiting one outward skin, but for the dominant motive, which makes the various tendencies and ideas converge in one direction. Except for this his name may be *legio*.

Again we must be careful to distinguish potential unity from actual. We may hope that there may be a thoroughgoing spiritual unity of the English-speaking nations; and such possibility seems indeed to be more than a dream. The unity of humanity is at best a remote potential unity—an abstract ideal which we hope to make concrete in the long ages. It lacks at present both the outside and

¹ William James and Other Essays, p. 73.

visible form and the inward and spiritual grace of one spiritual person. As regards our unity with nature, whatever growing sense of co-operation there may be between the army of scientists who try to write its story, nature itself seems to lack the qualifications for entering into sympathetic social union with man.

It is different with the religious unity. Here, indeed, our loyalty implies both sentimentally, and, in its practical results, a companionship, not only as a communion of the faithful, but as a union with the divine object of worship—the more and better of our ideal nature. A creative union is implied in all genuine religious loyalty of which creeds and forms are mere symbols. In true religious devotion there arises a new trinity, the divine mind meeting our mind in a new bond, where indeed the higher in ourselves is brought into significant and fruitful relief. This is merely intensified, not more real nor more worshipful, in the diffuse mystic states.

Anarchism is wrong both as a psychology and as a practical estimate of human nature. We are more than separate units. We live only as we overlap, as we fuse with other souls in common pursuits and interests. We are literally members one of another. This common sacramental life must be safeguarded from the accidents of human history, whether from indifference and disintegration within or from selfish manipulation from without. No ideal realization can be even conceived apart from social relations, though such striving may be out of tune with human temporal conditions and may find its only sympathetic complement and inspiration in the divine Socius.

The social mind, further, must be real because in our moments of critical evaluation—as well as in our spontaneous loyalty—it can be judged as a moral being, i.e., it is subject to praise and blame, not as a collection, but as an individual character or type. Individually we may admire the members of a nation which we condemn as a group. Again and again we have to censure our neighbor for what he is in his larger social capacity—a saloon-keeper, a political grafter—though in his narrower social circles we have no fault to find with him.

The evaluation which we place upon a social mind, such as a nation, differs with different periods of a nation's development.

In one period of a nation's development it is power which furnishes the dominant motive of a nation's life. Considerations of the claims of other unities in such a period have no weight. Fear of consequences is the only restraint on its self-assertion. At this very time we find plenty of instances where the love of power is dominant and where weaker nations can be protected, if at all, only by a combination which inspires fear. The dismemberment of African Turkey is an instance where the restraint of fear did not exist; and the averting of a European war over the spoils was due merely to a combination of powers which made the conflict too dangerous to the would-be contestants.

Sometimes the commercial motive is the dominant one, and at the present time it is often the deeper motive which underlies the conflict over spheres of influence. Such a motive, when it dare not force territory, may force upon a weaker nation its products—sometimes injurious products as in the case of the opium traffic in the Orient.

Sometimes the dominant motive is material comfort, which soon degenerates into internal weakness and debauchery. This is the most debasing of all motives in society as in individuals, and soon leads to decay and dissolution, even if external causes do not bring the existence of such a state to an end.

The motives of which we have spoken so far are not ethical. They may be non-moral, when they have no moral sentiment for a background. They become immoral when a society violates its better consciousness of fitness and right. Nations, however, like individuals may be dominated by a moral motive, even if this motive is not clear and distinct. There is at the present time a powerful idealistic undercurrent in many a nation which sometimes comes into the focus of its activity and dominates its conduct. The reforms going on within various nations for equal rights before the law, for mutual service as between classes of society, in a word for internal democracy of life, are signs of how vigorous this ethical consciousness is at the present time. Nor are signs wanting of an ethical consciousness as between nations. The settling of an impending war between the two sister-nations of Sweden and Norway by means of the discussion and recognition of fraternal claims

instead of by arms; the policy of fair play instituted by John Hay as regards the Orient and its powerful international effect; the pending of general arbitration treaties as between nations—all show the deeper idealism of our day, however much it is sometimes obscured by passion and prejudice and however easy is the relapse to the primitive impulsive levels. Just because the ethical consciousness of the nation is so recent, relapse is still to be feared, especially in the absence of any other effective sanction than national and concerted international force. There are, however, unmistakable signs of the spread of an international democracy outwitting political states, especially in the growing consciousness of the international solidarity of education, of labor, of capital, of justice. This is greatly assisted, as between the English-speaking nations, by the ties of kinship of institutions and blood.

The motives in these days of complex life are of course mixed. And it is not always easy for the critic, and it is still more difficult for the agent, to realize which motive is uppermost. In the blindness of human nature and the glamor of primitive passion, we often misjudge our motives as nations, as well as individuals. What we want to do intensely easily comes to seem to ourselves a question of right, and not of primitive irrationality. And as spectators, we may easily be blinded by our own national prejudices in judging another national consciousness. At any rate, the very attempt on the part of nations today to make their conduct, as regards both internal and external relations, *seem* ethical to the spectator shows the growing power of the ethical motive.

I might have selected the family or the community instead of the nation in illustrating this judgment of motives on the part of social minds. The nation, however, has the advantage of staging this consciousness in the large. And right now it has the advantage of a greater sense of reality as shown in the intense nationalism which prevails at present both in the dealings with the rest of the world and in dealings with internal problems. The family consciousness has not shown corresponding development. The family in trying to pass from the primitive bonds of dependence and vested authority to the ethical stage is in a serious state of disintegration. In spite of the ancient character of this social bond, the attempt

to apply ethical standards is comparatively recent. And even now the light manner in which the family is treated by one part of humanity and the attempt by another part to enforce an artificial unity in violation of all fundamental moral claims shows that the ethical consciousness is far from thorough.

The community consciousness, especially the city community, has made tremendous progress in recent years from the mere collective, *laissez faire* ideal and that of non-moral motives such as numbers and wealth to a more idealistic level of dealing squarely with internal problems for the good of the whole community. More and more the sense of responsibility has increased; and with it has come corresponding simplification and organization of the institutional instruments of the community. A new soul is being born, at least in a number of instances—the community soul.

The church is passing through a similar transition from a traditional consciousness to a consciousness of thoughtful ethical valuation of its life and functions. It is no longer a case of mere loyalty to a past, however glorious and sacred, with its host of witnesses, but there is a deepening sense of responsibility to the cause of righteousness as made concrete in the whole range of human problems. Loyalty to linguistic symbols and aesthetic forms is becoming secondary to the desire for improvement and democracy in our human relations. With this goes a larger sympathy and sense of unity between the different religious communions in the service of a common ideal.

THE COMPLEXITY OF SOCIAL MIND

When it comes to the complexity of social reactions, William James, even if dealing with the problem from the point of view of individualistic psychology, is strikingly true to the facts: "A person generally shows a different side of himself to each one of different groups. Many a youth, who is demure enough to his parents and teachers, swears and swaggers like a pirate among his tough young friends. We do not show ourselves to our children as to our club companions, to the customers as to the laborers we employ, to our own masters and employers as to our intimate friends. From this there results what is practically a division of

the man into several selves."¹ These several selves, however, must not be taken as entities, limited to one body. They are rather social intersection points, different types of social continuities. The various social situations cut the personal selves in different planes; they liberate, and make confluent, different levels of tendency and so produce different controls and fusions.

In contrast with the creative physical situation, which is apparently exclusive of other situations, so that the chemical element can figure in only one situation at a time, the social unities are interpenetrative; they are not spatially and temporally exclusive. The same instinctive center may and does figure in a large number of social minds at the same time, even though one of these may give the dominant tone for the time being. This makes life vastly more complex than the old individualistic atomism could grasp. This also makes it of momentous significance in what social situations the instinctive center of mind figures. We must try to create and control social situations, in order that we may emerge with the desired social atmosphere. And the more responsive mind is to such social confluences, the more jealously we must guard the social situations, with their soul, since they largely make the individual soul. Enthusiasm and abandon, such as youth alone is capable of, mean the most complete making-over, moral or immoral, refined or gross, of the unstable individual center. We can see the brutality of the arena, the association with Lincoln, the image of the Christ in every feature of the exposed soul. And the individual if he knows himself must say, I am no longer I, my past mind, but the social mind to which I abandoned myself, which I helped to create, but which has more truly created me.

It must not be forgotten that our classifying these social minds as religious, political, etc., is merely a matter of abstract genera. *Each* social situation has its own unique mind, which persists with its individual traits, and interpenetrates into the further flow of life. Here, too, we must get over our abstractness and come back to first things. And here again we must select and guard, not the genus merely, but the soul of the individual occasion with its creative and persistent life. There is not religion, but religious

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, I, 293.

situations, each with its soul, as unique in its origin as it is lasting, once it is brought into existence. Into whatever new contexts the abstract individuals may enter, they carry the atmosphere with them, more or less, of the social minds thus originated. These cumulate, more or less effectively, as part of the individual and social structure and so condition our reactions in the future social situations into which we may enter. The actions of individuals will be restrained or set free by virtue of this coexistence and interpenetration of social unities of which they are a part. Thus the dramatic religious situation, like a pervasive melody, still holds them, perhaps in their workaday business, perhaps in their play, so as to modify and control their conduct. The conduct of the individual must be written largely as the result of the conflict, interaction, and subordination of these social minds, which interpenetrate in his life. Self-conscious personality itself seems little more than the making explicit, and volitionally effective, this clashing and subordination of social values, good or bad. The ancients felt a spirit for each situation in nature, a continuous presence with which they must deal, friendly or unfriendly. We must at least learn to find this creative presence in our social situation and learn to control its value and thereby control our own individual value.

Since social continuities intersect individual centers in an indefinite number of planes; since, moreover, once created, they tend to persist and interpenetrate in a cumulative life, we can see that social minds are vastly more numerous than personal minds. The same person, so-called, belongs in an indefinite number of unities, more or less distinct, more or less persistent, but never quite disappearing.

How many social unities an individual comes to recognize in his loyalty or his aversion depends upon his instinctive qualifications, on the one hand, and the range of social stimuli, on the other hand. The former are largely constant in the race. It is the latter which vary. But if they vary, they are also to some extent under our control. We are reminded of a friend of Lincoln who sent his secretary to Lincoln just to stay there for a time and who said on the man's return, "I can see it, you have been with Lincoln."

The number, extent, and range of social minds cannot be estimated merely from the unities which we actually do acknowledge or are loyal to at any one time. We must estimate such realities, as we estimate the realities of the physical world, from the extent and kind of situations which we can and must acknowledge in the course of our individual and racial development. The abstract individual, when unmindful of this living relation within different social minds, becomes himself a specialized social abstraction, as is so often the case in our modern division of labor.

If the social continuities intersect individuals in various planes, within which the individual must discover his meaning, it is also true that a personal will may come to dominate the whole current of a social history. The great personalities of history stamp upon their social period their creative faith. Whole eras rightly bear the name of some great genius who thus focuses and in a measure directs the stream of history which runs through him and carries him onward. And so we speak of a Copernican era, a Napoleonic era, a Darwinian era, etc.

In the evolution of social minds, as in the case of individual, nature seems to strive, in the midst of the fluctuations, to develop and preserve certain distinct *types*—types of race mind, of national mind, of family minds, of religious minds, etc. The Hebrew mind is a distinct entity from the Greek mind, as shown in the genius of its creativeness. But the Hebrew mind itself is a unification of similar tribal types. The various Protestant denominations are merging into a more general type with a fusion of differences as contrasted with the distinct Catholic type of Christianity. This tendency to fix clear and distinct types of ideals goes on until some fresh social contact starts anew this process of give and take, or some genius with strong will creates a new mutation, which in turn must run the gauntlet of survival. Periods of mutation, moreover, and periods of simplification seem to follow each other in a certain rhythm in history. The growing uniformity of the Middle Ages is followed by the creative richness of the Renaissance and the Reformation.

While we are likely to look upon social minds as merely transitive, as vanishing with the situation from which the individuals

emerge, they obey the same laws of cumulative interpenetration as particular minds. The former may have the greater permanency; and in the midst of the vicissitudes and the coming and going of abstract individuals, they may continue their living reality—not merely the outward form—from generation to generation in the nation, the family, the community, the church, etc. Here, too, there is a survival struggle for dominance. Neither in individual nor in social history is the conservation of values indiscriminate and absolute. In the successive overlapping, as well as in simultaneous fusion, there is emphasis and obsolescence; some factors count for more. Some motif dominates the melody of each historic stream. Thus perished a large part of Greek civilization because the interest had shifted. This motif may persist generation after generation, guiding or prejudicing the current of life. Nor is the social mind, once it exists, dependent upon the individual factors involved in its creation. While individual minds are necessary conditions at the birth, yet the social mind is something more than the abstract individuals. It has a unique reality of its own. This may continue to exist independently of individual bearers, carried on physically by the manuscript, marble, tools, etc., but imbedded and swept on all the while in the evolutionary process of the universe. We may as finite histories connect with it after a long interval of time. Yet when we come upon it, or are enveloped by it, we must recognize its uniqueness, its reality, as it enters into living relation with ourselves, even as our experiences before going to sleep connect with our waking life. It may again sway our conduct, as the Greek mind did the Renaissance, even though it has been as buried as the civilization of the Hittites. Thus social divisions of mind may be functionally reunified as are sometimes divided individual minds.

Again social minds awaken and come to a recognition of their own meaning in the stresses and strains of experience as do individual minds. Dormant patriotism bursts into passionate loyalty, the feeling of family love and honor into its devoted sacrifice. Over vast stretches of time the social consciousness awakes and discovers its own fundamental direction in the stream of historic change and cries: Be Hebrew, be Greek, be British.

This has tremendous practical significance. The spirit of the nation or the institution—its identity and evolution—is not a mere fiction. It is the living creative process in which individual minds are bathed and without which they are abstractions. This psychic unity may be more real and permanent than biological heredity. It constitutes an important survival condition of the latter. It furnishes the real basis for the communion of the saints, for the sacramental relation of the present with the past by means of which the present becomes more than flesh of its flesh—it becomes soul of its soul in living vital continuity, as it contributes to the growth of this social mind and incarnates its meaning.

It is not uncommon for a social mind which has reached its maturity under its own historic conditions to be grafted by imitation upon a new people. Thus the religious mind of the ancient Hebrews has been grafted upon the Teutons, until their own primitive religion seems foreign to them. It must, however, be noticed that the mind thus grafted, while it has continuity with the past, comes to have a new consciousness, becomes a new social mind; the fruit has a new flavor, however faithful in many ways to the original type.

It has been laid down by Tarde as a law that collective imitation proceeds from within outward. That means that ideas and sentiments are imitated before outward forms. The reverse of this would seem to be the law, at any rate on the conventional level of imitation. The African chieftain has imitated the dress coat without any conception of European ideas. The Goths imitated the external forms of politics and religion, long before they could enter into the spirit of the ideas of the civilization which they supplanted. The immigrant imitates our clothes and manners, before he understands our language. The Japanese have imitated the militarism and commercialism of the Occident, but the religious, artistic, and ethical ideals of the West have had comparatively little influence upon them. On the conventional level, whether in the case of individuals or groups, we imitate what has prestige. It is different on the rational level. Here social minds, like individuals, imitate discriminately, with reference to intrinsic values instead of external associations. It is in this analytical way that Japan is

imitating Western science and hygiene, whatever their national prejudices in general may be. The conventional, non-reflective type, however, still largely dominates even civilized nations. Hence the craze for fashions and dreadnoughts.

Social minds have their own consciousness of familiarity as have individual minds. In fact the category of identity is primarily a social category and only secondarily a category of individual consciousness. We recognize our common memories. We feel a coziness in each other's presence as contrasted with the novelty of the first meeting. In the midst of the differences we recognize the sameness; and welcome or reject this past in accordance with its own value and its setting within intervening experiences. The mere fact of having a common country or even the use of a common language may give us an intense sense of familiarity when we meet in a strange environment.

We have particularly a strong sense of ease and security when we move within the traditions of the past, when we recognize the old landmarks within the journey of our social thinking. The strength of this tone of familiarity is especially strong on its negative side. The new discoveries, suggestions, and hypotheses upset society. They call forth bitter attacks. They jeopardize the individual's position and social standing, if no longer his life. The vehemence of the resentment is in proportion to the momentousness of the issues involved. It is strongest where the religious sentiment is brought into play, which may be by very remote and external associations, as in the case of the Copernican and Darwinian upheavals. Hence the wise innovator strives to relate the new to the old, to put conventional humanity at ease by making them recognize the identity in the growth—the fulfilment of the law and the prophets. And so in a time of political unrest, the would-be reformers fall back upon the Lincolnian ideals.

Social minds, too, fuse, even as individual minds, and in accordance with the same laws. Here, also, there is the inhibition of certain factors by the dominance of certain other factors. Here, too, the intensity of affirmation on the part of one factor gives character to the new and larger social unity. Here, also, the volume of the suggestion in a certain direction tends to sweep

away inhibitions. It is hard for a small group to retain its individual characteristics within a large one, unless it can maintain an artificial isolation. This may be an isolation from communication as in mountainous regions or a psychological isolation as in the case of persecution.

It has long been recognized that social minds may overlap in a hierarchy of greater and greater comprehensiveness. Just as the family includes abstract individuals, so families are included within communities, communities within states, and states may figure in larger schemes of industrial, educational, and military co-operation. For Hegel the history of humanity is a unity inclusive of states; and this history again is but the temporal staging of the eternal life of the absolute. For Fechner the earth soul is a more comprehensive soul than the various souls which are part of our sphere and in turn this exists within galaxies of souls until we reach the inclusive soul of the universe.

Two points must be kept in mind in such generalizations of social minds. In the first place, we must be careful to follow the lead of experience. If social mind means the conscious abandon of minds to a common direction, we cannot even now speak of humanity as one social unity, even though possible in the future. When we come to nature, as for instance our earth, our definition of social mind seems still less applicable. We fall here into vague impersonal abstractions. Analogies of any definite kind fail us. In so far as they are applicable, they seem to point the other way. As the movements of the earth are mathematically simple and stereotyped, they correspond at best to the habitual and automatic in our experience. A large part of the earth does not give evidence of mentality at all, and there is no reason, therefore, to suppose that the earth as a whole or any galaxies of cosmic masses have minds corresponding to them.

In the second place, we must remember that passing from a smaller to a more comprehensive unity is not a merely quantitative affair. It is not a case of the mere shifting of attention or perspective, so as to bring within attention larger and larger fields which existentially are one continuum of statically related facts. The "compounding" of minds is creative, not merely a case of more

extensive awareness. Each social situation, like each chemical compound, must be understood as such and empirically. So with each recompounding of social unities. They mean new social minds with new properties. This does not mean that they are private. They can be understood and predicted in their creative interactions, but they must be understood *a posteriori*. Each social mind is a unique result of fusing impulses, not a mere intellectual map which can be passed over in smaller or larger relations at will. In his theory of the recompounding of consciousness, William James, following Fechner, seems to hold that smaller fields can be taken over into larger in a purely neutral way, it making no difference to the inner nature of the smaller configurations that they are thus taken over and pooled in the larger mind. While he relied on the subconscious and mystical for this taking-over, instead of relying on logical implication as has that speculative idealism which he combated to the end, yet he seems to agree with the latter doctrine that the case of the separation of the smaller from the larger field amounts, on the part of the smaller, merely to the shifting of the threshold of attention, while on the part of the larger it means a taking-over and coexistence of the smaller within its comprehensive perspective of relationships. Both of these conditions—the receding of the threshold and the taking-over—he believes to be illustrated pre-eminently by religious experience of which mysticism is for him the most characteristic type. In a small way, it is illustrated by our ordinary taking-over of smaller fields, as when for example the dog's experience in our library is taken over into our significant relationships.

This view of mind assumes that mind consists of intellectual constellations of content which can be taken over again and again and whose fringes only carry us into further external relations such as the widening fields of memory. It neglects the deeper side of mind, that of volitional energy. While we may state mind, as we have seen, in terms of fusion, it must be in terms of creative volitional fusion, not merely in terms of sensations and ideas. This does not mean that experience is made up of absolute private circles of consciousness, as James himself at one time seemed to hold, but it means that mental situations like all energetic situa-

tions must be understood empirically and that prediction is possible only as we learn a posteriori to abstract certain constant and controlling factors in recurring similar situations. A social mind is not a mere taking-over of the abstract individual contents *a*, *b*, *c*, etc., as blocks with a new external context. It means a new volitional unity which must be understood as such. And if there is a more comprehensive social mind, such as the divine mind, here too, as indeed is known in our religious consciousness, we have not merely a neutral recompounding of our finite minds in a larger constellation, such as our external mathematical perspectives have made us familiar with; but we have a unique creative synthesis which must be appreciated as such and cannot be stated as merely an extension of our workaday unities. Whether it is sincere prayer, or solemn moral tightening, or mystical elation, the man of this world knows it not except in an external way. It cannot be translated into content of eye and ear nor into the narrow categories of the worldly heart, though it is perfectly understandable by those who have entered into the divine communion themselves. You might as well try to resolve love into pressure, motor and vascular sensations to the man who has not experienced it, as try to recompound the worldly man into the religious consciousness. In either case, what is recompounded is but the superficial intellectual aspect of the situation, not its deeper volitional and emotional value. The creative view of situations, with its implied empiricism as regards knowledge, must be maintained throughout the hierarchy of mind. The larger mind may intersect the individual centers at a different level from that of the less extensive social minds. The dominant direction or interest may be different. While within the national mind the smaller group-minds, such as families and neighborhoods, must overlap in a certain respect, there may be temporary conflicts. War sacrifices the family. Sectional interests are sometimes brought into jeopardy by the national will. In any case a compound of compounds does not in the case of society, any more than in chemistry, need to mean a summing-up of the characteristics of the smaller units.

The unity of the Absolute, if it exists, is so intimate and solvent that all other minds, individual and social, are merged into its

one field, be that logical or aesthetic. The Absolute tolerates no unities but its own. The others are fragments at best of what a fuller insight reveals as one and unique. It gives rise to only one immense fusion. Our failure to know this completely, we are told, is merely a limitation of our attention. The field is eternally complete. In our practical life, however, we must recognize a number of individual fusions in which we must empirically share in various degrees and in various bonds in order to live life reasonably and efficiently.

Inclusion within a social unity, finally, does not mean that everything pertaining to the factors within the group is shared. As in the fusion of contexts within the particular mind only the relevant aspects enter into the fusion, so in the fusion of individuals. The common level of intersection, in any one case, necessarily leaves out much which may be precipitated in other situations. And in the larger groups, like a nation, within which many smaller groups, such as families, neighborhoods, etc., overlap, many opinions and characteristics remain unique to the smaller groups. It is not only the extent which is different, the basis of fusion is different. But some overlapping there must be. Some common characteristics, however thin, some common traditions and sentiments, some common symbols must exist. The group mind also, like the particular person, must, in order to rise to self-consciousness have a name, by means of which it can set itself over against its non-ego—other group minds or it may be refractory persons.

THE MORALITY OF SOCIAL MINDS

The moral question, as we have already intimated, is a different one from the question of the psychological fusion of individuals into new unities. We must estimate the larger persons, as we estimate the smaller, in terms of the ideal requirements which we bring to their dominating purposes. The mere fact of social unities being larger does not necessarily make them ethical. More comprehensive class unities, such as labor or capital or military co-operation, may be stimulated by a negative rather than by positive loyalty—by the pressure of common danger rather than by the articulate consciousness of the common good. So far from

loyalty itself being a criterion of value, the ethical problem is generally an evaluation of loyalties. Social unities, in order to be ethical, must have for us the consciousness of being ultimately worth while, of being a clear and distinct resolving of claims.

In the past *there* have been two opposite attitudes as regards the morality of the social group. Some have held that the crowd is always immoral. For them only individuals in their abstract and reflective capacity can be regarded as the subjects of moral judgments. This view confuses the crowd with the mob. The mob is always immoral, because it means the dominance of the lower primitive instincts and the inhibition of the later instincts and intellectual processes. But the group may be deliberative and self-conscious. It may pursue articulate ideals. Even when the unity is instinctive and emotional it may be the confluence and reinforcement of the ideal tendencies of human nature rather than of the primitive. The social mind may mean an enthusiastic loyalty to a great cause. It may mean self-forgetfulness for family welfare or patriotic sacrifice for country. It may mean a deeper and richer sacramental communion with God than the individual is capable of in his abstract capacity. The worth of the social unity must be determined by the worth of its cause and its relation to other causes, not by any specific type of consciousness. It may be better than the individual in his separate capacity. In the end, moreover, all ethical value is social, is bound up with social relations. There is no goodness in the abstract. Individual morality is potential—what we have a right to expect in social relations.

It has been held, on the other hand, that loyalty to the social and institutional, in ever-widening circles, constitutes morality. The supreme command according to Royce is: Be loyal. Royce, like Hegel, takes for granted that the more concrete unity always brings out the more ideal element in human nature. In the conflict of loyalties, therefore, the more comprehensive loyalty must be maintained. In terms of Hegel's optimism, this meant the adoption of the Prussian state of his day and the Hegelian type of absolute idealism.

There is, of course, a great deal of truth in the attitude that the social is the moral—the concrete personal supplementation within

the group. Often at least the abstract human relations are synonymous with the immoral. At any rate the converse, we have seen, viz., that the moral must in the long run be the social, must always hold. There can be no private morality. But social minds like individual have various degrees of ethical worth. Some of them are non-moral, some of them are immoral. If the social were always the moral, the problem of boys' gangs, of questionable clubs, of lynching mobs, of political Tammanies, would not be so serious as it is now. Some social minds, like some individual minds, need to be stamped out. Social loyalty may be mistaken. Sometimes the individual is wiser than society. Organized society stoned the ancient prophets, gave Socrates the hemlock, crucified Jesus, and burned Bruno. Yet these indicated the direction of history. The social must not, at any rate, be taken as static and isolated. It must be taken in its historic movement. The moral life consists not merely in loyalty to that which exists. It does not signify merely the conservation of past value. It includes also criticism and desire for improvement—the striving to create new types of values—higher unities whether of higher quality or of greater extensity. Individualization and generalization both have their place in social progress.

Beside the commandment to be loyal, we must, therefore, add another commandment: Be creative. Loyalty must not be blind. It must be accompanied by selection and criticism, a passion for improvement, a striving to make real your individual insight. And with the reaction, the insight grows. We seem to recollect the supra-individual life which lies about and envelops us, from the dreamy infancy of the race, through its age-long struggle for meaning and freedom. This commandment looks toward the future as the other looks toward the past. It lays stress upon the contribution made by the individual will. It urges each of us: Help in the measure you can, whether great or small, to make clear and distinct the human relations of the changing world, of which you are a part. Do your part to produce greater harmony of claims in the midst of our human complexity. If we are intersection points in enveloping and overlapping social minds, we are at any rate not mathematical points, but dynamic points—centers of initiative.

We can give and take. We help create the atmosphere, the *Weltgeist*, which for better or worse reacts in turn upon us. It is our common impulse forward, our common faith in the future, our common willingness to risk, which creates the tension that selects and inspires our type of leaders, whether demagogues or statesmen, charlatans or prophets. It is our common sentiment, which elevates or corrupts. Without our common faith the prophet can do nothing. The Sophist and political grafter are but symptoms of a diseased or unorganized social mind.

If the law of loyalty makes us sharers in the great, warm living stream of humanity, past and present, the law of creativeness makes us a part of the eternal direction of the universe—prophetic of the kingdom of heaven. Furthermore, it is only through this individual endeavor, this travail and sacrifice to make ourselves creatively a part of the human stream, that we can gain true insight into the social heritage, the drift of history, and thus make our loyalty rational and significant, instead of being a mere blind imitation—an intolerant conservatism which builds the tombs of the prophets, but crucifies those that are sent.

Social minds, like individual minds, may become immortal, not only as impersonal influences in the stream of history but as individual souls, when they embody permanent and universal purposes; when they express, clearly and distinctly, essential human types. Thus the Greek mind, the Hebrew mind, the Roman mind, the mediaeval mind remain as living vitalizing unities in spite of the vicissitudes and changes of temporal events. In their spiritualized bodies of language, tradition, art, science, institutions, and religious symbols, they continue to live an individual life. And in the enveloping historic process, with its growth and unification, they continue to contribute their vital energy long after the temporal individuals, who once were their bearers, have passed from the scene. Social minds, as individuals, are subject to the law of survival. They persist by no external fiat, but by their capacity for leading and for furnishing permanent objects of appreciation. Whether they shall live forever in the changing cosmic weather depends upon whether they are unique embodiments of an eternally significant idea, the incarnation of a divine insight.

THE NEW ENGLAND CONSCIENCE

A STUDY IN MORAL PERCEPTION

LOUIS WALLIS

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The development of American public opinion with reference to the "social problem" during the last twenty years has been so remarkable that an attempt to diagnose its present condition from the standpoint of psychological sociology may be in order. It is hardly too much to say that the American mind is now undergoing a revolution comparable to that which marked the rise of Protestantism at the opening of modern history. The new spiritual order of things may not have entirely "arrived"; but its outlines are in sight; and the services of a prophet are hardly necessary to indicate the direction in which society is tending.

At the outset, we hazard the proposition that American society has even now *ceased to produce moral and social leaders whose chief emphasis falls upon the "individual" in the campaign against sin*. What we mean is, that the moral censor of twenty years ago cannot command his former hearing: he is unable to get into the spotlight. There are even yet, of course, plenty of the older type who speak from obscure platforms; but the nation has at least moved this far from its ancient moorings: it will admit no new leader to the franchise of national confidence who undertakes to point a moral by using the shortcomings of any individual as the whole text or pretext of his argument!

If specifications are wanted before we proceed, they can be readily supplied by running over the outstanding aspects of American life for the last two decennia. Twenty years ago, we were a nation of rank individualists; and if we have not wholly graduated from the swaddling clothes of that philosophy, we are at least ready for a change of garments. In politics, not long ago, the popular cry was "The Trusts!" by which we really meant certain individuals

who were supposed to have the power to fashion the world at their own pleasure. It was this state of mind which made possible the meteoric rise of Mr. Bryan to fame. Mr. Roosevelt, at the same time, was vigorously at work in another quarter of the political horizon, denouncing the "boss" as the root of all evil. But today both of these gentlemen have outgrown their earlier standpoints; and if neither of them has yet matured a coherent program, they have at least "progressed." In politics now, the cry is for "social justice," and investigation of the fundamental monopolies which underlie business.

On the industrial side of life, the ruling tendency among the foremost men twenty years ago was to assume that financial success is due *solely* to the element of individual initiative. The factory owner, the railroad president, and the banker were fond of telling how they began as poor boys and worked their way up the ladder. The prevailing impression was that any poor boy with "push" could become rich. But today this is decidedly a thing of the past. And while it may be true that the business man has not yet had time to study economics and sociology, his consciousness of the industrial situation is modified; and he is learning to take up a different standpoint. "The rich man," says Frederick Harrison, "is simply the man who has managed to put himself at the end of a long chain, or into the center of an intricate convolution, and whom society and law suffer to retain the joint product conditionally." This truth is gradually forcing its way into the mind of the business world. Bellamy states it even more clearly: "All that man produces today more than did his cave-dwelling ancestors, he produces by virtue of the accumulated achievements, inventions, and improvements of the intervening generations, together with the social and industrial machinery which is their legacy. . . . Nine hundred and ninety-nine parts out of the thousand of every man's produce are the result of his social inheritance and environment."

From the point of view of religion, the change is equally startling. Twenty years ago the prevailing gospel was a kind of propaganda for the redemption of the world by spiritual arithmetic through the simple addition of "saved souls" to the communion of the saints. Society was viewed as a mere crowd composed of "individuals."

To save society, you merely had to rescue the constituent units. This theory found expression in the popular hymn:

Throw out the life-line across the dark wave;
There is a brother whom someone should save.

Its foremost representative was, perhaps, Dwight L. Moody, the famous evangelist. This admirable and worthy lay preacher was approaching the close of a remarkable career. He had put stress upon the old-fashioned "simple gospel," and was innocent of all compromise with sociology. In his later evangelistic tours, it began to be apparent that the public was not giving its old response to the gospel appeal. Mr. Moody himself was forced to note that his audiences were not simply "people," but certain *kinds* of people. Speaking on one occasion in New York City where the "Labor Temple" now stands, he was unable to draw a large audience from the local population; but going uptown he attracted plenty of auditors from the middle and well-to-do classes. Moody was big enough not to be embittered by such experiences; but they made him thoughtful. One sign of his outreach toward new things was his invitation to the higher critic George Adam Smith (then of the Free Church Collegè, Glasgow) to speak to the Moody School at Northfield. He said to this scholar: "Explain to me briefly what the higher criticism is"; and after listening for awhile he asked: "What's the use of telling the people there are two Isaiahs, when most of them don't even know there was one?"

Two eras confronted each other in the persons of these men. Mr. Moody was perplexed by the new biblical scholarship, and saddened by the alienation of the working classes from the church and religion. In the meanwhile, the advance of higher criticism was rapid and steady. At the present time, the leading theological seminaries of most Protestant denominations in America and Europe have been reorganized around a new view of the Bible and of religion. The younger ministers and the more progressive clergy are profoundly influenced by the reconstruction of theological thought. The religious process today is distracting, because, along with the rise of higher criticism, there has come a shifting of emphasis from personal salvation to the "social gospel." The development of thought, instead of being simple, is a very complex

matter. There is acute spiritual distress at present, because the nature of the process going on around us is not clearly in evidence. To many minds, it seems as if all the old landmarks have been swept away. The constructive aspects of the newer scholarship are not yet in full sight; but every day brings us nearer to a positive issue. The advocates of old-school theology, of course, take a merely personal view of the situation: Our troubles, they think, are caused by certain scholars who have led this generation astray. But no man can *cause* a great historic movement, such as that going on around us in religion. What we may do is to guide and control the inevitable. The older theology looked upon the Bible and its religion as having been projected into human history like a meteor from the sky. The newer theology contemplates the Hebrew-Christian religion as the outcome of a process in which conscience and morality are the central factors. "Clouds and darkness are round about Him; but righteousness and justice are the foundation of His throne." It would be inaccurate to say that theological scholars are unanimously conscious of the sociological meaning of higher criticism in the technical sense. Yet they are becoming more aware of it every day, as criticism takes its place in the wider perspective of general culture.

The assimilation of politics, economics, and religion with the "social problem" has been so gradual that we are scarcely conscious of the change in the American attitude toward "reform" in general. It needs to be recalled that when the American public of twenty or twenty-five years ago was in a reform frame of mind, it was not consciously thinking in terms of politics, economics, or religion. Reform was treated as a kind of undertaking that had no organic relation to conventional modes of human activity. The reformer's vocation was looked upon as an enterprise which could proceed independently, while existing political, industrial, and religious institutions remained standing without essential alteration. But the change which has taken place here is just as remarkable as that which is registered by other phases of American life. Reform has passed out of the individualistic into the collective stage. It is no longer viewed as an isolated matter, but is blended with all aspects of social life.

To go back twenty years, then, and approach the world of today along the lines of politics, business, religion, and reform is like taking different routes which converge toward a common center. We are no longer a nation of rank individualists; and this fact is the underlying condition of all that we do and think, whether we clearly realize it or not. Characteristic of the present social awakening is the experience of Lincoln Steffens with the problem of municipal corruption. Mr. Steffens began his investigation of city politics on the basis of individualism: certain "bosses" needed to be exposed and deposed, and then politics would be all right. The remedy for misgovernment was the election of "good, clean men." This was very simple and easy. But as the investigation went on, certain underground connections were discovered between bosses and "business." Then it became apparent that the interest of business men in politics was not to be explained merely on the theory of "individual sin": it was due to economic pressure which the uninitiated layman could not comprehend without actual experience of the facts. Political "corruption," therefore, began to take on the character of a signpost pointing to maladjustments of the social system as a whole. Then it became clear that the church was timid about handling the problem in vigorous fashion. Finally, the truth was forced into view that the moral sense of the entire community is not such a direct and infallible guide as we have taken for granted. Mr. Steffens' conclusion was that if he went much farther on the trail of political corruption, he would catch himself and all the rest of us. In brief, he had learned, through patient investigation, that what we glibly call social *problems* are merely the various phases, or aspects, of *one* fundamental problem which simply cannot be cut up into sections and solved piecemeal.

The present social awakening provides a training school for that "New England conscience" with which America started. It is the ethical discipline of us all. By "New England conscience" we refer, of course, not to a provincialism, but to a state of mind. In Great Britain, we should have to call it the "Nonconformist conscience." The moral headquarters of America were at one time situated in its northeastern section; but the Puritan sense of righteousness is now pretty well diffused over the country. The American citizen of German, or Italian, or, if you please, of African,

descent may talk with a straight face about "our heritage from our Pilgrim forefathers." We make bold to affirm that the New England conscience is not dead nor even sleeping; but that it stands at the basis of the national character, and is now struggling to adjust itself to the moral demands of today. The forefathers of our national life had strong ideas about justice, duty, morality, and right dealing between man and man. And we have no less ethical fervor than they in seeking for the "rightness" of the social problem as it unrolls before us. A striking illustration of the new national spirit, which gathers into itself all that we have been saying about the general situation, is the famous "tainted money" controversy, which flared quickly up a few years ago, and then promptly subsided. That excitement could no more be repeated today than the Civil War could be fought over again. Yet, if the Reverend Washington Gladden was right in his position, we ought to be having a continuous ethical side show in America, with "tainted money" as the leading bill of attraction.

It will be recalled that after certain officials in the Congregational churches had solicited and received from Mr. Rockefeller a contribution to their missionary board, certain ministers objected strenuously. The leading figure in the campaign of protest has reviewed the controversy in a volume of *Recollections* under the suggestive rubric "Partnership with Plunderers." Everybody might be willing to agree with him that the "tainted money" discussion "revealed a widespread need of elementary instruction in the first principles of ethics" (p. 403); but we might not be unanimous about the line along which that instruction ought to proceed. The protesting party took the ground that the money in question was not earned; that it came to the donor's hand through plunder, and not through any service that he had rendered to the community; and that the acceptance of this money by the Congregational authorities brought them into partnership with iniquity. These persons argued the case upon the assumption that the fortunes of the very wealthy are due to individual sin; and that if certain rich men would only stop sinning, a large part of the evil and corruption which exist in our politics and business would be cured straightway.¹ If

¹ Washington Gladden, *Recollections* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909), chap. xxvi, pp. 398-409.

the fundamental assumption were true, the task of the moral teacher today would be far simpler than in fact it is; and if the problem of "great wealth" could really be treated by such methods, our industrial and civic ills would be far less perplexing than they are. Dr. Gladden bears witness that he received hundreds of approving letters from all parts of the country, and that he had the emphatic support of the great audience which heard his argument at the meeting of the Mission Board in Seattle. This is no doubt true. But ethical questions are not to be decided by counting heads. The less fortunate are always in a majority, and are always jealous of those who possess a greater abundance; and this jealousy exists irrespective of the manner in which the more fortunate acquire their wealth. The applause of the multitude cannot always be identified with the verdict of absolute morality. The feelings of the people are not, of course, to be treated disrespectfully, for it is probably true that when all the facts in a given case are before the great democratic jury, *vox populi* is as near as we can come to *vox Dei*. But there is the rub: the New England conscience has not yet digested the facts of the social problem.¹

America is now struggling to adjust itself to the fact that the problem of "wealth" raises the whole subject of the system in which wealth is made. What we are facing is not a mere question of "rebates," or "combination in restraint of trade," or "plunder," or "trusts." The discussion which is now going on brings into debate the categories of property in capital and land which lie at the foundation of all business. The problem of the Steel Trust, for instance, is not to be settled by saying that its income is "tainted"; that Mr. Morgan, Mr. Carnegie, and their partners ought not to combine and raise prices; and that if they will not voluntarily cease these practices, they should be coerced by law. Let us grant, for the sake of the argument, that every dollar which the Steel Company gets for its product stands for only seventy-five cents in

¹ Part of the field indicated by this paper has been traversed in greater detail by Professor Edward A. Ross, of the University of Wisconsin, in his book *Sin and Society*. "Now, as ever," he writes, "the judgments the average man passes upon the conduct of his fellow are casual, inconsistent, and thoughtless" (p. 25). And further: "In today's warfare on sin, the reactions of the public are about as serviceable as gongs and stink-pots in a modern battle" (p. viii).

real service-value, and twenty-five cents in "exploitation," or "plunder." And let us extend the supposition to all the great industrial concerns, in order to make the argument general. Now, it is exactly this problem which the Sherman anti-trust law undertakes to meet and fails to solve. The Sherman statute is based upon the so-called "abhorrence of English law for monopoly." Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence is supposed to detest monopoly in the same mysterious way that Nature "abhors" a vacuum. This principle sounds very democratic and brave when proclaimed as a generality. But when examined in the light of history, it stands out in its real significance.

The truth is that the tainted-money philosopher does not voice a full-rounded morality. In his fight against "big" business, he represents the aggrieved moral sense of *little* business. It is the small shippers and manufacturers and storekeepers that he seeks to protect. His complaint against big business men as the chief of sinners overlooks a fundamental fact which plays havoc with his argument. If we are to admit, with him, that every dollar of big business income stands for an element of exploitation, then he, in turn, must go farther, and admit that the institutions of private proprietorship in capital and in land, upon which the entire structure of industry is founded, involve elements of exploitation. To this claim he will not fail to reply: "But how do our existing institutions of property in capital and in land spell exploitation? These institutions are *legal*. Everybody recognizes the rightfulness of private property in the machinery of wealth production and in the soil. What have these things to do with the problem of plunder?" Let us look at this question.

It is obvious that human labor did not create the earth, and that the value of land arises from either its fertility, its mineral deposits, or the presence of population. When the proprietor of a given piece of land receives rent for the use of his land, he gets money for which he does not give a return out of his own labor. There is no escaping this conclusion. It stands at the heart of all speculation in real estate. The market price of a given piece of land is the estimated amount of money on which the rent of that land will pay interest over and above taxes. The "unearned incre-

ment," about which we hear so much, is the increase in rental value of land which follows upon the growth of population. Land is purchased at a certain price, and then held for a rise. The phenomenon of land value exists not only in connection with land which can be measured and sold by the square foot; it exists wherever a franchise is granted to lay rails, or pipe lines, or to string telegraph, telephone, or electric wires over specified strips of land. Private property in land carries with it an element of exploitation which affects all business that has anything to do with land either in the form of real estate or in that of quasi-public franchises. And this is only part of the story.

All business, both big and little, is conducted by the use of tools, machinery, buildings, etc., which are technically known as "capital." There is, of course, a broad sense in which land or any form of wealth can be viewed as "capital." But from the standpoint of abstract analysis, there is a difference between land, which is not created by human labor, and *things* produced by labor for use in the operations of industry. It is in this sense that we employ the term "capital" in the present connection. Now, unless the tainted-money moralist sets up the claim that the existing proprietors of capital created that form of property out of their own labor, or got it in exchange for wealth created by their own labor, then he will be compelled to admit that private capitalism also involves an element of exploitation. The capitalists who own railroads, manufacturing plants, buildings, steamships, etc., cannot by any possibility have produced these things by their own personal labor. We, therefore, have to note two things: (1) Private ownership of capital is in itself exploitation. (2) Not only so; but capitalism considered as a process, in which the capitalist enters the field of business life with all the advantages conferred by ownership, in competition with a vast army of persons who have no capital and have only their labor to sell—this phase of capitalism brings with it a continuous exploitation by way of interest and profit.

These aspects of the property institutions which underlie and condition *all* business, big and little, are ignored by conventional morality because they are so familiar and universal. The tainted-money philosopher thinks in terms of categories which he assumes

will stand without criticism, when, as a matter of fact, the very terms of his own thought need inspection. The trust magnate in all lines of industry has gone ahead with the game and worsted the small competitor by means of property institutions which, whatever their absolute moral character, have been until recently viewed as "right" and "legitimate" by everybody. But the change from individualistic to socialized thinking makes the tainted-money philosopher more and more a lonely figure. No longer may we condemn particular individuals as the *causes* of great public problems. We must all be ready now to acknowledge our community of responsibility for the social tangle.

Our new sociological insight, however, has not yet extended far enough to dispose of the superstition that the uninstructed conscience is fully equipped unto all good works. The judgment of the conventional "good" citizen may be unwittingly as evil as that of the worst criminal. An example from the experience of our New England forefathers illustrates this. The Puritan immigration to Massachusetts in the seventeenth century brought into close contact two sharply contrasted social orders in a way which was not realized by any of the people then living in the world. On the one hand were the Indians, in the clan stage of evolution, with common property in the soil, and having no more idea of the complexities of individual private ownership of real estate than a South Sea Islander has of an electric dynamo. Over against the Indian, the God-fearing Puritan loomed up suddenly. The white man brought with him not only an objective material outfit wholly strange to the native, but an equally alien system of property-concepts based on the foundation of Roman and English jurisprudence. And the white man was as ignorant of the Indian as the native was of the white man. When the Puritans made treaties with the Indians, and undertook to purchase land in fee simple, the transaction was looked at, necessarily, from two different standpoints. To the Puritan, it was an ordinary matter of real estate business, such as took place in the home country. To the Indian, it seemed as if the foreigner were giving him a few trinkets, bits of cloth, etc., in exchange for the right to live in the land as a neighbor. From the Indian's point of view, Massachusetts was as much his country as

before. The Puritan, on the other hand, felt that he had acquired rights of proprietorship just as sacred as those of the native. Consequently, as the eastern shore filled up, and the English moved inland, war became inevitable. There was no possibility of harmonizing the divergent views of the two races. They simply did not and could not understand each other. So the Indian tried to exterminate the foreigner, and failed; and the Puritan wiped the native race from the map of New England.

Posterity has hit off the ethical paradox by saying that when the Puritans reached this country, they first fell on their knees, and then fell on the aborigines. Mr. Palfrey, the learned historian of New England, has been very careful to point out, in vindication of his ancestors, that they scrupulously "paid" the Indians for all territory which they occupied; yet, at the same time, Palfrey admits (without being conscious of the problem involved) that personal ownership of land was a conception which had not yet risen upon the mind of the Indian.¹ Thus, we see that not only were the Puritans themselves unable to perceive the situation in its true colors, but that a learned historian, more than two centuries later, was also oblivious to it. While Palfrey's history was being published (1858 *et foll.*), the New England conscience was again going astray, this time on the slavery question. The Webster party was on one side; the Sumner party was on the other; and not until the Civil War did New England succeed in adjusting itself to the moral demands of the situation.

We recall these facts in order to show that the present age is not the only time of moral perplexity and struggle in American history. The past, indeed, was no golden age, as some would fondly believe. It was marked by epochs of transition the same in principle as that in which we now find ourselves. Our ancestors were no more perfect than we are. There has been no moral decadence from an age of pristine impeccability. While we have big problems to solve, the conscience of the people is more fully awake than ever before. We are moving into a new period in which the question is not whether America is to be controlled by radicalism or by conservatism, but: Shall radicalism be controlled by sanity or by insanity?

¹ Palfrey, *History of New England* (Boston, 1858), I, 36, 37, 38; cf. III, 138; IV, 364, 419.

In spite of the progress registered by the last twenty years, it has to be confessed that the change thus far is one of general atmosphere rather than of intelligent conviction about concrete aspects of the case. Twenty years ago, we were all dead set against the so-called "criminal poor," as a matter of course. Today, we are in peril of being equally dead set against the so-called "criminal rich." We have no more right to assume that the present hue and cry after the "man higher up" is a sign of progress in moral perception than a slave-hunter would have to assume that there is any essential difference between putting bloodhounds on the track of quadroons and putting them on the scent of full-blooded Negroes. We are in danger of trying to persuade ourselves that the substitution of one kind of quarry for another constitutes a radical transformation in the nature of the hunt. At the moment this paper is being written, the president of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad is in legal toils under charge of obstructing the free course of business; and the president of the National Cash Register Company is reported to be facing a prison sentence for a similar cause. If any considerable portion of the American public thinks that the passage of laws like the Sherman anti-trust act, and the prosecution and imprisonment of corporation heads under this legislation, will meet the difficulties now before us, that section of our people is destined to have a rude awakening. If the people, through the agency of their government, begin to clap millionaires into jail for playing the game of business on the basis of property institutions which the people *themselves* do not question, then we shall present the spectacle of a nation which not only stultifies itself morally, but which also impeaches its own intelligence.

When the United States Supreme Court rendered the Dred Scott decision, the court was technically right: it was bound to interpret the law within the terms of existing statutes. Nevertheless, the decision marked the breakdown of an imposing social organ; and the crisis was resolved only by the violence of a great civil war which incidentally abolished the type of property in question. A similar breakdown is indicated by current decisions in the cases of the Standard Oil Company and other corporations coming within the purview of the Sherman law. The real trouble, of course, is not

in the Supreme Court, but in the attitude of mind which forces the passage of such legislation as the Sherman law. So far as the actual results go, the entire anti-trust campaign in the United States down to the present hour has no more relevance than the amputation of pimples as a cure for the blood disease that makes the pimples. It is mere fussy tinkering with superficialities; and the sooner people find this out, the better for all of us. Popular prejudice of the moment finds a caterer in *Hearst's*, which continues to print Mr. Archbold's private correspondence with the righteous air of producing burglars' tools in police court (how obtained is not stated). While fully conscious that he is doing business in a popular market, Mr. Hearst would no doubt be entirely obtuse to the suggestion that his reading of the Standard Oil mind is connected not remotely with his failure to qualify in the statesman class.

If the evident intention of the government to press the trust issue farther is based on the policy of stinging the national conscience into an exploration of the social system as a whole by frankly showing up the limitations of its anti-trust and anti-protection remedies, then the Wilson administration is likely to cover itself with a glory which has attached to no administration since the time of Lincoln. On the other hand, if the intention of the government is based only on the policy of revising the tariff and pressing the Sherman law to the limit, then the Wilson administration lacks the necessary qualities of political leadership, and it will presently find itself confronted by a tremendous demand for goods which, in the nature of the case, it cannot deliver. The force of conscience in human society is like that of steam in the locomotive, which is guided by the logic of the engine's mechanism and by the intelligence of the engineer. Conscience, like steam, is a good servant, but a bad master. American society today has reached the turning of the ways. It has plenty of the propelling force of conscience; and it has also accumulated a new and unused stock of social insight. The immediate future will depend upon the intelligence with which our leaders teach us to apply our insight to our conscience. Unconquerable optimism should be the faith, as it is the duty, of every patriotic man and woman. We should all do our part to see that the new social thought and policy of America shall be sane.

LESTER FRANK WARD

The men who are best qualified by their debt to Professor Ward, and by their consciousness of it, to form a just estimate of his works, shrink from the responsibility of attempting immediately a formal appreciation of his meaning for sociology. While it is too early for the estimate, at once critical and comprehensive, which those to whom Dr. Ward has been preceptor and mentor, hope to put on record after due deliberation, the following tributes will sufficiently mark the place which he has occupied in the esteem of his colleagues, among whom his primacy was always uncontested.

Professor Ward's connection with Brown University came about in a perfectly natural manner. The department of Social Sciences was deeply interested in his sociological theories and when his *Pure Sociology* first came from the press, seized the opportunity of using it as a textbook for an undergraduate class. The members of it survived but still speak in bated breath of their experience in completing the book in thirty lectures. Interest in *Pure Sociology* resulted in a simplified edition of it in 1905, *The Text Book of Sociology*. When, a little later, Dr. Ward in conversation expressed a desire to resign from governmental service in order to devote several years to literary work, a suggestion from the department to President Faunce met with his hearty sanction, so that in the fall of 1906 a new professor of sociology at Brown modestly introduced himself to his classes.

Throughout his seven years of service Professor Ward conducted three elective classes of upper classmen and graduates, easily winning their esteem and stimulating the zeal of those students eager for a broad outlook over the sociological field. In the performance of his duties he was faithful in the extreme, and impressed all by his keen intellectuality and his enormous capacity for work. As his avocations he studied the geology and botany of Rhode Island, often taking long walks of ten to fifteen miles in length. Outside of the preparation of his lectures, the material of which he

planned at some time to put into book form, his chief literary task was the preparation of the manuscript for his unique collection of twelve volumes now on the eve of publication. This great task occupied him for the better part of four years and was finally completed, even to the index, less than a year ago.

He was so absorbed in his labors that his life was necessarily a secluded one. In social intercourse, however, he was always genial and kindly, and constantly showed a deep interest in the intellectual developments of the time and the newer discoveries in the several departments of science. Owing to the illness of his wife, he spent his last four years in a college dormitory, and thereby became more closely identified with the life of the campus. This experience he thoroughly enjoyed and he became in consequence deeply attached to the university.

The news of his unexpected death brought great sorrow both to city and college. For three days the university flag was at half-mast, and at the time of his funeral the college bell was tolled and classes were suspended. The *Providence Bulletin* of April 19, in speaking editorially of him said:

A DISTINGUISHED BROWN SCHOLAR

In the seven years of his connection with the faculty of Brown University, Dr. Lester Frank Ward, who died in Washington yesterday, became a familiar figure in Providence. Of a rather unusual personal presence, he was frequently seen on the streets of the city, though most of those who noted him in his afternoon walks were unaware that he was one of the most distinguished scholars of his day and generation.

Dr. Ward was a close student, a keen observer, a prolific and perspicuous writer. He received many honors abroad as well as in this country, among them election to the presidency of the International Institute of Sociology, a body to which only a very few Americans have ever been chosen. Withal he was a man of great modesty and kindliness, and endeared himself to his students by his ability to reach their point of view and his willingness to do all in his power to assist them.

Brown University has been honored by his seven years association with its teaching force, and is measurably poorer by reason of his passing.

On June 3 the faculty of the university placed on their records the following minute in his honor:

The members of the faculty of Brown University, desirous of expressing their deep sorrow at the loss of their esteemed colleague, Professor Lester Frank

Ward, hereby place on record their appreciation of his sterling character and scholarly attainment. Coming to us near the close of a long life of severe mental exertion, he brought with him the mature results of his studies and undiminished ardor in their pursuit. His labors in botany, geology, and paleontology had been crowned with success, and his pioneer work in sociology had given him a world-wide reputation. He was a profound student, and an original investigator in the most abstruse problems with which the human mind can grapple. For seven years the faculty and students found in him a genial associate, an inspiring teacher and a sincere and unflinching seeker after truth.

From the very start Professor Ward attracted the attention and devotion of his students. At the end of his first year a loving-cup was presented to him by his classes; an undergraduate philosophical society made him a member; the *Liber*, an annual undergraduate publication, was dedicated to him in 1912; and at the announcement of his death the students voluntarily contributed a large sum for flowers to be placed on his grave. The feeling his classes held for him is well shown in the following contribution from Charles Carroll, a candidate for the Master's degree:

"Every genius is a child; every child a genius." These were almost the closing words in Dr. Ward's last lecture at Brown University. In a sense they describe the man himself—a genius with the simplicity of a child—that glorious simplicity which the Saviour of the world had in mind when he said: "Unless ye shall become as little children." But in Dr. Ward it was the simplicity which comes from great knowledge, from the possession of truth; that mental calmness which must arise from a complete philosophy of life. Such are his works. In the classroom Dr. Ward impressed the student as a final authority; he seemed to know everything, from the beginning until the final destruction of the world. Logic flowed in his words like the gentle current of a country brook in midsummer. There was no turbulence, no strain, never a hiatus. Thought fitted into thought, each succeeding step resting upon the previous in perfect filiation, building always upward and onward. Every lecture was a recapitulation of evolution; not that tremendous striving of nature, with its waste and failures, its trials and errors, its barbarous natural selection; but the superior artificial selection which charms the reasoning mind of man. From the solemnity of great thoughts, from the simple statement of universal truths, fundamental yet transcendental in their importance, the class was called back by occasional bursts of genuine humor. The gentle Doctor was himself transformed, his face lighted up, his eyes sparkled—one might at such moments imagine what sort of man Dr. Ward had been in his earlier years—for he was old when he first came to Brown University. Old but not decadent, aged but

still active; his mental vision as clear as in his prime. Only the body of Dr. Ward had yielded to time, his mind was still fresh and an inspiration to his students.

JAMES Q. DEALEY

Brown University

Dr. Ward was the author of hundreds of contributions to botany, paleontology, geology, anthropology, psychology, and sociology. The bibliography of his writings would make a fair-sized pamphlet. The total number of his distinct publications amounts nearly to six hundred, in this respect showing his kinship with great European scholars like Virchow or Metchnikoff. During the last thirty years this prodigious worker has printed probably not less than six or eight thousand pages of book matter, all of it substantial in character and appearing with the imprimatur of the leading publishers. Probably no other American of our time matches Dr. Ward in scientific and philosophic productiveness.

Although he made original studies in many fields, increasingly his interest centered in sociology. He was not of those who amass knowledge for its own sake. He regarded all the sciences worth prosecuting because they may be made contributory to man's progress. With him social problems took precedence over all other problems. He came upon the field of sociology at the time when Herbert Spencer was at the height of his prestige and influence. His great two-volume book *Dynamic Sociology*, published in 1883, challenged the *laissez-faire* do-nothing conclusions of Spencerian sociology upon grounds as deep and philosophic as Spencer himself sought. Conceding that nearly all the social progress hitherto attained has come about as an incident to the efforts of individuals in the pursuit of their ends, he stoutly maintained that the time would certainly come when organized society would consciously and intelligently adopt measures to accelerate its progress. Hitherto, government has been conceived as a mere policeman to keep the peace and to protect private rights. But we are on the threshold of time when government will become the instrument of a social intelligence for the promotion of the general welfare, and will undertake to hasten progress in a great variety of ways.

"We are in the stone age of politics," was one of Dr. Ward's

memorable sayings. He meant that mankind has not even yet conceived what might be done by intelligent concerted effort to improve its condition. He hailed every step in government support of research, and in the promotion of higher education as heralding the new day of progress by collective effort.

Dr. Ward lived to see his philosophy triumph in the minds of leaders of thought and opinion. Today there is nothing left of the Spencerian theory of the state which thirty years ago dominated the political thought of the intellectuals, with the exception of a handful of socialists and a few men trained in the economic seminaries of the German universities. Few realize that Ward's daring arraignment of the supposedly perfect methods of Nature and his justification of the ways of mind in his *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, published in 1893, furnishes the philosophy that lies at the base of the recent great extension of functions by contemporary governments.

While many policies that are called "socialistic" find their justification in Ward's philosophy of progress, he was no Marxist. He was quite as profound and original as Marx, and offered a more satisfying sociology. He declined to recognize changes in the technique of production as a prime motor of progress, nor was he willing to stress class struggle as Marx did. While attaching great importance to economic factors in history, he was no historical materialist. To him, not the better distribution of wealth but the better distribution of knowledge is a first essential to social betterment. He insisted that unless the masses be lifted to a much higher plane of intelligence, human exploitation cast out in one form will creep back under another form. No policies aiming at a better distribution of wealth will avail in the long run so long as great differences in intelligence exist at the different social levels. On the other hand, provided only that social classes become approximately equal in intelligence, means will be found for putting an end to all forms of exploitation as they show themselves. Ward's *Applied Sociology*, published in 1905, is, therefore, the most elaborate and fundamental argument ever made for universal public education as the preparation for solving the social problem and the basis for a continuous social progress.

Since the death of Tarde, Dr. Ward has been generally recognized as the foremost living social philosopher. He served as first president of the American Sociological Society, and was president a few years ago of the Institut International de Sociologie. His books were translated into many languages, and he kept up a correspondence with social thinkers in various parts of the world. Some years ago, a Russian translation of his *Dynamic Sociology* was about to be brought out, but the entire edition was destroyed by the Russian censor, apparently under the impression that the word "dynamic" had something to do with "dynamite." At the time of his death, Dr. Ward had completed and was working on the proofs of a ten-volume edition of his lesser works and record of his intellectual life, announced under the title *Glimpses of the Cosmos*. When one considers the vast range of his intellectual interests, the number and variety of his original contributions to science, and his great power of generalization, one feels that if Aristotle had chanced to be born in Illinois about the middle of the nineteenth century, his career would have resembled that of Lester F. Ward more than that of any other American of our time.

In association with Dr. Ward there was an uplift like knowing mountain or sea. Like Spencer he was a man who early conceived a disinterested life purpose and carried it through to a triumphant conclusion. His will was adamant, and he allowed nothing to divert him from the path toward his goal. For thirty-five years he labored like a Hercules at his self-imposed task of proving the practicability of "telic" social progress. In early life he was severe and caustic with the champions of traditional ideas, but as the opposition began to give way and he found himself followed by a growing host of disciples, he mellowed and became very gentle with the honest holders of ancient beliefs. With sentimentalists he was patient, but he never mixed with them, for he realized that what is lacking is not the will to social progress but the way.

In spirit he was Spartan and he never sacrificed a stroke in order to win either money or popular applause. He was profoundly imbued with the true scientific man's reverence for truth, and faith in its beneficence. He would take no end of pains in order to verify a statement or to get a detail exactly right. His generaliza-

tions rested upon a vast knowledge of facts and nothing could induce him to use facts in a partisan way. He was indeed a worshiper of truth, and as such held himself to a high and exacting standard beside which the standards of the ordinary custodian of religion and morals seem low and loose.

EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS

University of Wisconsin

It is difficult to write objectively of a man whom one has known through the best years of life when every thought of him calls up memories that one cherishes. Dr. Ward was one of those great personalities in whom neither intellectual power nor erudition ever overshadowed the comrade and friend—the elemental human nature of such as love their fellowmen. In his seventy-first year the spirit of youth and the joy of living were still in him.

His fame will grow as the years pass. In his lifetime his reputation suffered in a measure because unfortunately he was most widely known as the protagonist of views that many of his contemporaries regarded as paradoxical and questionable. The biologists are not likely to accept his contentions about woman's place in the scheme of evolution, and the economists show no disposition to shape their theories of utility and value to his conceptions. His real work was not in fields of controversy.

His productiveness was remarkable, even when allowance is made for his splendid strength, and the fulness of years allotted to him. In paleobotany his achievement would have been a worthy life record for a scientific specialist devoted to that one subject. Yet that, no more than controversy, was Dr. Ward's real work. To sociology he gave his devotion and the best powers of his superbly equipped mind. Not counting articles, lectures, and summaries, his constructive writings in sociology fill five large, rich volumes.

Throughout them all runs one dominating and organizing thought. Human society, as we who live now know it, is not the passive product of unconscious forces. It lies within the domain of cosmic law, but so does the mind of man; and this mind of man has knowingly, artfully, adapted and readapted its social environment,

and with reflective intelligence has begun to shape it into an instrument wherewith to fulfil man's will. With forecasting wisdom man will perfect it, until it shall be at once adequate and adaptable to all its uses. This he will do not by creative impulse evolving in a void, but by constructive intelligence shaping the substantial stuff of verified scientific knowledge. Wherefore, scientific knowledge must be made the possession of mankind. Education must not merely train the mind. It must also equip and store, with knowledge.

This great thought Dr. Ward apprehended, expressed, explained, illuminated, drove home to the mind of all who read his pages, as no other writer, ancient or modern, has ever done. It is his enduring and cogent contribution to sociology.

FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS
Columbia University

The most obvious of Ward's contributions to sociological construction work was undoubtedly his share in fixing the terminology of the new science. He will always stand out among the great figures of the *Gründeraera* as a pioneer in the work of mapping out and naming the sections of the sociological field. For with a subject-matter so complicated as that of sociology the student must first be a discoverer and explorer before he can successfully handle terminological concepts. It is true that not all the terms suggested by Ward have been accepted as final, and the captious critic may easily instance certain rather mechanical terms of Greek origin which are not likely to become current, but there remains a store of those which, being real contributions to scientific clarity and precision, will permanently enrich sociological literature. Some of these he invented, others he imported from the technical sciences and naturalized in sociology, still others he took from common usage and gave a quite special significance. Examples are *telesis*, *sociocracy*, *synergy*, *meliorism*, *achievement*, *improvement*, *opportunity*.

But the need for a distinctive terminology was subordinate in Ward's mind to a conviction that sociology must vindicate its claim

as a genuine science. To do this it must have its own special equipment. While still a student of the natural sciences he saw that sociology must first of all be scientific. *Dynamic Sociology* was written in what we are now accustomed to consider the pre-historic period of American sociology, and in that book he declared that "if the domain of social phenomena is as completely one of law as that of physical phenomena, then we may logically expect the same measure of success, in proportion as their laws are known, which marks the progress of human supremacy in the material world." Rejecting the once-current pedantic contention of the philosophy-of-history school that the test of true science is its power to predict, he held that the only legitimate demand on a science is that it be a systematic study of the laws of phenomena, a study not of mere facts but of uniform causation deducible from recurrent facts. It was in this matter of the proper placing of sociology among the sciences that Ward's own equipment in general science, always the envy of his fellow-sociologists, was of peculiar value.

Each student of sociology is likely to find in a comprehensive system like Ward's some one feature to which he assigns paramount importance, and the fact that there is diversity of opinion as to what is of most value is an evidence of the richness and range of the system. To me the thing which bulks largest is his consistent and masterful working-out of the nature and method of collective telesis. Now I suppose that no one would class Ward's philosophy as utilitarian in the ordinary sense, but purposeful it certainly is. No man ever more rigidly insisted on scientific methods, but none was ever less a believer in science for its own sake. Readers are never allowed to forget that "the purpose of sociology is to accelerate social evolution." While he never entered the field of social politics with a specific program, Ward's ambition was to work out a system of philosophy worthy of use as the groundwork of practical social action. It is a significant fact that he made his *Applied Sociology* the capstone of his system, and of that work he could accurately say that "the central thought is that of a true science of society, capable, in the measure that it approaches completeness, of being turned to the profit of mankind. If there is one respect in

which it differs more than in others from rival systems of philosophy, it is in its practical character of never losing sight of the end or purpose nor of the possibilities of conscious effort. It proclaims the efficacy of effort provided it is guided by intelligence." It follows therefore that, if the conscious improvement of society by society is the supreme end, human achievement applied to social improvement is the subject-matter of sociology. If this definition of Ward's be found too narrow it at least has the merit of accentuating that element which is of most consequence in the range of interests with which the science is concerned.

This is true primarily because the characteristic attitude toward social progress has been one of blundering helplessness, and the predominant note of social philosophy one of pessimism, a pessimism based either on the doctrine of despair, as in certain introspective philosophies like Schopenhauer's, or on scientific determinism which assumes man's helplessness in the face of cosmic evolution. The *laissez-faire* attitude is not an accident, nor is it confined to economic theory. Ward's doctrine of meliorism is not new, but his virile exposition of the possibility and promise of improvement through effort is one of the most wholesome notes that has been injected into recent thought. True meliorism is "humanitarianism minus all sentiment." Life is to be emancipated and liberalized by knowledge turned to practical uses. Happiness—or rather that state of good for which there is no better word in English—is the most natural thing in the world, because it is the result of adaptations developed in the struggle for life. Aceticism, like pessimism, is a survival from the pain-economy stage of evolution when man was hampered or helpless. Ward has undoubtedly assigned too large a place to the part played by individual genius in the achievement of new truth and its social appropriation, for, as he himself has sometimes shown, man, who first conquered nature, has now himself been conquered by society. But out of this very overemphasis on the individual he has wrought the best part of his doctrine of augmenting the working capital of society by enlarging and generalizing opportunity. It is not necessary to accept Ward's theory of the uniform distribution of ability among classes and races in order to give proper value to his doctrine of opportunity, and I for

one am not ready to accept it. Nor is it necessary to believe, as he seems to imply, that a doubling of the means of education, for instance, would mean a doubling of the output of ability, for the amount of talent that remains latent in modern civilized societies, while undoubtedly large, is hardly to be reckoned in such dimensions as Ward imagined. But with all deductions a practical equalitarian social philosophy like his is an essential need for the present democracy which assumes to call itself efficient.

Although among the earliest and foremost champions of a psychological as distinguished from a biological interpretation of society, Ward's catholicity of view saved him from the excesses of rigid dogmatism which characterize some of the recent work in this line. His insistence on the predominance of the psychic factors is the outgrowth of a large and sane scholarship little concerned with the vagaries of social psychology as such. It is because mind is the directive agent that the psychic element is of primary importance. Even in his theory of social forces his attention is always directed toward social improvement as the end.

Ward's social philosophy grew naturally out of his career as a scientist and was the fruitage of wide studies in science, philosophy, and literature to which his early life was devoted. Like practically all other sociologists of the older generation, he thus came into the field of his greatest work after a preparation in other more specialized disciplines. Whether or not this kind of preparation be one which will always prove necessary for sociologists, and there is good ground for believing that it is, it remains true that it gave to his thinking a maturity and range which it could not otherwise have had. It enabled him, relatively late in life, to develop a particularly vital and organic system of social philosophy which has equal value as an instrument of education and as a manual of fundamental principles of social action.

ULYSSES G. WEATHERLY

Indiana University

The passing of Lester F. Ward removes from the scene of action the last of the great sociological giants of the nineteenth century. Professor Ward will always rank with the other two great founders

of our science—Comte and Spencer. In some ways his work for sociology was second only to that of Auguste Comte. If there were errors in both his premises and generalizations, as I believe there were, this fact in no wise detracts from the epoch-making character of his work, nor does it give him any lesser place than we have indicated. Like all great men, Professor Ward was great in spite of his errors.

The distinctive significance of Ward's work was, as Professor Small has said, to get for the psychic factor in human society due recognition, and adequate formulation. Spencer's sociology, based as it was upon a mechanistic theory of evolution, tended to minimize the psychic factor, even to lead to its ignoring altogether. Now, Ward was distinctly a Spencerian in both his cosmology and biology. It was all the more significant, therefore, that a scientific man of the same school of thought as Spencer should protest against the implications of the Spencerian sociology. Inconsistently or not, Ward undertook to show that the psychic factor is the dominant one in human society; that it is the factor which must receive chief attention from sociologists; and that, through it, human progress may even be artificially controlled. Thus Ward became one of the founders of modern psychological sociology. He found no difficulty in recognizing at their full value all the psychic or subjective elements in the social life. In his later work, even religion itself was recognized as "the force of social gravitation which holds the social world in its orbit," while, from first to last, education was in Ward's mind the chief instrument through which social progress was to be effected. Thus Ward found a place in his sociology for all the higher spiritual values of civilization; and incidentally by doing this he did much to relieve the materialistic monism, upon which he based his sociology, of the charge that it is entirely negative in its attitude toward these higher spiritual values. Whether Ward was consistent in all this or not, we must leave the future development of science to decide. One can only admire, however, his inconsistency, if such it was, for it transformed sociology from a negative to a positive, from an abstract to an applied, science.

Once more the tendency has become manifest to exclude from recognition in pure science the psychic factor. As the readers

of this *Journal* know, the very latest tendency in science is to rule out of consideration all psychic or subjective elements and make sociology purely a physical science, that is, a social physiology. The trend of the very latest school in sociology, in other words, is to rest everything upon the assumption of a pure mechanistic monism. This, the representatives of this school say, is necessary, because it is *the* method of science. Science, they say, can deal only with mechanical causation. It can know nothing of psychic causation, if there be such a thing. Will it require another Lester F. Ward to shatter this fallacy and recall sociologists to common-sense? If the new school is followed, to any extent, somebody will certainly be needed again to "breathe the breath of life" into sociology, as Ward did in his *Dynamic Sociology*, when he shattered the Spencerian social philosophy.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

University of Missouri

[*From a letter not written for publication*]

" I should deem it a great honor and a duty to spend any amount of time in helping the public to value rightly the place which Ward holds in modern thought. I admire his fine character and I value very highly his twenty-five years' contributions to sociological thought. I believe that his brave spirit, his splendid moral courage, and his profound wisdom are destined to have an ever-deepening influence on social progress. I am wondering whether the symposium which you are now planning might not in the near future be followed by a careful and elaborate study of Ward and his work? The first part of such a study might well be some account of his life and characteristics, gathered from his papers and the reminiscences of his friends. . . . "

GEORGE ELLIOTT HOWARD

University of Nebraska

Although I had met Mr. Ward frequently at association meetings it was not my good fortune to have a close personal acquaintance with him; therefore my knowledge of his life, character, and scholarly

ability is derived chiefly through his published works. However, I remember very well the first time I met him. It was in the "Historical Seminary" room of the Johns Hopkins University about 1888 or 1889. Some of us had been reading *Dynamic Sociology* under the direction of Dr. Herbert B. Adams, and Dr. Ward lectured before the "Seminary" on certain phases of the work. After his lecture we were permitted to ask questions. This method brought us into more vital relations with the subject and the author. I was much impressed with Dr. Ward's clearness of vision, soundness of doctrine, and the persistency with which he held to his course of argument.

I regarded him then as a great man and an epoch-making philosopher, far in advance of current thought. Since then I have come to regard him as the greatest sociologist of modern times, which of course means of any time. He is conspicuous as a leader among numerous able sociologists. Not that one can accept all that he says without criticism, for, indeed, one cannot read Ward without questioning many of his points of view and some of his conclusions. Mr. Ward as a special student in paleobotany was inclined to approach the subjects of sociology from the standpoint of his specialized science, and by his severely scientific method oriented the social subject, apparently forgetting for the time being its relationship to other subjects and creating apparent contradictions and semblances of disagreement. Frequently his narrow view of psychology, history and economics led him into attitudes of thought which were open to criticism.

In order fully to appreciate his masterly position one must rise to a higher generalization and contemplate his whole system. While he has had many able contemporaries who have written well and scientifically on various phases of sociology, he is the only one who has boldly attempted to make a system of sociology. The apparent antagonism of contemporary writers to Ward's sociology has arisen because they have written from the standpoint of social sciences while he has approached all social subjects from the standpoint of biological and physical science. As a follower of Ward's writings I have found that his attempt to bridge over the gap between organic and human evolution, and to relate biological

and psychological development with sociological, was the greatest service performed to me personally, and I doubt not that this was his greatest achievement. From these relationships he passes on to rational selection and the control of society in its own interests. Comte gave sociology a place in the hierarchy of sciences. Spencer systematized ethnological and anthropological data. Schaffle outlined a system of social structure, and de Greef combined the social structure with social activities, but Ward developed the plan on which society was evolved, discussed the principles on which it was founded, and operated and presented a program by which it could be improved. One cannot help regret that his *Pure Sociology* and his *Applied Sociology* could not have been followed by a work on social technology to complete the system. His recent writings on eugenics and practical social problems would seem to indicate that had he lived, a third volume would have been necessary to complete his system.

Mr. Ward has been criticized for undue emphasis laid upon social forces in both dynamic and pure sociology. Yet the great lines of his argument are in the main correct. One of his characteristics was to emphasize causation, and his social forces are social causes. They were the causes which created society and held it intact and hence were more truly socializing forces than true social forces. The latter arise out of society, and are the results of social activity rather than the causes, for real social forces arise from group activity. Nevertheless his concept is a valuable one from which all sociologists have profited. Differ as we may from some of his points of view, object as we may to some of his conclusions, the facts remain that he was the first great sociologist, that his work is epoch-making for social science, and that his system is monumental. Sociology, in its synthetic processes, and in its methods will change, but for years to come all writers must recognize the great lines of his system.

FRANK W. BLACKMAR

University of Kansas

If it is possible for me to add anything to what has been said or implied in the foregoing tributes, it will be by way of personalities which will be pardonable as ancient history.

I cannot precisely date my discovery of *Dynamic Sociology*, but its meaning for me was crucial, and I was aware at once that it had leveled barriers to an advanced stage in my mental growth. I had been occupying a chair of history and economics for a number of years. So far as I had developed a "method," it was under heavy bonds to speculation, rather than intelligently objective. I had given an undue proportion of attention to the philosophers of history, but both they and the historians proper had lost their grip on my credulity. Two things kept recurring in my thoughts, first, that there must be some sort of correlation between human occurrences, and second, that the clues to that correlation must be found by checking up cause and effect between human occurrences themselves, not in some a priori. I had read both of Comte's major works, but had been more impressed by their absurdities in detail than by the saving remnant of wisdom. They had increased my wistfulness for a credible clue to the explanation of human experience, but they had not appealed to me as affording anything very plausible to supply the want. I had read everything that Spencer had published, but the elements in his method that afterward seemed to me most useful failed to find me at first. The sight of the title *Dynamic Sociology* instantly acted as a reagent to crystallize elements that had been incoherent in my mind, and to separate the product from foreign substances. The moment I began to turn the leaves of the book, I was aware of feeling as the alchemists might have felt two or three centuries earlier if they had stumbled upon the "philosophers' stone." At the same time the book never seemed to me a solution, but rather a wonderfully expressive symbolic guide to the path in which solutions might be found. The epithet "materialistic" stood then for the most inexorable taboo in my ritual. After finishing the first reading, I wrote to the author: "I was well along in the book before I found reason to question my classification of you as a materialist. If that is what you call yourself, I must admit that materialism ceased to seem to me a very terrible foe of the spirit, when I found you ending the book with an exhortation."

Dynamic Sociology did not seem to me to push the frontier of the ontological problem any further back toward ultimates than

hundreds of philosophers had reached. It did make me feel more secure in accepting the working necessity of dealing with orders of phenomena in accordance with their last discoverable traits even if this procedure leaves us with practical duality. It enabled me to think of so-called physical and psychical phenomena as equally real, as equally instrumental in their place, as functioning in orders of experience which are somehow related whether we are able to formulate the relationships or not. It placed psychical causation on a plane of plausibility as convincing as the presuppositions of physical causation, without resorting to anything extra-phenomenal in support of the one more than of the other. It located social causation within human beings, instead of outside, above, beneath, or beyond them. It punctured the bubble of metaphysical philosophy of human experience, and exposed the literal problems of human relationships under the aspect of psychology as the ultimate analysis. As I said, this did not solve the problems, but it proposed them as real, whereas they had previously been formulated as more or less mythical or mystical.

I have often said, and it remains my estimate, that, everything considered, I would rather have written *Dynamic Sociology* than any other book that has ever appeared in America. Not surely because it has gained more applause of men than many others. I found in 1888 that Professor Ely was the only member of the Johns Hopkins faculty who seemed to know anything about the book. In 1893 Dr. Ward told me that barely five hundred copies had been sold. It was, however, at least a generation ahead of the sociological thinking of Great Britain and it saved American sociologists the long wandering in the wilderness of misconstrued evolutionism from which English sociology is at this late day working out the rudiments of its salvation.

I must confess that I have never been able to learn from Dr. Ward's later works anything of first-rate importance which I did not find in *Dynamic Sociology*. Unless I misunderstood his own estimate, my reaction was strictly in accordance with his own view of his writings. He thought he had said in substance in his first book everything which his later writings contained, but that the greater elaboration was necessary in order to make his message

carry. I think he would have indorsed my opinion that the later books were justified pedagogically, but that they exhibited a scientific anti-climax.

It would be impossible for me to express the sense of security which I felt in my earlier venturings into sociology, because of Dr. Ward's previous explorations. I might compare it with the confidence of a dispatch boat convoyed by a battleship.

After it became less venturesome to be a sociologist, Dr. Ward's friendship, on both the personal and the professional planes, was always an inspiration and a benediction.

ALBION W. SMALL

University of Chicago

THE RURAL SOCIAL CENTER

HENRY S. CURTIS
Olivet College, Michigan

Because the inhabitants of the country are scattered, and society is impossible in connection with daily work, the social center or common meeting-ground seems to be more needed in the country than it is in the city. It is doubtful if the social and recreational life and business co-operation can be organized without it.

The social center movement has taken a powerful hold on the imagination of the country during the last few years, but thus far not so strong a hold on the country as on the city. Still there is something being done in nearly every county in the northern part of this country at present. The Social Center Association of America was organized at the University of Wisconsin in the fall of 1911 with Professor Edward J. Ward as secretary and Josiah Strong as president. Professor Ward is organizing social centers about the state of Wisconsin from the extension department of the university, and five other states have already undertaken a similar work. There is keen interest in nearly all parts of the country, and the states of Wisconsin and Minnesota have recently passed laws requiring school boards to open the school buildings to the public whenever the public may desire it. In the last presidential campaign, the three candidates each indorsed the idea of this wider use of school buildings, and in Chicago, Rochester, and several other cities the schools were used for campaign speeches and in some for polling-places as well. One of the most able addresses that was given at the formation of the association was made by Governor Wilson, so it would look as though the movement should receive all due official encouragement during the years that are upon us. It has the indorsement of the National Education Association and of all prominent educators everywhere. The spread of the idea has been so quiet, and the recent developments have been so little reported, that it is almost impossible to

tell how general it has become at the present time, but it is safe to say that a beginning has been made in nearly every city and county of the country. This beginning is often very feeble and inadequate, but it is a seed out of which may well grow a great movement. While it is possible to do the work best perhaps around the church wherever an adequate church which has the support of the whole community can be found, there are few adequate churches with resident ministers in the country, and it is well-nigh impossible to have this development around the church without this condition. The church that is to be a real social center must owe its allegiance to the whole community, not to any sect; it must become in fact a community church. At present we have very few such churches, and nine-tenths of the work that is being done is probably at the public schools.

DIFFERENT AIMS IN SOCIAL CENTER DEVELOPMENT

The social center like most new movements is developing along different lines in different localities. It lacks suitable equipment everywhere, and nowhere has a real community center yet appeared. In some places the activities are largely educational, with public lectures, classes in domestic economy, manual training, and gymnastics; in others it is largely recreational, with singing, dramatics, games, and dancing; while in yet others it is becoming the civic forum for the meeting of various clubs and the discussion of public questions. New York took the lead in the beginning in developing the social center of the first two types. Rochester has been largely responsible for developing the social center of the civic type. This was similar to what parents' associations and school improvement associations had been doing in many places, but the movement took a new start with a new spirit of social equality at Rochester, and to Professor Forbes, the president of the school board, and to Professor Ward, the superintendent of the Social Centers, are due great credit, both for the developments at Rochester and elsewhere. The Rochester type of a social center comes the nearest to creating a real community center of any of the social centers thus far attempted, and it has also within itself the machinery that is necessary to reform politics

and improve the community, which the other forms of social centers have not. Under the New York ideals the social centers are carried on by the Board of Education. Under the Rochester ideal the social center becomes an expression of the people themselves.

THE METHOD OF ORGANIZATION

As the social center is in most cases using the public schools and is often a real extension of the work of the schools to the community, it might seem that this is a work that belongs naturally to the school board, and so it is if the school board finds itself in the position to do it. The educational phases of the social center, the classes, the lectures, the school exhibitions, and the library work, should naturally be under the school authorities, and it is well for them to take the initiative in these matters whenever possible; but so far as possible the social and civic interests of the center should be democratic and managed by the people themselves. School boards often will not have the authority to initiate this work unless a special ordinance is passed conferring this right upon them, and they will seldom have the money in the beginning that will be necessary. Hence, however properly this work might belong to the school board, in very many cases at least the first steps will have to be taken by some outside parties.

THE SCHOOL SOCIAL CENTER ASSOCIATION

It is highly important that the people should feel from the beginning that the social center belongs to them, as this will make it more popular and secure in its financial support. It is better to have the work initiated by the people of the community than to have it started by the school board or any less general agency. It is not at all difficult to begin the movement in this way. A public meeting should be called and someone should be invited to give a talk on the social center idea. After that there should be discussion, and a social center association or civic league should be formed with a temporary constitution and officers to hold over until a later meeting when permanent officers can be elected and a permanent constitution can be adopted. It is best as a rule to have some small dues. It is through organizations such as this

that most of the great social progress of the last two decades has been effected. In union, organization, there is strength. Twenty-five people who are in earnest and will work together can carry almost any movement against the indifference of twenty-five thousand. If there are half a dozen people who are interested enough to call such a meeting, and there are a few more who are interested enough to attend, this is an effective and admirable way to make a beginning. It is wise to have the discussion somewhat arranged for beforehand, to have a provisional constitution ready, and to have looked over the field carefully for the provisional officers, who are likely to be the permanent officers. The writer recently organized such a social center movement in a Michigan town of some seven hundred inhabitants. A public meeting was called with a popular lecture, and a civic league was formed with about forty members, who signed the slips that evening. The league maintains a class for civic discussions, which meets at noon on Sundays, a Sunday evening lecture course with civic lectures from the state university, the agricultural college, the various state departments, and several local sources. It has a social evening once in two weeks. It has been organized only about three months, but it has already secured dental and medical inspection for the school children, a better set of films for the moving-picture show, a closer co-operation between the grange and the town, an organization of the Camp Fire Girls, and it has started a movement for domestic economy and agriculture in the local high school.

However, the country is noted for its conservatism and lack of initiative in social affairs, and if all communities had to wait for the movement to start up in their midst, there are some that would have to wait a long time.

THE RECREATION ASSOCIATION

In the cities, a large part of the social centers are operated by the various playground associations. The most expensive social center buildings that have ever been constructed are the field-houses in the Chicago playgrounds. The centers at Rochester were a part of the movement for general recreation and were under the superintendent of playgrounds and social centers. In New

York, also, the evening recreation centers are under the same superintendent as the school playgrounds. In most cities the social center work is winter work of the playgrounds. This enables them to hire their directors by the year, and to maintain a continuous policy. However, there are no playground associations in the country and it looks as though the social center would have to start the organized play, instead of the recreation movement organizing the social centers.

A PARENTS' ASSOCIATION

Wherever there is already a parents' association or a home and school league in the neighborhood, this offers one of the best means of getting started, as the league may take up the social center work as one of its regular activities. They may be able to get the school board to make an appropriation for the sake of starting the movement, and they should always attempt to do this, even though it seems certain that the request will not be granted, as it helps to familiarize the board with the idea. If they are not able to secure an appropriation, it is best to raise a small amount by private subscription, and start the movement in a small way. Most people have great reluctance in asking others to contribute money to public purposes, but it is not nearly so difficult to raise money as most people imagine. About all that is needed is the expectation of receiving what you ask for. There is a new spirit of giving in this country at the present time, and there are many people who are genuinely glad to give to a worthy cause.

SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATIONS

In nine of the southern states, the Southern Education Board is paying an organizer of school improvement associations. This work was begun in Maine some thirty years ago and was later taken up by the state of North Carolina. Professor Claxton, now commissioner of education, became interested in it, and through him it became one of the policies of the Southern Board to put such an organizer into the office of each southern state superintendent of schools. This organizer goes about the state usually with a lantern and meets groups of parents who are called together by the county superintendent. She shows pictures of what other

schools are doing, and suggests that they form a school improvement association which will work for the welfare of the school and neighborhood. These associations have been very effective in improving conditions at the schools, and incidentally have organized the neighborhood to work for a public purpose. In Mississippi they usually meet once a month on Saturdays. The people bring a picnic lunch and spend the day or at least a half-day. The work of the children is exhibited and the deficiencies in the school equipment become evident. In the afternoon athletic contests are a feature. The Southern Board has done many good things that might well be adopted by the North, and such an organizer might well be an assistant to every state superintendent in the country and be paid from public funds. Superintendent Cook of Arkansas says that for every dollar that has gone into the salary of this person in his state there has come back to the state four hundred dollars in improved buildings and grounds alone. It is impossible to tell how much has come back in the way of a quickened social life and civic spirit. An investment that yields 40,000 per cent profit is worth trying. I believe this organizer of school improvements is an excellent agency for the initiation of this movement when outside assistance is necessary. Of course the social center will come in time without any systematic promotion from any body, for the consciousness of the need is already upon us; but it ought not to be necessary to wait for this idea to percolate down to each isolated board of education throughout the country; and those who take up new movements without expert assistance are likely to do the work badly and wastefully in the beginning. The social center is essential to the welfare of country life and it redounds to the welfare of the school directly in bringing the parents and the teachers together. As the social centers are organized in most cases in connection with the public schools, and are practically an extension of public-school work, their promotion belongs naturally under the state superintendent of public instruction.

THE STATE UNIVERSITY

Six state universities have already employed social center organizers. There is great interest in this subject in a number

of states, and the rather general extension of this idea seems likely. State universities are coming to conceive of their function in terms of service such as was scarcely dreamed of a decade ago. The University of Wisconsin has led in this new conception of the university, as the home of a body of specialists who would each endeavor, not merely to serve the student body, but to carry their message to the whole state. It has been rewarded by a phenomenal growth in numbers, in the loyalty of the citizens, and in large appropriations. It is a noble conception of the purpose and aim of a university, and one illustration of where it has not been merely the home of "abandoned ideals." There are advantages in such organizing of this work, because these men can give courses at the university at the same time. Still there can be little doubt that the university is here usurping the function of the superintendent of public instruction. Practically, however, it may be quite possible for the university to get the money for such an expert, and it may not be at all possible for the state superintendent to secure such an assistant. The important thing is to have the work done.

THE AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE

In about half of the states, the agricultural college is one of the professional schools of the state university. Where the schools are separate it may be that the starting of the rural social center falls more naturally to the lot of the agricultural college than to that of the university. Certainly the teaching of agriculture and domestic economy, and institutes for farmers and farm women are likely to be among its largest functions. Nearly all the rural life conferences that have been held in connection with the agricultural colleges have declared for the development of the social center in connection with the rural schools. Wherever the agricultural college has on its staff a man in rural sociology who can give some of his time to this work, it is certainly as appropriate for the agricultural college as for the state university to do it.

NORMAL SCHOOLS

There are some cases where the students and professors have gone out from the normal schools to organize social centers in

rural schools in the territory immediately adjacent to them. This is a piece of school missionary work such as we should naturally expect from the normal schools, and we may hope for a great extension along this line in the future. A number of normals are planning work of this character for the coming year.

It is evident from what has been said thus far that there is no lack of agencies through which social centers may be organized. If all of these agencies get busy together, they ought to be able to do the work up in a short time. From whatever source the social center is organized it should be mainly self-directed after it is once started.

WHO SHOULD MANAGE THE SOCIAL CENTER?

The classes, lectures, and the library will in general have to be paid for by the educational authorities, and should be managed by them. The social and civic activities should be an expression of the life of the people and managed by them so far as possible.

There will have to be some person in general charge of the center, and this person should if possible be the principal of the consolidated school, if the school is the social center; or better the director of recreation for the township, if such a position can be created. This serves again to emphasize the point of view of Commissioner Claxton that the rural teacher should be a fixture in the rural community, and that he should be furnished a house with a small farm in the immediate neighborhood of the school in the same way that a preacher is furnished a parsonage. No social center will run itself, and there must be one or more persons who are always there and who are responsible for the discipline, the readiness of everything that is to be used, and the general program. If the principal does this work, he will have to be paid for it, as will also the teachers of classes, the lecturers, and the janitor. The social center will also increase the heating bill and the lighting bill, and naturally a primary question in regard to the social center is: How are these expenses to be met?

FINANCING THE SOCIAL CENTER

Like all new movements, the social center usually has to be begun by private initiative. This nearly always means three

things: that the simplest and least expensive activities must be chosen; that the workers must contribute their time or serve for very small compensation, and that there must be some means for raising money. There are four ways of financing the social center: it may be largely by membership dues in the social center association; it may be supported by the entertainments which it gives or that are given outside; it may be supported by the contributions of public-spirited people; or it may be supported from public funds. Probably all of these means should be used at times. It is a good thing to have a small membership fee in the social center association in any case, so that it may not be entirely dependent on public funds. It is more blessed to give than to receive and giving increases the interest. There are now about fifty cities where the social centers are supported in whole or in part from public funds. For the most part, I believe the rural centers have been operated without any funds. The school has contributed the building, and the performers have contributed the talent. However, the sort of a social center which will really meet the need of a rural community cannot be so maintained; it must have a regular appropriation from the school or some other public funds, or a considerable budget must be raised from private sources. As a public enterprise the social center which becomes the real community center of a township has unusual advantages. Its constituency are the voters of the township and they can have anything they are willing to pay for unless the law forbids.

HOW MUCH TERRITORY SHOULD THE RURAL SOCIAL CENTER COVER?

So far as the social center is carried on under the school authorities, there are two possibilities: the school district may be taken as the unit, or the township may be taken as the unit. It is quite impossible for the single school district in most places to support the variety of activities that are needed at a social center. It cannot maintain a library that is worth while, public lectures, a gymnasium, classes in domestic science and agriculture, the moving picture, and many other things that are needed to make the social center really attractive. The social center can be maintained at the one-room school, but its activities will naturally be

very much restricted, both by the lack of equipment and by the lack of numbers. It would appear that the consolidated school is still more necessary to the adults than it is to the children, and that the social needs of the community are the very strongest reasons that we have at present for the consolidation, though the other reasons, arising from effectiveness in school work and economy of school administration, are entirely sufficient. Consolidation is already the accepted educational policy, and we may expect the very rapid development in this direction that is now going on in the most progressive states soon to reach the whole country. A village graded or high school will serve; but the consolidated school for the township, with a township park and athletic ground around it, is the ideal social center for a rural community.

THE SOCIAL CENTER BUILDING

The consolidated school should have both an auditorium and a gymnasium or hall, but if it can have only one, it should always take the gymnasium, because the gymnasium can be equipped as an auditorium whenever it is desired, and it can be used for dances, banquets, voting, and public meetings as well. It might well be the regular meeting-place of the grange, the women's club, or any other similar organizations. It would be well if there could be a small room for the care of the babies at the time of entertainments, and one or more social rooms or parlors for small neighborhood meetings, gossip, etc. As this room might serve as the teachers' room as well, it would mean no considerable extra expense. As the gymnasium would be also the town hall and polling-place and the grange hall, it might be a positive economy for a country neighborhood. Certainly the number of changes that are needed to adapt the ordinary consolidated school for a social center are not many or serious.

TAMALPAIS CENTER, CALIFORNIA

Tamalpais Center, a few miles out of San Francisco, was built by Mrs. A. E. Kent, the mother of Congressman Kent of California, as a contribution to this recreation problem for the country and country village. The ground given consists of twenty-nine acres of level land at the foot of Mount Tamalpais. It is a beautiful

location and there is a fine club building and a competent director. There is a playground for the children with a lady play-ground director, several baseball diamonds, and football fields, and space for athletic events. A speeding-track for horse races is around the edge. The fieldhouse is used for dances, social gatherings, literary and debating clubs, and public lectures. The popularity of this center has increased ever since it was started and it is expected that the community will soon assume the expense of its maintenance.

There have been a number of other centers constructed in the country on a somewhat less ambitious scale than the center at Tamalpais. It is another phase of the Chicago question whether we shall use the schools for social centers or construct special centers in the parks. On the whole, the argument seems to rest with the schools, as the school center costs very little above the regular school cost and has a far larger attendance. As the social center is one of the chief reasons for the consolidated school, it would be rather a pity to divide the argument by building a separate social center in most sections, though it is fine to have such an experiment, and to see how it will work out; for history sometimes confounds our fondest theories. All gratitude is due Mrs. Kent for the demonstration.

It is not necessary that the social center activities should always be carried on in the same building. If there is a social center or civic organization that can stand behind the movement, the meetings may be held in such places as are available, now in a village high school, now in a church, again in the grange hall or the opera house. There are certain kinds of activities that cannot of course be carried on through such a migratory center, but there are a large number that can, and, if the movement were begun in this way, it would soon develop better facilities.

THE ONE-ROOM SCHOOL

Wherever it is necessary to carry on the social center at a one-room school, it will be an advantage if movable desks can be provided, so that the room can be seated for adults as well as children or cleared altogether for entertainments. If a new build-

ing is to be erected, it would be well for those who have the matter in charge to investigate the model for a country school which has been built by President Kirk of the State Normal at Kirksville, Mo., for the practice work of his rural teachers. This has been described in many articles, and President Kirk can furnish a detailed account of it on application. Two of the features of this school building that fit it especially to be a social center are that the seats are not fastened to the floor but are on little platforms, so that they can be moved to one side, and the room can be seated with folding chairs for adults, or the floor space can be used for dancing or games. A stereopticon fits into its own cabinet in the back of the room. A gasoline engine in the basement pumps water for the toilets and shower baths and generates the electricity to light the school building and the lantern. The engine is operated by one of the older boys. In the attic of the school is a large cooking-range, which is used for lessons in domestic science by the older girls, and which might be used equally well for afternoon teas by the club women.

THE SOUTHERN SOCIOLOGICAL CONGRESS

L. L. BERNARD
University of Florida

The second annual session of the Southern Sociological Congress was held in Atlanta, April 25-29. This year the congress continued the policy begun last year, of confining the energies of the organization to a practical program. During the entire session of four days—seven sections meeting simultaneously part of the time—not a single paper in the field of theoretical sociology, strictly speaking, was read. All discussion was along practical lines, dealing with present issues in the South and looking toward the remedy of existing ills. This tendency to eschew the merely general and to eliminate fine-spun theories is characteristic of the bent of mind of the leaders of the New South. The assumption here in the South seems to be that our greatest need is action, since already we have accumulated much more information than we have yet found methods of putting into practice. The southern conception of the scope and meaning of sociology is radically different from that of the East. This fact was well illustrated by the comment of an eastern-trained man now teaching in one of the border-line universities. He said: "I am surprised that they call this organization a 'sociological' congress; so far I have seen nothing that is sociological in the usual sense." He did not realize that sociology is practical, or nothing, in the South.

In keeping with the practical character of the papers and the discussion, the program was planned in such a way as to make its results as far reaching as possible. There were two types of meetings. The sectional conferences were devoted to the more technical papers and were attended largely by specialists in the fields of organized charities, courts and prisons, public health, child welfare, travelers' aid, the church and social service, and race questions. The attendance at these divisional meetings, in spite of the fact that they were held simultaneously, in some cases reached as high as four hundred. Once daily, and twice on the final day of the congress, was held a general session which was largely attended by the public and before which the least specialized addresses were delivered. A good attendance was had at all of these

meetings, that of the Sunday afternoon drawing an audience of approximately three thousand persons. In a large sense these were the most important sessions of the congress, since they carried its message to the people and especially to the workers of the church, who embrace a fund of social energy as yet but inadequately utilized. That the message was responded to was abundantly attested by the careful attention and often generous applause which were accorded the speakers.

The chief significance of the congress centered in the conferences on race problems. Leading representatives of both races were present in considerable numbers from all parts of the South. At all sessions of the congress both races sat on the same floor and both took part freely in the general discussions, when the meetings were open to extemporaneous expression of opinion. However, only whites had been asked to read formal papers at this conference, a fact of which the colored members of the audience at the first session appeared to be conscious. But as the discussion developed, the attitudes expressed by the whites appeared so fair, their confessions of white discrimination against the Negro in the south were so frank and so full, and the promise of a new attitude toward the Negro was so earnest that practically all isolated traces of bitterness vanished and the Negroes joined in the discussion of the papers with the heartiest expressions of approval—although with a note of surprise in the background. The Negroes, however, were not alone in their feeling of surprise. For the degree of harmony on questions at issue and the resulting good feeling which were increasingly manifested at the conferences were in the nature of a revelation and a cause for gratification to all present. So strong was this feeling that it spread to the general meetings even, and, when in the closing moments of the last general session, minute talks were allowed from the floor, most of these were devoted to the race problem, Negroes and whites alternating in expressions of satisfaction at the direction affairs had taken and at the promise of a better understanding between the races. The sentiments of all present were best expressed, perhaps, by a young Negro of Atlanta, who declared that the white man and the Negro of the Old South understood each other in the order which was then dominant, and that the young white man and the young Negro of the present were beginning to understand each other and to reach a basis of co-operation. It is not too much to say that the conference on race problems of the Congress was of historic significance, since there for the first time the southern white man and the Negro met on an equal plane, intellectually, for the discussion of their common problems. But we should not forget that it will

require time for the ideas here expressed by leaders of southern white thought to percolate to the masses.

A close second in the degree of interest manifested were the conferences on the church and social service. The great awakening of the church in the South to its mission in this world was made particularly apparent both in the very hopeful and frank addresses by southern ministers and teachers, and in a series of thirty-five resolutions adopted by this section of the congress, declaring in particular for social and civic education in the elementary schools; for social surveys and systematic social reclamation work by the churches; for a wider use of church buildings and for a stimulation of community discussion under the co-operative leadership of the churches; for a closer study and a more effective amelioration of the living and recreational conditions of the working classes, in particular of working women; for a deeper interest by the church in public health; and for making the country church a center for general educational and cultural influences. One of the most conspicuous successes of the Southern Sociological Congress, so far, is its success in enlisting the religious forces of the South in hearty and intelligent co-operation with its work.

REVIEWS

The Child That Toileth Not. By THOMAS ROBINSON DAWLEY.
New York: The Gracia Publishing Co. Pp. 490.

This book is not entitled to scientific recognition within the field of labor problems. It is an unjustifiable attack upon recent child labor legislation, and upon the National Child Labor Committee. It is written by one severely biased because of unpleasant personal relations at Washington, and voices the ideas of the vested cotton interests of the South. Its chief purpose seems to be to create public opinion in favor of child labor for cotton mills, and to thwart governmental action which may result in further prohibition of child labor. The argument is illogical and weak. Conclusions are reached without proof and from premises which either assume the conclusions desired or are not directly pertinent to them.

Mr. Dawley would have us believe that child labor is beneficial and necessary, and that it should be encouraged because cotton mills pay taxes to pave streets and build schoolhouses; because they establish certain forms of welfare work; and because of their general redemptive and socializing influence. He would have us remember that the children in the mills say that they like their work; that there are kindergartens, sewing clubs, etc., under the auspices of the mill; that the superintendents are on such friendly terms with some of the young people that they give them rides in their autos; and that the management, because it cannot bear to see the people idle, gives them work even when the market is dull and the product has to be put in storage waiting better times.

Too much emphasis is thus placed upon a variety of data which are not deserving of a very prominent place in a fair consideration of the child-labor problem of the South, and almost nothing is said about other data which are vastly more important, namely, data which result from a really careful study of exact labor conditions in the light of our best standards. The book is conspicuous for what it omits.

The greatest value of this volume lies outside the field of labor. It is interesting and readable because of its narrative and descriptive style, and its close touch with human life. It is also a valuable contribution of detailed information upon the social life of the mountaineers.

ROY WILLIAM FOLEY

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Report on the Condition of Woman and Child Wage-Earners in the United States. In 19 volumes. 61st Cong., 2d Sess., Senate Doc. 645. Prepared under the direction of CHARLES P. NEILL, Commissioner of Labor. Vol. IX. *History of Women in Industry in the United States.* Washington, 1910. Pp. 276.

This volume contains an introduction and summary and chapters on the "Textiles, the Clothing and Sewing Trades," "Domestic and Personal Service," "Food and Kindred Products," "Other Manufacturing Industries," "Trade and Transportation," and twenty-four tables of statistics for the above occupational groups. So-called wage-earning women alone are considered. Professional work, women in independent business and in agriculture are considered only incidentally, and unremunerated home work of women is entirely neglected. It is the opinion of the writer that the common custom of designating this latter work unremunerative and separating it on that score from other wage-earning occupations is inaccurate and undesirable, for although the standard of payment for such work has been indefinite and the payment itself not a money wage, yet the food, shelter, and clothing which these women thus obtain must be recognized as wages.

The report brings out the fact that most of the transfer of women from home work to work outside the home has taken place since the beginning of the nineteenth century, although women have always worked for wages. Even now, only about one-fifth of the women sixteen years of age and over are breadwinners outside the home, yet there is scarcely an industry which does not employ women.

The causes of the entrance of women into industry are: machinery, division of labor, strike-breaking, scarcity of labor, the Civil War, and the influence of industrial depressions. Women are still more largely employed in their traditional occupations than in the newer ones, yet women's industrial sphere has expanded somewhat.

Contrary to the socialist contention, the evidence here collected shows that women's wage labor as well as other kinds of labor under the domestic system has often been carried on under worse conditions than their wage labor under the factory system, especially in the matter of hours and sanitary conditions. Women's wages have, it seems, always been low and unequal to men's wages, and women, too, have suffered from unemployment especially in the sewing trades. It is probable that in the long run women have not displaced men, but have lowered the standard of men's wages.

The history of women in industry shows that women have never been thoroughly trained for their work and have found it difficult to acquire proficiency. Consequently, they have "come to be to an alarming extent the cheap laborers of the employment market, the unskilled and underpaid drudges of the industrial world"—a general conclusion which was also reached by Miss Butler in *Women and the Trades* in the Pittsburgh Survey.

As is explained in the introduction, a somewhat disproportionate amount of space in this volume is given to the early work of women, information concerning which is only recently available from rare early sources. If any criticism is to be made of so able a report, it is, perhaps, that the transition from the early and middle period of women's work to the actual present situation is not always clearly stated and this is a distinct desideratum.

It is to be noted as a matter of general interest that the newspapers of the middle of the century, in contrast to ours, seem to have been surprisingly active in the investigation and publication of trade and labor conditions. Much of the material of this report is drawn from them. Other sources of the report are the Federal Census and other government publications, state labor and statistical bureau reports, old books, pamphlets, and newspapers. In addition, representative industrial establishments were visited and persons familiar with the industries were consulted.

FRANCES FENTON BERNARD

GAINESVILLE, FLA.

Report on the Condition of Woman and Child Wage-Earners in the United States. In 19 volumes. 61st Cong., 2d Sess., Senate Doc. 645. Prepared under the direction of CHARLES P. NEILL, Commissioner of Labor. Vol. X. *History of Women in Trade Unions.* Washington, 1911. Pp. 236.

This volume is in two parts; the first deals with the period from 1875, the beginning of organization of women into trade unions, through the activity of the Knights of Labor, the second, with the later history from the organization of the American Federation of Labor through 1909. A supplementary statement gives developments of 1909-11.

The following conclusions are reached in the first part: Women's unions, until the last generation, have been ephemeral in character, organized often temporarily in times of strikes. They have been, to a

greater degree than men's unions, led from outside the ranks of wage-earners. The organizer of women has, in addition to the obstacles familiar to the organizer of men, women's short trade life to contend with. Women in trade unions have resisted unfavorable conditions, have at times won a shorter work-day, have maintained or raised wages, and improved conditions of work. Prior to the formation of the American Federation of Labor, success in securing permanent improvement has come not so much through the strike as through a stand for protective legislation. As will be seen, this attitude toward protective legislation was not found by the writer of the second part of this volume to exist in the later years until very recently.

The second part of this volume is based upon an investigation of over 200 typical local trade unions in 1908-9, schedules secured from 262 others, and returns from local unions reported by the state labor bureaus of Massachusetts, Missouri, and New York. At the time of the investigation it seems that trade-union members formed but a small proportion of working-women; nevertheless, the proportionate amount of unionism among women is not far behind that of men.

An interesting discussion of the obstacles to the organization of women emphasizes two in particular—the temporary character of women's trade life and the strong opposition of employers to trade unions among women. The mixed union has been more effective than the woman's union in gaining advantages speedily, but this is due to the fact that women in joining it have joined old, strongly established organizations; in these, however, they lose the training in trade unionism which membership in women's locals gives them.

It is probable that women's unions have, in this last period, accomplished some increase in wages, some reduction in hours and gains in conditions of work, although their acquiescence in unfavorable conditions has limited their accomplishment. "Practically nothing in the way of securing improved legislation" has been accomplished by the women's unions themselves; indeed little united stand for it has been made by them until very recently under the influence of the Women's Trade Union League. The interest of women in unionism is "not yet by any means general and keen," but it seems to be growing.

The Supplementary Statement adds that since 1909 there has been a marked growth in the number of women's unions and a still larger growth in membership.

FRANCES FENTON BERNARD

GAINESVILLE, FLA.

Report on the Condition of Woman and Child Wage-Earners in the United States. In 19 volumes. 61st Cong., 2d Sess., Senate Doc. 645. Prepared under the direction of CHARLES P. NEILL, Commissioner of Labor. Vol. XII. *Employment of Women in Laundries.* Washington, 1911. Pp. 121.

The results of a study of the working conditions of women and girls employed in laundries in Chicago, New York, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, and Rockford, Ill., are here presented. These cities contain about 2,500 American laundries and 2,000 Chinese laundries, the latter largely hand laundries, and about one-sixth of the former, motor. The special subjects of study were general conditions of the workrooms, hours of labor, and the effect of the employment on women employees. The latter study, including case reports of 539 women, forms the greater part of the report.

In Chicago the motor laundry, in the other cities the hand laundry, prevails, but much of the washing of clothes which is ostensibly done by hand in New York and Brooklyn is really done by motor laundries and only ironed by hand often in unsanitary homes.

Weekly hours of work in laundries are not long as compared with other industries, but the daily hours are often unduly extended even to 14. Rates of pay per week ranged from \$5.50 to \$12.00 according to the type of work performed and the character of the laundry.

The injurious occupations within laundries in which women engage are in the washrooms, where chemicals are used in bleaching, the starching, ironing, and shaking processes. Hand ironing, however, is declining among women because of its heaviness. The sorting and marking of soiled clothes, commonly considered dangerous to health, was not found to be so in this study. Tuberculosis among laundry workers was also found to be rare. A special investigation of this disease is needed, however.

Conditions in laundries can be much improved by bringing the hand laundries and some of the motor laundries into line with the best existing types of motor laundries, which have proper ventilation and light, bathing facilities, restrooms, and other conditions making for health and efficiency. At present, a lack of standardization in these matters prevails.

As one reads the detailed descriptions of the processes in which women in laundries are engaged, it is apparent that much unnecessary labor of a socially unproductive kind in addition to the real cleansing

process is demanded by laundry patrons. Simplification in dress and the growth of the custom of not ironing bed linen and underclothes and of wearing more frequently materials requiring neither starch nor ironing are desirable from the standpoint of the employees in the laundry industry.

FRANCES FENTON BERNARD

GAINESVILLE, FLA.

Report on the Condition of Woman and Child Wage-Earners in the United States. In 19 volumes. 61st Cong., 2d Sess., Senate Doc. 645. Prepared under the direction of CHARLES P. NEILL, Commissioner of Labor. Vol. XV. *Relation Between Occupation and Criminality of Women.* Washington, 1911. Pp. 119.

The common belief that an increase of criminality among women has accompanied the widening of their industrial sphere is found in this study not to be supported by the evidence. The investigation was based upon the records of penal institutions and probation records in five states, and 3,229 women in all were studied in six states. Serious difficulties in gathering definite information from the state concerning its prisoners were encountered, but every possible channel for verifying and checking information was utilized.

Statistics of the offenders studied shows the highest percentage of criminality, 80 per cent, in the group designated in the Census domestic and personal service, and especially among servants and waitresses in that group, the traditional occupations of women. An examination of the earliest occupations of these offenders further emphasizes the high percentage of crime in this group. Moreover, while the number and proportion of wage-earning women is increasing, and increasing especially in the newer industrial pursuits, criminality among women seems to be decreasing if the falling-off in the female prison population can be taken as evidence in that direction.

The real relation between occupation and criminality among women seems to be not directly causal but to lie in the demand a given pursuit makes for intelligence and character in its workers. (It is a criticism of women employers and of all who engage employees for domestic and personal service that this work has been so little standardized and elevated as to demand low-grade employees.)

Immorality among women, of which a separate study is here made, seems to be due chiefly to the influence of early training or lack of training and to defective mentality. Low wages and poverty were found not to be

direct causes of immorality, but to have some indirect influence. In short, general social conditions are to be assigned as chief causes of the downfall of the more intelligent class of wrongdoers. Exception might be taken to the use of the term "inherited attitude" and "inherited taste for liquor," which are used as partial causes in certain cases.

This volume contains some exceedingly interesting material, reports of special cases, and discussions and is characterized by carefulness of statement and method and unwillingness to draw general conclusions from slight evidence.

FRANCES FENTON BERNARD

GAINESVILLE, FLA.

Report on the Condition of Woman and Child Wage-Earners in the United States. In 19 volumes. 61st Cong., 2d Sess., Senate Doc. 645. Prepared under the direction of CHARLES P. NEILL, Commissioner of Labor. Vol. XVI. *Family Budgets of Cotton-Mill Workers.* Washington, 1911. Pp. 255.

"The precise character and purpose" of the study of the family budgets among cotton-mill workers in Fall River and the South was to determine inductively from the customs prevailing in the communities selected what is a fair standard of living and what is the minimum standard upon which families in those communities are maintaining physical efficiency.

The main study was confined to 14 families in Fall River and 21 families in the South, and in addition the incomes of 75 families in the South in relation to fair and minimum standards were studied. The value of the study, therefore, limited as it was, lies in the claim of representativeness for the families chosen by the investigators, and in the presentation of numerous and concrete details of their prevailing modes of living, such as daily menus and expenditures for clothing of different members of the families.

The minimum standard of living for a normal family of five was found to be in the South \$408.26. This standard, however, assumes conditions which are practically non-existent. The fair standard, that is, one providing for more than physical efficiency, for the same type of family was \$600.74. But few of the heads of the cotton-mill families earn so much, and even where several members of the family earn wages, they are irregular and fluctuating.

In Fall River the minimum standard was found to be \$484.41, the fair standard, \$690.95. Here the investigation could not be so detailed

as in the case of the South because the absence of company stores made it impossible to gather such definite information as to daily expenditures. But interesting comparisons of housing conditions and menus in the South and in Fall River are made, and estimates of expenditures are given.

FRANCES FENTON BERNARD

GAINESVILLE, FLA.

The Ethics of the Old Testament. By HINCKLEY G. MITCHELL, Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis in Tufts College. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Pp. x+417.

The student of sociology has long needed a work of this kind, whether the need has been of the "long-felt" variety or not. Professor Mitchell takes the Old Testament as a source-book full of material of different ages, according to the analysis of historical criticism, and puts this material on view in the order of its antiquity, with special reference to the moral standards of successive periods. By thus exhibiting Hebrew codes of conduct in chronological rank, the author supplies a treatise on social evolution from the standpoint of the ethical interest. His book, however, is not a history; and hence its full value will not be apparent to one who has had no introduction to the modern way of interpreting the Bible. For this reason, the book should be used along with such works as Henry Preserved Smith's *Old Testament History* and Kent's *History of the Hebrew People*. Equipped with these, and with a good modern translation of the Hebrew text, the sociological student will have the tools which will enable him to go a long way toward handling, in terms of his own discipline, one of the most fascinating problems in human history. Sociologists have long recognized the importance of religion as one of the great moving forces of civilization; and within this field they are bound to be more and more impressed by the need of coming to terms with the Bible in particular as representing the special form of religion which functions at the basis of modern society. In this new adjustment of scholarly interests, Professor Mitchell's book will be of unique value.

LOUIS WALLIS

CHICAGO, ILL.

The Evolution of the Country Community. By WARREN H. WILSON. Chicago: Pilgrim Press, 1912.

The Preface is written by Professor F. H. Giddings, who says of the book: "It would not be possible, I think, to present these two aspects of

the problem of the country parish with more of first hand knowledge, or with more of the wisdom that is born of sympathy and reverence for all that is good in both the past and the present than the reader will find in Dr. Wilson's pages. I welcome and commend this book as a fine product of studies and labors at once scientific and practical." The two aspects mentioned are scientific surveys of conditions and practical efforts to improve them. The author treats subjects of fundamental importance: the various types of farms, economic and technical problems of rural occupations, co-operation, schools, morality, recreation, and common worship. This volume should appear in any select list of books on rural problems.

C. R. HENDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Modern Philanthropy, A Study of Efficient Appealing and Giving.

By WILLIAM H. ALLEN. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1912.

The author of this book follows up his *Efficient Democracy* with a study of 6,000 appeals to Mrs. E. H. Harriman, and a vigorous, nervous, irritating, caustic examination of the present condition of the public mind on the subject of philanthropy. One may quarrel with his style, may question the soundness of some of his generalizations, may raise question marks opposite some of his bold assertions, but no well-informed person can doubt the need of his criticism. He is profoundly right in regarding the work of government as the normal method of achieving the general ends of society, and in declaring that private philanthropy must always regard itself as supplementing the organizations of the collective will. He is entirely right in insisting with vigor and trenchant force that every city should have an impartial and capable budget committee, not merely to describe and criticize existing agencies, but to discover opportunities. Those who are trying to do useful social work will heartily sympathize with the contention that their lives should not be wasted in raising money; that business experience should be devoted to that task. The prospect of establishing a national clearing-house for the collection of information for givers and applicants is good enough to be hopeful. Business men, philanthropists, social workers, clergymen, associations of commerce, leaders of women's clubs, will find this book one of the most stimulating, thought-provoking discussions yet published. It is a small matter whether we agree with the author at every point; the first duty is to weigh his argument for more accurate account of stock and complete survey of social needs.

C. R. HENDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

How to Help. A Manual of Practical Charity. By MARY CONYNGTON. New York: Macmillan, 1913.

This is a reprint of a very useful book published first in 1909 and already familiar to students of relief.

C. R. HENDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Co-operation in New England: Urban and Rural. By JAMES FORD, PH.D. New York: Survey Associates, Inc. Pp. xxi+237. \$1.50 postpaid.

Co-operation is supposed to flourish best in old countries and where the economic necessity for it is greatest. Certainly it has not been a conspicuous success in New England. In spite of the fact that this section has had two perceptible waves of enthusiasm for co-operation, starting in 1845 and 1874 respectively, only seven of the nearly one thousand retail societies founded as a consequence have survived. Though the author's returns probably are not complete—he used the questionnaire method—he was able to find only sixty co-operative retail establishments at the time of his investigation (1911). Co-operative production, in the nature of manufacture, scarcely exists in New England. However, rural co-operative production, marketing, and purchasing (of supplies) societies are having a steady growth, due to the ever-widening abyss between the independent producer's returns and the prices paid by the ultimate consumer. In New England, as in other parts of the country, co-operative creameries appear to lead in rural co-operation. In this section they total 125.

The chief sociological significance of this concise study is to be found in the account of the causes of failure and the suggestions for future methods. The more fundamental causes of failure are lack of sufficient capital, discrimination in selling on the part of the non-co-operative wholesale establishments, the difficulty of getting good managers at small salaries, petty jealousies, lack of loyalty, the giving of credit, short-sighted submission to the machinations of competitors who offer better terms temporarily, favoritism in employing help and the difficulty of dismissing it when found to be inefficient, competition from large-scale, well-organized non-co-operative concerns, the exceptional mobility of our population, the prevalence of opportunity in this country which makes close saving relatively unnecessary, and in many cases the heterogeneity of the population due to immigration. By way of cure the author says:

"These evils can be entirely remedied only by a careful determination of sound co-operative methods, by the training of co-operative managers, and by the unceasing education of all co-operators in the essential spirit and ideals of the movement. Federation of societies is essential to large business and moral success." The author's interest is not alone in the economic success of co-operation, but he believes that it should be the means to "the creation of a constructive environment for the complete life of the citizen—for his leisure as well as his working hours." The study applies only to New England, but its conclusions will be found of value to other sections of the country.

L. L. BERNARD

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

Experiments in Industrial Organization. With a preface by W. J. ASHLEY. By EDWARD CADBURY. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912. Pp. xxi+296. \$1.60.

This book, by the son of one of the founders of Bourneville, a model factory suburb near Birmingham, England, describes the provisions made by this firm for the welfare of its employees. It consists of nine chapters with an appendix and a table on Bourneville Women's Savings and Pension Fund. In the nine chapters the author endeavors to indicate the methods by which the employees are selected, the plans for the education of the employees, the discipline, provisions for health and safety, methods of remuneration, organization of the employees, recreative and social institutions, industrial commissions, and conclusions as to the value of this work. He points out how the employees are very carefully selected, none being employed who have not reached the seventh "standard" in the English school system. Selection is also made on the basis of the character and physical efficiency of the applicant. In this way a careful selection of the employees is made.

The Cadbury Firm of cocoa, chocolate, and candy manufacturers have, in the course of their fifty years' experience, devised classes for the education of their employees. All children under the age of eighteen years are compelled to attend educational classes. Certain courses are marked out, four years in length, which must be followed by these employees. In this connection it may be observed that the courses have definite reference to the particular work which the student is doing, in the case both of boys and of girls. A system of monetary rewards is devised to add an incentive to school work and the remission of certain fees for the educational work is customary in order to incite to better work.

The physical training is also looked after for both the boys and the girls, the time for much of this being taken out of the regular working hours. In addition to these for the younger employees, there are miscellaneous classes for the men and women adults. Gardening classes for boys and girls are also provided. The apprenticeship system is in force in this factory in connection with certain classes for particular trades used in the factory such as card box-making, confectionary, and office organization.

In the matter of discipline the firm has abolished the old-fashioned system of fines and deductions, and depends entirely upon warning, suspension, and in cases where insubordination is due to a run-down or nervous condition, to sending the offender to the firm's convalescent home for a number of weeks until the health is restored. The whole system is based upon the idea of reforming the disobedient employee and fitting him into the system at the works. Instead of fining for spoiled work, dependence is placed entirely upon a record-system and upon paying only for the good work that is done. Under this system, from 161 cases of bad work in 1899, the number decreased to 15 in 1910. Cases of bad conduct have decreased from 700 in 1899 to 48 in 1910. One of the means by which the health and good nature of the employees are secured, especially among the girls in the candy factory, is to have the forewoman of each group of girls lead them in singing every half-hour or so.

The firm provides doctors, nurses, convalescent home, an ambulance, and all the modern appliances for looking after the physical welfare and health of the employees.

The remuneration in this company is based upon the piece-work system. This system is subject to the abuse of having the fastest worker set the pace and grading all the others accordingly as to their wages. If one may trust the writer of this book, this firm does not practice that method. The standard here is not speed but the best method of doing the work. That is, it has been found that speed often leads to poor work, whereas the main thing to be sought is the character of the work done. The firm fixes an adequate minimum wage, taking into account the age of the worker, based upon so many pence per hour. The actual rate fixed is based upon the earnings of the best workers. The firm has devised a system by which the average number of hours' work is forty-eight per week. The firm provides a gift before the annual summer holidays, which consist of ten days at the end of July, so that the employees may get away to the seaside or the country without the loss of a week's wages. The firm also extends the holidays in the case of

those who have worked for the firm one year or longer, on the basis of three working-days for one year's continuous service, six for three years, seven for five years, and one day for every additional five years' service with full pay. A pension scheme is also in force, inaugurated for the men in 1906, and for the women in 1911. All girl and women employees of fifteen years of age and over are eligible. There is also a benefit scheme for sick employees which was superseded by the National Insurance Act which went into effect January 15, 1913. However, the firm continues to pay sick benefits to all boys and girls under sixteen years of age, since they do not receive benefits under the Insurance Act.

The employees are organized and take part in the organization and conduct of the firm. For example, there is a Men's Works Committee, inaugurated in 1905, an Educational Committee, a Suggestion Committee, besides subcommittees dealing with works holidays, accidents, allotment gardens, and sick benefit. In addition there are various committees, like the Summer Party Committee, the Girls' Works Committee, which look after the welfare of the employees and the recreation of the employees of the works.

In these ways the firm has the advantage of suggestions by the employees as to the buildings and other matters which affect the welfare of the employees. The firm provides recreation grounds and buildings. Swimming-tanks, baths, gymnasiums, etc., are also provided for the physical welfare of the employees. In order to enlist the brains of the workers in bettering the organization, a plan is carried out whereby suggestions by the employees are paid for at a certain rate. The workers in the firm are organized into athletic clubs, social clubs, camera clubs, musical societies, a social service league, a holiday excursion league. Libraries are provided, a work people's exposition is held by the employees, and available land owned by the firm not immediately required for the purposes of the business is allotted to the employees for gardens.

To further relieve the monotony of employment, the firm provides for putting the women at more diversified work as they grow in years and experience. Insistence upon the quality of the work rather than upon the amount of work done also tends to break the monotony. Hygienic and clean surroundings are provided, dining-rooms for the employees are furnished, and during the noon meal the pipe organ provided for the works is played. Regularity of employment is provided for by careful organization in order to reduce over-time and short-time work to a minimum. Men and women and boys and girls are kept separate in

the works as far as possible. Thrift is promoted by the provision of a savings fund originated in 1897, on which the depositor receives 5 per cent interest on his savings each year up to £20. At the end of the year the firm transfers this to the post-office savings bank. The Social Service League, organized among the workers, makes the factory a sort of social center for the community. The author concludes that while this factory is not organized definitely for welfare work, as is the case of many factories in America, what the firm does is really more effective welfare work than is accomplished in most cases where a special welfare department is organized. On the whole, his conclusion is that this factory is a model with respect to its relationship to the employees, inasmuch as before the factory acts required it, many provisions that were later enacted into law were provided for the welfare of the women and children. Trade unions are not organized within the works, "because," says the author, "the provisions of the firm for the welfare of the employees are such as make the organization of the workers for their own protection absolutely unnecessary."

The writer treats only incidentally the Bourneville Village Trust, which has grown out of the brains of the owners of this factory and which creates a model village about the factory buildings. One could wish that he had devoted more space to this topic. However, his subject did not permit it and we can be very grateful for the insight which his book gives us into the provisions which an enlightened interest has created in the organization of one great industrial plant. Whether these provisions could be introduced into other lines of business or into even this line of business by a firm just getting established is a question on which the book throws no light. It is a record of an experiment which can be regarded with interest by all those who are concerned in better relationships between employer and employee, and a more humane consideration of the welfare of employees.

J. L. GILLIN

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

The Church and Society. ("American Social Progress" Series.)

By R. FULTON CUTTING, LL.D. New York: Macmillan, 1912. Pp iii-ix+223. \$1.00 net.

The contents of this interesting volume comprise the six Kennedy Lectures for 1912 delivered at the New York School of Philanthropy. These lectures, as stated in the Preface by the author, "are the expansion of an inquiry into the co-operation of organized Christianity with the

civil authority and the influence of such co-operation upon civilization and the church" (p. iii). Like the books of Professors Peabody, Rouschenbusch, Shailer Mathews, Simon N. Potter, and others, it places emphasis upon the church's opportunity for social service in building up a Christian civilization by helping to formulate policies of government to correct the maladjustment of the changing social order. This can be done by the church through co-operation with government in its conduct of the public schools, the police, public health bureaus, child welfare societies, and legislation, and in molding public opinion.

The author is thoroughly sympathetic, and yet frankly critical of the church as a whole for its lack of efficiency in its social program.

The volume has added value by including over forty pages of "Instances and Comments" from the correspondence collected by the author in his inquiry. It will serve as a valuable contribution to the literature that is now awakening the churches to their responsibility for conditions of living in this world.

EDWIN L. EARP

DREW THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Immigration and Labor. The Economic Aspect of European Immigration to the United States. By ISAAC A. HOURWICH, PH.D.
New York and London: Putnam, 1912. Pp. xvii+544.
\$2.50.

In his book on *Immigration and Labor* Dr. Hourwich has replied to the Immigration Commission and attempted to prove that free and unrestricted immigration has been and is wise for the United States. Partisan in its attitude, the book may be considered as a valuable antidote for partisan advocacy of restriction. It is well that we have such a compulsion to renewed and more careful analysis of this great national problem.

It may fairly be said that Dr. Hourwich has demonstrated that popular opinion and charity publications more than fifty years ago were as fearful and contemptuous of the Germans and the Irish as their descendants today are of the Slavs, Italians, and Jews. And since these latter races start from no lower depths, it is reasonable to hope and expect for them a rise to equal heights. But after we grant an equal capacity to the new immigrant, we still have certain questions to settle, such as the wisdom of the volume of immigration sixty years ago, and, more importantly, the comparative standards of immigrant and native

then and now, and the different conditions into which the immigrant now comes. What was wise then might not be wise today.

The chief contention of the book, however, is that the coming of the European laborer has not been disadvantageous to the native wage-earner. Dr. Hourwich's argument is a clever, however unconscious, combination of clear reasoning and sophistical dialectics. If the reader is not careful he will find himself believing that decrease of unemployment accompanied by heavy immigration in prosperous years means that immigration does not contribute to unemployment, that relatively higher wages in cities (where immigrants abound) than in rural districts (which are largely native) prove that immigration does not retard wages, and that because "scarcity of labor has not forced the farmer to pay scarcity wages, but has merely retarded the growth of farming," therefore a restriction of immigrations would similarly retard manufacturing and mining.

Not less specious is the claim that because there are substantially as many native laborers in leading industries today as there were a generation ago, therefore there has been no supplanting of native by foreign labor. An expanding industry would normally mean a proportionately expanded body of native workers. The argument to the effect that there is an irreducible proportion of labor doomed to unemployment and that therefore the restriction of immigration would not reduce the proportion of unemployment is scarcely less inconclusive. If he would make his comparisons on pauperism within the age groups chiefly filled by immigrants he would abandon his contention that immigration does not contribute an undue proportion of dependency, and if he would carry his quotation from Miss Claghorn to its logical conclusion he would realize that the recent races have not been in this country long enough to contribute their proportion of pauperism.

The book as a whole, however, is a plea for national prosperity based upon a rapidly expanding or dynamic industry. His fundamental weakness, if weakness it be, lies in his assumption that an inexhaustible labor supply is the chief factor that makes possible a dynamic industrial order. He argues that the coming of the immigrant provides for our phenomenal growth in the volume of industry, that it adds proportionately nothing to the volume of unemployment, supplants no native labor, does not adversely affect wages, creates official and skilled positions in definite proportion to the growth of unskilled workers, pushes the natives, the aristocracy of labor, forward and upward to these higher positions, and multiplies the wealth which gradually forces wages up.

We need an analysis of the forces which make industry dynamic. Mere expansion does not measure up to the concept of dynamic development. We are looking for such a continuous reorganization or readjustment of industry as shall give an ever-increasing productivity and an ever-higher degree of welfare to the industrial producers. Dr. Hourwich seems to think our prosperity has been conditioned by the mobility of migrant labor, but on the whole does not seem to get beyond the philosophy on p. 4 that "in the long run immigration adjusts itself to the demand for labor." This phrase suggests that migration is effect rather than cause, and it also suggests the constant tendency toward equilibrium upon the customary bases. An indefinitely expansive labor supply tends to a uniform relation of supply and demand in the labor market and therefore tends to a uniform rather than to an advancing rate of wages. Dr. Hourwich has not convinced all of us that the volume of immigration is always adjusted to the point where the maximum prosperity and development of the United States is assured. We still need some interpretation of the dynamic forces in the industrial world which shall tell us to what extent and in what volume immigrant labor is a national benefit.

In conclusion it should be recognized that we can have the most complete confidence in the capacity of the newer immigrant races and that we can most earnestly desire the highest welfare both of the United States and of all the races of the world, and still believe most heartily in some restriction of immigration.

FAYETTE AVERY MCKENZIE

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

Historical Sociology. A textbook of politics. By FRANK GRANGER, Professor in University College, Nottingham. London: Methnew & Co. Ltd.; New York: imported by E. P. Dutton & Co. Pp. 241. \$1.35 net.

This is an attempt to base a textbook in politics upon the *Scienza Nuova* of Vico. The keynote is given in the following sentences: "We observe, says Vico, that all nations, both savage and civilized, have these three human customs: that they all have some religion, all contract solemn matrimony, all bury their dead. Therefore we have taken these three eternal and universal customs for the three principles of this science."

The result, as might have been expected, is thin and unsubstantial.

VICTOR E. HELLEBERG

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

The Immigrant Invasion. By FRANK JULIAN WARNE, PH.D. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1913. Pp. 336. \$2.50.

This book by Dr. Warne, special expert on foreign-born population, United States Census, 1910, presents a study of the problem of immigration from the statistical standpoint. At the same time, it is evidently written for the public at large and betrays a conscious attempt at literary effect. To the student of immigration, however, the carefully worked-out statistical charts and the employment of the criterion of the number of foreign born in this country for the purpose of comparing the new with the old immigration will prove helpful. Among the suggestive discussions in the book are the following: the interrelation of the volume of immigration with periods of industrial depression, both as cause and effect; and the influence of the activity of steamship companies in augmenting immigration. The conclusion of Dr. Warne is that unless effective restriction measures are enacted by Congress the immigration from Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and the Balkan peninsula will continue indefinitely, and that to preserve the American standard of living, the immigrant invasion must be regulated by adequate restriction. Two of the best chapters in the book, "The South and Immigration" and "Standards of Living," are condensed and revised from two previous books by the same writer.

ERNEST W. BURGESS

TOLEDO UNIVERSITY

The Sociological Value of Christianity. By GEORGES CHATTERTON-HILL. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1912. 7s. 6d. net.

This volume represents religion as "suprarational," imposed on the individual and his reason from without, and resting solely on authority. It is "a social creation, created by society with a view to safeguarding its own interests as against the individual" (p. 40). The individual in primitive society comes only gradually to a consciousness of himself as an individual "and not merely as a member of a social aggregate." The development of this consciousness together with the exercise of reflective and critical powers results in individualism, which, for the author, is synonymous with egoism. The same process results, on the other hand, in a weakening of social control. Collective representations, customs, taboos, and the various other regulations become inadequate to preserve the integrity of society against the disintegrating forces of the ever-strengthening egoism. In sheer self-defense the "social mind"

(something *sui generis*, an independent reality) creates moral and religious beliefs and laws whose essential nature and purpose it is to repress the natural impulses of individuals and to subject these to the interests of society. Since social regulations as such have lost their power, the social mind can accomplish its purposes only by sharply sundering religion from the realm of the merely social and projecting it into a transcendent realm, the domain of the Absolute. To this "the human reason cannot penetrate" (p. 37). Only by thus taking away "from the individual all possibility of discussion" (p. 37), can religion maintain itself against dread "rationalism," or the criticism of reason, and only thus, therefore, can the safety and perpetuity of society and of social control be assured.

So far, then, from growing up out of the needs and life-experiences of individuals, as is often maintained, religion brings but repression, suffering, and the sword to individuals. Christianity itself "never stops to consider individual interests" (p. 174); "the Christian ideal offers to the individual nothing in this life but suffering" (p. 202). The keener psychological insight of Christianity above that of other religions is apparent in its recognition that the only motives of the individual are egoistic and that it is to these therefore that religion must make its appeal if it would be obeyed and maintained. Hence, in return for the sacrifices and sufferings which it entails on the individual in this life, Christianity holds out the hope of eternal rewards in a life beyond. "Egotism is combated by an appeal to egotism; and this is, in truth, the only way in which egotism can be combated in the rationalized individual" (p. 161).

A further corollary of Dr. Chatterton-Hill's argument is that the hierarchy and theology of the Catholic church alone are justifiable from a sociological point of view. The emphasis laid by Protestantism on reason and on conscience frees the individual to do as he pleases and the resulting egoism "leads directly to self-destruction and to social disintegration" (p. 223). Besides suppressing efficacious moral control over the individual, Protestantism reduces his duties to a minimum. For example, "Protestantism attaches no importance whatsoever to chastity; it permits its ministers to marry; it contents itself with condemning adultery, but apparently attaches little importance, if any, to the sexual intercourse of unmarried persons" (p. 147). Moreover, the fact that Protestant churches remain shut throughout the week is evidence that "Protestants are not supposed to have any religious wants during the week; if they have, it is considered improper and they must restrain them" (p. 227). In a similar manner the author defends the

hierarchical form of the Catholic church against all who preach equality and democracy. Those who champion these latter doctrines are either weaklings or persons who seek to gain some personal advantage. In his tirades against "the humanitarianism of the Beecher-Stowe type, that delights in hypocritical effusions over good-for-nothing niggers," the author reminds one forcibly of Nietzsche. Of course, this writer also comes in for his share of criticism, however, although it should be added that the points urged in this connection are much more defensible than many other parts of the volume.

Too much space has been taken up in exposition to permit of extended criticism. We would suggest, however, that one may have an appreciation of the historical significance and importance of mediaeval thought without attaching much value to present-day discussions that rest on its presuppositions and fail to reckon with recent psychology or the point of view of almost the whole of modern philosophy. The Chatterton-Hill's volume, moreover, is not sufficiently empirical in spirit or in method to warrant the attention of the sociologist.

EDWARD L. SCHAUB

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

Race Suicide. By M. S. ISEMAN, M.D. New York: The Cosmopolitan Press. Pp. 216.

This is a book by a writer who has familiarized himself with a considerable portion of the literature of the population question, statistical and otherwise, and yet does not show sure ability to distinguish between fact and surmise. The larger portion of the book is taken up with a discussion of the extent of abortion in different countries and in different sections of the United States. Undoubtedly a medical man will have somewhat more insight into certain conditions leading to race suicide than will the layman, but Dr. Iseman's view of the facts is far from convincing, and his interpretation of the results and ethical bearing of race suicide in the aggregate is uncertain. Until he reaches his final chapter on "The Remedy," he seems to take the conventional position that any interference with the birth-rate is necessarily uneconomic, immoral, and dangerous to the future ascendancy of any nation that permits it. This is especially noteworthy in his discussion of the declining birth-rate in France. The author could have written a scientific book, apparently, but he has marred this one with moral and rhetorical homilies, possibly desirable in their place but out of place here. In his final chapter he shows much sanity. "While it is unquestionably woman's mission"

he says, "to bring children into the world, it is debatable whether under all circumstances it is her duty to do so. Obligation to self is just as necessary in woman as in man, and where the bearing of offspring is detrimental to her interests abortion will continue to be her refuge where other methods of avoidance have failed. . . . At no time should woman be sacrificed to sex, and for twenty-five years—the average period of her fertility—be condemned to carry a child either in her arms or in futurity." It is refreshing to find a writer, and especially a medical man, approaching this whole subject, even belatedly in his last chapter, with a recognition of the individuality and personality of woman as part of the problem. To regard women chiefly as means to an end, "the race," is an attitude taken by most popular writers, and not a few supposedly scientific ones, and it is an attitude of which we should begin to grow weary.

A. B. WOLFE

OBERLIN COLLEGE

The Milk Question. The Northwestern University N. W. Harris Lectures for 1912. By M. J. ROSENAU. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1912. Pp. xiv+310. \$2.00.

This book is a notable one for several reasons. In the first place, the author, a man of high scientific standing, as shown by the fact that he has been director of the Hygiene Laboratory of the Public Health and Marine Hospital Service at Washington, D.C., and is now professor of preventive medicine and hygiene at Harvard Medical School, is able to treat a subject which has many technical phases in a manner perfectly intelligible and interesting to the layman. In the second place, although the author is an expert and an enthusiast on the sanitary aspects of the subject, he is quite able to see that it has economic, social, and commercial implications which must not be overlooked. In the third place, Dr. Rosenau's attitude is in refreshing contrast to much that is written today in a pseudo-hygienic spirit about the "milk peril." He says, for example, with reference to certain typical cartoons: "Such pictures probably do more harm than good, for they give an exaggerated notion of the danger in milk. This one gives the impression that every portion of milk is a portion of poison. Such overstatements are unfortunate, for common experience teaches that this cannot be true" (opposite p. 5). Or: "Such illustrations have the unhappy effect of deterring people from using milk at all" (opposite p. 9). Or: "Newspaper campaigns sometimes confuse, often react, and thus may actually

impede rather than help the final solution. Real progress in this case can only be achieved through patient, well-considered, and persistent effort that will gradually give us what we want; namely, clean, fresh and safe milk."

The various chapters treat of general considerations, milk as a food, dirty milk, diseases caused by infected milk, clean milk, pasteurization, infant mortality, and the commercial aspect which deals with farmer, retailer, and consumer. An excellent list of references is given, although it is to be regretted that no mention is made of the recent admirable contributions to the subject made by Professor E. O. Jordan of the University of Chicago. A few criticisms might be made but they would seem like quibbles in the light of the general excellence of the book.

The conclusions of Dr. Rosenau may well be quoted, viz.:

THE SOLUTION OF THE MILK PROBLEM

To keep milk clean we need inspection. To render milk safe, we need pasteurization.

Inspection goes to the root of the problem. Through an efficient system of inspection, the milk supply should be cleaner, better, fresher, and safer. Inspection, however, has limitations. These limitations may be guarded against by pasteurization.

A milk supply, therefore, that is both supervised and pasteurized is the only satisfactory solution of the problem.

MARION TALBOT

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Heredity and Eugenics. A Course of Lectures Summarizing Recent Advances in Knowledge in Variation, Heredity, and Evolution and Its Relation to Plant, Animal, and Human Improvement and Welfare. By WILLIAM ERNEST CASTLE, JOHN MERLE COULTER, CHARLES BENEDICT DAVENPORT, EDWARD MURRAY EAST, and WILLIAM LAWRENCE TOWER. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1912. Pp. vii+315.

This volume presents a series of nine lectures on evolution and heredity which were delivered at the University of Chicago during the summer of 1911. The lectures were intended to inform those who are not specialists in biology, and they are for the most part reasonably popular expositions of their topics.

Professor Coulter, in the introductory lecture, "Recent Developments in Heredity and Evolution," sketches the history of the conceptions of evolution and heredity, and thus presents the background for the more special lectures which follow. His treatment of the explanations of evolution, of biometry, and of heredity are brief and to the point.

In the second of his two lectures, Professor Coulter discusses "The Physical Basis of Heredity and Evolution from the Cytological Standpoint." After certain introductory remarks concerning the phenomena of heredity, he describes admirably the several methods of reproduction in plants, concluding with the statement:

The whole history of sexual reproduction among plants indicates that its primary significance is not reproduction, for probably many more individuals are produced by vegetative multiplication and by spores than by the sex act. This would mean that the sexual method is chiefly concerned with other results, which are secured in connection with reproduction. These results seem to be the continual securing of new combinations, and new combinations certainly make for evolutionary progress [p. 35].

This idea is doubtless new to many persons who are keenly interested in the phenomena of heredity.

In two lectures, Professor Castle deals with "The Method of Evolution" and "Heredity and Sex." Under the first title, he contrasts the Darwinian view of species production with the more recent Mendelian view. After presenting certain of the essential facts of Mendelism, he proceeds to show that it is possible by selection to produce new types of organism.

His attitude toward the two schools of evolutionists, which he chooses to contrast, is well indicated by the following statements:

Now I am inclined to think that Darwin was on the whole nearer the truth than the mutationists. They have perceived a half-truth and perceived it more clearly than did Darwin, but in scrutinizing this they have lost sight of the larger picture which he saw. Darwin saw that new races arise in two ways, and I shall attempt to show that he was right [p. 40].

In concluding the chapter, Professor Castle writes significantly thus:

From the evidence in hand we conclude that Darwin was right in assigning great importance to selection in evolution; that progress results not merely from sorting out particular combinations of large and striking unit-characters, but also from the selection of slight differences in the potentiality of gametes representing the same unit-character combinations.

Accordingly we conclude that the unit-characters are not unchangeable. They can be modified, and these modifications come about in more than a single way. Occasionally a unit-character is lost altogether or profoundly

modified at a single step. This is mutation. But more frequent and more important, probably, are slight, scarcely noticeable modifications of unit-characters that afford a basis for a slow alteration of the race by selection. Mutation, then, is true, but it is a half-truth; selection is the other and equally important half of the truth of evolution, as Darwin saw it and as we see it [p. 61].

The discussion of heredity and sex is limited to remarks on the history of our knowledge of sex determination and to an admirable presentation of the results of recent experimental studies of this subject.

The discussion is summarized thus in the concluding paragraphs of the lecture:

If, as has been suggested, the determination of sex in general depends upon the inheritance of a Mendelian factor differentiating the sexes, it is highly improbable that the breeder will ever be able to control sex. Male and female zygotes should forever continue to be produced in approximate equality, and consistent inequality of male and female births could result only from greater mortality on the part of one sort of zygote than of the other. Only in parthenogenesis can man at will control sex, and until he can produce artificial parthenogenesis in the higher animals, he can scarcely hope to control sex in such animals.

Negative as are the results of our study of sex control, they are perhaps not wholly without practical value. It is something to know our limitations. We may thus save time from useless attempts at controlling what is uncontrollable and devote it to more profitable employments [p. 79].

The lectures of Professor East are devoted to "Inheritance in the Higher Plants" and "The Application of Biological Principles to Plant Breeding." He describes at some length the Mendelian behavior of organisms, and in concluding his first lecture he briefly discusses Johannsen's "genotype conception of heredity." His attitude toward this conception is thus expressed:

One may question the stability of unit-characters as does Castle, but I cannot see how this affects the truth of the genotype conception as a help toward an idea of the process of heredity. Stability is a relative thing. . . . The important point as the foundation of the modern view of heredity I give in Johannsen's own words: "Personal qualities are the *reactions of the gametes joining to form a zygote*; but the nature of the gametes is not determined by the personal qualities of the parents or ancestors in question [p. 112].

In his lecture on applications, Professor East ably discusses the importance of hybridization in plant breeding, basing his arguments chiefly upon results obtained with maize and tobacco.

A single lecture given by Professor Tower appears in the volume as an extended discussion of "Recent Advances and the Present State of

Knowledge concerning the Modification of the Germinal Constitution of Organisms by Experimental Processes." This single lecture, in its printed form, occupies 125 pages, and it is the only chapter of the book whose appearance is likely to repel the layman. In spite, however, of its technical appearance and its somewhat detailed presentation of experimental facts, it is an eminently readable and valuable contribution.

Professor Tower has with admirable system and skill discussed the several important aspects of modification of the germinal cells by extra-germinal conditions. The problem, as he states it, is to produce "somatic variations" in a soma at such a time, or in such a fashion, that the germ cells will not be affected by the *action of the incident forces used*, and then by breeding discover if the change appears in the progeny arising from the unstimulated germs. Evidence of somatic influence upon germinal material may also be obtained by transplanting germ glands, especially ovaries, into different somas, as has been done by several experimenters [p. 146].

Under the heading of "The Direct Modification of the Germ Plasm," DeVries' observations on *Oenothera* are described with numerous and excellent illustrations. But the lecturer illustrates most of his points from his own extended study of the potato beetle.

To the student of heredity, Professor Tower's lecture is sure to be the most stimulating of this group, for it suggests innumerable problems and opens up new vistas of research.

The concluding lectures of the volume are those of Professor Davenport on "The Inheritance of Physical and Mental Traits of Man and Their Application to Eugenics" and "The Geography of Man in Relation to Eugenics." Like the other lecturers, with the possible exception of Professor Tower, Professor Davenport has made no attempt to offer new materials in these lectures. His is a popular exposition of the facts of heredity in man with strong emphasis upon their social bearings.

In the first lecture, he presents, with conciseness, and convincingness, evidence of the transmissibility of a variety of physical and mental characters in man. The list includes such characters as presenile cataract, diabetes, albinism, deaf-mutism, feeble-mindedness, artistic ability, and color-blindness.

In the second lecture, are presented many interesting facts concerning the relation of geographical distribution and physiographic barriers to heredity and eugenics. Thus it is shown that rivers and mountain ranges may have much to do with the development of desirable or undesirable characteristics in a community. Isolation is singled out as an important condition of race deterioration.

But a still more interesting portion of this lecture, which seems to the reviewer of extreme eugenic value, deals with "The Influence of the Single Germ Plasm on the Race." Under this title, are described the family of Elizabeth Tuttle, certain of the first families of Virginia and of the Kentucky aristocracy, and finally, by way of contrast, the Jukes family, and the Ishmaelites.

All who are socially minded will sympathize with Professor Davenport and find deep significance in his exclamation: "Ah, that, in the hordes pressing at the gate at Ellis Island, we could distinguish the John Prestons from the Ben Ishmaels of the future!" (p. 308).

This, the final lecture of the volume, is concluded by a concise history of the eugenics movement in America.

ROBERT M. YERKES

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Early Man in South America. By ALEŠ HRDLÍČKA (in collaboration with W. H. HOLMES, BAILEY WILLIS, FRED EUGENE WRIGHT, and CLARENCE N. FENNER). Bulletin 52. Bureau of American Ethnology. Washington: Government Printing office, 1912. 8vo, pp. xv+405.

For a long time past, a claim for man's great antiquity in South America has been made. The earlier evidence presented came from Brazil, the later from Argentina. That from Brazil, though presented on fair authority, has always been shaky and insecure; that from Argentina, on account of its mass, its diversity, its geographical range, its presentation by a man with reputation as a palaeontologist, has gained considerable consideration and has been accepted by some European authorities of weight. The man to whom we chiefly owe the Argentinian claim is Florentino Ameghino. He has proposed a classification of geological formations running back from modern time to the Upper Eocene, from which, at various levels, he has secured industrial vestiges, human remains, and the remains of man's precursors. As the result of finds already made, he has developed a scheme of human evolution which has been widely quoted. He claims that remains have been discovered, not only of several species of man besides *Homo sapiens*, but also of at least two genera of man's precursors. He has introduced the names *Homo Caputinclinatus*, *Homo sinemento*, *Homo pampaeus* (= *Prothomo*), *Diprothomo platensis*, *Tetraprothomo argentinus* for his new forms. By the term *Prothomo*, he means a form one step removed

from *Homo*; by *Diprothomo*, a form two steps back; by *Tetraprothomo*, one four steps back. These he claims to know. *Triprothomo* of course comes in between *Diprothomo* and *Tetraprothomo*, but has not yet been found. The theoretical importance of the occurrence of such a series of human and pre-human forms within a single area, a thing unparalleled elsewhere, could not be overemphasized. Such a wealth of forms in Argentina would speak loudly in favor of the South American continent as the original home of the *Hominidae*. This was clearly appreciated by Ameghino who, in recently announcing a sixth "hominien," says: "These six species of *hominien*s, cantoned in the same country, prove with all the eloquence of facts without appeal, that here exists the centre of origin, diversification, and dispersion of the human genus."

It is necessary then that these discoveries and claims receive critical examination. In 1910, Aleš Hrdlička visited Argentina and had the opportunity to study for himself the formations from which these remains were taken, the remains themselves, and the various industrial vestiges, which, found and described by Ameghino and others, had been considered ancient. Dr. Hrdlička was fortunate in having with him a competent geologist, Mr. Bailey Willis, who has had especial experience in the study of such loose, unconsolidated, easily shifted, aeolian, lacustrine, and fluvial deposits as are here in question. Hrdlička and Willis together visited the very sites from which the famous finds were taken, handled and studied the remains themselves, collected industrial vestiges for themselves *in situ*, reached their own conclusions. These are of the highest importance and significance. Let us look at them in detail. The industrial vestiges from Argentinan deposits are (a) baked earth or *tierra cocida*, (b) scoriae, (c) used or worked stones, (d) used or worked bones. Our authors decide that the *tierra cocida* and the scoriae are due to purely natural causes, not to fires artificially produced by man. The used or worked stones and bones are found in situations which suggest no great antiquity and comparison of them with objects of relatively recent Indian fabrication shows identity with them; there are, indeed, some local differences in these finds, but these suggest at most mere tribal differences between the makers; nothing was found to indicate a marked difference in culture, or a serious antiquity. Examination of the localities, where the famous remains were found leaves strong doubt of the great age of any of Ameghino's species of *Homo*. The specimens themselves, when critically examined, do not warrant the establishment of new species for any of them. All are plainly *Homo*—*Homo sapiens*—and *Homo sapiens* of a clearly marked South American Indian type.

One can but be convinced of this the moment that careful measurements are made of the specimens and an exact and rigid comparison established between them and modern Indian remains. As to the precursors—*Dipprothomo* and *Tetraprothomo*—the case is startling. The piece upon which the genus *Dipprothomo* is founded is a skull fragment. Ameghino apparently placed it for study upon any flat supporting surface; from it he made a full description of a “precursor” far lower than any human type now known, lower than *Pithecanthropus* itself. Hrdlička says that when he really saw and handled the specimen his “first impression amounted to incredulity as to its being the relic in question.” It is no precursor; when properly oriented and carefully compared with human skulls, it is plainly human. Not only so but it is a fragment of the skull of “a well developed and physically modern-like human individual.” It presents some peculiarities but they are of secondary importance and do not even warrant the separation of the skull from probable reference to an American Indian. As to *Tetraprothomo*, this precursorial genus of Ameghino is based upon two bones found at Monte Hermoso—an atlas and a femur. If the two bones come from a single individual it would indeed be different from *Homo sapiens*. The atlas presents some actually striking features. Hrdlička carefully compares it with a series of Indian atlases. He decides that it is human, modern, from a short and probably thickset man. Were similar atlases found in number, they might perhaps suggest a distinct human variety; the simple specimen does not warrant even such an assumption. The femur, referred by Ameghino to *Tetraprothomo*, proves to be that of a carnivore, probably a cat form, and has no “hominien” importance.

As is seen, Hrdlicka's book is one of destructive criticism. It is always an unpleasant task to tear down what another has reared in good faith; it is seldom done in entire kindness and courtesy. Hrdlička shows both qualities but he has done his work thoroughly. It is possible that from our brief notice one might think our author stands alone in his work of criticism, or that he has neglected the bibliography of his subject. Far from it; he is by no means the only opponent of Ameghino's views and in his discussion he makes a full presentation of the literature of the subject as he takes up point after point. But Hrdlička is actually the only worker, who has taken up *all the evidence* in detail, subjected it to exhaustive critical treatment, and reached definite conclusions.

FREDERICK STARR

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The first number of *The Quarterly Journal of the Society of American Indians* lies before us and is a document of exceptional significance. The society is a national organization, active membership in which is restricted to American Indians. "It proposes to bring together all progressive Indians and friends of Indian progress for the purpose of promoting the highest interests of the race and individual." It aims to develop the highest and best in Indian character in such a way as to enable the race to hold its own and to make its contribution to our American life and civilization. The movement—for it is a movement—took form in 1911, at the Ohio State University, when on invitation of Professor F. A. McKenzie, its first annual conference was held. The second conference was held last year at the same place. It was a notable gathering, in which educated and progressive members of the red race met with white friends to consult upon plans and methods of advancement. The objects of the Society are:

First: To promote and co-operate with all efforts looking to the advancement of the Indian in enlightenment which leave him free as a man to develop according to the natural laws of social evolution.

Second: To provide through our open conferences the means of a free discussion on all subjects bearing on the welfare of the race.

Third: To present in a just light the true history of the race, to preserve its records and emulate its distinguishing virtues.

Fourth: To promote citizenship and to obtain the rights thereof.

Fifth: To establish a legal department to investigate Indian problems and to suggest and to obtain remedies.

Sixth: To exercise the right to oppose any movement that may be detrimental to the race.

Seventh: To direct its energies exclusively to general principles and universal interests and not allow itself to be used for any personal or private interest.

Three classes of members are recognized—*active*, adult persons of Indian blood; *junior active*, Indians below twenty-one years of age; *associate*, persons not Indian but friends of the Indian-American. The society will maintain a *Quarterly Journal* which will cost \$1.00 per year to members, \$1.50 to outsiders. It is to be under the editorial management of Mr. Arthur C. Parker, a Seneca Indian, who is well known for his archaeological and historical investigations. The first number is a handsomely printed pamphlet of almost one hundred pages, containing a number of the addresses given last fall at the conference, summary of the conference proceedings, notes and comments, etc. Carefully

prepared articles are here printed, written by Indians of seven different tribes, and the reader can but be impressed by their serious, thoughtful and earnest character. The society has established head-quarters at Washington, D.C. (Barrister Building), where Mr. Parker has his offices, both as editor of the journal and secretary-treasurer of the society. Among the various matters now occupying the society's attention is the observance of a holiday to be known as *American Indian Day*. It is suggested that October 12 (Discovery Day) would be an appropriate date and the society urges its celebration "by schools, colleges, historical and fraternal organizations, and by the body of citizens generally." On such a holiday the true character and status of the Indian, past and present, might be fittingly presented to the American people. This society and its *Quarterly Journal* deserve much more than a half-hearted encouragement. It needs a large, active, and interested, body of associate members.

FREDERICK STARR

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

American Bad Boys in the Making. By A. H. STEWART, M.D.
New York: The Bookery, 13 East 38th Street. Pp. 241.

The author of this book, which consists chiefly of articles and addresses written and delivered from time to time, was assistant warden at the Kentucky penitentiary for three years. He states as the purpose of the book a desire "to awaken parents to a realization of the appalling record made by our boys in the criminal annals of the country." He contends that the influence of heredity is exaggerated, and that it is a mistake to regard crime as amenable only to repression and intimidation.

A personal inspection of more than half of the 119 county jails in Kentucky led him to regard most of these jails as "loathesome disease and crime breeding dens maintained at public expense," in which old and young offenders are herded together in the most dangerous promiscuity. In the state prison conditions were scarcely better.

Nor does the author confine himself to a criticism of conditions in Kentucky, as the following extracts indicate: "Many of our so-called reformatories are reformatories in name only." "Incompetency and cruelty still exist in many institutions supposed to be conducted according to the most modern reformatory methods." "I visited the prisons and reformatories in sixteen of our states and in many instances I found that the severest punishment was regularly inflicted on small boys in state institutions." "The monotonous, red tape and cold mechanical

process so prevalent in many industrial schools and eleemosynary institutions may produce human machines, but certainly not well-rounded citizens. The disproportionate number of delinquents found among those reared in orphans' homes show that children are not adapted to any wholesale plan of bringing up."

The chapters on the influence of age on conduct and on the relation of sex to conduct contain nothing that is new in the literature of these topics. The same may be said of the chapter on the relation of mind and body to character. All three subjects, however, are treated in an interesting popular style. The sections relating to the influence of heredity compared with that of environment constitute an eloquent, though not always convincing, plea for a larger recognition of the power of environment to overcome even the most noxious hereditary influences.

The sections relating to the relaxation of home discipline and to schools fix a large degree of responsibility upon the modern home and the modern school for the poor adaptation of the younger generation to the real needs of present society. It is pointed out that physical culture should occupy a more prominent place in education, from the kindergarten to the college; that play is of the greatest hygienic and social value; that our lack of respect for law and order is a serious menace to democratic institutions; and that the prevention of crime is wiser than repression.

The book as a whole constitutes a popular exposition, based upon familiar sources of information and upon some of the author's own experiences, of the newer preventive and reformatory criminology, with particular reference to that juvenile delinquency for which our present social order or disorder is so largely responsible.

C. W. A. VEDITZ

WASHINGTON, D.C.

History of the Supreme Court of the United States. By GUSTAVUS MYERS. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1912.

This is a valuable book notwithstanding the dogmatic viewpoint and the plain purpose of the author to condemn the federal Supreme Court as simply a tool of the interests.

One good thing is the pointing out to historians and others of the many selfish and partisan acts of a tribunal that has seldom been described in other language than that of fulsome praise and adoration. The country needs to know about the frailties of judges who have hitherto been vaunted or beyond the pale of ordinary human experience.

From the beginning there has been a tendency on the part of historians and of laymen, especially the wealthy, to make the Supreme Court a sort of divinity which cannot err and which shall not be criticized. The nationalists have done this because the court in its early career always decided against the states; while the land speculators, the builders of interstate railways, and the heads of great corporations have done the same thing because federal courts were thought to be a safer resort than those of the states.

The method of Mr. Myers' work is to study first the recommendations of each judge when he was appointed to office, then to study the reports of special committees of Congress investigating matters that afterward came before the court for settlement, and finally to follow up the history of the great suits that have been determined by the court. In this report the book is a decided addition to our historical literatures. If one wants to know the antecedents of the men who have composed the Supreme Court Myers will prove a ready help. To know judge Marshall's connection with land speculators, even if harmless in so far as he was personally involved, helps one to understand the case of *Hunter vs. Martin's lessees*. To have the documents in hand which show Story's bids toward banks and the privilege-seeking classes is an aid to the understanding of many a decision. And when one comes to the railroad era it is still better to know the history of each judge when he was appointed to office, to know his clients and his connections with corporations or director or other official.

All this Myers gives, and he names the places, dates, and volumes of the many documents in which his evidence is to be located. Every page bears its footnote as citation and one is convinced that there are vast storehouses of historical material in Washington or in the archives of the states which have never been explored by those who have written the history of the country or the biographies of the justices.

The result of Myers' work, however, is whole condemnation of the court. It is and has always been an engine of class aggrandizement, a powerful aristocratic organization, composed in the main of unaristocratic men, working ceaselessly to undermine whatever of democracy there was originally in this country. Such complete and overwhelming condemnation is unhistorical and it tends to vitiate the valuable parts of the book. No good author seeks to prove too much—it is sometimes said that a good historian seeks to prove nothing, but simply presents the evidence of what has happened in brief and digested form. Certainly this book fails when measured by such a standard. Inferences are drawn

conclusions set down which are unjust sometimes to the characters under consideration.

Aside from this the work is of great value. Its bold presentations and analysis of evidence seldom used, its short histories of the judges, of the party affiliations and business connections are all of utmost importance to him who wants to know the truth and where to find it in case of need. What the reviewer warns the reader or the librarian against is the conclusions oft times drawn, the inferences and interpretations. The Supreme Court still lacks a history in the full sense; Myers suggests and emphasizes the need of some broad, full work covering the whole subject.

WILLIAM E. DODD

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Bulletin de l'Office de la protection de l'enfance. Bruxelles, 1913.

The royal commission on patronage enters upon the administration of the new Belgian juvenile court law with the publication of an organ which is to appear quarterly. The first numbers give the law and various documents and addresses in explanation.

C. R. HENDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Social Welfare in New Zealand. The Result of Twenty Years of Progressive Social Legislation and Its Significance for the United States and Other Countries. By HUGH H. LUSK. New York: Sturgis & Walton Co., 1913. \$1.50.

This book, written by a former member of the New Zealand parliament, presents a quite enthusiastic account and sympathetic interpretation of the social legislation in New Zealand during the past twenty years. Successive chapters describe with some detail the progress of this young commonwealth of scarce a million people toward state socialism by means of significant beginnings in land nationalization, the achievement of a forty-four-hour week for workmen, compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes, old-age pensions, universal suffrage, state ownership of public utilities, such as railroads, telegraph, telephones, and coal-mines, state insurance, and postal savings banks. The writer evidently regards New Zealand as an experiment station for the world in social legislation, and makes the pertinent suggestion that United States with its numerous self-governing states offers an inviting field for further experimentation in state socialism of the New Zealand type.

ERNEST W. BURGESS

TOLEDO UNIVERSITY

The Economic Utilization of History and Other Economic Studies.

By HENRY W. FARNUM. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1913. Pp. viii+220. \$1.25 net.

This little volume contains, in revised form, several addresses which have been given by Professor Farnum in recent years. The presidential address given at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association in 1911 occupies the first three chapters and supplies the title for the book. Other chapters contain the presidential addresses given before the American Association for Labor Legislation in 1908, 1909, and 1910; and before the Connecticut Conference of Charities and Correction in 1911. One article from the *Yale Review* is included also.

The central thought of the titular address is that history should be utilized as the laboratory of the economist, where the records of the past may be studied with a view to discovering the operation of economic forces. In the remainder of the book this thesis is illustrated, though not directly applied, in the brief but interesting chapters on labor legislation, business organization, and charity. In each of these fields, as well as in many others, there is need of more complete knowledge of, and sympathy with, social facts and forces. Mere knowledge, without sympathy, tends to indifference; while an excess of sympathy without adequate knowledge breeds sensationalism. The great problem of the constructive worker is to steer a middle course between indifference on the one hand and sensationalism on the other to the attainment of practical results by scientific methods. Professor Farnum's emphasis of this problem is timely, and the only regret is that he has confined himself to so brief a treatment of a theme at once so promising and so suggestive.

H. L. LUTZ

OBERLIN COLLEGE

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

Les conditions biologiques de la timidité.—In social contacts we expose ourselves to the possibility of a depreciative judgment, and consequently to a partial destruction of ourselves. Physical danger is definitely limited in time and space, but an unfavorable opinion may last indefinitely and be communicated to others. Intimidation is essentially a powerlessness to assert oneself in the presence of another and to win his respect. It is a consciousness of threatened annihilation of a part of the self, and consciousness of inability to control the situation. Severe or repeated experiences of intimidation may give rise to a permanent phobia of social contacts. This is what we mean by timidity.—L. Dupuis, *Revue philosophique*, August, 1912.
S. A. Q.

The Origin of Totemism.—Convinced of the futility of the search for the specific character of first origins, we simply assume that there was a simple beginning. The many features of a totemic complex certainly did not appear all at once, but one by one, or possibly in small groups. It may be that they all made their first appearance in the same clan, or it may be that they had a varied origin. At all events they spread by waves of diffusion from clan to clan until they fused into the complex known as totemism. This is the pattern theory of the origin of totemism.—A. A. Goldenweiser, *American Anthropologist*, October–December, 1912.
S. A. Q.

Magical Factors in the First Development of Human Labor.—Labor in the sense of a continuous, purposive, and organized activity is not much engaged in by primitive peoples. But when it does occur, it is impregnated with magical elements for the control of the weather, movements of the stars, reproduction of plants and animals, sickness, death, etc. Dancing and music are the magical instruments *par excellence*, and hence among the earliest forms of labor.—Felix Krueger, *American Journal of Psychology*, April, 1913.
S. A. Q.

Report of Experiments at the State Reformatory at Bedford, New York.—In 1910 six weeks were spent in psychological tests upon certain of the inmates to find out whether it would be possible to frame a practical set of tests which would, upon application to a given girl, determine whether she represented the grade of normality necessary to receive benefit from the educational work of this institution, or to be safely set free after her term was over. Thirty-five girls were tested in reaction-time, memory, attention, and direct and indirect suggestibility. The results were sufficiently successful to bring about the installation of a resident psychologist.—Eleanor Rowland, *Psychological Clinic*, May, 1913.
S. A. Q.

Political and Economic Interpretations of Jurisprudence.—There are two prevailing types of interpretations of the law. The one is historical, idealistic, and political. The other is mechanical and economic. The political interpretation fails when put to the test of application to the facts of Anglo-American law, and the economic interpretation fails even more when applied to the traditional element of legal systems. Each interpretation is too narrow for the legal science of today.—Roscoe Pond, *American Political Science Review* (Supplement), February, 1913.
V. W. B.

Ethischer Individualismus und soziale Reform in England.—*Laissez faire* in English industry has persisted, re-enforced by the individualistic ethical standards of the Calvinists and other dissenters. But in recent years there has been a tendency to organize industry on a more social basis and subject it to state regulation. The laws and reforms in regard to the land question, the labor question, poor relief, workmen's insurance, and monopolies, the social conception of the educational problem,

and the attitude of the churches toward social reforms are evidences of progress from an individualistic to a social standard. There is, however, a strong counter-movement in favor of *laissez faire* and individualism that is being led by many conservative newspapers and business people.—Herman Levy, *Schmoller's Jahrbuch*, Heft 1, 1913.

V. W. B.

The Revival of the Village.—Country village life and occupations develop a human type whose existence is of importance to the nation and of value for stocking the large cities. The revival of the village, therefore, should be considered as a matter of national importance. For the revival of the village, attempts should be made (1) to deal, through acts of Parliament, with land and housing conditions; (2) to revive village handicrafts; (3) to revive old songs and dances and to stimulate interest in social life; (4) to induce villagers to co-operate for common purposes, such as credit, buying and selling, joint holding of land to be severally cultivated, and the building and ownership of cottages.—Sybella Branford, *Sociological Review*, January, 1913.

V. W. B.

Le chômage et l'assistance aux chômeurs dans l'Inde Britannique.—There is in India no unemployment in the occidental sense of the word, but there is much suffering due to the failures in agriculture, and consequent to that the depressions in dependent industries, such as weaving. In order to save life and to enable the people to resume the ordinary pursuits, various public measures have been taken to mitigate distress and to prevent such famines. In addition to the extension of the water supply through irrigation works, the improvements in methods of agriculture and trade, and the provision of cheap capital by co-operative credit societies of the Raiffeisen type, there has been a system of insurance against famines. This famine relief began in 1878, when it was made a regular part of the public charges.—C. R. Henderson, *Bulletin trimestriel de l'association internationale pour la lutte contre le chômage*, Janvier-Mars, 1913.

E. H. S.

The Contest against Criminality. Investigation and Probation Work in Sweden.—There has been in Sweden no public provision for prisoners released under suspended sentences, though there have been voluntary probation officers since 1902 for juveniles, and since 1906 for adults who have been finally released. In 1910 the Protection Society (*Skyddsvärnet*) was formed, with the purpose of investigation of the cases for suspended sentence and the supervision of those liberated under such sentence. The municipality of Stockholm and the state have granted subventions to this society. But the officers serve gratuitously, and, since there is no law on this subject, supervision must be accepted voluntarily by those under suspended sentence.—Harold Salomon, Reprint from *Journal of the Protection Society (Skyddsvärnet)*, April, 1913.

E. H. S.

Industrial Insurance and Child Welfare.—Industrial insurance may benefit children directly, or indirectly—through benefits conferred on the parents. The latter are probably the more important. Maternity insurance produces largest results. Good laws exist in England and Germany. Halle grants lactation premiums to mothers who nurse their own babies. Invalidity insurance brings large social and economic benefits. A few of the more important direct benefits are: (1) encouragement of prophylactic measures against the ailments of children, notably the Central Association for Public Welfare in Hanover and a network of "schools for mothers" in England; (2) special benefits for tuberculous children; (3) provision of special institutions other than sanatoria for children; (4) pensions for children; (5) medical inspection of school children; (6) supplementary voluntary insurance.—R. Murray Leslie, *Journal of State Medicine*, April, 1913.

R. F. C.

The Negro: His Relation to Public Health in the South.—The Negroes have a material and vitiating effect on the progress of any community in public health matters. They are a menace as a source and disseminator of infection. Their average mortality, in Jacksonville, 1908-11, was 23.2 per thousand against 15.2 for whites; birth-rate 16.79 for Negroes, 17.85 for whites, or, adding still-births 21.91 for Negroes, 19.26 for whites. An important factor is the practice of midwifery. In 1910-11,

51.7 per cent of all births were attended by Negroe midwives. They belong, usually, to the most ignorant type of Negroes. To require the most simple evidence of understanding of their calling would at once disbar them all from practice. Negroes are most inadequately supplied with efficient medical attention. Preventable diseases cause 42.5 per cent of Negro deaths as against 32.1 per cent of white deaths. A colored health improvement association and the employment of a well-trained colored nurse for district work under the supervision of the health department have worked well in Jacksonville. This work needs to be extended.—C. E. Terry, *American Journal of Public Health*, April, 1913.

R. F. C.

The Sanitary Supervision of Prostitution at Bremen.—Suppression of prostitution is impossible. The only hope is to reduce the damage connected with prostitution. Efforts should include improved conditions of livelihood and dwellings, instruction of the population on sexual life and the dangers of sexual diseases, perfection of medical education and experience, and control and sanitary treatment. The Bremen system of internments has been most successful. One small street was placed exclusively at the disposal of the police for housing the prostitutes. The houses are carefully regulated, and the street guarded. Periodical medical examinations are required. Girls are admitted only of their own free will and on application; examination must show them to be perfectly healthy and strong. The proportion of sexually diseased or suspicious cases is very much less than among secret prostitutes and the frequency is being greatly reduced. All women suspected of secret prostitution are arrested and examined by the police. If found guilty they are sent to the medical health officer for examination and punished after having, in case of infectious condition, been treated at the hospital compulsorily until cured.—Kreisarzt Dr. Weidanz, *Journal of State Medicine*, April, 1913.

R. F. C.

Saving the Backward School Child.—Nervous and mental diseases due to eye-strain are rapidly increasing with a frightful growth in the general morbidity rates. A bulletin of the United States Bureau of Education says that 25 per cent or about 500,000 of the school children in this country have defective vision, and 75 per cent need attention for physical defects which are prejudicial to health and which are partially or completely remediable. Experiments by Dr. W. M. Richards, in New York City, in examination and treatment were highly successful in their results. Principles and practice of refraction are not adequately and correctly taught in medical colleges.—George M. Gould, M.D., *Journal American Medical Association*, April 5, 1913.

R. F. C.

Room Overcrowding and the Lodger Evil.—No serious attempt has been made in America to cope with this problem. We are without accurate information as to the extent, causes, and effects of the evil, which is especially manifest among certain groups of immigrants. The desire rapidly to acquire money and racial solidarity are large factors. The real evil in America lies in the practice of taking lodgers and boarders and in the lack of proper housing accommodations for the newly arrived single immigrant. The evil effects are physical, moral, civic, social, industrial, and economic. Boston and New York are the only cities that have made serious efforts to solve the problem, and their methods have been ineffective. The general public and the minor courts must be educated with regard to the evil. The landlord, not the tenant, should be held primarily responsible for the taking of lodgers and boarders into an apartment without written consent of health officials.—Lawrence Veiller, *American Journal of Public Health*, January, 1913.

R. F. C.

The Principle of the Minimum Wage.—The policy of the minimum wage includes three different policies aiming at different ends and susceptible of defense and attack along different lines: (1) The subsistence minimum. This rests upon the doctrine that in every community there is a certain minimum standard of well-being below which the life of no member ought to be allowed to fall. A minimum wage, however, carries no pledge of continuous employment and it is inadequate unless the rate varies with the size and character of the family. The enforcement of a minimum rate in respect to workers whose efficiency was not before high enough to be worth that rate will

act, in the main, to throw these workers out of employment. (2) The inter-personal equality minimum. This is advocated as a means of promoting equality among efficiency wages paid to different people at the same time. The conclusion in regard to the effect of enforced equalization of efficiency wage-rates in cases where existing inequalities correspond to inequalities of marginal net products is that, where methods of engaging people are of a casual, unsystematic type, equalization is likely to prove socially injurious; but that where these methods are of the concentrated type it is certain to prove socially beneficial. (3) The inter-temporal equality minimum. This is advocated as a means to promote equality among the efficiency wages paid to the same people at different times. This doctrine that economic welfare is in general fostered by anything that renders individual income more stable is a valid one. As a means to secure this stability there must be a minimum time-wage along side the piece-wage to be paid to those workmen to whom the piece-wage scheme would at any time award less than the defined sum.—A. C. Pigou, *Nineteenth Century*, March, 1913. J. H. K.

Some Dangers in the Present Movement for Industrial Education.—A scheme of industrial education proposed for adoption by the next legislature of the state of Illinois has several fundamentally bad features associated with it. The scheme proposes a separate state commission of vocational education, thus dividing and duplicating the whole administrative educational machinery. The scheme also tends to paralyze modern movements for the vitalizing of the academic education through the introduction of manual training, industrial, and social activities. The proposed segregation will work disastrously for the true interests of the pupils who attend the so-called vocational schools. It could not give the pupils a knowledge of industry in relation to "science, art, and society," but would aim at increased efficiency in certain lines. This enthusiasm for vocational guidance should rather exhibit itself, first, by encouraging the children to stay in school and fit themselves for work where there are genuine openings ahead; second, by guiding public opinion to modify the school work so that it shall have more real connection with social opportunity; third, by providing supplementary agencies so that children when they do leave school to go out to work shall continue under educational supervision.—John Dewey, *Child Labor Bulletin*, February, 1913. J. H. K.

Unit Accounting in Social Work.—Social workers are today concerned with a close-range study of facts which will lead the way to effective local social administration. It is more and more clearly understood that the local neighborhood is the true unit of constructive social effort. There is strong demand for ordered information as to this subsection of society. It is very desirable that the national and state census should give local and detailed statistics and tabulations for the small areas. The local registration of all marriages, births, diseases, and deaths should provide specific exposition in terms of social geography and classification by age, sex, and nationality. All moral statistics should contain details as to precise local environments even to specification of individual houses. One of the first results of such an analytical method in applied statistics would be to make a better proportioned and adjusted service in the city departments. Such information is indispensable to charity societies, social service commissions, municipal administrators, and state legislators. Such knowledge would also bring about a much more effective form of co-operation between these different local neighborhoods and between the districts of a city.—Robert A. Woods, *American Statistical Association*, March, 1913. J. H. K.

Recent Changes in the Composition of the Population of the United States.—This article deals only with recent changes in regard to sex, age, and marital conditions as shown by the census of 1910. The proportion of males in continental United States is shown to be greater by over a million than that recorded at any previous census. The number of states to show an excess of females is diminishing. This seems due to the unprecedented immigration of the past decade together with the extremely large proportion of males in the immigration. The states with the smallest proportion of males show an increase in the proportion since 1900, but the states with the largest proportion of males have in many cases shown a decrease in this proportion. There has been a decrease since 1900 in the proportion of the population in the early-age

groups and an increase in the upper-age groups, the foreign-born whites being the only exception. The proportion of married is higher in the age periods of early middle life and lower in the advanced ages. This would indicate a tendency to earlier marriages, although the proportion single in advanced ages is greater than in 1890 or in 1900.—William B. Bailey, *American Statistical Association*, March, 1913. J. H. K.

Wandlungen und Entwicklungstendenzen in der deutschen Auswanderung.—The traditional definition of emigration as the surrender of one's entire economic existence in his native country with a view to permanent settlement in another is no longer adequate to characterize present-day German emigration. This is becoming part of a world-wide phenomenon of the migratory movement of labor between countries, following the fluctuations of economic opportunity. The change demands a corresponding modification of the conception of emigration and an adaptation of statistics to the new conditions. This may be accomplished either by distinguishing between temporary and permanent emigrants, or by supplementing the existing emigration statistics by re-migration statistics. The latter procedure is recommended.—Dr. W. Moenckmeier, *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, March, 1913. P. W.

Zur historischen Analyse des Patriotismus.—The rise of patriotism is a relatively recent phenomenon. Ecclesiastical loyalties and conflicts retarded the formation of a national consciousness in western Europe until the end of the seventeenth century and later. The sense of linguistic and cultural unity emerges gradually, and patriotism attaches to ethnic nationality and to civil liberty. In modern states patriotism is colored politically where several nationalities are comprised in one state, ethnically where state and nationality coincide. The industrial revolution and the consequent creation of an international proletariat for a time impeded the growth of patriotism by substituting class for country; but the other result of capitalistic industry—imperialism—is a species of patriotism. The form which patriotism takes varies with the particular environment of a people, and the evolutions the concept has undergone in the course of centuries prove that it is not an ethical postulate but a historic necessity of every period, which it is every thinking man's duty to analyze for himself.—Robert Michels, *Archiv für Sozial-Wissenschaft und Sozial-Politik*, January–March, 1913. P. W.

Über die idioplasmatischen Ursachen der physiologischen und pathologischen Sexualcharaktere des Menschen.—For the scientific biologist the question no longer is: How are acquired characteristics transmitted? but: How are hereditary characteristics acquired? And the answer is: By means of non-teleological factors operative in the environment. The concept of the pathological is a relative one, implying life in the margin of the zone of adaptation. Adaptation is itself relative to a given environment. From the standpoint of eugenics there can be no objection to inbreeding. The interest of the race lies not in obscuring pathological tendencies but in their elimination. A thoroughgoing racial hygiene is realized neither by crossing with sound stock nor by sterilization and prohibition of marriage, but solely by positive selection of healthy idioplasmic stocks, i.e., by aiding these through social legislation in collecting and increasing until they displace the pathological ones.—Dr. Fritz Lenz, *Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschaftsbiologie*, September–October, 1912. P. W.

Crime et altruisme.—It seems a paradox to associate two words as diverse in meaning as crime and altruism, but if we adopt a point of view strictly utilitarian the anomaly disappears. Affection and sympathy are motives which dominate many of the crimes against property. Some of the most celebrated assassins have been characterized by a passionate love of family and delicate sentiments of refinement. Religious fanatics have believed they were doing God's will when they slaughtered those of alien faiths. Many times loved ones have been slaughtered by their nearest of kin, who truly believed that by the act they were pleasing their Deity. Altruistic impulses move those who take human lives in order that their victims may be spared earthly pain. Mothers have slain their children to shield them from a burden of disgrace which would be inevitable should they live. And instances are by no means lacking

of persons being dispatched by sympathetic friends because they were burdened with great physical or mental distress. The numerous illustrations of cases such as the foregoing show emphatically the dominating force of fixed ideas—ideas which may in themselves be altruistic, but which may be easily pushed to a conclusion most criminal.—Ch. Vallon et G. Genil-Perrin, *Archiv d'anthropologie criminelle*, February 15, 1913.
E. E. E.

Riddles of the Ten'a Indians.—During the six months preceding the winter solstice the Ten'a Indians of Alaska spend their evenings in story-telling; during the other six months the stories are displaced by riddles, in the belief that the days will be lengthened by this means. These riddles have been handed down through many generations and are a part of their folk-lore; consequently the answers are frequently no more than mere memory work. For these riddles they possess a language apart from that ordinarily used in daily life. Unless one guesses the exact answer that is in the propounder's mind, he is adjudged incorrect, even though his answer may fairly fulfil the conditions of the riddle. A hint at the proper answer is sometimes conveyed in the question itself.—Father Julius Jette, *Anthropos*, January-February, 1913.
E. E. E.

The Trade Union Attitude toward Prison Labor.—The trade unionist insists that the convict's labor should not be performed for the private profit of a contractor; but if profit is to be secured, it should go to those dependent on him and to the state. The so-called trades taught in penal institutions do not educate the prisoner and train him to work as a mechanic after his release. Convict labor should be employed in public highway construction, or in providing agricultural products for eleemosynary institutions, in which there will be a minimum of competition with free labor.—John P. Frey, *Annals of American Academy*, March, 1913.
R. E. S.

The Theory of the Suffrage.—There are five distinct theories of the suffrage which have been used to explain or justify various electoral systems: (1) the primitive tribal theory that voting is a necessary attribute of membership in the state and that suffrage is an adjunct and function of citizenship; (2) the feudal theory that the suffrage is a vested privilege usually attached to the possession of land; (3) the theory of the early constitutional régime that voting is an abstract right founded in natural law, a consequence of the social compact, and an incident of popular sovereignty; (4) the modern scientific theory that voting is a public office, a function of government; and (5) the ethical theory that voting is an important and essential means for the development of the individual character.—W. J. Shephard, *Annals of American Academy*, February, 1913.
R. E. S.

A Measure of the Manner of Living.—There should be a measure of the manner of living in order to determine the adequacy of household furnishings to the end of carrying on the fundamental living processes in accordance with a certain arbitrary standard of decency and propriety. Such a standard could be formed by giving weights to various articles of furniture in the kitchen, dining-room, bedroom and parlor.—C. A. Perry, *American Statistical Association*, March, 1913.
R. E. S.

Is Insanity on the Increase?—Within the last thirty years there has been a steady increase of registered insanity in England and Wales. The causes of this increase are: (1) the diminution of unregistered insanity and the increase of asylum accommodations; (2) the collective responsibility which has replaced family responsibility; (3) the steady diminution of discharge of patients as recovered. Consequently the increase of registered insanity does not prove that insanity is on the increase. Unsuitable mating and environmental conditions tend to revive a latent neuropathic tendency of the stock, or to develop the first forms of nervous degeneracy. Social conditions play an important part in producing insanity.—F. W. Mott, *Sociological Review*, January, 1913.
R. E. S.

Berufswahl und Berufsschicksal des modernen Industriearbeiters.—The selection of workers in modern industry is made according to age, environment in youth,

qualification; and working power. This selection is essentially the same for all industries studied, but is modified by the size and form of the business. Discussion of the effects upon the laborer of the work, forms of payment, division of labor, and rest-periods are to be continued in a later number.—Marie Bernays, *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, July, 1912. S. A. Q.

Konsumvereinbewegung und Volkswirtschaft.—The recent fiscal policy of Hamburg in imposing a tax upon consumers' co-operative societies is not only contrary to sound economic and legal principles, but is also a political mistake. The advantages of co-operative enterprises are many: (1) living expenses are reduced and (2) commodities of better quality and unadulterated are produced; (3) such societies have moral and cultural significance; (4) they promote the common welfare of their members by providing insurance and other benefit schemes; (5) they foster diligence, saving and business experience. The savings which enable the society to return dividends to its members are obtained by cash trading and sales, by elimination of the retail dealer's profit, etc. Of all taxes that on "sales" is conceded to be the most unjust and oppressive. The effect of taxing co-operative societies will be to reduce the dividends of the poorest class, since this class especially avails itself of these societies, and it will increase the burden of taxation of this class in proportion to the other classes. The tendency of this act will be to change the form of organization to evade paying taxes, or to increase the number of retail merchants. How will the interest of the middle class dealer then be protected?—W. Krüger, *Annalen des deutschen Reichs*, No. 6, 1912. Y. S.

Ein Seminar für Soziologie, Politik und Ethik an der Universität Jassy.—A seminar has been formed in the University of Jassy in sociology, political science, and ethics under the conviction that these social sciences constitute a single science, and with a new thesis in regard to the general nature of seminar work. The general portion of the work of the seminar is on the subject of scientific law in the social sciences. The particular work of the individual student consists in the preparation of a monograph on a particular village, in which the student makes a critical study of all the social activities of the village. This trains the student for scientific work in all the social sciences.—Demetrius Gusti, *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie*, Heft II, 1912. E. H. S.

A Psychological Definition of Religion.—An accurate definition must be broad enough to include every conceivable form of religion and sufficiently narrow and specific to exclude everything not properly religious. With these requirements in mind the following definition is offered: "Religion is the endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values through specific actions that are believed to evoke some agency different from the ordinary ego of the individual, or from other merely human beings, and that imply a feeling of dependence upon this agency."—William K. Wright, *American Journal of Theology*, July, 1912. G. T. J.

Economic Theory of a Legal Minimum Wage.—Sixteen years' actual experience of the legal minimum wage in Victoria, have brought ruin neither to the employer nor to the operative. Where a common minimum rate has been fixed: (1) competition for employment has not been abolished; (2) industrial and moral efficiency of the operative and the productivity of industry have increased; (3) invention and adaption of new processes of industry have been stimulated, causing a consequent tendency for it to be carried on under more advantageous conditions and so to increase the nation's productivity; (4) the community becomes insured against the evils of industrial parasitism; (5) rather than an increase in the amount of maintenance of abnormal individuals by the community, there has been a positive increase in demand for labor. A joint board of operatives and employers of the whole trade to fix minimum standard is recommended.—Sidney Webb, *Journal of Political Economy*, December, 1912. R. E. S.

Agriculture and a Minimum Wage.—The a priori right of the state to fix a minimum wage for agricultural laborers is based on their helplessness considered from the point of view of organization. There are three possibilities in regard to the

problem of deterioration: (1) improved efficiency resulting from an increase of wages; (2) an increase in wages followed by no improvement in efficiency; (3) improvement in the skill and energy of farmers. Small holdings would obviate the difficulty of unemployment.—Reginald Lennard, *Economic Review*, October, 1912. R. E. S.

Syndicalism and Socialism.—Syndicalism and socialism are derived from the same situation—the universal discontent of workingmen. This discontent is due to economic injustice, education, and the sympathy of the church. The ultimate goals of syndicalism and socialism are different, though their genesis is the same. Syndicalism would make the operative in each group politically and economically supreme, and would eliminate the employer, for labor has been kept from its fair reward. But this attitude of syndicalism cannot be justified, for the organization of labor and legislation have effected an approximate equilibrium of economic forces. The remedy for their attitude lies in an investigation of the facts, and the cultivation of sympathy based on knowledge.—J. A. R. Marriott, *Nineteenth Century*, November, 1912. R. E. S.

Socialism in California Municipalities.—The California Socialist party in local politics stands for "immediate demands." The local campaigns have not been struggles between Socialism and Capitalism, but have been general discussions of Socialist doctrines, and the issues have been those which stood for a reform program, for an extension of city activities and powers, for public ownership, and for clean government. The Socialist vote has almost trebled itself since 1908. This increase has been due to popular dissatisfaction with current political and administrative conditions, the socialist periodicals, and the McNamara trial. Party victories and the actual work being done by successful candidates can be noticed by reviewing the situation at Berkeley, Los Angeles, San Bernardino, Santa Cruz, Daly, etc. The ability and personality of the Socialist candidates have been powerful factors in the local success of the party.—Ira B. Cross, *National Municipal Review*, October, 1912. R. E. S.

L'assistance par le travail.—Dr. Édouard Courmouls-Houlès has published a large work entitled *L'assistance par le travail*, in which he favors a plan by which the state shall come to the aid of its workmen, especially when they are thrown out of employment or are laboring for an inadequate wage. The theories of the book are impractical and chimerical, for the introduction of machinery is a benefit rather than a detriment to the laborer, and indiscriminate charity serves no lasting purpose in solving the problem of pauperism, but often encourages a class of professional loafers and vagabonds. Dr. Courmouls-Houlès is more of a solidarist than a collectivist and the solidarists are not to be counted on to help solve the problem of the unemployed.—Georges de Nouvion, *Journal des économistes*, August 15, 1912. E. E. E.

Sozialreform und öffentliche Meinung in England.—In the general strikes of 1912 the laborers have demanded (a) recognition of the union, (b) exclusive union labor, and (c) a minimum wage. The settlement of the controversy was submitted to arbitration in parliament and a bill was passed which established: (a) a joint district wage board, composed of miners and mine-owners in equal numbers, the duty of which should be to draw up a graduated minimum-wage scale, and general district instructions for the regularity of work, and its efficiency, and for the provision for old-age and emergency insurance; (b) a standard of private rights, namely, the laborer may demand payment of the minimum wage, the employer is not obliged to hire anyone willing to work for the minimum wage, and both employers and laborers are allowed to fight for other wage laws by strikes or shut-outs. The reform movements of recent years indicate that the conservatives fight against the general principle of recognizing laborers; the laborer as a party fails to hold to any fundamental principle; the general public concedes that the strike is a necessary weapon for reform, but prefers arbitration as more efficient; socialism, liberalism, and syndicalism are especially important.—Mary Agnes Hamilton, *Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Sozialpolitik und Verwaltung*, IV. Heft, 1912. V. W. B.

Massnahmen zur Verhütung von Betriebsunfällen, Gewerbekrankheiten und Volkskrankheiten.—Great emphasis should be placed on measures for the prevention

of accidents and occupational diseases—increase and improvement of preventive regulations, development of the technique of protecting labor, disseminating knowledge of protective acts by means of books, journals, conferences, expositions, museums, etc. Expert supervision is indispensable. Attention must be given to the construction and method of employment of industrial apparatus. Penalties should be imposed for selling machinery which does not comply with the safety requirements. The co-operation of the workmen is highly desirable. Merely publishing or posting the regulations is not sufficient. Workmen must be aroused to active interest by means of workmen's committees, frequent conferences, traveling exhibitions, etc. Regulations should be scientifically and systematically prepared.—Dr. Konrad Hartmann. *Bulletin des assurances sociales*, 1912, Supplement. R. F. C.

Grundsätze des Heilverfahrens in der Sozialversicherung, insbesondere auch bei Betriebsunfällen, Gewerbekrankheiten und Volkskrankheiten.—Medical treatment and preventive measures are the principal tasks of social insurance, the payment of indemnities is only of secondary importance. The object, in medical treatment, should be the complete restoration of the earning power. Patients, physicians, and insurance societies must co-operate. The treatment must be prompt and energetic, each case individualized, specialists employed when needed, special hospitals and sanatoria provided, contagious disease cases isolated, dispensaries established. There should also be established institutions for the general improvement of the public health—workmen's homes, workmen's gardens, rest stations, etc.—Dr. Klein, *Bulletin des assurances sociales*, 1912, Supplement. R. F. C.

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JULIUS LIPPERT

AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH¹

After the publication of Sumner's *Folkways*, in 1907, the editors of the then *Yale Review* were anxious to secure a good review of that book. I was commissioned to consult Sumner on the matter. He never paid much attention to reviews, but he said he would not mind knowing what somebody like Lippert thought of the *Folkways*. I then wrote to Lippert, stating the case and explaining the high regard which Sumner had felt and had instilled in us all here at Yale for the *Kulturgeschichte*. I received a very kindly letter from Lippert, in which he expressed great interest in the book we wished to refer to him, and promised to write a brief article on it if his advanced age and invalidism permitted. This review was never written, for, as I have since learned from Lippert's daughter, sufferings grew on him apace and he died after an operation to relieve bladder troubles, on November 12, 1909.

After the death of his wife, referred to in the autobiographical sketch, and of the husband of his daughter, Lippert went to live with this daughter, so that she knew much of his mental activities during his later years. She reports that he was deeply interested in Sumner's book, but that, aside from his illness, he was impeded from carrying out his purpose of writing by the slowness with which he read English.

I have received within the last week a letter from a man whom Lippert seems to have aided in his extremities, inclosing two encouraging

¹ This translation from *Deutsche Arbeit*, Jahrgang 1905-6, is published at the suggestion of Professor A. G. Keller. At the request of the editors Professor Keller contributed the introductory note.

notes from Lippert, and warmly appreciative of the essentially helpful and kindly nature of the dead author. It has been a great gratification to me to find that a scientist, for whose intellect I cherished so high a regard, was also worthy of high esteem as a simple, helpful man.

A. G. KELLER

I was born in the old cloth-manufacturing town of Braunau in Bohemia April 12, 1839. At that time the town was governed by the Benedictine foundation of the same name. My father, Vinzenz Lippert, had migrated as a clothmaker from Freiwaldau in Silesia, and then became an apprentice as a member of the household of the clothmaker, John Mendel. The presence in the same household of Josepha Schön, who afterward became my mother, accounts for this arrangement. The Schön family came from old settlers in Hermsdorf in the Braunau countryside. As was so often the case, the linen trade lured the family into the town. The cholera scourge which broke out at the beginning of the thirties of the nineteenth century bereft my mother of parents and older brothers and sisters. The orphan had found a home in the family of the clothmaker.

My father took over from Mendel—with debts, of course—the shop, and after the death of the daughter Agnes also the house, 211 Niedergasse. To this daughter long unmarried, later Frau Janauschk, I owe a large part of my education. My mother's feeble health, and my father's submersion in his work often compelled them to intrust me to the care of this "aunt." She well represented a culture of the well-to-do class of the time which furnished me more stimulus than could have been afforded by the narrow conditions of my own home, particularly in view of the depression then beginning in the cloth industry. Before I was old enough to enter school, her father, living in comfortable retirement, had not only been glad to keep me occupied in his little garden which was a model of cultivation, but he had taken me into the shops of all sorts of artisans and had taken delight in my zeal for knowledge. The daughter, who was not without literary culture, continued the work in other directions.

It was not at all unwelcome to her that my father decided me to be too weak for his trade, and I owe it to her influence that in

my twelfth year I was sent to the Benedictine *Gymnasium*, which at that time consisted of four classes. After the custom of the time the secret thought in my parents' minds in adopting this course was of the clerical calling, which to them meant at the same time membership of the ruling class. "There is nothing better," said my by no means bigoted father, "when you open your eyes in the morning a twenty piece is already lying on the table!" Deep piety drew my mother in the same direction. From that time the family of the notary, Eppinger, in which I was welcomed as the comrade of the boys, exercised various beneficial influences upon me, and I was very impressionable.

While I was in the third grade my father died. The complete collapse of cloth-making in Braunau and the expenses of the long sickness had almost exhausted the family resources, and my mother also wasted away after several painful years. A Saxon scholarship yielding eighty gulden enabled me to pursue my studies and caused me to enter the higher *Gymnasium* at Prague. Under great deprivations—my physical appearance and my meager costume did not make me a preferred creditor of student benefactions—I attended the university, hearing first law under Brinz and Schulte, then philosophy, history, and the German language under Volkmann, Höfler, and Kelle, with paternal advice about tributary subjects from Tomek, who was a not infrequent visitor in Braunau.

Volkmann's "Tuesday" brought me into relations of friendship with Dr. Dressler, Philipp Knoll, Leo Nagel, Pickert, Wiechowsky, and Ludwig Schlesinger. In another direction and mostly in connection with a younger element, I formed friendships by means of the newly organized union "Teutonia," to which I belonged as a senior for some semesters, and by means of the newly awakened fraternity life in general. From such sources sprang my early friendly relations with Gustav Laube, the lawyer Alfred Goldschmid, and others. Together with Wiechowsky, Schlesinger, and Hallwich I became a founder of the *Verein für Geschichte der Deutschen in Böhmen*, which brought me into connection with J. V. Grohmann, Jos. Bayer, and Banhans. Under the auspices of this youthful organization, and supplied with a traveling stipend of twenty gulden, in the same year in which I was preparing for

the state examination for appointment as *Gymnasium* teacher, I undertook a survey of the city archives of Trautenau. In this work I was at all events not assisted by the chief magistrate of the town, Dr. Porák. The outcome of this voluntary enterprise, guided by no competent adviser, was the schoolboyish work now forgotten, *Geschichte von Trautenau*. Other apprentice works brought me into relations of friendship with D. Kuh, the benevolent encourager of ambitious students.

My "economic situation" in 1863 was such that it was out of the question for me to proceed to a university degree. I successfully passed the test for fitness as a *Gymnasium* teacher, and Professor Höfler so warmly recommended me to the city council of Leitmeritz that in the same year I was appointed to a position in its newly established *Oberrealschule*. The finances of the town were in a condition very much like my own, and the salary promised was only six hundred florins, with an additional one hundred florins as soon as the town should win a suit then in court over a bridge claim. The town was prudent enough to lose the case.

Nevertheless I had to forego the customary recourse to tutoring for increase of my income. I was impelled to devote all my leisure time to examination of the city archives, the treasures of which were at that time in the most miserable state of preservation imaginable. On the other hand I was favored with more gracious treatment by the city council than had been my previous lot in Trautenau. As outcome of my studies there appeared in 1871 my *Geschichte der Stadt Leitmeritz*.¹ Whatever estimate be passed upon the results of these studies, with which I must now group those to which I was stimulated during my preparatory period by the old town record of Braunau, for me they had the one great value that they taught me to penetrate through the historical phrase to the literal ground of facts. I ceased to "learn" history from the top downward, and I began, within narrow limits to be sure, to construct it from the bottom. This also corresponded with a talent which from childhood I thought I discovered in myself. With retentive memory, and with still more active observing powers, I

¹ In der III. Abteilung der "*Beiträge zur Geschichte Böhmens*", herausgegeben von dem Vereine für die Geschichte der Deutschen in Böhmen."

was from the outset beaten in the routine of learning lessons by less talented pupils. While I was carrying on my studies in Leitmeritz, there was before my mind as ultimate purpose a vision of a *Geschichte des Bürgertums in Böhmen*, but the course of my life and especially the bread-and-butter problem, which always had a certain share in shaping the former factor, deflected me from that goal.

In the early spring of 1865 I entered into matrimony with Malwine Fridrich, with whom I had become acquainted in Braunau. She was the daughter of a Vienna merchant who had carried on a linen business in Abtsdorf, which had been caught and wrecked in the swirl of the war year 1859. Whatever was thereby lost to the new household was amply offset by my brave wife during nearly forty years of faithful and conscientious fulfilment of her marriage vows.

In addition to the studies named, and to instruction of classes always overfilled with ninety to one hundred pupils, I was occupied not only with minor contributions to the *Mitteilungen* of the *Geschichtsverein*, but also with the political and especially the politico-pedagogical questions that were at the time eagerly pressing for solution.

I undertook to deliver the address at the first *Wanderversammlung* of the historical society mentioned. The meeting was held by invitation at Leitmeritz, and in company with Dr. J. V. Grohmann and Dr. Heinrich Stradal, later Bürgermeister of Leitmeritz, I organized there the first "political union." Then, with the essay on the new public-school law I opened the long-drawn-out series of discourses of the "German Union for Dissemination of Knowledge Useful to the Public." For a long time my pen was in the service of that movement.

At that time the German representatives in the town organization of Budweis, which was at that time already somewhat affected by a national reaction, were planning an ambitious reform of the seriously demoralized public-school system. The scheme took as its basis the new public-school law, and was developed in the spirit of its progressive principles, the application of which had been very fragmentary and grudging. As director of a new public school of twenty-two classes for boys and girls, I attempted, under the

stimulus of the popular movement, the work of reorganization which amounted to a re-creation of the Budweis school system. I concentrated all my energies upon this task, at the same time I devoted every free hour to supplementary instruction of the teaching force which gave me its full confidence, and to collection, with as little outlay as possible, of material for observation instruction. Incidentally I learned the preparation of specimens and modeling. In a few years I had completed the reconstruction to my own satisfaction, and as I believe to that of the authorities. At least I could not infer the contrary from my appointment as second vice-chairman of the *Prüfungskommission für Volks- und Bürgerschulen*. At all events it may be mentioned that, in the most influential of the school boards of the time, the influence of Father Maresch, who was opposed to the spirit of the new public-school law, was eliminated so far as the *Volksschule* was concerned, and against his wish he was assigned to inspection of the *Realschule*.

When I reconsider my attitude at that time from the standpoint of my subsequent experience, I discover the one mistake that, filled with the spirit of the law, I believed that in all those cases which were not placed beyond the range of doubt by subsequent ordinance, this "spirit" was necessarily decisive. Perhaps I occasionally fell under the second error that I identified my own spirit with the spirit of the law. On one occasion an employee of the mayor's office, where I often had business—I remember neither the name nor the rank of the man—warned me to this effect: "You are on the wrong track. The best way in a public office is to do only just enough to keep from being fired. Anything more than that is all to the bad." "This," he added, "is an ancient rule of the Capucines." I had not previously been aware of it.

A single example may be permitted. Even the Germans in Budweis at that time usually had their children learn the *Tschechisch* first. German was supposed to be learned in school. The consequence was that 90 per cent of the children of school age entered school without knowledge of the language in which instruction was given. In accordance with the law pupils who had never been in school at all and others who had been in the *Piaristenschule*, which had to be self-supporting, were put together.

On account of the existing law, which permitted no variation of material for instruction, no progress could be made with such a heterogeneous mass. No help could be counted on from the higher authorities, and the primer of Heinrich which was afterward approved by no means met the demand. In my innocence, regardless of the aforesaid Capucine rule, I felt myself bound to introduce the method of Kehr, and along with it the Kehr primer. It started with an observed object and its name as "normal word." It offered the sole possibility of building up the instruction quite without presuppositions, and therewith to complete the pupils, lacking linguistic knowledge. I initiated the younger teachers into this method. They adopted it gladly, and in an astonishingly short time we accomplished with the most unpromising material results which were recognized with admiration by the school inspector, the local pastor. The national inspector did not interfere with this reform plan, but was inclined to encourage it. Nevertheless it was a questionable departure from the prescribed track. I was less successful in gaining similar treatment by the authorities for my publicly expressed opinion about the relation of the "religious exercises" to the new school. The obvious reason was to be found in the fact that the minister of instruction, von Stemayer, was of a different opinion. If I had no right as a subordinate in the school system to make use of the press to strengthen my case, I felt that I had the right as a member of the lower house of the *Landtag*.

It was necessary to mention these things because my subsequent persecution by the national inspector, Father Maresch, could not have had its motive in what I did later in his inspection district, strictly in accordance with the old scheme. It was prompted by what occurred before, in a position which he could not control.

After completing the establishment of the "new school," as I had imagined the spirit of the law to indicate, I found occasion in 1872 to return to teaching in the intermediate school. In recognition of what I had done the town representatives of Budweis nominated me as director of their *Oberrealschule* and the *Landeschulrat* promptly confirmed me in this position. My acquaintance with men in the upper circles was not at the time of a sort to suggest the idea that I might be in danger because of previous services.

It was also a betrayal of insufficient knowledge of men that I accepted as sufficient the verbal promise of the *Stadtrat* to give me credit as a matter of course for my period of service in the *Volks- und Bürgerschule*. How little also I understood the Austrian judges of the time is indicated by the fact that when presently the quinquennial advance in my salary was paid, on the basis of this reckoning, and with written authorization, I regarded the transaction as sufficient proof of the arrangement once for all.

Another candidate for the position of Director was Dr. M. Koch. As professor in the same institution, as a son of the city, as a relative by birth and marriage with the most well-to-do families, he was the more humiliated by my preferment because he had been unsuccessful in competing for the position which I previously held. Surely the decision against him in the two cases made no friends for me in certain circles. Such friends might presently have been of especial use to me, since my political activity, which I did not feel bound to suspend, brought me into collision with many elements in my own camp—to say nothing of the national and clerical opposition—and at that time the wholly inexperienced population could not distinguish political from personal enmity.

In 1871 I was member for Elbogen of the Bohemian *Landtag* during a very short session. I declined re-election in consideration of my new position in the *Realschule*, although urged to stand again by the group Pickert-Alfred Knoll. All the more necessary seemed to me my activity in the town which was even then more threatened than was realized. The German middle class had no points of support whatever. The most frequent resort was to the "Ressource," the spirit of which was relied upon to equalize taxation, but this was a feeble reliance, since its provisions were particularly adjusted to the changing elements of the civil service and the officer class. No fundamental change was possible here; yet I tried to find out whether a reform were not feasible in the way of giving to the statute a somewhat broader basis upon which the German element in the population could build some shelter. In the Budweis of that time these petty matters were regarded as very important. Bürgermeister Claudi felt decent disgust for all such efforts. The clan of the unsuccessful Dr. Koch, with the rich soap-maker and city

councillor, Lampel, at the head, manifested a similar reaction, and regard for his popularity drew to their side the worthy old Stegmann. Perhaps similar considerations moved J. U. Dr. Wendelin Rziha, the leading spirit of the governing class at the time, to put his organizing talent at the service of my opponents.

These were also the very people with whom national inspector Father Maresch—pulled by what strings I do not know—merged his interests, at the time of his first inspection of the *Oberrealschule* under my direction. It was not an easy task to show that there had been a falling-off in efficiency. Eleven pupils took the examination under his supervision, and all passed, six with distinction. Nevertheless he asserted a falling-off in a complaint served on me later. How and by whom details were collected in all parts of the town to support charges against me I do not know. At all events such a collection was made with such success that Father Maresch thought he had sufficient material for a disciplinary complaint to the national *Schulrat*.

The chief object of attack was my unecclesiastical temper. But on this very point the crown witness who had been counted on failed—viz., *Anstaltskatechet* and later *Stadtdechant* Father Marek. My “temper” he said was well known, but it had never led me to hinder him in discharge of the duties of his office. The nature of the other charges may be gathered from the blackest of all the faults alleged. It was said that in the drawing-room there was a picture of the Kaiser in his youthful appearance of 1849. The teacher of penmanship had felt called to try his unskilled hand on an attempt to bring the picture down to date by painting a beard. In removing the picture during the cleaning of the building between semesters, and in a way which could scarcely have been observed except by the would-be artist, I was charged with having insulted not only the latter but the original of the picture. This constituted merely the point of crystallization for all the more trivial charges. In the disciplinary court, the *Landesschulrat* of the time, Father Maresch sat as complainant, witness, and referee. There was no verbal hearing, no examination of witnesses. In spite of that, a majority could not be gained for an administrable judgment. The verdict was rather entirely indefinite, to the effect that under the

existing local conditions my efforts could not be expected to be fruitful of results. Therewith nobody was satisfied. On my appeal the ministry suspended even this noncommittal judgment. Another tack had to be taken, and Father Maresch found it in all secrecy and quiet in a way in which the whole community might, so to speak, be bribed and satisfied.

Happy at the fortunate outcome of the affair, I started in the vacation of the year 1874, in company with my friend Dr. Holzamer, on a recreation and study trip through central Germany. In Nuremberg I found in my mail a clipping from a home paper which contained an account of the cancellation of my position as Director. Without any publicity my seat had been pulled from under me. The *Realschule* in Budweis had been nationalized, and all its positions were filled with new people. The school board—this time the referee undisturbed—ignored all my rights to legal protection, and the court appealed to declared itself without jurisdiction, on the ground of an ancient court decree, and referred me to the political authorities. Thereupon when I confined my demand to the promised pension, the court found that the unrecorded account of my service years was not necessarily to be taken for granted from the transaction above recited. Although the claim was as clear as the sun, I did not have the means to pursue it farther—nor the confidence. Thus the negative judgment acquired legal force. In spite of contrary decisions elsewhere, I have to this day an unsatisfied claim of 36,000 kreutzer upon the town treasury of Budweis.

It seems to me that a sort of conscientious scruple expressed itself in the legend which arose in Budweis that I was a victim of the "*Tschechisch-klerikalen Reaktion*." As it was commonly understood the content of this legend was incorrect. To be sure my activity in the *Volksschule*, as well as my attempt to influence politically the inert German mass, was disagreeable to the reactionary Tschechs, and I often had to put up with demonstrations of the fact, but I never suffered hostilities on account of my activity in the *Realschule*. On the contrary it received every recognition from the progressive Tschechs. The enmity was, however, not personal, and it did not manifest itself as persecution in the sense implied.

The like was true of my relations with the clerical circles. Although my aims were opposed to theirs, and in spite of many an affront from the subordinate catechists, the leading clergy never made themselves my personal opponents. Both their nationalism and as I believe the integrity of their purposes restrained them from sharing in the unchivalrous program of Father Maresch.

I must also refer to my colleagues of the time, in order not to leave them under groundless suspicion. Father Maresch understood how to spread fear and trembling among the teachers by the persistence of his unlimited domination in school matters, about which no one seemed to be disturbed. With two or three exceptions, however, my colleagues at the time were on my side with a freedom from fear which could be sustained only by sincere conviction. Several of them were in various ways disciplined, although later reappointed in the *Staatsrealschule*. Their offense was that they presented me with a loving cup at my departure. The catechist, Father Maresch, was transferred into other relations, and this was regarded as a sort of discipline which the city afterward removed by his promotion to *Dechant*.

I was now without position and practically without means. I had no relatives to lean upon in finding a way to support my wife and three children. My courage did not fail, however, and neither sorrow nor trouble took away my heart. It had no room for cowardice nor disgust, on the contrary I began to have a joyous sense of freedom. The years of being under watch, for purposes which I could imagine, the spying and the gossip, with the delight of success the traces of which I had to encounter step by step up to the triumph of the crime of the picture, the hundred petty annoyances up to the triumphant final blow—all this had so nearly stifled me that, from the moment of my enlightenment at the Nuremberg post-office about the relentlessness of my enemy, the sacrifice of my position did not seem too great a price to pay for freedom from the filthy atmosphere. In consciousness of youthful strength I regarded the world as by no means closed against me. On the contrary, one part of my interests had long tempted me to leave the parochial conditions of Budweis, shut off at the time from the whole German world, and my companion, so faithful in all the

circumstances of life, was prepared without reserve to share all my fortunes.

In the youthful German Empire there was glowing in 1874 in all ranks a lofty enthusiasm for progressive endeavor. Moved by such ideas Dr. Leibling, in association with choice men—Schulze-Delitzsch, Miguel, Gneist, Virchow, Löwe-Calve, Fritz Kalle, and others—had founded a "Society for the Extension of Popular Culture." Its membership and branch organizations extended throughout Germany. Its purpose was similar to that of the society which Dr. Holzamer founded, and which I developed into life—the "German Union for Dissemination of Knowledge Useful to the Public."¹ It aimed to surpass the older society both in extension and in activity. Through the mediation of the friend named I found here the field I had desired for unhampered activity in the fight for pure humanity. I accordingly moved to Dresden, and from this point as base of operations I entered the service of the society mentioned, as traveling teacher. My work was not easy. My self-imposed ideals made severe demands upon my strength of mind and bodily endurance. The winter was unusually prolonged. My first trip took me into Niederlausitz, where in Guben Dr. Hamdorf was the first German in the Empire to extend to me a friendly hand. The second circuit was in Upper Saxony, and there was deep snow on the ground until late in March. While on the trips I not only continued preparation of my lectures, for which the circumstances had not left me enough time, but I carried on work also for the other union; and whenever I had a day in comfortable quarters near a warm stove, I counted myself among the luckiest of men. Then the fate of our countryman, Paul Stransky, would come vividly before my mind. My studies in the archives of Leitmeritz had given me many details about the subject. When I compared my persecutions with his I congratulated myself on the progress since his time.

At that time the eyes of all hearers betrayed confidence in a better future, to be based on improved morals and intelligence. I saw much genuine thirst for knowledge. I was delighted with that moral elevation and striving for the ideal which so distinguishes the German people in their own land from all others, and which exhibits

¹ See p. 149.

in the entire German education of school and home something imponderable and indefinable which cannot be reproduced by all the imitative devices of other countries. My new vocation thus gave me much high satisfaction. Moreover, my journeyings tended to satisfy my own thirst for knowledge. Including the later years, in which I was not all the time on the road, I visited almost every part of Germany, and the way in which land and people presented themselves to me gave me deeper insight as a rule than any other type of traveler could gain. My heart had always longed for this sort of knowledge. Many educational colleagues in the German Empire, some of them with eminent names, showed me the most cordial attention, and with some of them I formed intimate and permanent friendships.

During the following vacation period I had the pleasure of meeting in Dresden several of my former colleagues, who professed their faith without fear of the widely extended system of denunciation. Among the co-operators with the society for useful knowledge Professor Dr. Huppert visited me and Dr. Holzamer joined me in a tour of the Harz region.

As a result of the hardships of the campaign of 1866, Dr. Leibling was severely disabled, and the injuries proved fatal in the autumn of 1875. It was necessary for me to move to Berlin to take provisional charge of his work. Then I became his successor as general secretary of the society, and my family followed me to Berlin. There followed the ten best but most laborious years of my life. Although I had occasion to visit all parts of the Empire, I was not entirely separated from my family, and the new field of labor, with ample assistance, afforded me besides opportunity to devote my leisure to use of rich literary and museum material for purposes to which I was impelled by my strongest impulses. To be sure, in order to reconcile these interests with the duties of my position I had to employ every moment which I could wring from day or night, and to forego everything which the capital offered except these resources. In those ten years I saw the inside of only two Berlin theaters, and only once each. On the other hand the progress of my knowledge, and a vacation trip once a year to my old home satisfied all my desires for pleasure.

Since I was not a citizen of the German Empire I could not take an active part in politics, but my occupation brought me into somewhat close relations with some of the most important parliamentary leaders of the *National-liberalen* and of the *Fortschrittspartei*. Besides those already named I should mention Dr. Hammacher, Franz Duncker, Rickert, Parisius, A. Traeger, Seyffardt-Krefeld, the two Eberts and Zelle who later became *Oberbürgermeister*.

I count myself fortunate in having been able to continue my favorite studies and at the same time to make them of service in my occupation. In Budweis, in addition to lectures for the *Gemeinnütziger Verein* and the editorship of the *Volkskalender* which was an organ of the same purpose, I had begun to develop the plan of a series of popular textbooks. The idea was to make the books a graded course which would enable studious laymen to proceed from more familiar to less familiar subjects, or at least to choose reading matter which would enrich their knowledge and sharpen their insight. To me and a circle of friends it was a settled conviction that the degree of profitable use of newly acquired political freedom as well as of effective struggle for the protection of our national group would depend on the degree of general knowledge and of all around exercise of the power of generalization. These unpretentious little books were to scatter a few seeds for this sort of harvest. Accordingly the *Verein* published *Des Landmanns Gäste* and *Pflanzen der Heimat*. Then I added detached books on geography, geology, and astronomy, with the intention of continuing with general and cultural history. The work itself gradually turned me, however, from the original program, and set new aims. As continued intercourse with educational unions of all sorts constantly intensified the demand for attention to cultural and social history, I was forced to immerse myself deeper and deeper in study of those subjects. The path to them led through ethnography in the widest sense of the term, for the study of which, moreover, the magnificent collections and other incitements of Berlin afforded the most natural stimuli. From this standpoint I found myself forced back into renewal of the unfinished fight of my youth between belief and doubt as an incident of further studies in the history of religion and in folklore, the results of which began to

appear in a series of books dating from 1881. The discoveries which I thought I had made seemed to me to have been set forth implicitly in such manner, in the little book *Der Seelencult in seinem Verhältnisse zur althebraischen Religion*, that for the purposes of seekers after truth no further explanation would be necessary. Only after I had found myself fundamentally deceived in this did I take up the task of showing the influence of the same principle in all religions and all religious developments. Unfortunately I found it necessary to yield to the publishers' desire that I should not emphasize in the title this purpose and correlation of the books. This necessarily caused some confusion and unfavorable judgments. Still, I could credit my work with leading toward somewhat general abandonment of the false clew which the system of so-called "comparative mythology" had followed, and thus to emancipation of research from a narrowing monopoly.

Although I by no means neglected the duties of my occupation for the sake of these labors, I was aware that the employment of my leisure could no longer contribute in the same degree as before to the purpose for which I was employed. On the contrary it was bound to become more and more detached. Anyone who has been wholly devoted to his own work will understand that the duality of duties began often to oppress me. Although I had learned from childhood to pay heed to the gravity of the bread-and-butter problem, yet I could never consent to be guided by it alone, nor to be subjected to it. If in the circumstances of the time I had been willing to do that, I should have left *Die Religion der Kulturvölker*, etc., to take care of themselves, and along with my official duties I should have been able to enjoy many pleasures suitable to my social standing. I could not make that choice, however, and yet the signs of the times—no one else could see the symptoms as plainly—seemed to be forcing me toward a decision that could not be long deferred. Although there was no causal connection between the fact and my affairs, the death of our first president, Dr. Schulze-Delitzsch, seemed to me to be a warning that my choice should be made. The spiritual movement in the German population was at that time visibly slackened, and I was convinced that, in sharp contrast with my own desires and inclinations, the activity of our

Verein must thenceforth require, instead of calmly persistent instruction, more and more exclusively agitation. I therefore had to ask myself seriously whether my age and my talents would qualify me in such a degree for that sort of work that it would pay to sacrifice for it the research that was next to my heart. Who can correctly appraise his own work! That my deeper inclination was urging choice of research was to me as plain as day, and that at least in his own opinion and in that of our new president, Heinrich Rickert, my colleague, the youngest of the brothers Wyslicenus, possessed the desired qualifications in a degree which I did not credit to myself, I was willing to grant; and it quieted my scruples. Under the circumstances I regarded resignation of my position as a sacrifice which I was bound to make to that institution which had saved me from the most embarrassing situation and had lifted me to a fairer life. I hoped at all events that I could help myself for the future.

I accordingly purchased from my savings a piece of forest land (*Bauernwald*) in the central mountain region of Bohemia near Leitmeritz, the beautiful home of my choice. On it I built a snug house into which I moved in May, 1885. I had in my pocket a publishing contract which assured me labor and bread for at least a few years. My nearest friends—so I may call Dr. Hammacher, who afterward sought me out in Kundratiz and *Stadtrat* Röstel-Landsberg—found the plan venturesome, but still more reasonable than the scheme of emigration to Brazil, previously proposed by A. von Eye, the custodian of the Germanic Museum. Today I must laugh at it as childish that, at the time, I took the failure of my *Seelencult* seriously enough to make flight from the musty old continent seem the proper reply. My wife was ready to follow me confidently into exile. She did not know the motive of my disaffection. She knew better my glowing affection for the tropical world which I was never to see. As a counterweight to this renunciation the flight into the Bohemian forests, in spite of the economic considerations which Rickert did not tire of keeping before my attention, was a harmless affair. From childhood I had been accustomed to the most straitened rural conditions. Life in the great city always seemed to me a burden. My provincial frugal habits

could not order our expenditures so as to lighten the burden. The Mark also failed to afford me compensation for the pains I felt at deprivation of the enjoyment of nature—at least until my fellow countryman, Dr. Schiff, Berlin representative of the *Neue freie Presse*, had begun to introduce me in some measure to the more hidden charms of the flora of the region. I was able, nevertheless, to accept the not yet petrified *Thiergarten* in place of the melancholy beauty of the Bohemian forest and the deep charm of my native land; but the kindly allurements of our central mountains in which I had rejoiced in the springtime of my life would not withdraw from my dreams. My wife was well aware of the difficulties of carrying on the household with uncertain sources of income; but for that very reason she also with practical logic was urgent for a decision: "Now only are we equipped for such a venture—in a few years that will seem a burden to you which now seems merely a pleasure!"

Into the third year I enjoyed undisturbed the idyllic life of the forest abode, and I wrote from studies largely completed in Berlin my larger *Kulturgeschichte*. Minor works of a similar sort had already appeared in *Wissen der Gegenwart*.¹

After the completion of this work old friendship disturbed me in my solitude. Friend Philipp Knoll could not bear to see, in the midst of the swelling waves of the German-Bohemian struggle, such—in his opinion—valuable energy unemployed. A temporary illness gave force to his urgency, and his arrangements enabled me to remove to Prague, while retaining my country house as a summer home. My literary activity was now to be in the service of politics, which had been its original employment, and of journalism. On my side a sort of "first love" helped to overcome the initial aversion to this plan. I had begun my teaching career with an investigation of Bohemian local conditions, and I now felt a drawing as to the completion of something already begun toward Bohemian history, in which, to be sure, social history had meanwhile become the chief

¹ The *Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit in ihrem organischen Aufbau* was like my works on the history of religion in departing from the beaten tracks in choice and emphasis of essential material. It was later translated by Dr. Frischmann into Hebrew (Warsau-Verlagsinstitut *Achiassaf*), and is now in course of translation into Magyar for a library of social science.

concern. There had always been charm of mystery to me about trying dark unbroken ways. Here I should have to deal further with obstacles thrown into my path. This helped me to resolve at least temporarily to plant my traveling staff at Prague, where alone I could find all the necessary resources.

But I was far from finding here the repose I desired. Scarcely had I so far arranged my new program of duties that I could arrange work for my surplus time than one obstacle after another blocked my way. In the year 1889 my devoted friend *Reichsrats- und Landtagsabgeordneter*, Dr. Rickert, died, and even at his funeral I was urged by the legislators present to take his place. I resisted honestly, and the party leaders in Prague supported me. It was, however, of no avail. The circumstances forced us to yield.

The period which I spent thereupon in the rural electoral district, Tetschen-Rumburg, and still more in Vienna, turned me completely from my intended study, and the political duties once undertaken placed new hindrances daily in the way of return to such labors. At the same time I was able in another way in Parliament to return to a first love, since the Liechtenstein proposal for modification of the public-school law enabled me, not without success and recognition, to enter the lists against the renewed alliance between clericalism and German philistinism.

When the Vienna compromise (*Ausgleichsbeschlüsse*) of 1890 had again enabled the German representatives to share in the activities of the Bohemian parliament and in the administration of the country, circumstances were again changed for me. With Dr. L. Schlesinger I was chosen as a member of the national committee, and as such had sufficient reason for resigning my membership in the *Reichsrat* in order to confine my activity to Prague. Now at last I was able to continue my studies of the history of old Bohemia. These were again interrupted by long and serious illness in 1894. I never fully recovered from the effects of this attack, at least not to the extent that I was ever again in possession of my full working strength.

During the period just referred to I had published partly in the *Mitteilungen* of the historical society, partly in *Bohemia*, a number of detail studies on critical questions of Bohemian history and

legend. In the following period occurred my gladly undertaken collaboration with the *Gesellschaft zur Förderung deutscher Wissenschaft, Kunst und Literatur* founded by my friend Knoll. As member and as second president I served the society as long as I remained in Prague. With the support of this society I was at last in 1896 able to see in print the first volume of my *Sozialgeschichte Böhmens in vorhusitischer Zeit*. Before the second volume appeared in 1898 many difficulties with the publisher, G. Freytag, had to be overcome, and even then it had to appear abbreviated and mangled, because the publisher insisted on such limitation. No one of my books could have made me rich, but no one of them caused me so much annoyance and dissatisfaction as this in connection with the publisher. At that time I resolved never to undertake a book for a local publisher, and with the exception of one or two minor contributions in book form to Bohemian architecture, I carried out my resolve. I contributed minor socio-historical papers to the *Mitteilungen* of the historical society, to F. Wolf's *Sozialwissenschaftlicher Zeitschrift*, and to *Deutsche Arbeit*, published by the society named at the beginning of this paragraph.

In another connection annoyance and dissatisfaction were also the final outcome of irritating and nerve-racking activity and devotion. At the same time I cannot deny that my share in the national administration afforded me many an insight valuable to a culture historian. Among the subjects particularly assigned to me, I was especially interested in the technical problems of water-works. I was a member of the commission for the channeling of the Moldaw and the Elbe. I was interested in like degree, however, in the solution of several urgent social problems. My report resulted in the law which provided for district conservation stations eventually to be distributed evenly over the country, and with national support.

This enterprise was not sufficient to earn the thanks of my German countrymen. Here also the national interest crosses the social, and without legal determination the one must always suffer from the other.

All the experiences which I gathered in my most diversified political activities tended to confirm my conviction that the first

and indispensable precondition of the material and spiritual prosperity of two national stocks, located in the same country under such circumstances as those which existed in Bohemia, must be a fixed legal norm for their status, and their freedom of movement. How strict or liberal should be the terms of this law is a matter of secondary importance. Whenever we Germans have neglected an opportunity to secure such a norm we have committed a political blunder injurious to both parties. It is no longer practical politics to demand the subordination of one of the national groups to the other. To abandon the field to enthusiasts for such a policy is at the least sinful negligence. Among the minority such elements may get credit for their zeal. If their impulse seizes the majority the political craft will run aground.

That this was the state of things in the German party, however, I had only too much occasion to learn when the frequent illnesses of Schlesinger forced me to preside at the meetings of the club. That the Reichenberg *Volkspartei* split with us was not in itself a misfortune. Its action set the example, however, for further secessions, which with conscious purpose took their stand upon the unattainable because this program most surely promised the eternity of their existence. But not even by this policy did they become a common danger. To reach that pass another trifle is necessary: that electorate and *Volk* shall credit that which this program—as the catechism phrases it—“gives them to believe.” And the fact that this actually came about was the entire hopelessness of the time. This very transition, this injecting of the politically impossible into politics, became the active ferment, and first of all in the German club itself. With every question of importance the greater number were at once ready for a jump. Popular favor so easily gained, and the certainty of securing popular support by mere revolt from the club program were the death of reasonable politics. To give more of my energy and time to politics seemed to me the more intolerable since my spirit of independence revolts at nothing more than the reproach of *Klebertum*. I well know that historically and essentially our national stock is a labor folk, and sometime there will be a return to kind. It does not pay to wait for such developments when one has reached my age.

Such was the state of mind and the calculation on the basis of which in the autumn of 1898 I decided to withdraw from political activity in the *Landtag* and in the national administration. I now at last possessed for the first time in my life that which in hours of overweariness I had so often coveted—unlimited leisure for literary and similar enjoyment. I had no longer the courage and inexperience of youth to risk my economic life on the basis of literary work. I preferred to begin a new section of life by investing my small savings in the foundry belonging to my son-in-law in Aussig. I became a silent partner in the firm “Ig. Lumpe’s Neffe,” and I passed my time according to the season of the year between Aussig and Kunderatitz.

Only once more did the “merchant” fall under temptation to leave this quiet haven. The commission appointed to nominate a successor to my former parliamentary friend, Hofrat Beer, as professor in the *Technische Hochschule* at Vienna, had the idea of proposing my name. A lustrum earlier such a nomination, with the involved recognition of my scientific endeavors, would have meant the realization of my most extravagant dreams. Now my own decision had to destroy the satisfaction in the germ. Apart from the fact that my age was no longer promising, the health of my wife, whom I prized above all else, might have been endangered by the migration and the other changes connected with it. I owed much more to her than to my ambition. But even with this sacrifice I was able to prolong her life only a few years. On the seventeenth of December, 1904, I was left alone.

FIVE GREAT BATTLES OF CIVILIZATION

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Historians have often argued among themselves and at times have taken the people into their confidence with regard to the great battles of history, and so well have they done what they have undertaken, describing and comparing the battle-scenes, fighting over again the great struggles, and explaining the causes and the epoch-making results of Marathon, Philippi, Hastings, Waterloo, Gettysburg, and the rest, that a layman like myself in such historical studies as theirs must not trespass on their territory. For me to trespass there would be to add only one more battle-scene to the long list and, while the outcome could hardly be called epoch-making, there can be no doubt at all either as to which side would lose or as to the serious fatalities attending defeat. But in human history there are battle-fields and battle-fields and at no serious risk of encroaching on any expert's preserves I have chosen from history five battles that I know to be great, indeed that I am almost ready to declare the very greatest, and that I think I can show to be in the fullest sense epoch-making. The scenes of these battles I would visit in this essay.

Before setting out, since the journey is hardly an ordinary one, being very like a journey in wonderland or at least being in a world the geography of which no geographers known to me have ever mapped or described, I must try to show, at least in a general way, in what sort of a world the various battles of this essay have been fought to their finish. Probably the one word "civilization" will reveal, as in a flash, the world whose battle-fields I would visit; contrary to what many may now infer, however, the world of civilization, although having its peculiar ideal character, is not to be thought of as separate from the world of the geographers; only as bigger, being made so by having spiritual as well as physical values. The spiritual values, not alone, but added to the physical

values or shot through them, really do turn the geographers' world into a wonderland, as will quickly appear.

Thus the five great battles, whose scenes I would visit and describe, are these: The Clash of Arms and Armor, The Offense and Defense of Striking Dress and Pointed Manners, The Rational Game of Standard Methods and Instruments, The Great Hazard of Subjective Attitudes and Natural Processes, and The Final Winning of Soul and Body. Here surely is wonderland, although hardly that of Grimm, Andersen, or Carroll. Moreover, here is after all only the world of ordinary geography and ordinary history seen under what is not the ordinary light; and the light and the shade of the ideal or spiritual values, under which those battles are seen and without which they would prove quite meaningless, are so different, so subtle and elusive, that I must at once explain their nature as clearly as I can.

Whatever metaphysicians and theologians and psychologists may have to say of what men call the spiritual, I need here only say that man, for example, is spiritual, not through aloofness from what is physical, but through his having an inner life, a life to self, in his various relations to the physical world, and, if I am to make quite clear how much this means, I must ask the closest attention to the following, and, first, to a very commonplace matter indeed. Everybody who can lay claim to only the rudiments of education is able to read to himself, but have you ever reflected at all carefully on what it is to read a printed page to oneself? Of course, when reading to oneself, one no longer expresses what once one did express, the sound-values of the symbols on the page, and, more than this, one does not write out the symbols, or other corresponding symbols, although there are always present certain writing-values. Then, besides being a wonderful system of sound-values and of writing-values, which are not expressed, every page one ever reads to oneself is a system of other values that touch the feelings and the will of the reader far more deeply. The words all have values that I must call inwardly personal as well as outwardly pertinent, for they suggest, if they mean anything at all, things, relations, feelings, motions, acts, all of which at some time have been immediate in and of the life of the reader. "In,"

"round," "toward," "effort," "buzz," "between," "attention," "candy," "comprehension," "up," "fall," "run," "ice cream," "ugly," and all the rest of the dictionary, if you wish—only I shall not try to complete the list—are words with the stimulus of such values. "The ship moved restlessly across the wild and tossing sea" is a sentence that would keep any ordinarily self-contained and self-controlled reader extremely lively and alert, if he acted up to only half of the values for feelings, relations, and activities which the words possess. What a busy scene, too, the reading-room of a library would be—how annoying to the hushed but never sedentary official husher—should the readers suddenly carry out all of the rich full life that the open volumes before them have held so long between their covers or—still more annoying—if the whole library under touch of some magic wand should suddenly come alive.

Reading to oneself is not the only commonplace fact of life that I would here call to mind and in bringing to mind make appear remarkable. Suppose, remembering the methods of that distinguished schoolmaster, Squeers, having read a certain word in the library, the word "walk," for example, you proceed to express the action it suggests openly and go—this will be quite enough for my purpose—half a dozen blocks down some street. You pass possible missiles, a dog or two or three, climbable trees, a group of scurrying squirrels, threatening vehicles, a grocer's wagon, a playful child, pleasant lawns, unlocked if not open doors, attractive and unattractive men and women; but you pass them. It begins to rain perhaps and yet you keep on, putting up your umbrella; or it is beautifully clear and fresh and yet, although by sky and air impulses have been stirred within you that would interrupt your going I know not to what results, you keep on. You walk, then, and you walk all six of those blocks and how much more than walking you are really doing at every moment, although so splendidly to yourself. Did you and the rest of us belong to the monkey-people, as once we did, if not in outward form, at least in ways, our streets would be quite as confusing as that library relieved of its concentrated centuries of restraint. A single word, I would have you remember, from the library was what took you out into

that street which might have kept you—and the local police—so busy.

What, now, is language? A medium for the expression of thought, as the old grammars used to say—correctly enough, of course—but I much prefer to call it one of civilization's mediums of exchange. There can be no exchange without thought. Also there can be no exchange without some restraint or life to self. And thought, exchange, and restraint, while not all the factors of civilization, are certainly very important factors in any moment of its development. Another factor, somebody says, is the distinction between end and means, but that, I take it, is just what restraint implies, what thought serves, or what exchange depends on. But next, language being one of civilization's mediums of exchange, what is that street with all those mentioned details and many unmentioned details through which you walked? Or, quite generally, what is that whole complex system we call environment? It certainly is a system; else not even you could walk through streets or do any other things smaller or greater. Science has often told us in so many words that environment is a more or less systematic aggregation of the natural conditions of life, but, not to deny any truth to such an account of it, science not always but too often has treated the conditions of life as if they were quite external to life. I venture to say, however, that no environment of external conditions, or, for that matter, even of external results, ever environed any living creature. Environment is really a system of *natural* conditions; as environment it is only another medium of exchange that is quite indispensable in the use of the former medium already remarked and that all progressive life, not merely all human civilization, depends upon. May I use a figure? Man's environment being, through its manifold details as actually and manifestly presented, a complex of all the possible things, feelings, relations, and acts of human life, is only the set staging and scenery for the free and self-contained life of language. Only, by language we need now to be general enough or philosophical enough to understand any of man's free mediums of expression and exchange, even such instruments of civilization as weapons, dress, manners, tools, natural processes, freely moving human bodies. Thus

civilization seems to have depended upon both a set medium, or staging, like environment, and a freed medium, like language. But I would propose a still better, because more accurate and even less physical, account of environment than that—in more senses than one so well supported by Shakespeare—of a theatrical stage. *Man's so-called natural environment is only his reading to self, or his life at large to self, vicariously maintained.* What could the words mean or the manners or the tools or the weapons, if there were no such vicarious maintenance of the life, control and mastery of which they so plainly show? Man is *really* civilized, his civilization has *substance*, just because what in his life to self he does not do openly himself or what, when leaving a library, he does under the excellent control of an orderly and becoming walk down the street, is always still going on really and manifestly. Being civilized, he is himself no longer, literally or figuratively, just stone or clod, but there are, surrounding him, countless clods and stones, literally or figuratively possible missiles for his use. Again, he is outwardly no animal, but his animal nature, spiritually within him or marvelously concentrated in the language he uses, is always out in his environment materially and objectively disporting itself thus vicariously to his manifest upholding and uplifting; to his glory, then, if not also even to the glory of God. I am less theologian than historian, but man's environment looks to me very much like his greatest spiritual friend—so far as anything that seems so outside of him can be that. And, really, is his environment in any but a possibly physical or spacial sense, resulting from an abstraction, to be thought of as outside? *His spiritual life is his life within, his life to himself, as he reads and sometimes walks, and this were not possible without the vicarious service, I almost said the vicarious sacrifice, of his very real environment.* So, if now and then man has reverently personified and deified that environment, who can wonder?¹

¹ The idea of man's environment, or even of the material environment generally, here suggested, is hardly a new one, except possibly in the way in which I have chosen to express it. Aristotle, if no one even earlier than he, "began it." Leibnitz took it up, at least as I have come to understand Leibnitz, and between the lines it can be detected even in Mill's definition of "matter" as "the permanent possibility of sensation." Bergson seems to have it in mind in his *Matter and Memory* and, without being unmindful of the humor of my joining such superior company, I venture to quote a

I have been trying to explain what the spiritual values are and here in simple sum is the result. Man is spiritual in having the wealth, which we have seen, of life to himself, while the world in which he fights all his battles, as is now to be added, is spiritual, not of course as just an external world—such an abstraction makes it material—but as the world that vicariously maintains all the elements and all the possibilities of man's controlled life. Naturally as an important conclusion from this, whatever unity and order the vicarious life, the environment, may at any time manifest, say to jurisprudence, art, science, philosophy, or religion, can be only a reflection of man's acquired freedom, that is, of the power of control and organization to which he has attained. And such unity and order, referable either to the outer life or to the inner, must always be the intent or meaning of the language which man is using. I had almost forgotten the language. In all its forms, higher or lower, in words, gestures, manners, tools, weapons, in all these the language is most essential, the freed medium being quite as important as the set medium. Language has at once the separation from the environment which action to self requires, or it is in other words, portable, and at the same time it has the environmental character of itself being something that may be lived to self—as when one thinks without even writing or speaking. Language is, again, both a part of the life of those using it and a part of the environment; or, in scriptural phrase, it is the word made flesh.

Now we are ready, I think, to visit the first of the five great battle-fields, and I mean first, not merely in the order of my essay, but in the order of civilization. If anyone thinks that I have given too much attention to the things that make life and language and environment spiritual, I can only say in self-defense that very

statement of my own, published several years ago (*Dynamic Idealism*, 1898): "The whole outer world, as we have it now about us, in all its wonderful nature and with all its lawfulness, has . . . risen as a monument in the wake of the progress of man, or, let us say, in order to be quite broad and inclusive, in the wake of intelligent life as a whole; and even as languages and monuments . . . are but man over again, so the outer world in those most general characteristics, to which the psychologist looks, is man too. What seems not-self is only the obverse of self" (p. 23). And again: "Control brings activity to self and consciousness of a not-self" (p. 184). See also "The Stages of Knowledge," *Psychological Review*, March, 1897, especially pp. 171 f.

recently I knew of even an expert historian who led his hearers through many dry contemporary sermons before regaling them with a great political revolution. But, to come to the first battle, a story from the nursery will serve me well. Once upon a time a very small boy was struck—so he seemed to view the event—by the bureau, near which he had been playing with his blocks, and at once in anger, his own body, nay, even his own head the weapon, he struck back violently. Curtain. Some time later, suffering a similar blow, he hesitated and then, seizing a near-by block, he struck back by throwing that, so to speak, instead of his own head; and those who saw him knew that, however small the way, his civilization had begun. He had also learned to eat pins and other indigestibles *to himself*, but, apart from that, he had come to strike “to himself” or—the other side of the acquirement—to let something else take the action and particularly the reaction of the blow dealt. He had, then, entered the life at once of spiritual activity within and vicarious activity without and, in the large way of speaking for which I have claimed license, he had done this by use of language, his block being the freed medium of his expression. Also what he had done is what, but in large writing, always characterizes the first battle, the clash of arms and armor, in which men appear as using, not now against bureaus or other objects or forces of nature, but against each other, the rude rough methods of that small boy. In such use behold the factors of civilization, of life in the world of spiritual as well as physical values: the restraint or life to self, the language or free medium of expression and exchange, and, at least equally important, the vicarious environment. Indeed so obviously are these factors there that further account of them seems unnecessary.

Still, of the clash of arms and armor two things remain to be said, both very important and both involving a principle that will prove applicable to all five of the battles, not merely to this one. Thus, in the first place, reversion to what, after the nursery tale, I will symbolically call head-bumping, is always possible and more or less likely—remember that even the staid and sedentary reader in the library finally reverted to his one-time habit of walking out in the open; but secondly, *when men meet men on common ground*

and in common ways, when any action of a conscious being meets an equivalent reaction of a like being, an advance is certain to be made sooner or later in spirituality and civilization. The advance may be delayed by reversions, men going back to a warfare in which there is not even the crude mediation of armor and weapons; but men meeting and striking men constitute a different situation from that of men meeting and striking anything that is not human, that, like a bureau, is, as we say, quite "inanimate," and the difference is such, as I believe, that the meeting between men on whatever common terms must always lead in the end to new terms of fighting. It is almost too commonplace to say that when men meet men, especially if they fight, they learn self-control, but the important fact therein is, I imagine, not too commonly observed, namely, that a newly acquired self-control always brings new depths to the inner life, new qualities to the outer, vicarious environment, and new form and meaning to the mediating language. Thus, meeting in clash of arms and armor, men finally learn self-control and come in due time to appear on a new battle-field, that of the offense and defense of striking dress and pointed manners.

By the dress of this second battle very evidently I must mean more than anything worn for mere protection, whether against men or nature, and I mean also more than just the dress of persons. I mean all the more or less artful adornments, and all the more or less sensitively artistic interpretations of life that clothe persons and their nearer surroundings, their homes, their streets, their public squares and buildings; and as for manners, pointed manners, these are related to dress very much as weapons to armor, comprising, as I would have them here, all the graces of personal behavior, as sensitive as they are designing, and all the designing ways of subtle and sensitive diplomacy or all the artful rituals of institutions with which men are known to meet each other. Can anything be more interesting in history than this change from prompt and open war to the delays and often to the so-called peaceful settlements of cunning diplomacy, from armor and weapons to dress and manners? True, the change made, resort to the past and its arbitrament of open war is still all too easy and all too likely at least for some time, since striking dress and pointed

manners always imply a good deal of very human sensitiveness and self-consciousness and so, anger readily arising, may be removed for armor and arms, but even then civilization has gained. There is more control in a concealed weapon than in an exposed one, just as sensuously perceptible harmony or beauty in environment means more of man's life maintained vicariously than only force or might in the environment, mass colliding there with mass, can mean. Thus felt or recognized might means only that man himself can exert might mediately, but perceived beauty means that man's inner life has reached the same harmony and poise, however tense and unstable, which the beauty reveals, and man's dress and manners are merely the language expressing this.

How subtle and sensitive and unstable the offensive and defensive life of dress and manners is, I hardly need to show; nor do I need to say that the blows it deals, although drawing no blood, unless forsooth the concealed stiletto is brought into play, may be harder to bear as well as more widely serious in their results than those of more primitive and more direct warfare. But, injuries and losses for the moment forgotten, how about the final victory? Again, when on this second field, as on the first, evenly matched men come finally to meet, with their like ways, their common offense and defense, they are bound to produce a more controlled type of battle, involving deeper inner life and wider or more comprehensive environment. The life to self is made calmly rational, calculating, and at least outwardly quite insensitive; the environment turns prosaically lawful and mechanical; and the free medium of expression comprises, besides prosaic language in a literal sense, also the prosaic medium of standard methods and instruments. Only so can the conduct of life be as outwardly impersonal as the new control requires.

To me nothing is more suggestive or illuminating than this change that apparently is always incident to the battle of well-equipped but especially of equally matched men, and I must add to what I have said of it. Of course, victory must always be to the best man and, unless my vision greatly deceive me, the best man, the opponents being evenly matched, must always win by devising, not just a new kind of fighting, but, as was said, a kind

involving more self-control; that is, involving—for what else does self-control mean?—free and conscious use of the existing conditions and relations or what was above referred to as distinction between end and means, instead of just ordinary, however powerful, compliance with the conditions. In short, in such a meeting there is always induced a battle of kinds in addition to the battle of magnitudes, or say of different values instead of like and balanced forces, and *the best kind or value always wins and winning raises the plane of future struggles*. May I recur to the first battle? Emphatically there is a certain grandeur in the physical encounters of men. The ordeals of might, the collisions of splendid armies, like the battling tension of great forces and masses in nature, appeal deeply to all men, but, as I have to believe, for the new kind of life that such struggles are always, however vaguely, potential with. Men who fight with death-bringing weapons are bold as well as strong men, but the man who can control his fighting-with-deadly-weapons is still stronger. Men, again, who have such control and whose weapons are accordingly concealed and who fight outwardly with graces and manners are also strong men, but the best man among them is he who is so self-contained and personally insensitive that he can make grace and manner quite impersonally and conventionally a means to an end. Diplomacy has settled more differences, that is, has won more battles, than war; but calm reason, dress and manners becoming conventionalized, is a more artful and more powerful adversary than the most cunning diplomacy.

When man reaches his third battle, the game of calm reason, the rational game of standard methods and instruments, which on the abstractly intellectual side is the game of science, on the openly practical side, that of commerce and industry, reversion to the arbitrament of arms is rare. Not so rare, reversion to diplomacy. Especially may uncivilized, or when not uncivilized at least very alien peoples, disturb the natural order, but characteristically the time is one, no longer of armor and weapons always openly worn, as in the first battle, nor of these still worn, although concealed behind striking costume and manner, as in the second, but of the sheathed sword or the standing army and of conventions for

dress and manners. Man shows himself at once rationally prepared for war and rationally disinclined to it, having identified himself with a life whose control and mediation and environment are such as to require an inner activity that is superior to any signs of emotion and a medium of self-expression that, in the form of exact instruments of measurement, matter-of-fact methods in thought and conduct or business, and standard tools and machinery of industry, is quite detached from him personally. How non-human, for example, and impersonal, chronometers, thermometers, metric systems, printing-presses, steam-shovels, and the like, not to mention also a very prosaic literature, all are. And as for his environment, this, vicariously expressing man's control and accurately named or represented by the methods and instruments and literature just mentioned, is "physical" or mechanical, the very incarnation of reason and natural law. Where are the mighty powers that once moved and clashed? Where those sensuous, storm-set harmonies, those startling metaphors of human hope and passion, that once reflected and inspired the pointed manners and the two-edged arts? Here and there such things of times gone by, so gloried in by men, may reappear, but for the most part reason has chained the powers and cooled the hope and passion, supplanting both might and harmony with staid and passionless law.

The new inner life, the life to self, and the new vicarious life of environment during this third battle are, I suspect, in spite of all I have said, not yet clearly seen and appreciated, vision being now more difficult than in the former cases of arms and manners. May I, then, force vision or rather swimming, by going out into even deeper waters? Sometimes one's language needs to be even cryptic in order to insure understanding. The standard method or instrument! What magic it possesses! Do but think, for a moment, of the great versatility, of the unlimited variety of relations and applications, which it brings to the life of every user and try to get some conception of the rich, intense, inner life that must accrue through it; and then, for another moment, think of the environment that, answering to that versatility and so unlimited in extent, comprises in a manifest setting all of the possible applications! Think of the numberless acts to self and the numberless processes

in environment that a standard measure—for I suggest that in this one word all standards may be summed up—mediates and renders exchangeable. Who does not know how, having a standard length, foot or yard or mile, he can lay it off always once more or how for an instrument there is always one more use? The realm's standard coin is not richer in subjective opportunity or in variety of objective exchangeable commodities. With this knowledge, then, it is possible to appreciate man's inner life, and to see how broad and how wide and how various in its manifestations of possible activities is the world through which a man with a standard measure for his acts is free to walk. Although the now mechanical environment lacks—except of course in moments of relapse or reversion—the former sensuous values that led men to all sorts of sensuous contacts, direct, as in war, or indirect, as in time of artful diplomacy, it is more than ever, more freely and more openly than ever, only the sum total of the possible activities and relations that man has under control and so, even as not before, is vicariously human. It is such a mistake to argue from a mechanical environment to fate or necessity imposed on human life.

I spoke of the sword being sheathed, of the armies being only standing armies. Armed neutrality is the natural limit in the rational game of standard methods and instruments and it shows again the meeting of evenly matched men or evenly balanced powers. The preparation and the disinclination tell the story. So a third time kinds as well as magnitudes, values as well as forces are pitted against each other and the question comes: Who now is the best man? Who will break the neutrality, not by reversion, but by advance? Remembering the general word, "measure," that was suggested, I answer again that the best man must be he who can show himself superior to the measurable or commensurable conditions by really using them instead of just complying with them, and so by attaining something not measurable—the new kind or value always being that. This answer, as I suspect, is very nearly unintelligible and yet does it mean more or less than that genius must always overcome talent? In general, talent, however brilliant, only complies; genius really uses. Genius leads civilization: from arms to manners; from manners to measures; from measures—to what?

To what is superior to measures or the measurable. So I have already given answer. But let me explain with another question, albeit a difficult one. Precisely in what sense is the inner versatility or the outer application, which a standard measure always signifies, unlimited? According as one answers this difficult question one makes the use of a measure consist in mere perpetual routine, the continual aggregation or multiplication of the measurable without limit, or in productive, creative action, that is, attainment to something different and new because not just formally or negatively immeasurable but really so, being flatly incommensurable. Thus, for talent, versatility and application are really without limit; for genius, which has the self-control and consequent insight of real use, they are only formally without limit. Genius has the faculty of bringing to an end the endless routine of talent and so of breaking the armed neutrality or the "deadlock" to which the battles of routine and talent always come. So much science, for example, is only multiplication. So much commerce and industry is only prosaic accumulation. The whole rational game of standard measures is, or at least ends by being, only that—witness, for large illustration, our boasted modern industrialism. But every battle has its genius, since every situation, balance and neutrality being reached, brings the real opportunity of still deeper inner life and still wider outer life. So, this third time, the plane of battle changes and the rational game of standard measures gives place to a new freedom, the bold hazard or adventure of subjective attitudes and natural processes or—let me say, as if speaking directly to scientists—observation, experiment, and action at large that depend mechanically on certain standards and supposed uniformity in nature give place to all three with the primary dependence transferred to open-mindedness and informal natural life.

The life of the fourth battle has a quality that I may not succeed in making my readers feel as distinctly as I could wish. That of the third battle is related to it in its intellectual character as exact science to speculative philosophy, in its practical life as conservative commercialism that never leaves terra firma to a commerce and an industry that show a spirit of adventure and uncalculating open-handedness or as mechanical accumulation and

manufacture of all sorts, including even the making of friends as well as of fortunes and commodities, to a life of heartiness, discovery, creation. Images will come into one's mind, and this fourth battle looks very like a battle in the air, its combatants entering the fray in flying-machines—so different from the earth-bound standards of the third battle. Such imagery, however, is fleeting, if not wholly futile; unless it be that a lecturer, whom I heard a year or two ago, was right when he suggested virtually, not just in these words, that the flying of birds nowadays giving the name to perhaps the freest instrument of the time, only expressed vicariously the separation from earth that comes to man through subjective attitudes and nature's free, informal processes. But do you even half realize the self-control, the inner life, and at the same time the personal freedom of a subjective attitude; of such attitudes, I suggest, as equanimity, adaptability, moderation, a big hospitable will that can sanction any event, even sudden death, as its own free act? Such attitudes show the lesson of standard measures and instruments to have been well learned. They show the spirit of those standards set free from the mere letter, man discovering with his new action to self that their restraint is for his use, not he for it and its uniformity; a discovery, it is my belief, that would be quite impossible without the series of battles and victories through which we have seen him come. And free, formless processes are the medium, the proper medium, of such attitudes. Those subjective attitudes are hopelessly inexpressible through arms or dress and manners or rational methods and instruments; only nature's own life, immoderate and immeasurable as the attitudes themselves, can really serve. What it is to use nature instead of some more articulate medium of expression is doubtless hard to see, but imagine a man without a country, yet with all the memories of country, and you will begin to understand. Those memories, cherishing the customs and the government, the church and the home, the place and the occupation, to whose measures he once conformed, make him see with a far vision and, as he wanders, bid him find in nature the free life of his vision. Thus for one who, so deeply self-controlled as to be free from the formal bonds of the past, can, so to speak, make informal nature

the language of his life, there is an abstraction from the world, a sublimation of thought and life, that is not easily exaggerated. Of course, although in very different degrees, instruments and manners and even weapons—all showing both some self-control and some breadth and objectivity of view—produce abstraction and sublimation of life, but as a free medium of expression natural processes involve more abstraction, more aloofness of thought and act, more sublimation, than any of those other media.

I can explain exactly what I mean in two words. First, the attitudes, often finding outlet in written or spoken language, show man's consciousness busy with making worlds of its own, the imagination reaching visions of wonderful construction. Old measures of all sorts are reverted to, but are used as loose analogies, not as hard-and-fast rules. True, in dress and manners, in all the fine arts, there is a dependence on loose analogies, so different from literal conformities; the designed harmony being for both cases, for dress and art and for speculative vision, between human life as institutionally set or conventionalized, and nature as that which lies outside of the institutes or conventions; but the earlier use of analogy, the humanly artistic use, is quite different from the later philosophical use. For the former the analogies are drawn with primary assertion of man's visible ways and conceits, the intention being to make nature seem at least loosely to conform, but for the latter the tables are turned completely—suggesting the change from the geocentric to the heliocentric astronomy—and analogies are drawn with the *primary* assertion of the wide, free life of nature. Thus nature's free processes are the true vicarious life of philosophy, and, realizing this, one can understand the sublimation of philosophy. The free nature, primarily asserted, is envisaged in such imagery, boldly if not even licentiously traced, as traditional means and measures can supply. The man of subjective attitudes may still have to use the spoken or written language of the man of standards, but his meaning or vision is not just commonly natural and "objective." And so, for my second word, if natural processes are thus the proper medium, then man, his life so mediated, that is, so taken care of, so far as all positive overt action goes, has a consenting or sanctioning will rather than a

directly and openly active one. He even says in so many words: "I will that nature's processes do the work." Everybody works, you see, but the philosopher; the philosopher only rules; the philosopher's will, though outwardly so idle, is in reality accomplishing everything. Of course everything; for he has no very ordinary tool, working as he does with nature, I cannot quite say—not being enough of a poet—in his hand, but in his will. Nor have I yet said just what I set out to say in this second word. It is just such a will as the philosopher's, so accordant with his inner subjective attitudes in general, that insures new life, for his will courageously bids nature proceed with her own reconstructions at whatever losses. Nature is never measurable. Creation, manifest expression of the immeasurable, is her work always; and this means that the philosophical spirit—let me speak again as if to scientists—in a laboratory must always bring originality; not mere extension of human knowledge in the sense of multiplied applications of old theories, but a new sort of knowledge involving change in quality rather than just in quantity. In practical life, in life with the busy world of affairs for its laboratory, the philosophical spirit induces invention, reform, unconstitutionalism, sometimes revolution, and always and everywhere—for no words tell the story better—*invasion of what is foreign*. A philosophy that does not bid the foreigner come, to the end that life may be freed from its confining commensurability and routine and so become openly creative, is certainly no true philosophy. The attitudes so sublimated in their vision, and the will, so consenting to the work of a free nature, show this, and we can see now, I think, more clearly than ever, how sublimated or abstract philosophy, the ruling spirit or atmosphere of the fourth battle, is; abstract in its life, so deeply within; abstract in its vision, so like a mirage; abstract in its mediation, a foreign life, the free unformed processes of nature, expressing its meaning. But reflect at least for a moment, and longer if you must, on creative life, invention, revolution, invasion, being the outcome of self-control. Small wonder that the moralists find in self-control, life to self, the foundation of all the heroic virtues.

Do I seem to forget that this is a journey over battle-fields,

spending my time with outlying scenery instead of bringing to mind the great historic struggles? Let me come back to my subject by mentioning some of the dangers and losses. Nothing suggests battles more vividly than these, and so far only the most casual reference has been made to them. In the clash of arms and armor, very clearly the direct dangers and losses are mainly bodily. Wounds and death are the proper cost and I have no need of asking you in imagination to cross the field after the fight and so to realize that a battle has been fought. On the second field, too, the casualties are openly personal, but—unless reversion take place—not so directly by bodily injury. The injuries, which, as was suggested, may be much harder to bear and more widely and deeply serious in their results than wounds and even death, are to the rising sensibility and self-consciousness. In a qualified sense, I suppose, such injuries are still bodily—witness blushing and the flush of anger and the shrug of shoulder and stamp of foot, not to say the pressing impulse to draw a weapon—but commonly we think of them as spiritually personal, not bodily. How injured sensibilities may lead along many disastrous ways other than those of possible sudden bodily harm, I hardly need to show, for many diseases of body and mind and character are commonly known to spring from them. So, to go on, in the third battle, the game of standard methods, again apart from what reversion or the recognized possibility of reversion may bring, such as the cost and burden of a standing army, the direct and characteristic losses are only formal or are, at least outwardly, impersonal; being external to open personal interest and feeling; being, not of life and limb nor yet of personal address and influence, but of what is only mediate to life, of property and material opportunity and visible occupation. Yet these new casualties, although so detached from the outer person, are deeply felt and their results may be appalling. Compare, for a very simple example—thinking, however, at least twice before you decide on my meaning—a whole family's loss of all its worldly resources, of home and fortune and social position, with its loss by death of just one of its members. But to pass on, with inception of the fourth battle, the adventure of subjective attitudes and natural processes, the direct casualties very mani-

festly are such as affect character. In the earlier battles, as was indeed intimated, character is also in jeopardy; diseases of character may arise from seriously wounded sensibilities and also from the dejection following lost property or lost material opportunity of any sort; but in the fourth battle character at its best is become quite mature and superior to material dependence; it is also at the same time freed from the traditional restraints; so that it is more openly on trial and the successes or disasters of life are more openly those of character. The magnificent self-control, then, with all its wealth of inner life and vision, which we have seen, may break down with many in society and dissipation of their lives becomes the cost of the acquired freedom. The danger of such loss is, moreover, probably much enhanced by the fact that this fourth battle, as well as the fifth, which is still to be considered, must always be fought by the individual. The other battles allow what, in the language of football, I will call bodily mass-play. In dress or weapons or instruments men are seen to be still wearing a uniform and to have common visible modes of expression; such visible modes of expression are the signs of social classes, but for subjective attitudes and natural processes there is obviously no manifest uniform possible. For all that anyone can see, then, each man fights for himself to victory or defeat and, although in victory the success is proportionately more worthy and more exhilarating, in defeat the failure is more distressing. A battle-field strewn with fallen personal characters is more horrible than the scenes of Waterloo or Gettysburg, although as to this, reminding myself of the pathos and the romance that have so long attached to the fallen in the open battles of common war, I cannot help wondering if fallen characters should not also have requiems said for them and flags placed at their graves. At least in the matter of battles human pathos and romance seem to me to have been altogether too military.

Of the losses that come from all the so-called diseases of civilization, diseases of mind as well as of body, if the two can ever properly be separated, I make only the briefest mention. Armies have their camp-followers; dress and manners and the fine arts are often defeated by the disasters of temperament; standard measures,

however indirectly, can be fearfully and even fatally brutal; a man without such measures, a man without a country, can be destructive instead of creative, a licentious being instead of the "best man"; and nature seems to have so ordered things that diseases of all sorts have to appear with special malignance in all these instances. Mass-play, too, in general seems to invite diseases, although the isolated individual is also often an easy victim. But, to say no more of diseases of civilization, with regard to mass-play I must here modify something that I have said. For the fourth and fifth battles there can indeed be no bodily mass-plays; men are no longer in any visible way grouped together; and so may not battle in any formally organized social movement; but, while this new freedom has involved their release from any uniformity, it has not, after all, left individuals wholly isolated. There still remains the vital rather than formal organization of a common spirit among them, however free this spirit be, and in a very genuine sense they may be said really to have become more social than ever, since, leaving the long companionship and loyalty of their organized uniformity and routine, they have entered into the still richer and worthier fellowship of a free open unity, always so much bigger and deeper than uniformity, and creative life, so much more vital than routine. Real creation, as everyone knows, belongs to free persons living in the universe.

The fifth battle-scene, except for a few allusions already made, remains to be visited. What can I say as we approach it? Of course the higher quality of its struggle, which I have called the winning of soul and body or—more fully—the final birth or liberation of the soul and the spiritual realization of the body, must be relative to some as yet unnoticed weakness belonging to the battle of subjective attitudes and natural processes, and the only conceivable weakness must be some still lurking impulsiveness, some final lack of self-control, in human nature. Does any such weakness appear? Most certainly and very plainly. The attitudes themselves are conscious and assertive; they lend themselves to the human construction and conceit of great visions; they still let formal traditions, although, it is true, only as loose analogies, control man's thinking and so also man's living; they compromise

their boasted freedom and abstraction by actually *willing* that an *outer* nature have its way; and so, if self-control be the test of civilization, if it truly be the mark of the best, the winning man, then a better man than any who have fought yet is to be seen by us. Personally he is not a creature of attitudes, however subjective and heroic, but a creature of soul or of self-control *par excellence*; and, as for the medium through which he expresses himself, or names his world, this is his own natural, and for all that anyone can see, unprotected body. Yet how to make what I mean clear, I do not know. Perhaps there is no way. Yet soul is something won or earned or realized with the growing skill of reading to self, of living to self, the critical moments of which have been shown in the succession of battles, and, when perfect self-control is reached, the free human body, the natural body, but at the same time the body inspired with the fulness of meaning and the strength of victory that its history has imparted, is—this is how I would put it—the soul incarnate. Again, when a man has such control, such power of life to self, as not to need even to assume attitudes or construct ideal worlds or assertively let nature and her foreign life have their way, then is he free from nature by being free through his natural self and he can therefore safely, that is, without betrayal of himself, let his own body run its own, which is as truly also his own, natural course. His soul is full born. His body is spiritually perfected, the creature at once of nature and of his will. He has, then, realized *to himself* all of the brute force which showed in his life when in savagery he first clashed with nature and other men. From that past a soul as the meaning of his free body is his splendid heritage.

The free body, like all language, like every medium of expression, besides meaning a soul, also means an environment. This environment holds—but vicariously, that is, in the form of elemental passions and forces, often grandly riotous and at once destructive and creative—the full, free, formless life of the man who, now living it all to himself, with open heart and with a will as free as no longer impulsive, follows confidently along its various ways. The whole city and the freedom of it are his. Whatever it may seem to you or to me, to him is his environment one of brutal, clashing forces?

Has it perhaps, the doubtful harmony, the striking, even awesome, beauty of that which mingles possible pain with pleasure, possible danger with safety, possible death with life? Is it altogether orderly and prosaic, its primal forces chained and its one-time beauty spoiled by law? Or is it, finally, even more perfectly a unit, being not mechanically dead but creatively alive with law, a place for the romance of philosophy and the life of such as freely will that nature have her way? Not one of these; yet the goal to which these all have led; for, like the soul, whose life it holds and serves, it, too, is spiritual. And so, as I had occasion to say above, if history has sometimes suggested that by their battles men have won gods as well as souls, we can feel no surprise.

But all is not yet said that needs to be said here. With the full load of meaning gathered in the progress of this essay, let me once more recall that the self-controlled reader, as if selecting one word from all that he was so quietly reading to himself, finally left the library and *walked* down the street. The freedom of that street was his and in like manner, but with far greater wealth of meaning, the freedom of all the paths of the whole world is the natural opportunity, if not always the earned right, of every human soul; self-control, acquired in such steps and with such growing vision and growing skill—the vision and skill of arms and manners and instruments and nature's processes—as I have now described, being the duty that answers to the right. What self-control means, however, is often misunderstood, when not purposely misinterpreted, and an essay, like this, having historical form, may very easily only aid misunderstanding or misinterpretation. Thus the history here presented has been toward a limit, the free soul and the natural body, these being presented—for what indeed they truly are—as the acme of what makes life spiritual. But this is no case for either the cloistered asceticism or the decadent naturalism that by some strange humor of events have often, if not always, come together. Such things are extreme reversions, not real spiritual freedom. They are losses, not victories. The free soul is no thing to confine in a library, much less in a monk's cell, and the natural body is not a thing to run wild and loose. Let me ask a simple question. Had the reader remained there forever reading to

himself, would he have had real freedom of his reading? Surely only his walk, direct and unwavering, proved his freedom, and in like manner the true freedom of soul is complete only with ability to live in the world of all the battles and there use, not impulsively, but—can I put it better?—with spiritual reserve, weapons and dress, standard measures, and nature's processes. With spiritual reserve? This can mean only the wisdom of real adaptation; the insight and the readiness of will for all possible situations that the world may offer; decision as to what from one's long past, militarism or philosophy, any present demand upon life really justifies. Emphatically, then, this history of battles, like all true history, is not just its last stage, a merely formal limit; it is a cumulative whole; and it shows, I think, beyond peradventure, that spiritual freedom must consist in ready adaptations, in the simple freedom of openly, not just to oneself, doing the right thing at the right place and time. Had I the brush or pen of an artist, I should conclude with a sketch of the spiritual life and I should hope to have my picture recognizable. In human society, always alive with every battle, the spiritual life should show a sympathetic co-operation of all men, some seeing and feeling deeply and living freely however "impractically," some, whether in laboratory or in factory, mechanically skilful with methods and instruments, some as artists or as their cultured supporters interpreting life as graceful and pleasing to the senses, some still wearing armor and carrying arms, and all moving upward; and in an individual it should show at least some ability and readiness, upon call, to enter into any one of all the battles. Of course, to speak with special regard to the use of arms, the history of the battles has plainly taught that in the spiritual life, the life of the free soul and the natural body, taking up arms should be man's last resort, and yet that even of this it may sometime be true that nothing can be more spiritual than the return, whatever one's reserve, to the home in which one was born.

THE SPHERE OF PECUNIARY VALUATION

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The general function of values, whether pecuniary or other, is to direct the energies of men and of the social wholes in which men co-operate. In this paper I mean to inquire what part pecuniary values have in this function, how far they serve, or ought to serve, as the motive force of social organization and progress, what they can and cannot do. The discussion, I may add, is based on the view maintained in a previous paper,¹ that the activities of the pecuniary market, taken as a whole, constitute a social institution of much the same general character as other great institutions, such as the church or the state.

It seems clear that the distinctive function of money valuation is to generalize or assimilate values through a common measure. In this way it gives them reach and flexibility, so that many sorts of value are enabled to work freely together throughout the social system, instead of being confined to a small province. And since values represent the powers of society, the result is that these powers are organized in a large way and enabled to co-operate in a vital whole. Any *market* value that I, for instance, may control ceases to be merely local in its application and becomes a generalized force that I can apply anywhere. If I can earn a thousand dollars teaching bacteriology, I can take the money and go to Europe, exchanging my recondite knowledge for the services, say, of guides in the Alps, who never heard of bacteriology. Other values are similarly generalized and the result is a mobility that enables many sorts of value, reduced to a common measure, to be applied anywhere and anyhow that the holder may think desirable.

We have, then, to do with a value institution or process, far transcending in reach any special sort of value, and participating in the most diverse phases of our life. Its function resembles that of language, and its ideal may be said to be to do for value what

¹ See this *Journal*, XVIII, 543 ff.

language does for thought—furnish a universal medium of communicative growth. And just as language and the social organization based upon it are extended in their scope by the modern devices of cheap printing, mails, telegraphy, telephones, and the like, so the function of pecuniary valuation is extended by uniform money and by devices for credit and transfer, until the natural obstacles of distance, lack of knowledge, and lack of homogeneity are largely overcome.

This mobilization of values through the pecuniary measure tends to make the latter an expression of the total life of society, so far as the values that stand for this life have actually become mobilized or translated into pecuniary terms. Although this translation is in fact only partial and, as I have tried to show, institutional, still the wide scope of pecuniary value, along with its precision, gives it a certain title to its popular acceptance as Value in a sense that no other kind of value can claim.

This also gives it that place as a regulator of social activity which economists have always claimed for it. Pecuniary value provides a motive to serve the pecuniary organism that penetrates everywhere, acts automatically, and adjusts itself delicately to the conditions of demand and supply. If more oranges are wanted in New York, a higher price is offered for them in California and Sicily; if more dentists are needed, the rewards of the profession increase and young men are attracted into it. Thus there is everywhere an inducement to supply those goods and services which the buying power in society thinks it wants, and this inducement largely guides production. At each point of deficient supply a sort of suction is set up to draw available persons and materials to that point and set them to work.

Thus our life, in one of its main aspects, is organized through this central value institution or market, very much as in other aspects it is organized through language, the state, the church, the family, and so on.

We come now to the question of limitations, and it will be well to consider first the view that the sphere of pecuniary value, however wide, is yet distinctly circumscribed and confined to a special

and, on the whole, inferior province of life. According to this view only the coarser and more material values can be measured in money, while the finer sorts, as of beauty, friendship, righteousness, and so on, are in their nature private and untranslatable, and so out of the reach of any generalizing process.

It seems doubtful whether we can admit that there is any such clear circumscription of the pecuniary field. All values are inter-related, and it may reasonably be held that none can stand apart and be wholly incommensurable with the others. The idea of a common measure which, for certain purposes at least, may be applied to *all* values is by no means absurd. The argument that such a measure is possible may be stated somewhat as follows.

Since the function of values is to guide conduct, they are in their nature comparable. Conduct is a matter of the total or synthetic behavior of a living whole in view of a situation: it implies the integration of all the motives bearing on the situation. Accordingly when a crisis in conduct arises the values relating to it, no matter how incommensurable they may seem, are in some way brought to a common measure, weighed against one another, in order to determine which way the scale inclines. This commensuration is psychical, not numerical, and we are far from understanding its exact nature, but unless each pertinent kind of value has a part in it of some sort it would seem that the mind is not acting as a vital whole. If there were absolute values that cannot be impaired or in any way influenced by the opposing action of other values, they must apparently exist in separate compartments and not in organic relation to the rest of the mind. It does not follow that what we regard as a high motive, such as the sense of honor, must necessarily be overcome by a sufficient accumulation of lower motives, such as sensuous desires, but we may be prepared to find that if the two are opposed the latter will, in one way or another, modify the conduct required by the former, and this I believe is usually the fact. Thus suppose a lower value, in the shape of temptation, is warring against a higher in the shape of an ideal. Even if we concede nothing to the former, even if we react far away from it, none the less it has entered into our life and helped to mold it—as sensuality, for example, helps to mold the ascetic.

And this weighing of one kind of value against another will take place largely in terms of money, which exists for the very purpose of facilitating such transactions. Thus honor is one of those values which many would place outside the pecuniary sphere, and yet honor may call for the saving of money to pay a debt, while sensuality would spend it for a hearty dinner. In this case, then, we buy our honor with money, or we sell it, through money, for something lower. In much the same way are the larger choices of society, as, for example, between power devoted to education and power devoted to warships, expressed in pecuniary terms. In general we do, in fact, individually and collectively, weigh such things as friendship, righteousness, and beauty against other matters, and in terms of money. Beauty is on the market, however undervalued, in the form, for example, of music, art, literature, flowers, and dwelling-sites. A friendly personality has a market value in salesmen, doctors, writers, and teachers; indeed in all occupations where ability to influence persons is important—and there are few in which it is not. I notice that if there is anything attractive about a man he soon learns to collect pay for it. And not less is it true that the need for righteousness finds expression in a willingness to pay a (reasonable) price for it in the market place. Convincing preachers and competent social workers command salaries, and great sums go to beneficent institutions.

The truth is that the values we think of as absolute are only, if I may use the expression, relatively absolute. That is, they so far transcend the values of everyday traffic that we think of them as belonging to a wholly different order, but experience shows that they do not. Life itself is not an absolute value, since we constantly see it sacrificed to other ends; chastity is sold daily by people not radically different in nature from the rest of us, and as for honor it would be hard to imagine a kind which might not, in conceivable situations, be renounced for some other and perhaps higher aim. The idea of the baseness of weighing the higher sort of values in the same scale with money rests on the assumption that the money is to be used to purchase values of a lower sort; but if it is the indispensable means to still higher values we shall justify the transaction. Such exchanges are constantly taking place: only those who are pro-

tected by pecuniary affluence can imagine otherwise. The health of mothers is sacrificed for money to support their children and the social opportunities of sisters given up to send brothers to college. In the well-to-do classes at least the life of possible children is often renounced on grounds of expense.

There are, no doubt, individuals who have set their hearts on particular things for which they will sacrifice without consideration almost anything else. These may be high things, like love, justice, and honor; they are often ignoble things, like avarice or selfish ambition. And, in a similar way, nations or institutions sometimes cherish values which are almost absolute, like those of national independence, or the authority of the Pope. But in general we may say that practically all values may become pecuniary in some such sense as this. If A be any individual or social organism and X and Y be among its most cherished objects, then situations may occur where, through the medium of money, some sacrifice of X will be made for the sake of Y .

I conclude, then, that it is impossible to mark off sharply the pecuniary sphere from that of other kinds of value. It is always possible that the highest as well as the lowest things may be brought within its scope.

And yet we all feel that the pecuniary sphere has limitations. The character of these may be understood, I think, by recurring to the idea that the market is a special institution in much the same sense that the church is or the state. It has a somewhat distinct system of its own in society at large much as it has in the mind of each individual. Our buyings and sellings and savings, our pecuniary schemes and standards, make in some degree a special tract of thought that often seems unconnected with other tracts. Yet we constantly have to bring the ideas of this tract into relation with those outside it; and likewise in society the pecuniary institution is in constant interaction with other institutions, this interaction frequently taking the form of a translation of values. In general the social process is an organic whole somewhat clearly differentiated into special systems, of which the pecuniary is one.

There are many histories that fall mainly within this system and

must be studied chiefly from the pecuniary point of view, not forgetting, however, that no social history is really understood until it is seen in its place as a phase of the general process. The histories I mean are those that have always been regarded as the peculiar business of the economist: the course of wheat from the grain field to the breakfast table, of iron from the mine to the watch-spring, of the social organizations created for purposes of manufacture, trade, banking, finance, and so on. There are other histories, like those of books, educational institutions, religious faith, scientific research, and the like, which must be understood chiefly from other points of view, although they are never outside the reach of pecuniary relations.

To say, then, that almost any kind of value may at times be measured in pecuniary terms is by no means to say that the latter are a universal and adequate expression of human nature and of society. On the contrary, pecuniary value is, in the main, a specialized type of value, generated within a specialized channel of the social process, and having decided limitations corresponding to this fact. I shall try to indicate a little more closely what some of these limitations are.

Let us notice, in the first place, that the pecuniary values of today derive from the whole past of the pecuniary system, so that all the wrongs that may have worked themselves into that system are implicit in them. If a materialized ruling class is in the saddle, this fact will be expressed in the large incomes of this class and their control not only of the mechanism of the market but, through prestige, of the demand which underlies its values. If drink, child labor, prostitution, and corrupt politics are part of the institution, they will be demanded upon the market as urgently as anything else. Evidently it would be fatuous to assume that the market process expresses the *good* of society. The demand on which it is based is a turbid current coming down from the past and bearing with it, for better or worse, the outcome of history. All the evils of commercialism are present in it, and are transmitted through demand to production and distribution. To accept this stream as pure and to reform only the mechanism of distribution would be as if a city should draw its drinking-water from a

polluted river and expect to escape typhoid by using clean pipes. We have reason, both in theory and in observation, to expect that our pecuniary tradition, and the values which express it, will need reform quite as much as anything else.

Indeed we cannot expect, do what we may to reform it, that the market can ever become an adequate expression of ideal values. It is an institution, and institutional values, in their nature, are conservative, representing the achieved and established powers of society rather than those which are young and look to the future. The slow crystallization of historical tendencies in institutions is likely at the best to lag behind our ideals and cannot be expected to set the pace of progress.

Suppose, however, we assume for the time being that demand does represent the good of society, and inquire next how far the market process may be trusted to realize this good through the pecuniary motive.

It seems clear that this motive can serve as an effective guide only in the case of deliberate production, for the sake of gain, and with ownership in the product. The production must be deliberate in order that *any* rational motive may control it, and the pecuniary motive will not control it unless it is for the sake of gain and protected by ownership. These limitations exclude such vast provinces of life that we may well wonder at the extent of our trust in the market process.

They shut out the whole matter of the production and development of men, of human and social life; that is, they indicate that however important the pecuniary process may be in this field it can never be trusted to control it, not even the economic side of it. This is a sphere in which the market must be dominated by other kinds of organization.

If we take the two underlying factors, heredity and environment, as these mold the life of men, we see that we cannot look to the market to regulate the hereditary factor as regards either the total number of children to be born, or the stocks from which they are to be drawn. I know that there are men who still imagine that "natural selection," working through economic competition, oper-

ates effectively in this field, but I doubt whether anyone knows facts upon which such a view can reasonably be based. In what regards population and eugenics it is more and more apparent that rational control and selection, working largely outside the market process, are indispensable.

The same may be said of the whole action of environment in forming persons after birth, including the family, the community, the school, the state, the church, and the unorganized working of suggestion and example. None of these formative agencies is of a nature to be guided adequately by pecuniary demand. The latter, even if its requirements be high, offers no guaranty that men will be produced in accordance with these requirements, since it does not control the course of production.

Let us observe, however, that even in this field the market may afford essential guidance to other agencies of control. If, for example, certain kinds of work do not yield a living wage, this may be because the supply of this kind of work is in excess, and the state or some other organization may proceed on this hint to adjust supply to demand by vocational training and guidance. Or the method of reform may be to put restrictions upon demand, as in the case of the minimum wage. Although the market process is inadequate alone, it will usually have some share in any plan of betterment.

Personal and social development must, in general, be sought through rational organization having a far wider scope than the market, though co-operating with that in every helpful way, and including, perhaps, radical reforms in the pecuniary system itself. It would be hard to formulate a principle more fallacious and harmful than the doctrine that the latter is an adequate regulator of human life, or that its own processes are superior to regulation. We are beginning to see that the prevalence of such ideas has given us over to an unhuman commercialism.

What I have been saying of persons and personal development applies also to natural resources and public improvements, to arts, sciences, and the finer human values in general. These last have a pecuniary aspect, of more or less importance, but a money demand alone cannot beget or control them. Love, beauty, and righteousness may come on the market under certain conditions, but they

are not, in the full sense, market commodities. Our faith in money is exemplified in these days by the offer of money prizes for poetry, invention, the promotion of peace, and for heroic deeds. I would not deprecate such offers, whose aim is excellent and sometimes attains the mark. They are creditable to their authors and diffuse a good spirit even though the method is too naïve to be very effectual. If money is greatly to increase products of this kind it must be applied, fundamentally and with all possible wisdom, to the conditions that mold character.

These higher goods do not really come within the economic sphere. They touch it only incidentally, their genesis and interaction belonging mainly to a different kind of process, one in which ownership and material exchange play a secondary part. The distinctively economic commodities and values are those whose whole course of production is one in which the factors are subject to legal ownership and controlled by a money-seeking intelligence, so that the process is essentially pecuniary. Thus we may say that ordinary typewriting is economic, because it is a simple, standard service which is supplied in any quantity according to demand. The work of a newspaper reporter is not quite so clearly economic, because not so definitely standardized and affording more room for intangible merits which pay cannot insure. And when we come to magazine literature of the better sort we are in a field where the process is for the most part non-pecuniary, depending, that is, on an interplay of minds outside the market, the latter coming in only to set its very questionable appraisal on the product. As to literature in general, art, science, and religion, no one at all conversant with the history of these things will claim that important work in them has any close relation to pecuniary inducement. The question whether the great man was rich and honored, like Rubens, or worked in poverty and neglect, like Rembrandt in his later years, is of only incidental interest in tracing the history of such achievement. The ideals and disciplines which give birth to it are generated in non-pecuniary tracts of thought and intercourse, and unless genius actually starves, as it sometimes does, it fulfils its aim without much regard to pay. I need hardly add

that good judges have always held that a moderate poverty was a condition favorable to intellectual and spiritual achievement.

I would assign a very large and growing sphere to pecuniary valuation, but we cannot be too clear in affirming that even at its best and largest it can never be an adequate basis for general social organization. It is an institution, like another, having important functions but requiring, like all institutions, to be brought under rational control by the aid of a comprehensive sociology, ethics, and politics. It has no charter of autonomy, no right to exemption from social control.

Thus even if market values were the best possible of their kind, we could not commit the social system to their charge, and still less can we do so when the value institution, owing to rapid and one-sided growth, is in a somewhat confused and demoralized condition. Bearing with it not only the general inheritance of human imperfection but also the special sins of a narrow and somewhat inhuman commercialism, it by no means reflects life in that broad way in which a market, with all its limitations, might reflect it. The higher values remain for the most part untranslated, even though translatable, and the material and technical aspects of the process have acquired an undue ascendancy. In general this institution, like others that might be named, is in such a condition that its estimates are no trustworthy expression of the public mind.

Having in mind these general limitations upon the sphere of pecuniary value, let us consider it more particularly as a motive to stimulate and guide the work of the individual. For this purpose we may distinguish it broadly from the need of self-expression, using the latter comprehensively to include all other influences that urge one to productive work. Among these would be emulation and ambition, the need of activity for its own sake, the love of workmanship and creation, the impulse to assert one's individuality, and the desire to serve the social whole. Such motives enter intimately into one's self-consciousness and may, for our present purpose, be included under the need of self-expression.

It is true that the pecuniary motive may also be, indirectly, a

motive of self-expression; that is, for example, a girl may work hard for ten dollars with which to buy a pretty hat. It makes a great difference, however, whether or not the work is *directly* self-expressive, whether the worker feels that what he does is joyous and rewarding in itself, so that it would be worth doing whether he were paid for it or not. The artist, the poet, the skilled craftsman in wood and iron, the born teacher or lawyer, all have this feeling, and it is desirable that it should become as common as possible. I admit that the line is not a sharp one, but on the whole the pecuniary motive may be said to be an extrinsic one, as compared with the more intrinsic character of those others which I have called motives of self-expression.

When I say that self-expression is a regulator of productive activity I mean that, like the pecuniary motive, though in a different way, it is the expression of an organic whole, and not necessarily a less authoritative expression. What a man feels to be self-expressive springs in part from the instincts of human nature, and in part from the form given to those instincts by the social life in which his mind develops. Both of these influences spring from the organic life of the human race. The man of genius who opens new ways in poetry and art, the social reformer who spends his life in conflict with inhuman conditions, the individual anywhere or of any sort who tries to realize the needs of his higher being, represents the common life of man in a way that may have a stronger claim than the requirements of pecuniary demand. As a motive it is quite as universal as the latter, and there is no one of us who has not the capacity to feel it.

As regards the individual himself, self-expression is simply the deepest need of his nature. It is required for self-respect and integrity of character, and there can be no question more fundamental than that of so ordering life that the mass of men may have a chance to find self-expression in their principal activity.

These two motives are related much as are our old friends conformity and individuality; we have to do in fact with a phase of the same antithesis. Pecuniary valuation, like conformity, furnishes a somewhat mechanical and external rule: it represents the social organization in its more explicit and established phases, and espe-

cially, of course, the pecuniary institution, which has a life somewhat distinct from that of other phases of the establishment. It is based on those powers in society which are readily translated into pecuniary terms, on wealth, position, established industrial and business methods, and so on. Self-expression springs from the deeper and more obscure currents of life, from subconscious, unmechanized forces which are potent without our understanding why. It represents humanity more immediately and its values are, or may be, more vital and significant than those of the market; we may look to them for art, for science, for religion, for moral improvement, for all the fresher impulses to social progress. The onward things of life usually come from men whose imperious self-expression disregards the pecuniary market. In humbler tasks self-expression is required to give the individual an immediate and lively interest in his work; it is the motive of art and joy, the spring of all vital achievement.

It is quite possible that these motives should work harmoniously together; indeed they do so in no small proportion of cases. A man who works because he wants money comes, under favorable conditions, to take pleasure and pride in what he does. Or he takes up a certain sort of work because he likes it, and finds that his zeal helps him to pecuniary success. I suppose that there are few of us with whom the desire of self-expression would alone be sufficient to incite regular production. Most of us need a spur to do even that which we enjoy doing, or at any rate to do it systematically. We are compelled to do something and many of us are fortunate enough to find something that is self-expressive.

The market, it would seem, should put a gentle pressure upon men to produce in certain directions, spurring the lazy and turning the undecided into available lines of work. Those who have a clear inner call should resist this pressure, as they always have done, and always must if we are to have progress. This conflict between the pecuniary system and the bias of the individual, though in some sort inevitable, should not be harsh or destructive. The system should be as tolerant and hospitable as its institutional nature permits. Values, like public opinion to which they are so closely related, should be constantly awakened, enlightened,

enlarged, and made to embrace new sorts of personal merit. There is nothing of more public value than the higher sort of self-expression and this should be elicited and rewarded in every practicable way. It is possible to have institutions which are not only tolerant but which, in a measure, anticipate and welcome useful kinds of non-conformity.

The lack of self-expression in work which is so widespread at present seems to have two sources—the character of the work considered in itself, and the surrounding conditions affecting the spirit in which it is done.

Under the first we may reckon the repellent and even destructive character of many tasks, especially when continued for long hours. Regarding this the question is how the pecuniary demand which imposes such tasks may be prevented or its operation controlled. Under the second comes the lack of that sense of freedom, outlook, and service, which might easily render work self-expressive when it would otherwise be repellent.

Pecuniary valuation, represented by the offer of wages, will never produce good work nor a contented people until it is allied with such conditions that a man feels that his task is in some sense *his*, and can put himself heartily into it. This means some sort of industrial democracy—control of working conditions by the state or by unions, co-operation, socialism—something that shall give the individual a human share in the industrial whole of which he is a member.

Closely related to this is the sense of worthy service. No man can feel that his work is self-expressive unless he believes that it is good work and can see that it serves mankind. If the product is trivial or base he can hardly respect himself, and the demand for such things, as Ruskin used to say, is a demand for slavery. Or if the employer for whom a man works and who is the immediate beneficiary of his labors is believed to be self-seeking beyond what is held legitimate, and not working honorably for the general good, the effect will be much the same. The worst sufferers from such employers are the men who work for them, whether their wages be high or low.

It is noteworthy, and suggestive as regards improvement, that

the prevalence of a spirit of art tends to reconcile self-expression with the claims of the market by making the former an object of pecuniary demand. An intelligent demand for art is a demand for self-expression by the workman in his work; and in so far as this becomes diffused it will, at least as regards decorative products, drive out the dead, unhuman kind of work that now prevails and bring in something that has an individual and joyous spirit in it. It hardly seems possible, however, that most work can ever be art work, and self-expression for the majority must probably be looked for in a free and self-respecting attitude toward their work—involving a more democratic control than we have at present—also in moderate hours, security of tenure, and the consciousness of social service.

As regards the general relation in our time between market value and self-expression, the fact seems to be something as follows: Our industrial system has undergone an enormous expansion and an almost total change of character. In the course of this, human nature has been dragged along, as it were, by the hair of the head. It has been led or driven into kinds of work and conditions of work that are repugnant to it, especially repugnant in view of the growth of intelligence and of democracy in other spheres of life. The agent in this has been the pecuniary motive backed by the absence of alternatives. This pecuniary motive has reflected a system of values determined under the ascendancy, direct and indirect, of the commercial class naturally dominant in a time of this kind. I will not say that as a result of this state of things the condition of the handworkers is worse than in a former epoch; in some respects it seems worse, in many it is clearly better; but certainly it is far from what it should be in view of the enormous growth of human resources.

In the economic philosophy which has prevailed along with this expansion, the pecuniary motive has been accepted as the legitimate principle of industrial organization to the neglect of self-expression. The human self, however, is not to be treated thus with impunity; it is asserting itself in a somewhat general discontent and in many specific forms of organized endeavor. The commercialism that accepts as satisfactory present values and the method of establish-

ing them is clearly on the decline and we have begun to work for a more self-expressive order.

Notwithstanding the insufficiencies of pecuniary valuation, the character of modern life seems to call for an extension of its scope: it would appear to be true, in a certain sense, that the principle that everything has its price should be rather enlarged than restricted. The ever-vaster and more interdependent system in which we live requires for its organization a corresponding value mechanism, just as it requires a mechanism of transportation and communication. And this means not only that the value medium should be uniform, adaptable, and stable, but also that the widest possible range of values should be convertible into it. The wider the range the more fully does the market come to express and energize the aims of society. It is a potent agent, and the more good work we can get it to take hold of the better. Its limitations, then, by no means justify us in assuming that it has nothing to do with ideals or morals. On the contrary, the method of progress in every sphere is to transfuse the higher values into the working institutions and keep the latter on the rise. Just as the law exists to formulate and enforce certain phases of righteousness, and is continually undergoing criticism and revision based on moral judgments, so ought every institution, and especially the pecuniary system, to have constant renewal from above. It should be ever in process of moral regeneration, and the method that separates it from the ethical sphere, while justifiable perhaps for certain technical inquiries, becomes harmful when given a wider scope. As regards responsibility to moral requirements there is no fundamental difference between pecuniary valuation and the state, the church, education, or any other institution. We cannot expect to make our money values ideal, any more than our laws, our sermons, or our academic lectures, but we can make them better, and this is done by bringing higher values upon the market.

To put it otherwise, the fact that pecuniary values fail to express the higher life of society creates a moral problem which may be met in either of two ways. One is to depreciate money valuation altogether and attempt to destroy its prestige. The other is to concede

to it a very large place in life, even larger, perhaps, than it occupies at present, and to endeavor to regenerate it by the translation into it of the higher values. The former way is analogous with that somewhat obsolete form of religion which gave up this world to the devil and centered all effort on keeping out of it in preparation for a wholly different world to be gained after death. The world and the flesh, which could not really be escaped, were left to a neglected and riotous growth.

In like manner, perceiving that pecuniary values give in many respects a debasing reflection of life, we are tempted to rule them out of the ethical field and consign them to an inferior province. The price of a thing, we say, is a material matter which has nothing to do with its higher values, and never can have. This, however, is bad philosophy, in economics as in religion. The pecuniary values are members of the same general system as the moral and aesthetic values, and it is part of their function to put the latter upon the market. To separate them is to cripple both, and to cripple life itself by cutting off the healthy interchange among its members. Our line of progress lies, in part at least, not over commercialism but through it; the dollar is to be reformed rather than suppressed. Our system of production and exchange is a very great achievement, not more on the mechanical side than in the social possibilities latent in it. Our next task seems to be to fulfil these possibilities, to enlarge and humanize the system by bringing it under the guidance of a comprehensive social and ethical policy.

THE ITALIAN TRIPLE ALLIANCE OF LABOR

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The economic and political views of a large percentage of Italian working-men are a function of their attitude and relation to the church. A practicing Catholic is in most cases under the absolute control of his priest, not only in his spiritual, but also in his economic and social life. From the Alps down to the Ionian Sea we see a gradual lowering of the standards of education and of civilization. The priests, most of whom come from peasant families or from the lower walks of society, rarely leave their native province, of which they are a typical product. In the north the clergy has built up a powerful, quite wonderful Catholic organization, especially in the provinces of Lombardy and Venice. The south, with the exception of Sicily, though very much in need of assistance, is almost entirely neglected. One cannot but regret the separatistic Catholic movement in the interest of the workers, for it weakens their action for improving the conditions of life and labor. Though everybody can see that undemocratic differences exist between the higher dignitaries of the church and the masses of the lower clergy, the church is not willing to recognize it, and does not tolerate in the organizations of the working people the spirit of class antagonism. The Catholic organizations will in this article be referred to only incidentally.

The aims of the non-Catholic movement are to organize the radical, mostly socialist, proletarian workers along political and economic lines.

A few words must be devoted to socialism. While Italy was under foreign or reactionary governments, socialism could not be discussed openly. Between 1864 and 1870 Bakounin and Garibaldi preached it, and the first Italian branch of the international working-men's association was formed in Naples in 1867. Unification brought greater political freedom, the development of

capitalistic industries, and a general desire to raise the low level of wages and of the standard of living. Some mutual aid societies assumed after 1870 the name of trades union or socialist club. The socialist party of Italy was united until the Congress of Reggio Emilia in 1912. Since then it has consisted of a progressive and a stand-pat wing, the latter with a Marxian and partly syndicalistic program. Though the number of inscribed members of the party never was over 42,000, it received, in 1904, 21 per cent of the total vote, in spite of the fact that most proletarians were disfranchised on account of illiteracy. The progressive wing co-operates with every agency which helps the working people, above all with the federation of labor. The agitation of the socialists has undoubtedly stimulated the further organization of the working class in trades unions, mutual, and co-operative societies. Under Pope Leo XIII, who favored a Christian socialist movement, liberal Catholics could, without fear of church punishment, join quite advanced societies. The present Pope disapproves of it and condemns an organization whose members do not absolutely submit to clerical supervision. For this reason, it seems, has the Catholic movement lost ground, while the neutral and socialist move has made good progress.

Many members of trades unions, mutual aid, and co-operative societies, as private citizens, take an active part in the struggle for political power and equal rights in the ranks of the socialist party, while the different societies themselves generally assume an absolutely neutral attitude.

TRADES UNIONS

In 1911 640,000 workers were organized in neutral or socialist trades unions; 108,000 workers were organized in Catholic trades unions; 112,000 workers were organized in syndicalistic organizations.

The Italian trades unions, at first called *leghe di resistenza*, are now mostly referred to as *leghe di miglioramento*, improvement societies, or *leghe di mestiere*, trades unions. The old name indicated the fighting spirit of the founders, while the new names show clearly that the movement has undergone an evolution.

Radical socialism, displeased with the German more opportunistic spirit which it held responsible for the politically almost neutral and very conciliatory attitude of the *leghe*, formed syndicates after the French model. The latter are in favor of a determined class struggle and opposed to parliamentary action, to any co-operation or agreements with the employers or the government for the benefit of the working class. The general strike, boycott, and sabotage are their weapons. The *Unione sindacale italiana* is their central organization. Their agitation is responsible for a second unfortunate split in the battle line of labor. Many railroad and other governmental employees and agricultural laborers belong to these revolutionary organizations.

The strongest trades unions are those of the masons and iron workers, of which 16 and 21 per cent are organized. Both are well-paid skilled workers; the latter are concentrated in a few localities, which facilitates the work of propaganda. The local unions of the same trade are federated in provincial and finally in a national organization. The *Federazione generale italiana*, federation of labor, established in 1906, is the central organization of all the unions of industrial and agricultural workers. According to the membership the local unions pay a yearly quota in the treasury of the higher organizations. Men and women have equal rights in all these organizations. The low standard of education makes a really democratic government of the unions impossible. Therefore the power of taking action on important questions is taken out of the hands of the general council of the union; it is intrusted to the secretary of the *camera di lavoro*, chamber of labor, or to the secretary of the general federation of labor. The direction of conferences with employers, for instances, about questions of the labor contract is confided to these officers. The general council decides issues of purely local interest, but when a strike is voted, further action is suspended. The minutes of the meeting, in which the vote was taken, must be sent at once to the two secretaries. If they believe the strike is inopportune and disapprove of it, the local union may appeal to a referendum of the federation of their union, whose vote is decisive. The local loses by such action generally the moral and financial support of the federation and

of the *camera*. The trades unions seek to improve the conditions of life, labor, and education of their members. They lately have begun to insure them against invalidity and unemployment. Whenever possible, collective bargaining with the employers is favored. The unions in the Emilia have succeeded in raising wages about 25 per cent in five years.

While petty jealousy and lack of funds handicap the extension of trades unionism in the cities, the same causes and in addition the low standard of popular education and the hostility of the priests must be reckoned with in the rural districts. There is, however, a considerable rural union movement, and the tillers of the soil are energetically freeing themselves from a state of servitude. Different classes are represented in the rural unions.

In 1912 there were 262,000 day laborers, or *braccianti*; 105,000 tenants, or *mezzadri*; 14,000 small proprietors, or *contadini*; 32,000 others.

The small proprietors are economically in a more favorable position than the tenants and the rural proletariat, the common day-laborers. The Congress of Tenants adopted a resolution in Bologna in January, 1913, which declared that their interests were identical with those of the day-laborers, especially in regard to agricultural contracts, mutual aid and co-operative societies. The *braccianti* live from hand to mouth, and are permanently moving about in search of work. Hence they have no love for the land, economic conditions preventing them from ever owning some of it. They are easily attracted by radical ideas and become syndicalists. By collective bargaining and by social legislation some of the worst abuses have been eliminated, especially in the malaria-infected rice fields. Only 45 per cent of the rural unions are affiliated with a *camera di lavoro*, while only 12 per cent of the trades unions, all Catholic organizations, have not joined a *camera*. The syndicalists have unfortunately established syndicalistic *camere di lavoro*. All affiliated societies share in the expenses of the local *camera* by paying a regular tax according to their membership and by paying rent for the premises they occupy.

Most of the *camere* belong to the federation of labor, while the syndicalistic *camere* have joined the *Unione sindacale*. The *camera*

is the center of activity of organized labor in a district. The affiliated societies have usually their headquarters there, which greatly facilitates a general exchange of ideas between the different officers and leaders, and hence guarantees, in spite of much petty jealousy, more or less concerted action. Ninety-eight *camere* existed in 1910, and as they perform much valuable social service in the community under the form of labor exchanges and free legal aid bureaus, they often receive substantial subsidies from the municipality. A *camera* is governed by a council, representing the affiliated societies, and is therefore often unmanageably large. Men and women members of the societies elect this council, which in turn appoints an executive committee of fifteen and holds a competitive examination for the place of the secretary. The latter must be a well-educated, conciliatory, and able man, on whom rests a great responsibility. The executive committee allows generally the secretary to carry on the routine work; important questions are submitted to the general council which meets once a month. The secretary must keep constantly in touch with other *camere* and with the federation of labor. He spends usually much time in straightening out difficulties and dissensions between members and their organization, and between different organizations. His efforts to introduce a uniform system of bookkeeping are frequently checked by the unwillingness of many affiliated organizations to let an outsider interfere in their internal affairs.

It might be interesting to report the activities of the *camera* of Turin. About twenty-six years ago the organized proletariat, socialists, trades unions, co-operative and mutual aid societies built a substantial house as a headquarters for their organizations, it is now too small for its purposes, though the Torinese co-operative alliance has moved into a house of its own, and every available space from the cellar to the garret is used. A very fair co-operative restaurant and a roomy auditorium serve the social needs of the members and their families. I watched there during a hot summer night about fifteen hundred people, all of whom had paid 7 cents for admission, listening to an address by the famous former priest and leader of the Christian socialist movement, Don Murri. A circulating library; a reading-room, a legal aid and a technical

bureau, and an employment office render excellent services. The latter had in 1909, 2,800 offers of work and placed 1,990 of its members in permanent positions. The stronger unions maintain still their own labor exchanges. Injured members get free medical assistance and are referred at once to a competent lawyer. Classes are carried on in order to increase the number of class-conscious voters by decreasing the number of illiterates. A people's university was started with the co-operation of the Umanitaria of Milan, but it failed owing to the indifference of the members. The lack of funds prevents the chamber from taking decisive part and action along economic lines, which causes a good deal of dissatisfaction among the members. Though the latter are mostly socialists, they do not like to play politics at the *camera*, and defeated consequently a socialist ticket for the election of the general council a few years ago. The secretary is a convinced Marxian, but that was his private opinion, and he was absolutely impartial in the execution of his duties. He was rather discontented with his position and small salary of \$480, and scornfully pointed out the secretary of the Milanese *camera*, who had just accepted the secretaryship or the place as business agent of the co-operative society of railroad porters at a salary of \$800. The secretaries seem to change about a good deal, because their salary is so low. Through their varied activities they acquire a wonderful knowledge of the labor movement, and are often called to more important and also better-paying positions. Vergnanini, the former secretary of the *camera* of Reggio Emilia, for years an exile on account of his political ideas, is now the general secretary of the National League of Co-operative Societies and the Federation of Mutual Aid Societies. Reggio is a small city with comparatively little industry, but is, owing to Vergnanini's activity, thoroughly organized. All the artisans and craftsmen have their co-operative societies and their trades unions; the women had such of dressmakers, milliners, and of straw workers. In 1909, 467 different societies were affiliated with the *camera*, among which 105 co-operative stores, 85 co-operative societies of producers, 110 trades and 108 rural unions. As a man in Reggio generally belongs to a number of societies, it would be misleading to quote the membership.

Verona is the headquarters for a *camera di lavoro* of employees of the state and of different communities in the province; 210 teachers, 200 county physicians and 50 veterinary surgeons, 200 municipal and 150 county employees, 100 employees of the post, 80 of the war office, 150 railroad employees, and 60 others have joined it. The *camera* protects most energetically the interest of its members.

CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES

The Italian proletariat has undoubtedly profited by its organization in trades unions, but greater has been its gain by the successful imitation of the English co-operative store and the German co-operative banking. Co-operation is the association of men and women who, by uniting their resources for the common benefit, procure for themselves as consumers the necessities of life cheaper and in better quality. As producers they become their own employers, as a co-operative bank they provide for their members cheap credit, dispensing with usurers and public pawnshops. Co-operation is the best and most efficient weapon in the struggle of the working people to emancipate themselves from the exploitation of the capitalistic producer and the middleman. For a long time the Marxian socialists fought this movement as bitterly as they had fought trades unionism. The wives of the laborers were the first to recognize the advantages offered by the co-operative store, and their husbands followed the lead. Thus Italian socialists had already answered the question in the affirmative, when the International Socialist Congress of Copenhagen decided in 1910 that co-operation was not incompatible with the doctrine. The incomplete Italian statistics for 1911 mention about 4,200 co-operative societies with a capital of \$30,000,000. The Italian government has very wisely encouraged this movement by granting postal, fiscal, and other facilities to co-operative societies with a small working capital. The law of 1911 grants very extensive privileges to three different kinds of those associations: (1) Co-operative societies of production, *produzione*, or of skilled laborers, and of labor, *lavoro*, or unskilled laborers; (2) co-operative societies for agricultural purposes; (3) mixed co-operative societies, combining agricultural and other workers.

Only bona fide working-men are allowed to join the societies of production and of labor, if they are to profit by the law, while peasants, tenants, and day-laborers are entitled to membership in the other organizations. The law is therefore not applicable to Catholic societies as long as they admit as honorary members priests and professional people. No member shall hold more than \$1,000 worth of shares. The par value of a share shall not exceed \$20. The shares are not transferable, until they have been paid up entirely. The general meeting has to authorize the transaction. One man has one vote regardless of the number of shares he owns.

If an organization of the three above-mentioned types has at least seven members, it can ask for official incorporation in the provincial register. In 1910, 468 societies with a capital of \$750,000 were incorporated. They had secured in the same year governmental and other public contracts at a value of \$6,000,000, at a net profit of \$160,000. A provincial commission must ascertain whether the society conforms with the law. Once incorporated the society must submit to governmental supervision and inspection, and adopt a uniform system of bookkeeping and accounting. Several incorporated societies can form a *consorzio*, which may also be incorporated. The government and public bodies favor co-operative societies whenever they need either finished products, food-stuffs, or labor of various kinds for the public administration. The most interesting example of a governmental contract is the following: The public authorities of the province of Reggio Emilia allotted to a *consorzio* a contract for building a short railroad between Reggio and Ciano, and the running of it for seventy years. There was \$88,000 subscribed by the *consorzio* whose members practically comprised the whole working population of Reggio and its surroundings. The banking department of the Umanitaria of Milan furnished the necessary funds to pay for machinery, raw material, and other costs of installation. Individual co-operative societies of skilled and unskilled laborers constructed depots, train sheds, bridges, laid the tracks, did in fact all the work connected with railroad construction. The work was a great success, and in 1909 trains were running between different sections of the line,

which was under the absolute control of the co-operative *consorzio*. Co-operatives all over Italy were proud of the achievements of their friends of Reggio. A co-operative *consortium* of Bologna secured in March, 1913, a contract for railroad work on the direct line, between Bologna and Elorezn. The private contractors protested energetically against this favoritism toward co-operative societies. To facilitate the bidding for work, the authorities can divide the contracts into those for supplying material, finished products, and labor, in order to give different co-operative societies an opportunity to compete. If, as in the above-cited case, a contract is awarded to a *consortium*, it divides the work among its constituent societies. Cessation of the work or subletting to outsiders is a violation of the law. When, however, unforeseen circumstances arise, outside help can be hired. Such workers must be paid fair wages and they share in the profits of the enterprise. Incorporated co-operative societies are not obliged to give bonds for the faithful execution of the work, which is always required from private contractors. Instead 10 per cent is deducted from the weekly pay-roll for work accomplished or material furnished during the preceding week, until the necessary guaranty fund has been collected.

The authorities negotiate directly with co-operative societies wherever the amount of the contract is less than \$1,500; bids for more important work must be publicly invited. The competition may, however, be limited to co-operative societies, at the discretion of the authorities. Governmental officials compute the maximum and the minimum amount to be allowed for the work. The bids are opened in public session and the best offer is accepted.

Co-operative societies violating the rules are suspended, and for more serious offenses stricken from the register, which frequently entails serious financial loss. Only after a lapse of two years can such a society ask for reinstatement. The by-laws of the society must contain rules about the admission and withdrawal of members, about the division of the profits and the value of individual shares.

The officers must be members of the co-operative societies. In twenty years 3,400 contracts to the amount of \$16,000,000 have been awarded to co-operative societies by public bodies.

Many societies of production and of labor were at first not willing to submit to governmental supervision; the advantages are, however, so great that they have changed their policy. In a recent report of the general commissioner on the budget the following is said about co-operative societies:

In face of litigation in which the state administration finds itself too frequently involved, we can only express preference for contracts with co-operative societies. It is a recognized fact that co-operative societies contracting for public work have not harassed the administration with law suits in which private contractors seem to revel (or have done so very exceptionally and in very small if not insignificant numbers). This must necessarily give rise to serious consideration both with the object in view of studying the means of gradually increasing the number of contracts with co-operative societies, and with the object of strengthening the position of the state in its dealings with private contractors.

The co-operative societies of production and of work get their working capital, by their members, whose number is not limited, subscribing to shares at a value of from \$5 to \$10. The working capital is increased by part of the profits of the society. The credit of the societies is generally good. The liability of the members is unlimited. They must be paid fair wages; at the end of the financial year it is estimated how much work each individual has done for the society, and he receives his share of the profits, or must assume his responsibility if there are any losses. It is usual to divide the profits in the following way: 45 per cent to the members; 40 per cent to increase the reserve fund; 5 per cent to increase the capital; 10 per cent for insurance.

Skilled workers are naturally more in need of capital for the purchase of raw material, which they transform into finished products for machinery and tools, and, above all, for the building or renting of workshops. Hence they are generally obliged to borrow from mutual societies or co-operative banks until they have accumulated a sufficient working capital. Those societies are especially successful which have a large part of the process of production in their hands. The brickmakers of Reggio Emilia, for instance, secured a contract from a former manufacturer for the delivery of bricks. The digging of clay, the molding and baking, and transporting the finished product to the place where it was

needed were all done by the co-operative. The contractor had only to ascertain whether the bricks came up to the stipulations of the contract. The co-operative society at Altare in Liguria, formed by glass-workers in 1865, is the prototype of co-operative societies of skilled workers.

Italy has about 30 co-operative societies of high-sea fishermen. Sardinia's fishermen have even organized *consorzii* for the following purposes: The *consortium* sells collectively the catch and maintains a store in which the members can buy everything they need for plying their trade. Modern methods of catching and transporting fish are adopted. The members bind themselves to observe the Italian fishing laws and to secure better governmental protection. Most co-operative societies own boats. Where this is not the case they see to it that the profits are divided in a fair way between the owners, the captains, and the crew. All the members are insured against invalidity, and belong to the same mutual societies.

About twenty years ago 84 typographical workers in Milan subscribed \$200 to start a co-operative printing plant, which is at present one of the best-equipped shops in the capital of Lombardy. A close union is formed with the co-operative society of book-binders. The Umanitaria of Milan erected a number of well-built shops for co-operatives of skilled workers, like painters, carpenters, glass-workers, and others. The men choose of course their own managers. The city of Milan is governed by a progressive majority. It gave the contract for renovating the old Sforza stronghold and for the construction of a new power plant to the *consortium* of co-operatives of the building trade, which successfully finished the work. At present the same *consortium* is building a number of really beautiful and at the same time hygienic and inexpensive houses for the working population. The tailors' co-operative secured a municipal contract for furnishing uniforms to the city employees, while the work of white-washing the buildings belonging to the wealthy Milanese orphan asylum was awarded to the painters' co-operative society.

The splendidly organized longshoremen of Genoa, who occupy a position intermediate between skilled and unskilled laborers, are not in need of large funds, hence they divide their profits by

using 10 per cent for insurance and 10 for the reserve fund, while 80 per cent is paid to the members.

The co-operative societies of the building trade, the wood- and metal-workers, expressmen and freight handlers showed the best results, while the pebble, cement, and paving work showed neither loss nor profit.

Co-operative societies of unskilled laborers have a membership of 33,000 men and women, willing to do any kind of rough work, such as farming, ditch-digging, stone-quarrying, irrigation and railroad work, and the like. These *braccianti* have no permanent home, and they move from province to province according to the season and the fluctuations of the labor market. The first society of this kind was started in the province of Ravenna, an old republican and anticlerical stronghold, in 1884. There the day-laborers averaged 120 working-days a year and their wages were extremely low. They were forced to hire out for work in other provinces, but it was exceedingly difficult for individuals to know where they were needed. Three hundred subscribed to a \$5 share of a co-operative society and their secretary looked out for work and made contracts with public or private agencies. The first year the net profit was \$1,880. This society has now over 3,000 members and a capital of \$40,000. It undertakes by preference improvement of arid and swamp land, work on mountain torrents and reforestry, construction of dykes, and similar work. In 1884 the Italian government contracted with it for the improvement and sanitation of the swamps around the old port of Rome, Ostia. In 1892, 5 families of *braccianti* settled on 125 acres of improved land, while at present more than 40 families cultivate as tenants of the government over 600 acres. Truck-gardening and raising of cattle for the near market of Rome is their specialty. Another flourishing colony of *braccianti* lives on over 600 acres of land in the province of Ravenna not far from the famous Pineta, which has been improved by the society. Italy has 6,500,000 acres of arid and 3,000,000 acres of swamp land. If the necessary money could be found for the reclamation of this vast and at present absolutely unproductive territory, her sons would find it unnecessary to leave home in order to get work.

Though the work performed by co-operative societies of unskilled laborers is generally simple, detailed estimates must be made before a contract is signed in order to avoid the acceptance of work at ruinous prices. This is not necessary in the case of a governmental contract, as the officials themselves estimate the minimum cost of the work. Moreover, the work always needs careful supervision by experts. Co-operative societies of skilled workers are in still greater need of such assistance. In different parts of the country technical bureaus, connected mostly with a *camera di lavoro*, assume the work of computing the costs and supervising the work. The revision of the business administration of the co-operative societies rests also in their hands. It is customary to have small units work under a responsible gang boss. To furnish good substantial work is in the interest of every member, as his individual profits depend upon his own and everybody else's co-operation and *esprit de corps*.

The government encourages the direct sale of agricultural products by co-operative societies and has a sum of money for prizes at agricultural shows. Those co-operatives receive premiums which excel in good management and results. The agricultural co-operative movement is partly capitalistic and partly proletarian. Most of the fire, hail, and death of cattle insurance companies, the co-operative breeding of stock, dairies, wine and olive presses are of this kind, and therefore find no place here. The Catholic rural co-operative movement is very flourishing in the north and in Sicily.

Agricultural co-operative societies seek to re-establish the equilibrium between the agricultural producer and the consumer by directly furnishing agricultural products to him, instead of selling through a middleman. Very early the societies were forced into establishing co-operative mills and bakeries, to which the members would bring their corn or flour. The next step was to have collective olive and wine presses, sausage and cheese factories, to prepare agricultural products for the market. Many agricultural societies supply governmental institutions with food-stuffs, or have contracts with co-operative stores in near-by towns for the furnishing of wine, oil, sausages, and cheese, in return for which they secure loans at reasonable rates.

Owing to the ignorance of business methods and to their isolation, the inhabitants of rural districts fall an easy prey to the merchants in the towns, from whom they must often order goods by mail. The goods supplied are frequently of very inferior quality and sold at exorbitant prices. The needs of a farming community are simple and of no great variety—certain kinds of implements and tools, household supplies, fertilizer, and seed. Co-operative purchasing societies buy all these at wholesale prices either on their own account or on order of a member. Buying directly from the producer, examination in laboratories to ascertain whether the goods come up to the stipulations, and shipment in bulk at greatly reduced rates guarantee to the consumers a considerable saving. The purchasing societies maintain magazines in the different communities, which, according to local needs, are opened once a week or oftener. As they pay no salary to the manager, their running expenses are reduced to a minimum. The products of their own members, including cocoons of the silkworm, are stored in warehouses until the market becomes favorable.

As the demand for artificial fertilizer is increasing, not a few manure factories are run by co-operative *consorzii*.

In 1892 the different *consorzii agrarii* formed a federation, which greatly strengthened the neutral agrarian movement. The federation acts as a wholesale purchasing agency, having a trade of \$2,000,000 in 1906. The affiliated societies are not obliged to purchase exclusively through it.

Larger rural stores must of course have hired employees. The model way for dividing the profits in this case is: 30 per cent to the reserve fund; 60 per cent to the members according to their purchases; 10 per cent to the employees. The shareholders are entitled to 4 per cent interest on the shares. The general assembly decides how much of the profits, if any, shall be used for improving social conditions.

A great handicap to intensive husbandry in Italy is the ownership of land by absentee landlords. They either use their estates for extensive farming, in which few agricultural laborers are needed, or they hand the administration over to a middleman, a *gabelotto*. The latter pays the owner a stipulated sum as rent,

and is obliged to make his profits from subletting the land at exorbitant prices to tenants. The contracts are generally of short duration, usually for 5 years. As the tenants are not sure that at the end of the term their lease will be renewed, the land is naturally worked for all it is worth, and is thus constantly impoverished. Rotation of crops, which would counteract this defect to a great extent, is practically unknown.

Day-laborers and tenants, in an effort to free themselves from these unbearable conditions, have formed co-operative societies for the collective renting of land, *affittanze collettive*. By acquiring shares and by borrowing from interested outsiders they get the necessary capital for competing successfully with the *gabelotto*. As a co-operative society they lease the land from private owners, the state, the municipalities, or charitable institutions for a long period. The owner is sure of the rent, as the members are liable collectively, and, moreover, are backed by financially strong organizations. Machinery, implements, live stock, and mules and oxen are owned in common. An expert manages the whole enterprise, and the members and their families work according to his orders. They receive fair wages. The profits are divided in the following way: 20 per cent to the members; 20 per cent for insurance; 40 per cent to increase the working capital; 20 per cent to the reserve fund. In Sicily and four northern provinces over 110,000 acres are held in common lease by co-operative societies with 26,000 members at an annual rent of \$400,000. Different institutions of credit have allowed over \$900,000 to these societies.

If it is not possible to employ all the members on the farm, they either work in shifts or the unemployed must hire out for work. At harvest time it is necessary to hire outsiders. The government encourages the collective farming by sending out traveling teachers and lecturers, who preach modern agricultural methods, especially rotation of crops, use of better seed, and the scientific use of fertilizer. On market days and during the festas the teachers are always in evidence and are much consulted. All over Italy we find experimental farms where the new methods are shown to the peasants, who see what the local soil can produce under careful and scientific management.

The Catholics have developed another form of collective renting. A co-operative society is also here the leaser of the land, but the estate is divided into individual farms, for which a family pays rent. The profits of the lot belong to the family. An expert directs the work also here. The sowing and ploughing are generally done by the management. A few neutral societies have likewise adopted this plan, to which the socialists are strenuously opposed.

Co-operative stores or societies of distribution or of consumers flourish in the cities of the northern Italy. The official statistics of 1910 show about 1,600 such societies with a capital of \$4,400,000.

The co-operative store would have solved the problem of the high cost of living, if the unfortunate regionalism of the Italian had not succeeded in establishing often a number of these societies in one place. In Milan we find, for instance, 46 different co-operative stores; the yearly turnover of 7 of them amounts to \$3,800,000, while the 39 others have an annual trade of not more than \$200,000. A movement was started last February to combine the three strongest organizations in the hope that all others would finally be obliged to fall in line. Unfortunately it was not successful.

The Catholics have their own societies, which are strongly centralized.

The modern industrial development has attracted to the Italian cities great masses of people with simple wants, which can be easily satisfied by co-operative societies. After the English and Scotch example a wholesale co-operative society has been formed, but so far few of the co-operative societies of consumers have joined this national league. A co-operative society of consumers needs capital for the renting of stores, paying of salaries, and purchasing of goods; it saves immensely by not having to advertise in the papers and by not needing magnificent shop displays. Sales at current prices at cash encourage thrift among the purchasers, who save at the end of the year often substantial amounts without any effort. The hostility of local shopkeepers is not violent in this case. They are even willing to furnish certain commodities to members of the co-operative societies at great discounts. As the co-operative societies pay cash for the goods, they get a large discount off. Some societies sell only to members, at cost, in which

case they enjoy fiscal advantages as, for instance, exemption of the onerous local taxes on food-stuffs. Where the general public is served it benefits at the end of the year in the profits. The rule is, however, that non-members get only half of what regular members receive. Frequently their portion is kept back, until it is high enough to pay for one share of the co-operative society stock.

The stores have been forced to take up the production of staple goods in their own shops, unless they have an arrangement with an agricultural co-operative society or one of production for furnishing certain products. This is an excellent thing, for shop conditions, hours of work, and wages are satisfactory in these shops; members of the Consumers League would approve of them. Macaroni, bread, pastry, shoes and clothes, wine and olive oil are manufactured in this way. Sometimes co-operatives of shoemakers and tailors are under contract obliged to furnish their products to the store or to members directly.

Turin's centralized Co-operative Alliance maintains 20 branches ail over the city and the suburbs. Besides producing many commodities, it maintains a clinic for its members, a dispensary for nursing mothers, allows free medical and obstetrical aid, has a chemical and pharmaceutical laboratory, runs several pharmacies, and maintains a sanatorium at the seashore. A circulating library, evening classes, and entertainments serve the other needs of the members. Experts in bookkeeping and accounting travel around in the province to inspect the business administration of co-operative societies. When the latter ask for a loan, they must bring a certified statement of these experts as to the financial status of the society.

Milan's co-operative union maintains a wine depot at Varese and a restaurant in Berlin. A central store and 26 branches in Milan, a bakery, a coal depot, a hotel, three co-operative restaurants, and a weekly paper are owned by the society. It had, in 1911, 14,000 members with a capital of \$1,125,000. Its reserve fund amounted to \$500,000. Its \$5 share is quoted at \$6.60.

The working classes, massed in insalubrious quarters of the cities, live in wretched dwellings and flats, for which they pay an

exorbitant rent. To improve these conditions co-operative building societies have been formed, which, with the help of the municipalities, local savings banks, and mutual aid societies, place at the disposition of the working people sanitary and decent houses at reasonable rent. In many cases it becomes possible for the tenants to buy the house on yearly instalments. The resources of the co-operative societies hardly enable them to undertake this improvement work. They are therefore obliged to depend for their working capital to a very large extent upon the co-operation of outsiders. The actual building and finishing are mostly in the hands of co-operative societies of masons, painters, and carpenters. In a group of such houses we find generally co-operative restaurants, whose large halls serve for meetings of the tenants, barber-shops, tailors, and shoemakers, all working on a co-operative basis. The first Montessori kindergarten I ever saw was in the center of a beautiful group of co-operative houses in Milan, built by the Umanitaria.

The backbone of the co-operative movement is the co-operative bank, which furnishes cheap credit to its own members, and at the same time assists every other co-operative movement in need of money. The usurers who infested the country, especially the rural district of the Campagna and of Sicily, have been driven out of business wherever a strong co-operative banking movement has appeared. The former prime minister, Luigi Luzzatti, is the best friend of the co-operative banking movement. He adapted the German system of Schulze-Delitzsch to Italian conditions and opened the first co-operative bank, Banca Popolare, in Lodi in Lombardy forty years ago. Shopkeepers, artisans, and laborers acquire shares for which they pay in 10 monthly instalments, they deposit their savings in the banks, and find plenty of credit if they need it. The advantage of the system is that different social groups are represented in the membership of the banks, whose credit needs do not come at the same time. The liability of the members is limited. A large board of directors, elected by the general assembly of all the members, controls, without receiving any compensation, the work of the different committees and of the paid clerks. An auditing committee assists them in their work.

The popular banks discount bills and acceptances of the rural banks, thus providing for the credit needs of the latter. In 1909, 825 such banks existed with a membership of 500,000 and a capital of \$50,000,000. Preference is always given to the small borrower. Mortgages, securities, bonds, and products are put up as collateral; loans on honor are not infrequent. The *banca popolare* of Bologna loaned in thirty-five years \$66,000 on honor, of which only \$2,000 were lost. The co-operative bank of Padua loaned during two cholera years \$8,000 and lost \$280. A shoemaker secures, for instance, a loan on honor to buy leather, a laundress to buy irons, women to buy sewing-machines. For a long time the mutual aid societies had done this work, until co-operative banking was started. The popular banks have had since 1876 a central organization in Rome, which serves as a clearing-house. The affiliated banks invest their surplus funds through it, and in case of need secure loans through the same agency.

For the credit needs of the rural districts Raiffeisen's system was adopted by the Catholics and by the neutral organizations. Wollemborg established the first *cassa rurale* in Loreggia in 1883. A number of small consumers of capital constitute with their resources the rural co-operative bank. The banks receive deposits from everybody, for which interest is paid. They loan to members only. The capital which they borrow from outside is secure because the rural co-operative banks have only a limited field of action; their members know each other very well, credit is given exclusively in case of need, and the money must be used by the borrower for the purpose for which he received it. The moral standing of the borrower and his security are considered before the credit committee grants a loan. The banks have accepted unlimited liability. Farmers, tenants, and day-laborers get credit at rates varying between 4 per cent all over northern Italy and 8 per cent in Sicily. The profits are used to increase the capital and the reserve fund of the bank, only a small percentage going to shareholders. In case of dissolution the reserve fund must be used for some work of social betterment. Loans for agricultural purposes are made for ten years, but the bank's risk committee has the right of calling a loan, when a man neglects his duties, and begins, for

instance, to drink and gamble. Loans are paid back in monthly instalments including interest. The *cassa rurale* is an independent co-operative society, while the *cassa agraria* is generally the agent of a larger co-operative credit institution of the province.

The Catholics have about 1,300 banks of their own, the neutral movement counts over 500, but they are absolutely unable to satisfy the rural needs of credit.

The national organization of rural banks spends a good deal of money to extend the movement; the government helps it along by placing funds at the disposition of the banks. Most important is the assistance rendered to the movement by the Umanitaria of Milan. Moise Prosper Loria's object was to raise the efficiency of the working people by this wonderful creation. It has extensive funds to start and to help along different co-operative enterprises, above all co-operative banks all over Italy, but especially in the northern provinces. It has established a banking department in Milan and branches in Turin, Florence, Reggio Emilia, and Genoa which serve as clearing-houses for the financial transactions of most co-operative societies of northern Italy. Over \$100,000 of the capital of \$300,000 were contributed by trades unions, co-operative and mutual aid societies, whose deposits amounted in 1911 to over \$260,000. In the same year over \$2,500,000 had been loaned by the banking department of the Umanitaria to 1371 co-operative societies of production and of labor; 48 co-operative societies of consumers; 122 co-operative societies of credit; 11 co-operative societies of agriculture; 23 co-operative societies of building. In 1912, \$6,000,000 were loaned, while loans of more than \$4,000,000 had to be refused. Only \$2,000 had been lost in two years, of \$50,000 loaned on honor. The Umanitaria maintains at Milan a practical school of civics and of accounting, in which labor leaders and officials of co-operative societies receive a much-needed training for their work. The instruction aims to introduce a uniform system of accounting and bookkeeping, which facilitates revision. It is of the utmost importance to have trained men in charge of the financial and business administration of co-operative societies. With an often unbelievable optimism new co-operative societies are established all over Italy whose financial resources are extremely

limited, and whose managers have no business ability. An early failure is the result. Hence the general desire of the friends of co-operation to put the societies under closer supervision.

A legal aid bureau helps out in all cases needing the services of a lawyer, a technical bureau looks out for eventual contracts and their specifications in the interest of co-operative societies of production and of labor. It makes estimates and supervises the technical execution of the work.

In the Italian parliament exists a group of deputies, belonging to different parties, who co-operate in all questions pertaining to labor and social legislation in favor of the working people. Quite recently they forced a substantial change in a law which intended to prevent co-operative societies from running pharmacies. The law now not only allows them to continue in this business, but allows explicitly co-operative societies to compete whenever a new pharmacy shall be opened.

MUTUAL AID SOCIETIES

The third form of organization of the Italian working population is the mutual aid society. These societies are really intimately connected with the co-operative movement and in many instances have begun with starting co-operative undertakings like stores and banks, and are still doing it. As it was said above, they were the only organizations tolerated before unity was secured because they had ostensibly only humanitarian purposes. The policy of strict political neutrality has not been abandoned inspite of great pressure to do so. As individuals the members are free to express any opinion and to join any political party. Italy has lately introduced obligatory accident and maternity insurance, and plans at present to make use of her recently acquired insurance monopoly by providing for cases of sickness and old age. But so far this and insurance against unemployment and death has had to be secured with the help of mutual aid societies. Many mutual societies have also been formed by members of the middle and the higher classes. Mutual aid societies of working people have a great variety of aims. All of them insure the members in case of sickness, more than half give pensions to invalids and widows, 12 per cent give

assistance during unemployment, though a proper insurance against unemployment is possible only where all the members work at one trade, i.e., by trades unions. In case of an accident the workingman receives also a pension from the invalidity insurance. As frequently the two subsidies are more than what he earns, he is not too eager to get well. A proposition will therefore be submitted to the next congress of the mutuals to abolish altogether sick money in case of an accident. Loans are conceded to members by about 25 per cent, more than 14 per cent have established labor exchanges and started co-operative societies of production and of labor, 10 per cent maintain free night schools and provide in other ways for the instruction of the members. About the percentage of mutual aid societies which help their members in acquiring tools and utensils and those which have burial benefits, no recent statistics were available.

The Catholics have many mutual aid societies and sodalities, which worship in common and provide a decent burial for their members. A fairly typical example of the many activities of a mutual aid society presents the one at Voghera.

Minors of school age can join a school mutual, through which medical assistance is provided in case of sickness. When they are twelve years of age and leave school, they join as junior members the regular mutual society. By paying 15 cents a month they have a right to 16 cents a day for 90 days in case of sickness, of 8 cents for the following 45 days. They become regular members at 16. By paying 25 cents a month, they get in case of sickness for the same periods 32 and 16 cents. Parts of the profits of the communal savings bank are turned into the general fund of the mutual. Widows, orphans, and those unable to work receive a small pension. The society owns a well-constructed house which contains club-rooms, a library, a school for designing and applied art, and a night school for illiterates, and a school of citizenship. These latter activities were recently transferred to a communal building, and the local *camera di lavoro* has now established its headquarters in these rooms. The mutual has established a co-operative building section for the construction of decent houses for the working people. The mutual workmen's association contributed \$12,000

at 4 per cent interest; the savings bank of Voghera contributed \$20,000 at $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent interest; the city donated the land at a value of \$4,000. A very small mutual exists at Sinalunga near Sienna with 352 members, who pay 3 to 5 cents in weekly dues. In case of sickness 18 cents are allowed for 180 days, 9 cents for the following 180, \$16 a year receives a member, unable to work. The society has a capital of \$8,000, and a large building which is partly occupied by the public school.

Italy has a specialty of mutuals in her mutuals for mothers. Members who have contributed for 10 months receive in case of confinement a subsidy, which is increased in case they nurse the baby more than three months.

As quite a number of the mutuals are not in good financial conditions, an announcement by the minister of agriculture, industry, and commerce that the government intended to subsidize the mutuals of the working people was received with great enthusiasm. The largest mutual society is the Mutual Pension Bank of Turin with 412,000 members and a capital of over \$9,000,000. The accumulated funds of the mutuals are invested in governmental or municipal securities and bonds, in savings banks, and in shares of co-operative societies of the locality. In this case the savings bank frequently does not ask the society to pay interest on the shares held by it. In this way the money of the working people is used to assist them in their efforts of improving the condition of life and labor.

In 1900 a federation of mutual aid societies was formed in Rome, which meets every three years in a congress. Every affiliated society is there represented by three delegates. The congress elects the board of delegates with one representative for every 20 societies. This board meets twice a year. It elects an executive committee of 8, which meets every two months, to carry out the policy outlined by the congress. Its principal function is to stimulate legislation in favor of mutual aid societies and of labor. The general secretary is appointed on an understanding with the national league of co-operative societies. By this personal union of the secretary both organizations show clearly that they want to work harmoniously together. This is possible because the

interests of both societies never conflict, but are identical. To form the Italian triple alliance of labor it was therefore only necessary that the general federation of labor should join the union of the two other societies. This happened recently and the new alliance is the most important factor in the struggle of the lower classes to improve their conditions.¹ In January, 1913, representatives of the three organizations met to discuss the situation of the Italian proletariat and to adopt a common platform as a basis of action which should bring greater solidarity and better organization of the masses. The leaders were quite outspoken in their criticism of the present lack of unity and of co-operation between the different organizations of the people. The representatives decided on starting a vigorous campaign of education and of propaganda in all three fields, resistance against capitalistic exploitation by trades unions, organization of co-operative societies to free the workers from commercial and industrial oppression, mutual aid societies to insure themselves against the consequences of physical disability and unemployment. It was agreed to fight energetically the dissenting and separatistic organizations of Catholics and syndicalists. The co-operation of the friendly group of deputies was requested in the following matters: obligatory accident insurance for agricultural workers; the official incorporation of mutual societies; the introduction of a revised system of *probitviri*, industrial courts, in agricultural districts; interior colonization on a large scale by settling on improved land proletarian families as collective tenants; better representation of the working people in the superior council of labor; establishment of a bank of labor to guarantee necessary credit to co-operation societies of production and of labor.² This

¹ The triple alliance made a wonderful and impressive demonstration in Bologna on May 25. Capitalistic contractors had urged in the public press and petitioned the government to stop giving contracts to the organized laborers. For response the united forces of labor, over 1,000 different organizations, met and showed the conditions under which private contractors had severed public contracts, and how many times the government had been exploited and deceived. The latest great building scandal in Rome and several others of less importance furnished ample material to the defenders of the co-operative movements.

² By royal decree issued May 28, 1913, the new national institute of credit in Rome was created with a capital of \$1,300,000. Its purpose is to subsidize all co-operative societies, which submit to governmental inspection.

is a very extensive program for the next years, but nothing radical or revolutionary. It must be hoped in the interest of Italy that her representatives in Rome will embody these or similar provisions in the laws of the country. The Italian proletariat is at present divided by different socialist doctrines. Progressive legislation will help the opportunistic wing of the party and its able leaders in their struggle for existence. Moreover, the Italian government is totally in the dark about the outcome of the next general election. It extended the franchise to all males, whether they can read and write, or not. It is in absolute need of the progressive socialists in the face of a probable large return of reactionary deputies. The socialists in Italy of the progressive type can well afford to vote for a government which has shown its absolute willingness to legislate in order to improve social conditions.

A WOMAN'S HANDICAP IN EFFICIENCY

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In 1910 there were enrolled in the different colleges of the country about 75,000 women. The influence of these women upon the physical, mental, and moral welfare of our future citizens is almost incalculable, for it is so far reaching. Incalculable as it is, there should be some way of measuring to some degree the influence of this college education upon these women and the influence of these women upon the race. Otherwise, as a race we can make no definite progress but simply advance or retrograde in a haphazard way.

An exact scientist when he wants information makes use of his microscope and his laboratory. When a sociologist, whose field is found in man's relation to man in a state of society, wishes definite information he must gather his facts from individuals in the great laboratory of the world. Subjective facts must be obtained at the volition of the individual and too often the individual "won't tell."

In no field has it been more difficult for the sociologist to obtain complete material for conclusions than in that of the home, which is the institution most fundamental to society. Objective material can be obtained, but of the real inner life of the home and the action and reaction of individuals there, in accordance with their heredity, environment, and education, much remains to be discovered before external conditions can be improved.

Much of the objective material which comes to the notice of the sociologist is not favorable to the continuance of the home under present-day conditions. For instance, statistics tell us that one-fourth of all deaths are of children under five years of age who are entirely dependent for their welfare upon the intelligent or unintelligent ministrations of the home. This high death-rate of itself shows something wrong with home conditions or the preparation

of home-makers. The 75,000 college-bred women who represent the most intelligent women in training today, together with the alumnae of these colleges, can contribute much to sociological investigations for improving home conditions if they will honestly give subjective facts from their own experience, if only on this one topic of how much their public-school and college education has really helped or hindered them in their home life. Until some such accurate information is obtained, our colleges for women will go on much as they are doing, giving culture studies alone or almost everything else than anything pertaining directly to the real business of home-making and of raising men and women to be sound physically, mentally, and morally.

My parents provided for me a college education. I make this statement not from any feeling of pride but simply for the purpose of showing that I received what at the time was supposed to be a liberal education for a girl. I am glad to tell for the benefit of the home life of others just what that education has meant to me and to suggest from the facts in my own experience, strengthened by those gathered from observation and the testimony of others, something of woman's handicap in developing efficiency in the home.

During my college days I was well trained in four languages, their literatures, and some related connecting historical facts. I was indifferently trained in the small amount of science I was compelled to take and not taught at all concerning the fundamental facts of human relationship. My college being a coeducational one, I did not suffer for men's society nor social life. These combined opportunities of my college days furnished the foundations of my assets when later I was launched into my profession in life—that of home-maker.

It is customary for a father to ask of a young man who comes to claim his daughter: "What are your business qualifications? Are you capable of supporting a home?" With equal justice the mother of the prospective bridegroom might ask the bride-to-be: "What are your qualifications for the business of home-maker? Are you capable of maintaining a home efficiently and of raising children who shall be *physically, mentally, and morally* sound?"

However, my future mother-in-law did not ask these same questions in just this way, and so I passed—into matrimony.

I have been trying to make a success of it with the resources at hand and I am free to confess, after an effort extending over several years, that I realize that the successful home-maker needs to be a much more capable and balanced individual than I in my school and college days ever imagined. A day of the average home-maker in the middle walks of life, where she is often mistress and maid, child's nurse and invalid nurse, companion and friend, calls for a wit and wisdom and efficiency on her part which can be developed, not by domestic science studies alone nor by culture studies alone, but *by a suitable combination of them all*.

From my college education, insufficient as it was, I brought to my business in life some help, to be sure. A person cannot live in the presence of the master-minds of the different nations without receiving some uplift in so doing. But though I cannot see that the study of language and literature has made me more capable of dealing with the practical problems of life, it has made life much more interesting to me and has made me, no doubt, more sympathetic and appreciative of the best things in the world.

My training in history has increased my enjoyment in reading and has helped me of course with a background of general intelligence without bearing directly on the real duties of life today.

Some of the most efficient training for life which I did receive came from our professor of English literature, who, not content with developing our appreciation of the beauties of an author's work, used continually to call upon us without warning to give in a few words the thought of a paragraph or page. As a preparation for class we were frequently called upon to outline essays and books paragraph by paragraph, and then, discarding everything unnecessary, to construct an outline of the work. Macaulay or DeQuincey or Carlyle might have been startled to have been confronted by some of these skeletons of theirs if they had seen them, but we students in this way developed an ability in getting to the heart of the story which I, for one, know has stood me in good stead in every decision in later life. To this extent my college education has helped me to think my way quickly through a situation.

The science I studied had little reference to anything in my profession in life. No doubt it would all have been very valuable to me if I had been going to continue scientific work for some other purpose. But of my professional life as a woman or that of any of the other girls in the class, the professors were not taking cognizance in those days.

We were then in that stage of education when we were engaged in proving that a girl can master the same lessons as a boy if she will, rather than in that stage which is now in sight when we choose to take for granted that a girl is bright enough to learn the same lessons as a boy but that she needs for her life's work something different from what the boy needs.

A good practical course in domestic chemistry or physics or bacteriology or physiology or domestic entomology, I am sure, would have done my family and myself more good than all the knowledge and experience I derived from cutting up clams and earthworms. I think we girls would also have been the gainers in mental uplift and culture from such courses if they had been offered in our time.

The social life which came to me in a coeducational institution was productive of good up to the point where it became a waste of time and strength. I learned to appreciate men for what they really were without illusion, and this insight is helping me to train my boys more carefully to cultivate the traits of character of permanent value. One of our foreign diplomats recently, in speaking in private conversation, said: "You know in my college days I was not much of a believer in coeducation, but since I have lived so long in foreign countries I have come to the conclusion that coeducation in America with the constant mingling of boys and girls in a natural and inspiring environment is responsible for the much better moral conditions here than abroad."

Out from my four years' college training, then, I brought to my profession of home-making an appreciation of literature and history, some ability in sifting out the kernel of a subject, some discrimination in recognizing a character for what it is worth, and some social instincts—not a very big legacy to bring to the task of raising a family to physical, mental, and moral efficiency on limited income and limited strength.

What have I needed to cultivate to make me fitted for my profession? First, I needed to cultivate an attitude of mind to make me conscious that no work is drudgery which leads to a worthy end, excepting that we make ourselves think that it is drudgery. This state of mind I have cultivated, not so much with the aid of my college training as with the help of my religious training.

I will lift up my eyes unto the hills from whence cometh my help.

In quietness and confidence is your strength.

Your labor is not in vain in the Lord.

Be ye steadfast, unmovable.

I have fought a good fight.

He that is faithful in that which is least is faithful also in much.

The heart of her husband doth safely trust in her so that he shall have no need of spoil.

She openeth her mouth with wisdom and in her tongue is the law of kindness.

She looketh well to the ways of her household and eateth not the bread of idleness.

Her children rise up and call her blessed; her husband also and he praiseth her.

Next after this attitude of mind was developed I needed to increase my efficiency. I must be cook and nurse and business manager in the home. In addition I must give all I could to the outside world in the way of sympathetic co-operation. I must learn to do well all I could with the least possible expenditure of energy. Hence I must read, study, and work just as I had done in college, but along new lines, and I set to work, step by step. To be sure, my college training helped me to grasp subjects more quickly than I otherwise should have done, but a course in my senior year in college by some practical as well as theoretical person upon the application of college studies and science to home life would have saved much friction and many mistakes.

I had had no careful training in the subjects, in the fields, in which society expects me as a woman to be supreme. I had had no opportunity for a careful study of chemistry and physics, bacteriology and physiology as applied to disinfection and disease, sanitary construction, the disposal of wastes, and the many other problems of human welfare which must be solved through the homes. To be sure, these principles were taught somewhere in our university but

nowhere were they correlated to make a systematic course adapted to a large proportion of the students—that is, to the girls who were to have in closest charge the physical, mental, and moral welfare of the race.

Most men are only indirectly interested in these problems, and if women cannot, or will not, solve them, in many cases they will be unsuccessfully met.

When in the early days of my married life I spoiled an expensive aluminum roasting-pan by trying to clean it with lye, I wished for some scientific information of more practical bearing than the knowledge of the circulation of an earthworm. I felt the same need when little John was brought in senseless from a fall from the barn. Some way nothing from Homer or Virgil seemed quite suitable in the extremity. Again and again in treating the cuts of childhood and adult life I have wished for an intelligent course in emergency nursing, and surely such a course in my college days could not have detracted much from the influence of culture studies.

I have felt in diverse difficulties the need of more of a study of science with special application to home-making. For example, one morning when the cream in the neighborhood turned ropy, the neighbors came running to me because they thought that I, being a college girl, ought to be able to explain the difficulty and tell them if the milk would injure their children. I was obliged to own to myself in confusion that the ability to quote Dante freely had in no way fortified me for such predicaments of practical life.

But there are other deficiencies in the training of us college girls which I have been trying to overcome besides the practical ones relating to food, clothing, and shelter. Food is always essential to vitality, and clothing and shelter generally so. After a while, however, some mothers find that they can provide for these needs not only well but somewhat automatically. Then if we take account of stock we may find that there is danger of our laying too much stress upon the physical needs of humanity. Our children need food for their minds as well as for their bodies, and we begin to wish that our college training had given us, in addition to an appreciation of literature, an appreciation of music and art also, and had had more to tell us girls of human nature itself, of the interrelations of man and man, of society and society, of state and state.

Some women are blessed with husbands who can point the way along these paths of learning, and occasionally a woman is pioneer enough to blaze a trail for herself. The successful college for women cannot depend upon the husbands to educate the girls, because so few husbands have the time or talent and many girls have no husbands.

A woman's first responsibility to her family, as society is today organized, is food, but beyond that she is responsible for their mental and spiritual development, and as an aid in meeting this responsibility she has a right to expect much help from her college.

For colleges where women are students, to undertake something in the way of science and art applied to home-making is not servitude nor retrogression. It will be the giving to the girls who go out into life to be leaders reserve information which in their wide activities as women they are bound to require.

And so a woman's need today is the recognition in the planning of her college course of the fact that, no matter whether or not she is to be the breadwinner, nevertheless in some capacity, either as wife or sister or daughter, in the majority of cases the welfare of a home, sometime, somewhere, is to be dependent upon her. She is the connecting link between the civilization of the past and the progress of the future.

The need seems clear and the path of remedy plain. The difficulty for the next few years will be to find teachers of college and university grade with high ideals and broad culture, with wide training and successful experience in home life, who because of these qualifications are thus capable of removing from woman this handicap in her efficiency, by giving her suitable education for her work in the world.

AN INTRODUCTORY COURSE TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

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There has been a good deal of discussion recently in regard to the introductory courses in the social sciences. For example, the introductory course in sociology has been discussed at recent meetings of the American Sociological Society, and certain groups of economists have been discussing the introductory course in economics. Considerable difference of opinion has manifested itself in these discussions. For example, among the sociologists there have been those who have denied entirely the utility of an introductory course, while among those who favor such a course there has been much difference of opinion as to its nature. The question may legitimately be raised whether it is possible or advisable to standardize the introductory course so that it will be taught in about the same way everywhere. It goes without saying that each teacher has a pedagogical method which is somewhat individual, and he must therefore teach in his own way. This is particularly true in advanced work, where there should be the greatest latitude for individual peculiarities of method. In these advanced courses the teacher should be dealing with the special problems in which he is interested.

Despite the objections referred to above, the force of which I recognize to a certain extent, I wish to propose a course which would serve as an introduction, not merely to one of the social sciences, but to all of them. For while in the discussions mentioned above the introductory courses to several of the social sciences have been discussed, a general introductory course to social science has barely been mentioned. And yet such a general course would, I believe, be of great value and could take the place in part of the introductory courses in the different social sciences.

Social science deals with some of the latest products of organic evolution, namely, social phenomena. The evolution which precedes these social phenomena is the same for all these phenomena, so that there are a great many facts with regard to this evolution which are the same for all the social sciences, just as there are a great many facts with regard to social phenomena which are the same for all the social sciences. For this reason it would hardly be possible for the introductory courses to the social sciences to be entirely different. On the contrary, if they are truly introductory in the sense that they furnish this evolutionary background, they would have to be very nearly if not quite alike. It is therefore to a certain extent a waste of time to be offering an introductory course in each of the social sciences when one course can perform this function in large part if not entirely for all. Furthermore, such a course would impress upon the student very emphatically the fundamental unity of all social science. In all probability there are many students who, though they may take courses in several of the social sciences, never realize this fundamental unity.

It would appear, therefore, that there are a sufficient number of facts that are generally accepted which should be in any introductory course in a social science to make it possible to devise a general introductory course to social science. We have already recognized that each teacher has his own pedagogical method, and it has been admitted that it is well, up to a certain point, for him to follow his own method. In any case he is bound to do so to a certain extent, since individual peculiarities can never be entirely suppressed in teaching. In the advanced courses it is probably best to make no attempt whatever to standardize pedagogical method, for the teacher will thus be left entirely free to make his own contribution, and the students should be sufficiently oriented in the subject to be able to profit by it regardless of the method of presentation. But in the introductory course it seems reasonable that the data used should be much the same for all, and that certain psychological and pedagogical principles should be observed which will make it easier for the student to become oriented in a new subject.

Let us consider briefly the nature of the introductory courses

to the social sciences as they are now taught, before describing a general introductory course to social science. As has already been noticed, there is a good deal of difference of opinion among teachers of sociology as to how the introductory course in that subject should be taught. Many of them have been led by practical considerations into giving courses which deal largely with immediate social problems. Such courses are supposed to have the advantage of having practical value and of being concrete and therefore easy for the students to understand. A much smaller number of teachers have been giving courses which consist largely of the discussion of methodological questions and of highly abstract theories as to the nature of society. But it seems to me that those teachers have been most successful who have been giving courses which have set their students upon the highroad leading to an understanding of the nature of society. That is to say, these courses have furnished the students the necessary data as to the simpler social elements and the fundamental forces at work in society. These courses should contain only a very small modicum of methodology and may be quite as concrete as the so-called practical courses. Furthermore, they may have quite as great a practical value in the long run as the so-called practical courses for reasons which will be stated later.

The introductory course to economics has been usually too theoretical and abstract in its character. It would take too long to explain why this has been the case, but it is evident that this course should become more historical and concrete in its character. On the other hand, the introductory course to political science has frequently been very concrete and practical in its nature. Many teachers of this subject have chosen to make this course a study of local political institutions without endeavoring to make it a fundamental course in the origin, evolution, and nature of political institutions.

History may or may not be a social science. This is a question we need not discuss here. At any rate, it is obviously in a somewhat different status from the other social sciences, since it is devoted primarily to recording events, while the other social sciences are devoted to the description and analysis of social phenomena. For this reason a general introductory course to social

science could not hope to replace the introductory course in history, whatever that course may be. For example, if this course is modern European history it is obvious that such a general introductory course would in nowise replace it. But a general introductory course to social science might nevertheless furnish very excellent general preparation for the study of history in a way which will be indicated later.

The general purpose of all these introductory courses, it seems to me, should be to direct the student toward an understanding of the nature of society so far as that is possible. The scientific reasons for this are obvious enough. But there are also excellent practical reasons. It is usually true that courses which are limited to the study of local conditions and immediate problems have more immediate practical results. But, on the other hand, it is probably quite as true that the more fundamental courses have, in the long run, greater practical value. This knowledge as to the nature of society, which gradually spreads by filtering down from those who attain it in university courses, must have a great deal of effect in placing legislation and other methods of changing social conditions and institutions upon a broader and wiser basis.

Let us now turn to a consideration of what should be the nature of such a general introductory course to social science. It seems to me, in the first place, that it should furnish an evolutionary approach to social science. Many students, probably most of them, lack an evolutionary background when they begin the study of social science. There is much loss of time because of this ignorance. They find it difficult to understand existing social phenomena because they are incapable of comprehending how they came into existence. Furthermore, without such an evolutionary background it is hardly possible for them to arrive at a dynamic conception of society. The question, therefore, is how to devise an introductory course which will furnish this evolutionary background. A course in biology might serve this purpose. But, in the first place, it is frequently impossible to require such a course before the study of social science is begun. Furthermore, biology is in any case not sufficiently close to social science to furnish the specific evolutionary background which is needed. I believe that this

background is furnished by anthropology, and that the evolutionary approach to social science should be through anthropology. This is because in anthropology the theory of evolution is applied directly to man. Thus the student, through the study of anthropology, becomes keenly aware of the fact that man has evolved like other animals and that the culture which characterizes him is also the product of evolution.

This general introductory course in anthropology should be two or three hours in length for half a year, preferably three hours. It should be sufficiently simple to be within the comprehension of the average Freshman, since most students should take it as Freshmen in order to be able to go on with the study of the social sciences during the rest of their course. The first part of this introductory course should be devoted to a very simple presentation of the facts as to the physical origin and evolution of man. Some emphasis should be laid on the biological and psychological aspects of this evolution. It is unfortunately true that anthropologists have usually ignored these aspects in the main. Their treatment of man's physical evolution has been almost entirely morphological in its character. They have thus missed the dynamic element which the broader biological treatment involves. There should also be in this part of the course a brief treatment of man's psychic characteristics on their biological side, which involves dealing with the neural basis for these characteristics, etc. The second part of this course should be devoted to a similarly brief and simple description of the origin and early evolution of the principal social usages, customs, beliefs, institutions, etc. It should give the student some idea of how human society came into being, and what it has been like in the past.

It will probably at once be said that such a course deals with matters too remote from the experience of the student to make it comprehensible to him. But if taught in the right way, it may be made very concrete, and therefore quite comprehensible, even to a Freshman. For example, in dealing with the physical evolution of man, pictures and casts of the skulls of prehistoric man and living or stuffed representatives of the lower primates can be used to represent the different stages in the evolution of man. When

dealing with social origins, primitive tools and other implements, pictures and models of archaeological remains, graphic descriptions of primitive peoples, etc., can be used to make the data studied real and concrete to the student. In other words, an anthropological and ethnographic museum can serve as a laboratory for such a course. Furthermore, the use of certain pedagogical methods can aid greatly in making this course comprehensible to the student. When stated in simple language, the primary factors in social evolution can be made very clear to the student. The need for food and other necessities leading to the invention of tools the origin of the division of labor, etc., the necessity for reproduction and the care of the young leading to the family and to a certain extent to the higher forms of social organization, the need for social control leading to the origin of moral ideas, law, government, etc.—all these can be made quite comprehensible to the student. At nearly every point in the study comparisons and contrasts with present-day conditions can be made, thus making these phenomena all the more real to the student.

What, then, would be the utility of this course for the study of the social sciences? For sociology it would furnish some idea of the beginnings of association, of early social organization, etc., in other words, of the origin and early evolution of human society and of primitive culture. As a matter of fact, many of these details are now furnished by some teachers of sociology in their introductory courses, so that the course we have described would to a large extent take the place of these courses. For economics this course would furnish some idea of the beginning of the use of tools, the origin of the division of labor, of exchange, of money, etc., in other words, of the industrial life in general. It is pitiable to see students floundering around in the effort to grasp the nature of our present complex economic organization when perplexed and confused with the textbooks and methods used. This difficulty for the student might be obviated in large part if not entirely if the evolutionary method which has been described were used. For political science this course would furnish some idea of the origin of law, government, etc., in other words, of social control in general. For history this course would furnish a prehistoric background and

a scientific basis which ought to have a very beneficial effect on the teaching of history. I am inclined to think that many students never succeed in orienting historic time in time in general. That is to say, historic time somehow or other begins in the air without anything definite to precede it. It may be true that there is nothing definitely historic to precede it, but there are things which are quite as real nevertheless. That is to say, there are the prehistoric human remains which give us some idea of what man was like previous to historic time; there are the remains of man's implements, art, dwellings, etc., which give us some idea of his culture before the beginning of history.

If, then, this course should have such utility for the social sciences, it would certainly result in a considerable saving of time in the study of these subjects. Whether or not special introductory courses should be dispensed with if this general introductory course were given it would be impossible to state now. But even if the special introductory courses were still given, so much more rapid progress would be made in them and in the more advanced courses which succeed them that the time given to the general introductory course would be more than made up.

Such a general introductory course would also have some utility as a preparation for the study of certain other subjects which are not usually regarded as social sciences, such as ethics, psychology, philosophy, comparative religion, comparative jurisprudence, etc. Some of these subjects, such as ethics, certainly are in large part if not entirely social sciences, but whether this is so or not, the course we have described would in one way or another be a preparation for the study of each one of them.

As has already been suggested earlier in this paper, such a course would also have utility in giving currency to the theory of evolution. I need not stop to describe the intellectual awakening which has come in human society at large as a result of the spread of this theory during the last half-century. The teaching of the theory may have the same stimulating and clarifying effect upon the thought of the individual student, so that no student should leave a university without becoming acquainted with this theory. And yet it is probably true that a good many university students never

become acquainted with this theory. It is, of course, taught in the biological and other scientific courses. It is taught in some of the courses in social science. But it would come to the student in the most vivid and significant form as applied to man in such a course as I have described.

Let us now consider the objections to such a course, some of which have already been mentioned. It will be said that such a course would not be in touch with present-day life and would therefore be too difficult for the student, and would have no practical value for him because it could have no practical application. I have already suggested how the course could be made real for the student, even though dealing with phenomena somewhat remote from the present. As to its practical value, I believe that this knowledge may have some practical application in the practice of medicine, law, education, etc. But even if it had no immediate practical utility, this course would be justified in the long run, even on practical grounds, as furnishing a sound scientific basis for the further study of social science.

Probably no one who is at all acquainted with anthropology would question that there is plenty of material for such a course. But some might contend that the great uncertainty and difference of opinion with respect to many anthropological questions make anthropology an unsuitable subject for such an introductory course. I have no desire to minimize this uncertainty with respect to many anthropological questions, and it goes without saying that things should not be taught to students in a dogmatic fashion which cannot be known with certainty. However, I am inclined to think that enough is known with certainty to furnish a basis for the course, while the study of the undecided questions may be very suggestive and stimulating to the thought of the student.

Certain very practical and real objections which may be made to this course are the lack of suitable textbooks, and the lack of teachers who are prepared to teach such a course. However, these are not insurmountable difficulties, and both the textbooks and the trained teachers will be forthcoming all the more quickly if the need for such a course is realized.

The last objection I shall refer to is that it is unfortunate to

attempt to standardize courses too much. It has already been indicated earlier in this paper that I do not believe in too much standardization. It is evident that there must always be much latitude in the use of methods by different teachers. But it seems to me that we might arrive at a consensus of opinion as to the general field to be covered by such an introductory course.

I need hardly say that the suggestion which has been made in this article with respect to such a course is tentative in its nature. It is apparent that this course must be tried out very fully before we can be entirely certain that it is needed and can know just what form it should take.

Before closing this article, I should like to say a word as to the conception of the function of social science which should be held by teachers of social science. It seems to me that the great function of social science is to develop social self-consciousness and social self-knowledge in society. This can be accomplished only in the first place, by acquiring as much information as possible about the nature of society, and, in the second place, by diffusing this knowledge as widely as possible. Thus only can a broad and stable foundation be laid for making society that which we should like to have it.

REVIEWS

Das religiöse Leben in Amerika. Von WILHELM MÜLLER. Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1911. Pp. 266.

From the day of Mathew Arnold until now the number of "impressions" concerning American life and American traits has been on the increase. School Director Müller gives us a series of impressions concerning the religious life of our national group similar to Henry Barge's Monograph, *La religion dans la société aux États Unis*. There is this difference between these two essays. Barge explains the functioning of American religious life as synonymous with ethical life, while to Müller ethical conduct seems to be a fruit of religious disposition. The little book does not aim to be either a history of religion in America or a scientific critique, but merely a subjective reaction on religious impressions in general, and their portrayal as they appear to the observer of German extraction.

In the first part of the treatise the author gives a rapid survey of religious life in New England under the headings "The Puritan (the Pilgrims, the Puritan theocracy, the end of the theocracy)," "Alienation between Church and Life, under the influence of Jonathan Edwards," "The Reaction Led by Benjamin Franklin," "Unitarianism as an Ethical Force," "Transcendentalism," and "Emerson." In the three chapters "From the religious life of the Middle States," the Quakers, Methodism, and Roman Catholicism are rapidly surveyed, while the chapter on "From the Religious Life of the Southern States" surveys the Protestant Episcopal church, and the rise of the followers of Alexander Campbell.

In the second part Doctor Müller traces the influence of the German immigrants of the late forties in a negative way. He affirms that in America, Judaism is working out its destiny as an ethical force. Of the new religious sects Mormonism, Spiritualism, New Thought, Dowieism, the Walt Whitman Cult, and the Comradships of Mills seem to him especially worthy of mention. He is under the impression that the Society for Ethical Culture has about run its course of usefulness. A very sympathetic treatment is given to the work of the laity in America, under which chapter the author treats the Young Men's Christian Association, the Salvation Army, and the Societies of Christian Endeavor.

The reaction of this typical German schoolman on the matter of revivals may be of interest: "The German mind is offended by loud demonstrations, such as the painful sighs and groans of the penitents and the thundering hallelujah shouts of the converted. The relation of a man to his God is, moreover, such a personal, inner, and sacred thing, that an exhibition of it before others appears to him as a profanation, especially if he reminds himself of the saying of Jesus that the kingdom of heaven is within you. The difference of race must be borne in mind here. The Anglo-Saxon shows colder blood under ordinary circumstances, even when he is in danger, than does the German, but under extraordinary stimulation there appear in his case often violent emotional outbreaks, sometimes volcanic power. . . . It is utterly reprehensible, if individual revivalists abase their calling to the stratum of remunerative business. . . . Scientific research may have transformed our ideas concerning the world, society, and the interpretation of the Bible, but the needs of the human heart have remained the same. And in the new world these needs are religious in the case of thousands and thousands. Let modern positivism relegate religion into the rummage chamber of outlived world views, these multitudes yet believe that it has saving power. And if anyone brings it to them with the power of compelling conviction, he becomes to them a welcome herald of inner liberty."

The chapter on faith healing leads the author to the statement that the religious power or significance of the Emmanuel movement will function positively only in so far as the healing will lead the healed to a higher plane of ethical living. After a highly sympathetic survey of the question of the church and labor, Director Müller makes the dictum of the late Carroll D. Wright his own, in which that lamented author states that the solution of the great economic problems must be worked out along the line of scientific investigation, but can be worked out only by a practical application of religious principles. In his chapter on "Church Life in America" the author analyzes keenly the competitive sectarian scheme, and gives it as his conviction that the Inter-Church Federation will solve the problem.

The hope of the American world is summed up in the chapter on "Religious Liberalism" in this fashion: "Surveying the mountain peaks of historical development in America, . . . the religious liberal . . . connects the fulfilment of his expectations with the appearance of a far-seeing thinker who enters the arena of life in the possession of the wisdom of the past, with clear understanding of the needs of the present, and with a warm heart for their longings. . . . In this strife he would

have to be the creative spirit, who would find new forms of expression for the religious feeling and thinking of these seekers after truth, who are illumined by the dawn of the morrow of the future, and these forms of expression would have to be comprehensible, significant, and commanding reverence to the wise and the foolish alike."

The concluding chapter is devoted to a prophecy as to the religion of the future: "The coming religion will need less a theological system, a definite ritual or an ecclesiastical organization, than it will need a life in the veneration of God, in striving after inner truth and purity, in enthusiasm for everything good, in strife against everything bad, and in unceasing endeavor to work sacrificially and unceasingly toward the self-realization of the individual in society."

Withal, Director Müller is giving us a picture of ourselves, a nation in the making, in which he sees through German optics, darkly, the truth, that some of us have been seeing more or less clearly for some time, that the religion which will function in contemporaneous life is not a religion of Shibboleths, nor a religion of provincial sectarianism, nor an asseveration of distinction of policy in things ecclesiastic, but a religion of spirit, revealing itself to spirit, and issuing in righteousness, until the nations of the world shall come to see that righteousness exalteth a nation, and that that nation is blessed whose God is Jehovah.

HUGO P. J. SELINGER

UNIVERSITY OF PUGET SOUND

Women in the Bookbinding Trade. By MARY VAN KLEEK. New York: Survey Associates, Inc., 1913. Pp. xx+270. \$1.50.

This book is the first published of the peculiarly timely investigations of the newly organized Committee on Women's Work of the Russell Sage Foundation. As pointed out in the introduction by its chairman, Professor Henry W. Seager, the number of women in industry is rapidly increasing, the conditions under which they work threaten social deterioration, and our courts are now fully committed to the policy of recognizing them as a class in need of special protection. Social workers who have followed the recent efforts of our state legislators to give expression to an increased public sensitiveness about the treatment of women workers would be glad to have the lawmakers learn a lesson from the plans of this committee. Hasty efforts to enact laws based on no more accurate information than that collected in sensational and haphazard investigations of untrained legislators are likely to result in a serious setback to

our American social-politics movement. This series of exhaustive and painstaking examinations of typical trades employing women will furnish a sound basis for regulations in eastern cities, and supply models for the studies needed in the Middle West and on the Pacific coast for the guidance of the generous impulses of the lawmakers of these newer communities.

We are left in no doubt as to the findings of this investigation, as the concluding chapter gives a clear summary of the changes necessary to establish wholesome standards (pp. 230-31). The most serious evils of the trade are overtime and irregularity of employment. The reports of overtime show twelve-hour days in 23 per cent of the cases; in 25 per cent the overtime day was longer than twelve hours, and instances were found where girls had worked continuously for 18 to 22 hours. The need of strictly enforced legal regulations of the hours of labor and periods of night rest is obvious. The introduction of more "scientific management" and the training of learners in a variety of the highly specialized processes of the trade would do much to overcome the suffering due to the fluctuations in employment. Other recommendations calling for improved sanitation, the use of safety devices, protection from fire, exclusion of young children, and avoidance of overspecialization touch evils generally recognized as common in our American industries.

Miss Van Kleek argues that these recommendations are entirely practicable because each of them has been enforced in one or more of the binderies of New York. She divides the responsibility of attaining good standards between the public, the employers, and the workers in the trade. The public should remedy its lax enforcement of existing laws, provide remedies for the serious extension of night work revealed by the investigation, and do more effective and intelligent educational work through the public schools. As more than half of the bindery workers of New York are employed by less than 10 per cent of the binderies, a few employers have power to set standards for the trade. It is suggested that more personal oversight of foremen and superintendents by the owners of the business might help to eliminate much of the overtime and unemployment due to a bad distribution of work and the defective training of learners, and might also result in a realization of the necessity of a more generous scale of wages. Should this group of large employers establish standards demanded by an enlightened public opinion, the workers might be charged with the task of developing their trade-union control so as to insure the maintenance of the improved standards throughout the business. This latter agency was found to be doing the

most effective work for establishing conditions in the trade shown to be socially desirable. In concluding her study of collective bargaining in the bindery trades, Miss Van Kleeck declares (p. 193): "In regulations regarding the training of the learners, in the shortening of the normal hours below the limit which the state has been able to establish by legislation, in the gradual enforcement of a minimum wage scale, and in the protection of the individual women against unjust and unfair treatment, it has accomplished results more important than any yet secured for this trade through legislation."

LUCILE EAVES

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

Le sentiment religieux base logique de la morale? Par le COMTE PEROVSKY-PETROVO-SOLOVOVO. Paris: Marcel Rivière et Cie, 1913. Pp. 172. 3 fr.

The author protests that he is neither a metaphysician nor a savant. Contrary to the expectation aroused by the title, the work is not a systematic study of the religious sentiment in relation to moral values. It is rather an assembling of what may be said against the inconsistencies, absurdities, and non-moral tenets and practices of religions, ancient and modern, with the exception of deism. The definition of religion is believing absolutely in the truth of particular religious doctrines and the working-over into practice of those phases of the doctrines which can be applied (p. 10). Then follows an attack after the manner of Tom Paine. The fruits of dogma are clannishness, hatred, intolerance, and hypocrisy. Belief in fixed transcendental truths means pious frauds, persecution of scientists, and blindness to secular satisfactions. Immorality is imputed to the deity and abject submission and fatalism fostered by religion. The Bible is full of contradictions: cult and authority restrict the free play of natural social forces, etc. The author thinks that while there may be some justification in modern times for pious lies to keep the credulous multitude in order, for the cultivated man and gradually for everyone the morality of prudence and social consequence will suffice. Logically and practically morality stands on its own feet and derives nothing from the religious sentiment. The true standard is the maximum of personal and general utility. The concluding pages (pp. 156-65) rehearse in crude form the argument of J. S. Mill without that writer's qualification of the utilitarian doctrine.

Many of the writer's charges are historically accurate. They are nevertheless more appropriate to an earlier stage in the controversy and

the deductions which are drawn are dubious. The relativity of dogma, concept of God, and moral practice to social *milieu* is a truism: without proof, however, it does not follow that all forms of religious attitudes are superfluous survivals. The historical standpoint is not grasped by this critic, whose views perhaps have been too much colored by Russian ecclesiasticism. His insistence upon the supremacy of the test of common welfare is admirable. Still what is needed now is an appraisal of the religious attitude from the standpoint of mental development and social function. The essay does not utilize recent literature dealing with psychological and sociological aspects of religion. It does not notice the results of a half-century of criticism of the doctrine of pleasure, and it does not realize that the positive theses of utilitarianism have entered into constructive sociological thinking on religion and ethics.

E. L. TALBERT

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The New Morality, An Interpretation of Present Economic Forces and Tendencies. By EDWARD ISAACSON. New York: Moffat, Yard & Co., 1913. Pp. xvi+203.

"The New Morality" is a utopian scheme for limiting population to the numbers which can make the best use of the world's natural resources when the limit of food supply is reached. The suggestion is that two classes be established—to one of which already, the author states, practically all human beings belong—a fecund class specializing in the reproduction of the race and rearing of children under the best conditions for such a task, and a surplus class, free to marry but not to reproduce. The former should live in agricultural communities and produce the food supply; the latter should live in cities and perform all of the rest of the necessary work of society. The corollaries of this proposed system discussed by the author are: the elimination of the proletariat, the establishment of world-peace and understanding, the self-sufficiency of each nation in the matter of its food supply, the extinction of much of the present competition in commerce between nations and of much labor expended on transportation.

The book is extremely theoretical in character. In the chapter entitled "Practical Working Out of the Theory," practical obstacles are dismissed as "mere matters of detail." A number of unverified generalizations are used, such as that in the largest cities the number of unmarried adults or the childless marriages is greater than the number of marriages

with children except in the slums, and again, that it is accepted by many authorities that alcohol has a distinct food value and aids in the digestion of other foods, hence, moderate users of it secure better returns in work than those who do not use it.

The author's general standpoint, that of advocating scientific social control of fundamental social problems, such as the relation of population to food supply and the rearing of children is to be strongly commended, but his suggestions for carrying out this control lack tangibility and conviction.

FRANCES FENTON BERNARD

GAINESVILLE, FLA.

Los elementos de la sociologia. Por ENRIQUE MARTINEZ PAZ. Córdoba, Argentina: Beltran y Rossi, 1911. 1 vol. Pp. ii+372.

Senor Paz, Professor of Sociology in the University of Córdoba (R.A.), has produced in beautiful print and clear exposition a timely volume. The nature and substance of sociology, its relation to other sciences, a sketch of its growth, and analysis of Comte, Spencer, Tarde, and other masters are presented, closing with a chapter on "Method," for the purpose of "substituting demonstrated truth in place of the traditional error which otherwise will remain mixed with every system." This volume will strengthen the fraternal relations between Professor Paz and the University which he represents and the other universities of the world.

A. J. STEELMAN

SEATTLE, WASH.

A Philosophy of Social Progress. By E. J. URWICK. London: Methuen & Co., 1912. Pp. i-xii+300. 6s.

This thoughtful little volume of three hundred pages is written not as a contribution to the science of sociology, for the author frankly doubts the possibility of a science of social life, but "to introduce students and general readers to a point of view which will increase their interest in the study of social life, and perhaps, too, their understanding of the issues in all progress and reform" (Preface, v). "I do not believe that there is or can be any science of social life; nor do I believe that sociology is or can be a science. . . . What passes for sociology is a collection of generalizations of very varying value" (Preface, vii). But Mr. Urwick adds,

"There may, however, be a philosophy of social life—or rather of social change; but this will be transcendental, of course, and will always be very closely analogous to a religious faith."

After this candid avowal, approximately the first two-thirds of the book are devoted to an analysis of the factors of society in the spirit of those who call the result of their analysis sociology. But Mr. Urwick wants us to consider the results of his study a philosophy of social progress. In this analytical portion of his book, he considers society in successive chapters as subject: (1) to the forces and laws of the physical world; (2) as subject to forces and laws of organic mind; (3) as subject to the laws of mind; and (4) society considered as an ethical structure, a unity dependent on purpose.

After this analysis, in which the usual course of the sociologist is followed, comes the remaining third of the book, consisting of three practical essays: (1) the implications of citizenship and the rights and duties of the citizen—here the Greek spirit and the Christian combine to urge the privilege and obligation of social service; (2) the spiritual element in social progress and the nature of the true individual—here we have a blend of transcendental philosophy and applied religion; and (3) the real purpose of the social process and the tests of the reformer's aims and methods. A concluding chapter states the final criteria of social progress.

The reading of this book may be commended to students of sociology because of the breadth of view which it inspires; and it may be commended to the practical social worker on account of the splendid poise of which it is possessed and the hopeful outlook which it conveys.

ISAAC A. LOOS

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

Socialism and Democracy in Europe. By SAMUEL P. ORTH, PH.D.
New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1913. Pp. iv+352. \$1.50.

This book in nine brief chapters gives us the reason for socialism and the history of the development of socialism in the nineteenth century with a view to showing its political aspects, and in particular to showing its ultimate merging, if not its final disappearance, in the greater modern movement for democracy. It is sympathetic without being partisan, and withal admirable for its perspective. While socialism as a reconstructive process is declared to be hopelessly at sea, and as a method divided within itself, it is recognized as a criticism of the existing order

to be unanimous in its sentiment, and above all its utopian rainbow is declared to have inspired the energy which has organized the largest body of human beings that the world has known, a body that for zeal and homogeneity finds its only rival in the Christian church.

Very nearly half of the book is devoted to the history of the Socialist party in each of four countries, France, Belgium, Germany, and England.

All these chapters are written with primary emphasis upon political developments, the limitations of the suffrage, the voting strength, and the legislative representation of the party. But with all this there is a rather surprising amount of detail concerning theory and personality in each country. The communistic efforts in Belgium, syndicalism in France, democratic opportunism in Germany, and labor-unionism and liberalism in England do not fail to find clear expression in themselves and in relation to the socialistic movement. And in sixty-five pages of appendix, as well as scattered through the body of the text, there is a valuable collection of programs and platforms adopted in these several countries.

To us in the United States it is interesting to notice how radically the theories and the policies of the Socialist party have changed and are changing on the continent. The fact that conservatism and moderation come with numbers and power is perhaps nowhere else better illustrated. To hold the people, a political party must express the opinions and the will of the people. Party success as well as popular demand will force this result. It is not strange, therefore, that after the setback in Germany in 1907 "a number of the leading Socialists began to attack the dogmas of the party program as illusions and pitfalls." "Today one hears very little of Marx and a great deal of legislation. . . . The truth is, Marx is a tradition, democracy is an issue." In Germany, for example, we are assured that the Socialist party has abandoned its policy of mere criticism and has become active in constructive legislation, has abandoned or modified its traditional theories, has made "human cultural activities" an important object of the party, and in considerable degree is looking to the professional and intellectual classes for leadership and support. Socialism is thus abandoning its two great illusions, the beliefs in class struggle and in the necessity for violent revolution. "Everywhere violence is giving way to political methods. In Germany the bourgeois are more frightened over the legal than over the illegal acts of the Socialists."

Dr. Orth recognizes that socialism has accomplished three notable things: it has spread democracy, forced the labor question upon the law-

makers, and has stimulated a constant increase in the functions of the state. We are led to feel, however, that he himself looks to democracy to guide its own destinies in the future, and that he believes that when all the people through the instrumentality of the state shall conserve the interests of all the people, the function of the Socialist party will have ceased to be. Conservation through democracy, the theory of Professors Ely of Wisconsin, and Brentano of Munich, is in process of justification in the history of socialism and democracy in Europe.

FAYETTE AVERY MCKENZIE

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

Social Wrongs and State Responsibilities. By WILLIAM JANDUS.
Cleveland: Horace Carr, 1913. Pp. 149. \$1.50.

A sheaf of random essays, this book attacks the present economic machinery of society. Under the existing system of capitalistic credit society is constantly in debt to itself; there is persistent insolvency of values which is prevented from throwing society into bankruptcy only because the exploited producing classes pay interest on this manufactured credit to the credit promoters—the capitalists. Hence, the abolition of interest which is a means to exploitation is desirable. While there is much truth in the author's characterization of the methods of capitalistic control of credit, he does not adequately set forth the social function of credit, nor does he explicitly outline a substitute for capitalistic control. The implication is that the state shall in some way take on this responsibility. The author's accusation that economics is at present the servant of capitalism and is therefore not a science is doubtless in some quarters true in the first instance, though it is perhaps not so well established that science cannot be invoked in the cause of partisanship.

L. L. BERNARD

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

Essais de synthèse scientifique. Par EUGENIO RIGNANO. Paris:
Librairie Félix Alcan, 108 Boulevard Saint Germain. Pp.
xxx1+294.

Students of biological and sociological science, who are familiar with the author's previous work on "The Inheritance of Acquired Characters," and who have been charmed by his clearness of views and his logical analysis, even if they have not been convinced by his theories, will welcome this volume as an added impetus to further investigations.

It is refreshing in these days of the specialist, when so much emphasis is being placed upon the technique of investigation, to find a vigorous defense of the synthetic philosopher. Progress in knowledge is furthered as much through the efforts of the theorist who forms his hypotheses on the basis of wide generalizations from concrete data as by the specific and intensive work of the experimentalist investigator.

The specialist has certain points of advantage because he works within a small and limited area and upon a specific and definite problem. By the application of technical skill he arrives at a degree of certainty never acquired by the theorist, but he is limited by the narrow confines of his specialty. Upon him must depend, however, the task of furnishing the data for the theorist whose function is that of the creative genius; to foresee new analogies, to establish new generalizations, to discover new horizons, to conceive new hypotheses. In his work of constructing these new syntheses, the theorist never possesses completely the integral and intimate representations of phenomena which constitute the objects of research of the experimentalist, and which he knows only by the mediation of the information so provided; nevertheless, it is the theorist who furnishes the motive and not infrequently indicates the direction of further valuable investigations and experiments as a means of testing the hypotheses proposed. "The theorist is, on the whole, in his general theses less exclusivist, less unilateral and more objective than the specialist experimenter." These two methods of approach to knowledge are by no means antagonistic, but in the fullest sense are supplementary. It is gratifying, especially to the sociologist, to find the author reaffirming, almost with Comptian and Spencerian eloquence, the value of both methods in the field of sociological research. He says: "The degree of masterful and capital importance to which, even more than in the physical sciences, may and should attend the work of the theorist in the biological and social sciences, results from the fact that in these sciences the mass of particular facts to be synthesized present themselves so much more confused and complicated, and that the subdivisions in so many of the particular disciplines which are more or less autonomous are affirmed to be more or less numerous and specialized. All the more need, therefore, is felt for the co-ordination and synthesis of the facts in these sciences."

The body of the work consists in a collection of essays previously published in *Scientia* during the period 1907-11, and presented as illustrating the value of the synthetic method. The topics are: "The Synthetic Value of Transformism," "The Biologic Memory in Activity,"

"Concerning the Origin and the Mnemonic Nature of the Affective Tendencies," "What Is Conscience?" "Religious Phenomena," "Historic Materialism," and "Socialism."

In this great variety of material the author has pursued substantially the same course, that of examining the principal theories in an endeavor to present, as far as possible in one synthesis, all the essential features and to do it "with all the objective serenity of which we are capable."

Whatever may be the degree of divergence of opinion from the conclusions reached, the method is one of great value and one which will commend itself to all serious students.

J. P. LICHTENBERGER

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

The Science of Human Behavior. By MAURICE PARMELEE. New York: Macmillan, 1913. Pp. 424.

Using the term "behavior" as meaning the objective and external physiological movements and activities of living beings, Mr. Parmelee has undertaken to present the bases for behavior that are to be discovered in anatomical, physiological, and psychic facts. The work is primarily critical instead of constructive, although in several places the author has advanced independent definitions and viewpoints. The reviewer is not qualified to pass judgment on the strictly biological and neurological discussion but has viewed it entirely from the sociologist's standpoint.

After the introductory chapter the physico-chemical character of organic matter is discussed. This is followed by "a brief survey of organic evolution showing how the structural forms and physiological processes which condition behavior have evolved and what forces are at work in the animal world such as heredity, variation, selection, etc." The next two chapters deal with the behavior of animals without a nervous system and the evolution of the behavior of higher animals. Then follows an account of the evolution of the nervous system, the nature of instinct, and a discussion of the human instincts. This is followed by a discussion of consciousness and intelligence, and the book closes with an account of the social phenomena of animals and early man.

The book abounds in quotations and comments on the works of various writers on biology and animal behavior. The greater part of the first half of the book is based on the works of Jennings, Loeb, and Sherrington, and is mainly a condensation of the contributions of these authors. The attempt is made to cover such a wide field of biological

and neurological research that the author is forced in nearly every chapter to complain of the limitations of space. The principal contribution made by the author is his definition of instinct (p. 226) which he regards as "an inherited combination of reflexes which have been integrated by the central nervous system so as to cause an external activity of the organism which usually characterizes a whole species and is usually adaptive."

In the part that deals with social phenomena (less than one-fourth of the book) the greater amount of attention is given to the activities of insect societies and vertebrates below man.

The work is an excellent review and condensation of the literature of biology, neurology, and recent psychology which bears on the nature and evolution of the behavior of living beings. The title, however, is somewhat misleading unless the intention expressed in the preface is carried out. The author there expresses his purpose of presenting a series of works dealing with the evolution of human culture. And this volume may be regarded as the basis for such a series. Moreover, the subtitle, "Biological and Psychological Foundations," gives some such an implication. This volume, however, can hardly claim in itself to constitute a science of human behavior, since it deals almost exclusively (except in the chapters on human instincts, consciousness, and intelligence—about a fourth of the book) with lower animal life. That it does furnish a good biological and neurological introduction to the study of human behavior is beyond question. And its merit lies in its careful condensation and criticism of the literature that has been accumulating in recent years in these fields.

The two points of view that predominate throughout the book are: (1) The evolutionary series is continuous, and, while at different points in the development the change has become great enough to call for different terms to describe the processes, nevertheless all the higher forms of psychic manifestations are but a part in a gradually developing but unitary scheme. Lines of demarkation between different animal types in the evolutionary series, including that between man and his nearest relatives, are more or less arbitrary. (2) Behavior is caused by the operation of external forces and the evolution of behavior and the structure on which it depends are the result of the operation of these external influences. This leads to a mechanical and objective conception of all behavior, including the psychic. In various places the author carries this viewpoint very near if not completely over to an assumption of materialistic monism. With these two points of view goes the frequent

emphasis on the fact that scientifically we have no basis for postulating any teleological element in the evolutionary process. While there is nothing new in these three points, the emphasis and support they receive are valuable in establishing a point of view for beginning the study of human activities.

CECIL C. NORTH

DE PAUW UNIVERSITY

La culture morale aux divers degrés de l'enseignement public. Par ARTHUR BAUER, Professor Honoraire de Philosophie, Membre de la Société de Sociologie de Paris. Ouvrage couronné par l'institut, avec extraits du rapport de M. GABRIEL COMPAYRE. Paris: M. Giard et E. Brière, libraires-éditeurs. 1913. Pp. 261+24.

The question of the hour in France, according to M. Bauer, has been formulated by the Academy of Moral and Political Science as "What place should ethics hold in the different stages of public instruction?" implying "in order that French democracy, with reason and liberty, may not die." To this question the author presents an answer which he hopes to have adopted by the schools of the nation. It is thus avowedly a study for practical ends of the actual conditions in France, not at all a system of moral education for general application. Its three sections consider in turn primary, secondary and higher education, with special chapters on boys' and girls' schools and with forewords and conclusions on general educational problems, such as the needs of the modern state, the effect of feminism, etc. It is not a handbook for teachers of ethics, but rather an exposition of general principles and methods illustrated by special cases.

Fundamental to any system of moral training, M. Bauer points out, are true conceptions of its object, of the nature of a democracy, and of the men and women who are to form it. Equality and liberty must be developed and to this end the people must have virtue and a sense of duty, they must be obedient to law and exercise trained wills. Education aims to develop such qualities and to fit the scholars for their functions in life.

The school has the last word in matters of conduct and discipline rather than the home, since the former has the large, social point of view, while the latter is too often narrow of vision and swayed by personal feeling. Upon the school rest the broad duty of developing the citizen.

The author draws a vivid picture of the spoiled child who seems to dominate the French family. In the maternal school it finds the first corrective of family indulgence and first experiences through firm though mild discipline the duty of obedience, respect for others, and self-control.

From the entrance into the primary school at the age of seven boys and girls are placed in separate schools, not merely to avoid the excitation of sex instincts, but also because their functions in life are to be different. It is a little difficult for an American mind to understand why the fact that a boy is to be a miner or a brick-layer or a woodchopper and a girl is to be a milkmaid or a factory-worker or a cook should necessitate a difference in their moral and intellectual training, but the author regards his principle as axiomatic. The method of training is, however, the same for both, the discipline of the classroom in promptness, silence, and order, and of mental culture in exactness of observation, comparison, and judgment, and dogmatic instruction by the teacher. The influence of play upon boys, especially of football, is recognized to some extent.

The objects of country and city schools for girls are distinguished. The country school should try to teach the peasant girls to love country life and realize the vital social necessity of their labors. The author draws such an idyllic picture of the wide horizons of the country, the kindly, close-knit social life, the varied tasks, etc., that we almost doubt his first-hand knowledge of the conditions, though undoubtedly his view would be a desirable one for the girls to acquire.

In the town he regards the working girl as beset with temptations on every side through the displays of luxuries, the passion for amusement, the lack of group control in the strange crowd, the vice in factories, etc. The school should be a refuge from this teaching moral lessons by its cleanliness, order, and beauty as well as by the formal instruction from a manual "exactly fitted to feminine psychology" and given with great impressiveness.

In the secondary schools, while the method of formal teaching is still dogmatic rather than dialectic, there is more place for reflection. The boys in the classical schools are the *élite*, those destined to be leaders, and they are to be trained accordingly, recognizing that "social superiority is only justified by services rendered to society." The good citizen has noble sentiments, a lively sense of social duty and energy of will. In his training, clothes, manners and speech are significant. The indirect teaching through different studies is of value, the stories and examples from the classics being especially helpful because of their serenity and freedom from the conflicting prejudices of the present.

Formal teaching is given from a manual of ethics, and rewards and prizes furnish a stimulus to good action.

The élite girls in secondary schools may possibly in time, thanks to the recent reforms in education, be intellectually emancipated and freed from tutelage, but now they are in much danger of yielding to luxury, idleness, and excessive sensibility. Since celibacy is an exceptional condition, education can ignore it and fit the girl for the normal marriage, "to be a companion of the cultivated, honorable man." The study of hygiene, sewing, and domestic science, with attention to clothes and manners, is valuable in moral training, but the author deprecates "tearing away the veil of Isis" by teaching sex hygiene. The suggestions and examples of teachers, lessons from a textbook of ethics, and the discipline of school work are the other methods employed.

The colleges and universities offer numerous courses on various ethical subjects, but M. Bauer criticizes them for leaving the professors entirely free to choose their own subjects and for the too frequent use of the historical method of presentation which gives an idea of the flux of things and often dwells too much in the past. What the students need is a dogmatic presentation of truths approved by the social conscience, not doubts and questions. The author proposes a course in social ethics, the social good and social duties, for all, with special courses for the students in law, medicine, art, pedagogy, etc.

Undoubtedly the book will be a stimulating one to French educators and provocative of thought.

HANNAH B. CLARK POWELL

The Hill Folk: Report on a Rural Community of Hereditary Defectives. By FLORENCE H. DANIELSON and CHARLES B. DAVENPORT. Cold Spring Harbor, Long Island: Eugenics Record Office, Memoir No. 1, August, 1912. 4to, pp. v+56, with three folded charts and four text figures.

This memoir is the first in a series to be published by the Eugenics Record Office. The form of the series is quarto in order that ample space may be available for charts. As has been indicated by Doctor Davenport in the preface to the memoir, the study reported is of interest primarily to sociologists, since it deals in a general way with the inheritance of human traits and with certain of the conditions under which undesirable social groups may develop and persist.

The observational work reported in the memoir was done by Miss Danielson who, in 1910, became field-worker for the Monson State Hospital, Palmer, Mass. One of the hospital cases investigated led the worker to a community characterized by the high frequency of feeble-mindedness, alcoholism, and immorality. A study of this community yielded an abundance of interesting facts concerning two families, the history of which "shows how much crime, misery, and expense may result from the union of two defective individuals—how a large number of the present court frequenters, paupers, and town nuisances are connected by a significant network of relationship."

The report "includes a discussion of the undesirable traits in the light of the Mendelian analysis. It presents some observations concerning the relation of heredity and environment, based on their effects upon the children. While it is not an exhaustive study of all the ramifications of even these two families and their consorts, it may be sufficient to throw some light on the vexed question of the prevention of feeble-minded, degenerate individuals, as a humane and economical state policy" (p. 1).

The method of the investigation was not such as to furnish highly accurate as well as extensive information concerning the individuals in the pedigree. Consequently, the analysis of the results for the purpose of solving problems of human heredity is not highly profitable. Miss Danielson gathered this information by personal visits, interviews with the individuals, their relatives, physicians, town officials, neighbors, and from court and town records. She undoubtedly made excellent use of these various sources of information, but it is, of course, to be recognized that the direct measurement by reliable methods of the physical and mental traits of the persons described is much to be desired.

The memoir presents, in the form of charts, the histories for five generations of two families which originated from Neil Rasp, a shiftless basket-maker, and an Englishman known in the memoir as Nuke.

The results of the analysis of the data concerning these two families are admirably summarized in the following paragraph:

The analysis of the data, then, gives statistical support to the conclusion abundantly justified from numerous other considerations, that feeble-mindedness is no elementary trait, but is a legal or sociological, rather than a biological term. Feeble-mindedness is due to the absence, now of one set of traits, now of quite a different set. Only when both parents lack one or more of the same traits do the children all lack the traits. So, if the traits lacking in both parents are socially important the children all lack socially important traits,

i.e., are feeble-minded. If, on the other hand, the two parents lack different socially significant traits, so that each parent brings into the combination the traits that the other lacks, all of the children may be without serious lack and all pass for "normal" [p. 11].

It is evident from the investigation that the unfavorable condition of the community is due largely to the matings of defectives with defectives, for it is perfectly clear from this study of 737 individuals that even when a mentally defective person migrates he is likely to marry in another community a person of similar mental grade.

Of obvious importance from the economical and sociological points of view is the financial burden on the town by reason of the "Hill Folk." Carefully analyzed statistics indicate that during the last decades the financial aid given to this community by the town has increased 400 per cent, and, as the authors point out, "the large percentage of the crimes which were against sex indicate that the influence which such persons exert in a community is of far more importance than the 10,700 odd dollars spent in punishing the criminals after the influence has been established" (p. 17).

A comparison of the "Hill Folk" with the Jukes family yields numerous interesting conclusions. The numbers of individuals included in the reports are similar for both communities, but whereas the Jukes family presents with astounding frequency criminal tendencies among the men and prostitution among the women, the "Hill Folk" present a picture of shiftlessness and low-grade mentality associated with sex immorality and a tendency to minor criminal offenses.

The authors' study of the school children of the community is of prime significance, since it gives us a glimpse into the future of the "Hill Folk." Of 75 individuals in the school children group, the school records of 7 were not obtained. Of the remainder 38 were below grade and 30 were up to grade. In a table, the characteristics of the parents and a brief characterization of each of the 68 individuals are presented. It is evident that "before adolescence half of the children from the Hill families show evidences of their mental handicap. The detrimental influence which such children may exert upon the schools which they attend is an important matter for consideration" (p. 19).

Even more interesting in several respects than the results of the study of the school children among the "Hill Folk" is the discussion of heredity and environment which the authors present. For naturally the community furnishes an experiment on the influence of environment, since many of the children are early taken from their homes and placed

in better environments. "A comparative study of the varying results of good and poor environment upon individuals from the same germ-plasm increases the evidence of the power of individual potentialities" (p. 25). This conclusion is based upon a careful study of the development of thirty state wards concerning whom the authors venture the following statements:

Of the thirty state wards who have been away from home long enough to be affected, fourteen, approximately half, are at present, or probably will be, good, average citizens. Of these, seven carry an almost intangible burden of unfortunate heredity which may always be a retarding factor [p. 26].

These cases, then, prove that persons belonging to these strains who have been brought up under good influences may turn out well or ill, and that even when placed *early* under good conditions the result may be highly unsatisfactory. On the other hand, of members of the same fraternity who remained at home under the same poor environment, some turned out relatively well. It is not to be denied that the latter would have done better if their culture had been superior, nor that the "easily influenced" workman would have taken a wrong path if surrounded only by bad influences instead of good. But, on the other hand, it is clear that the capacity of these people for good or evil is born with them and bred in the bone and environment acts as a more or less effective screen or lure, as the case may be [p. 31].

We quote, in conclusion, the entire summary of the memoir, since every point made is of great social importance:

1. The analysis of the method of inheritance of feeble-mindedness shows that it cannot be considered a unit character. It is evidently a complex of quantitatively and qualitatively varying factors most of which are negative, and are inherited as though due to the absence of unit characters.

2. The value of out-marriage, or exogamy, as a means of attenuating defective strains is diminished by the action of social barriers and the natural preference of individuals, which induce marriages among like grades of mentality, in a foreign as well as a native locality.

3. The amount of town aid, which this one group of defective families requires decennially, has increased 400 per cent in the last thirty years. In the same length of time its criminal bill has been \$10,763.43 for sixteen persons; and the bill for its thirty children who were supported by the state during the last twenty-three years is \$45,888.57. During the past sixty years this community has, it is estimated, cost the state and the people half a million dollars.

4. Half of the present number of school children from these families who are living at home show evidence of mental deficiency.

5. One-half of the state wards from the community in question have reacted favorably in an improved environment and give promise of becoming

more or less useful citizens; the other half consists of institutional cases and those which have not reacted to the better environment, but are likely to become troublesome and dangerous citizens.

6. The comparative cost of segregating one feeble-minded couple and that of maintaining their offspring shows, in the instance at hand, that the latter policy has been three times more expensive [pp. 33, 34].

ROBERT M. YERKES

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

A Sunny Life. The Biography of Samuel June Barrows. By ISABEL C. BARROWS. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1913.

The poetic title should not divert attention from the substantial contributions to the history of social reforms in this country. Dr. Barrows was an embodiment of those motives which our best men honor; and his careful preparation for his duties is an example to the student. The record of his achievements is remarkable and inspiring; he was a pioneer in a field where much hard work remains to be done. Honor to his memory.

C. R. HENDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

List of Industrial Poisons. Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, No. 100, May, 1912.

Owing to ignorance of the subject in this country and the neglect which goes with interested blindness, it has long been imagined and often asserted that American workingmen are somehow magically immune to the harmful effects of those chemical substances which enfeeble or kill European workmen. Among the many useful publications of the Bureau of Labor not one touches life more closely than this "list of industrial poisons" prepared by Drs. Sommerfeld and Fischer for the International Labor Office. The work has been done by experts and passed through the most critical ordeal of examination by a large number of competent specialists.

The inquiries of the Illinois State Commission on Occupational Diseases (1911) not only led to important protective legislation in Illinois and other states, but served to stimulate other investigations. Congress after long discussion removed a disgrace from our flag by taxing out of existence the manufacture of white phosphorous matches which among operatives and consumers has been so injurious and fatal.

The list here noticed gives a designation of the poisonous substance used in the arts and trades, the branches of industry in which poisoning is known to occur, the mode of entrance into the body, the symptoms of poisoning, and special measures of relief until a physician can be called. Physicians will find in this small pamphlet valuable material, while manufacturers and "welfare workers" should make themselves familiar with the dangers herein revealed. No more vital subject of study can be found.

C. R. HENDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Insanity of Passion and Crime. By L. FORBES WINSLOW, M.B., LL.D., CANTAB., D.C.L. OXON. London: John Ouseley. n.d. Pp. 352.

It is the tragedy of life's abnormal phenomena which the gifted physician portrays with very great power and literary skill: the passions, incipient insanity, irresponsibility, mental obscurity, criminal abnormality, early mental collapse, feminine loss of balance, heredity. The illustrations are drawn from a long course of observation and reading, and the warnings against excess and neglect have the weight of professional authority. And yet many readers will think they have reason to complain that they are asked to follow *ipse dixit*; for many assertions not on the bare affirmation of the author. No doubt this authority is high, but most of us desire an indication of sources, of original collections of facts, and independent means of forming a judgment which are usually wanting in this treatise.

The treatment of statistics (on p. 206) raises serious doubts about the author's method of interpreting figures. He tells us that in England and Wales in 1859 there was one lunatic in every 536 of the population; in 1909 there was one lunatic in every 278 of the population. The inference is that at this rate of increase in 2209 there will be one in four of the population who will be insane. Truly we live in a "mad world"—if figures do not lie. The premises, however, may be restated with advantage: in 1859 there was one lunatic *recorded* in every 536 of the population, a very different basis for calculations about the future. The fact is since 1859 the sick of brain have been more carefully sought out, recorded, and brought into institutions, and so appear in statistics. The tendency may be discouraging, but not so hopeless as some think.

The illustrations from life are drawn from a long experience in a

professional career and from wide reading; every page bristles with suggestion, and the practical warnings are too authoritative to be ignored.

C. R. HENDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Christian Unity at Work. The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 1912. Edited by CHARLES S. MACFARLAND, Secretary, 1913. Pp. 291.

The Secretary of the Federal Council of Churches has brought together in a volume the speeches, reports, and discussions of the conference held in Chicago in 1912. It is the best available presentation of the aims and opinions of this powerful organization. The conclusions reached and the methods recommended are necessarily stated in very general terms and have only moderate interest for specialists. The ground covered is too wide for contributions of knowledge to any particular topic of the program; but the vista opened in the discussion of internationalism, race improvement, diplomacy, temperance, preservation of the home, and religious education is hopeful and inspiring.

C. R. HENDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Penal Philosophy. By GABRIEL TARDE; translated by RAPELJE HOWELL. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1912.

Tarde requires no introduction or recommendation among students of sociology, but this publication of a translation of his great work on crime, under the auspices of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, offers a good occasion to call attention to some of the important discussions contributed by this book.

The philosophical controversy on "determinism" versus "free will" is clearly stated, but left where it was before. Tarde insists that his deterministic theory of responsibility is sound; that we can discover a strictly causal series in conduct while we hold the criminal responsible for his deed; but he also clings to the common-sense legal view of the criminal as a man to be blamed and detested. For the criminal is not a savage, not a sick man, not insane, not an epileptic, but just a criminal. The classifications of Lombroso are rejected; there is no "criminal type"; we discover the guilty by his record of conduct, not by his physiognomy and by craniometry. The most reliable distinction

among offenders is sociological rather than physiological; and all law-breakers are classified as urban or rural, with sub-groups of the violent and thieves.

One of the most profound suggestions in the whole book is the declaration that while science, art, religion, all tend to diminish crime, commercialism and material success tend to increase it. "There is one sentiment which, in becoming generalized, should it be developed in the mind without a sufficient counterweight, agrees with one of the principles dear to delinquents. This is what we might call the mercantile sentiment, the worship of gold and immediate enjoyment to the exclusion of everything else. . . . Industry increases the number of products, but where is the collective work which it engenders?" Under our present system this great judge declares business is "to make war on one's neighbor." In an age which is agnostic about all except the value of wealth this note of warning is not likely to be much heeded; but it will be heard when the "noise and shouting dies."

If Tarde, the lawyer, were heeded, some of our law students would study criminals by serving as assistants or teachers in prisons. Study of criminal law would then be something nearer life than looking at dried specimens in the leaves of penal codes.

The argument about capital punishment is a fine and subtle example of walking on a tight rope; the weight of argument on the whole seems to be contrary to the conclusion which apparently is to retain the death penalty, but on impossible conditions.

C. R. HENDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Industrial Warfare. The Aims and Claims of Capital and Labour.

By CHARLES WATNEY and JAMES A. LITTLE. London: John Murray, 1912. Pp. x+353. 6s net.

A very useful compendium on labor legislation and conditions in Great Britain during the past few years. Very sketchy in places and sometimes not clear, it nevertheless in twenty-five chapters and fifteen appendices gives the essential facts regarding the "Issues and Personalities" of nearly every phase of the labor movement. Eleven chapters are devoted to special industries or classes of workers, as "Cotton and Weaving Trades," "General Labourers," "Women Workers," and others to "Labour Organization," "Syndicalism," "Minimum Wage," "Remedies," "Profit Sharing." The book is purely descriptive and matter-of-fact throughout, a detached position being successfully main-

tained by the authors. Even in the chapter on "Suggested Remedies" they do not have a special panacea but report faithfully the respective standpoints of employers, workers, and public.

Except for hints here and there one must therefore look to the "Introduction" for views attributable to the authors. The chief cause of labor unrest is there said to be "the progress of education," "the development of thought and the advancement in the popular ideals of happiness and comfort" among the laboring classes. There has resulted a widespread feeling that labor does not receive its due proportion of the product of industry. This unrest has come to stay but will assume various forms according to local conditions and the attitude of employers. Though the authors definitely state that "the fight between Capital and Labour" (p. 12, note) is not "class war" (p. 9), they nevertheless very clearly imply that it is just that—a fact also made plain by the title and much of the subject-matter. It would seem that their opinion that labor "will be content with fairer treatment" is also too optimistic. On the contrary human experience universally shows that the demands for larger opportunities and a higher standard of living, like the demands for wealth and liberty, grow with every morsel fed them, except for moments of temporary quiescence; the fundamental demands of labor are in essence the demand for democracy in industry, which like the demand for democracy in politics can stop only at full realization of equality. By way of solution of the labor problem the authors place most confidence in collective bargaining and profit-sharing (p. 10), but without finding them a cure-all (p. 255).

There is a certain naïvete in the statement (pp. 6-7) of the relation of gold to prices; and the opinion (p. 7) that "a general increase in the price of commodities rarely affects the very poor" seems preposterous.

This brief sketch of the demands of capital and labor in Great Britain and the attempts by legislative and industrial reforms to meet them, or as the Preface describes it, this "résumé in encyclopaedic form" explaining "the exact significance and the probabilities of the growing unrest," should prove valuable reading for all those interested in the industrial situation. It contains lessons from the experiences of a great nation for extremists of every sort. With its index and topical page headings it is a ready reference storehouse of information for the student wishing to acquaint himself with the labor situation in the oldest industrial nation.

F. H. HANKINS

The Charity Visitor: A Practical Handbook for Beginners. By AMELIA SEARS. Introduction by CHARLES RICHMOND HENDERSON. Chicago: The Chicago School of Physics and Philanthropy, 1913. 8vo. Pp. 72. Paper covers.

Training for the new profession of social work has been rendered difficult by the lack of textbooks adapted to the use of classes in the schools of philanthropy. This little book will therefore meet a need long felt by all interested in the training of social workers. It describes in simple terms the practice prevailing in the district offices of the United Charities of Chicago, a practice gradually formulated by the superintendent of the Bureau of Charities, Mr. Ernest P. Bicknell, now executive secretary of the National Red Cross Society, and by the general district superintendent of the United Charities. This practice accords, of course, in the main with the accepted practice in well-ordered charity organization societies, so that the material presented has far more than local interest. The topics discussed include among others: "The Initial Visit"—The Visitor's Mental Attitude, The Family Individualized; "Record-making"—with a detailed examination of the Record Card; "Methods of Verification"; "Types of Dependency"; "Sources of Co-operation"—Relatives, Employers, Unions, etc.

These topics while briefly presented are yet discussed with sufficient fulness to prepare the student and the new visitor for the delicate and difficult questions of human need and family decline that are found in the case of every applicant for aid. The book should, therefore, be of great interest, not only to the professional student but to all who are concerned with the discovery of the kind and the volume of want and suffering facing the modern city. It will undoubtedly find a welcome on the part of college students of social problems and of those individuals who desire as volunteer visitors to be of service to the poor. As Professor Henderson well says in his sympathetic and discriminating Foreword:

Long experience in charity makes us all impatient to see the day when charitable relief, with all its humiliations, and harrowing uncertainties, will be no longer needed, when a fairer distribution of income, a complete system of social hygiene, education and insurance will reduce dependence to a vanishing point; and the hope of promoting that purpose is the chief inspiration of contemporary charity. We know that these tragic case records and the statistics which are gathered from them must quicken the public conscience and lead to nobler methods. Meantime, in spite of cheap and ill-advised jeers at means of relief, which are confessedly only mitigation and not final cure, we cannot

refuse to help diminish distress so far as possible. Talk of Utopias in some future state, here or hereafter, comes with poor grace from those who totally neglect the miserable victims of personal fault and of social misrule. It is not fair to say that all charity is mere opium taken to relieve the remorse of willing exploiters. As Miss Sears well says, the direct use of these pathetic histories is to improve our methods of immediate relief, but our ultimate and larger purpose is "to accumulate data concerning poverty, disease, social exploitation, and industrial abuse—data that may prove effective in securing an investigation and amelioration of the conditions, social, industrial, and economic, that produce dependency."

SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

A Psychological Study of Religion. By JAMES H. LEUBA. New York: Macmillan, 1912. Pp. xiv+371.

A wide range of topics is discussed. Chapters i-ix contain the writer's psychology of feeling, intellection, and volition; criticize numerous definitions of religion; repeat his well-known distinction between the mechanical, the magical, and the "anthropopathic" types of behavior; and detail the varieties of magic and the essential qualifications of a god. In chaps. x-xiii there is a brief treatment of religion in its relation to morality, mythology, and metaphysics, followed by extended criticism of recent utterances of apologists for religion. The aim is to show that when theologians fall back on "inner experience" and satisfying states of mind as proof of the validity of religion they cannot logically claim that such experiences are exempt from the interpretation of the psychologist. Admitting the psychologist's way of approach, theology will become fruitfully empirical and shake off the incubus of an old-fashioned metaphysics. The concluding pages deal with oriental religions, "psychotherapeutic cults," such as New Thought and Christian Science, the Religion of Humanity, and the Ethical Culture movement; finally, the bases of a religion of the future are prophesied.

Among the contentions advanced are the following: religion is a type of behavior, an appeal to a kind of power believed in, an agency psychic, superhuman, and (usually) personal; originating in impulses and needs of human nature, primitive religion had biological value in the struggle for existence; out of mechanical behavior (dependence upon quantitative, causal relations) science has developed; magic, eliminating mechanism and causality, is opposed to science in spirit and method as caprice is opposed to systematic control; moral values are superior to religious values; a tenable religion should not run counter to "well-established

scientific or philosophical conclusions," should stress ethical imperatives and general happiness, and should listen to Bergson's intuition of God—"unceasing life, action, freedom."

Anyone who writes on religion and magic today may not legitimately confine himself to the researches of Tylor, Fraser, Jevons, and others who have not sufficiently realized the implications of the collective background of primitive groups. Professor Leuba freely takes exception to the conclusions of the English anthropologists, yet he follows their leading to the extent of ignoring the work of Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl, Hubert, and Mauss. Whatever exaggerations may be found in the categories of the French social anthropologists, they have demonstrated that the ordinary psychology of the textbook falls short in method and interpretation if it is invoked to explain the genesis of magic and religion. A suggestive example of what may be done when an investigation is based upon specific group contexts is the study of Greek magic, religion, and philosophy made by F. M. Cornford, who derived his standpoint from Professor Durkheim and his colleagues.

It is worthy of note that Dr. Leuba sees fit to include a somewhat full analysis of the social philosophy of Comte. Positivism is reproached because of its inadequate view of Nature and its defective philosophical assumptions. However, the religion of the future described in chap. xiii is a revised version of the Religion of Humanity. Dr. Leuba urges that "Humanity idealized and conceived as a manifestation of Creative Energy possesses surpassing qualifications for a source of religious inspiration. . . . The sense of weakness and imperfection, the need of comfort and encouragement, the desire for the final triumph of good are sentiments which might readily enough be collectively expressed in declarations addressed to the religious brotherhood, or even perhaps to the Ideal Society. And I see no sufficient reason why a religion of Humanity should not incorporate in a modified form elements of the therapeutic cults which have been found effective in the healing of mind and body.

"A religion in agreement with the accepted body of scientific knowledge, and centered about Humanity conceived as the manifestation of a Force tending to the creation of an ideal society, would occupy in the social life the place that a religion should normally hold, even the place that the Christian religion lost when its cardinal beliefs ceased to be in harmony with secular beliefs" (pp. 335-336).

E. L. TALBERT

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Psychology of Revolution. By GUSTAVE LE BON. Translated by Bernard Miall. New York: Putnam, 1913. Price, \$2.50. Pp. 337.

In this study, Le Bon has endeavored to unravel some of the tangled skeins of history with the aid of modern psychology. He shows that we have arrived at a more profound understanding of the principles of this science, and he makes practical application of them in his interpretation of events. The discoveries in this science which the author puts forth as applicable to history are as follows: a knowledge of ancestral influence, the laws which rule the actions of a crowd, data relating to the disaggregation of personality, mental contagion, the unconscious formation of beliefs, and the distinction between the various forms of logic, rational, affective, collective, and mystic.

Revolutions are classified and the relation of government to social interaction analyzed. All violent social disturbances are shown to have a logical basis which may rest wholly or partly upon psychological premises. There is a wide range of difference between a scientific, a political, and a religious revolution. The scientific revolution hardly makes a ripple upon the surface of society; it is merely an evolutionary process. The causes leading up to a political revolution may be summed up in the one word discontent. Intolerance is back of the force that sweeps society into religious controversy, with its attendant excess and crime. In political and religious revolutions, rational logic is swept aside and is replaced by affective, collective, and mystic logic.

The keynote of the analysis is found in the different forms of mentality prevalent during revolution. These are classified as the mystic, the Jacobin, the revolutionary, and the criminal. The classification is evidently made with special reference to the French revolution. Man as a collective unit under leadership without legal restraint or substantial moral and religious moorings is a different creature from man as a segregated unit under centralized authority. It is this dual nature of personality which admits of the excesses and crimes against civilization committed by a revolutionary body under the influence and leadership of an abnormal mind. Such a character would be restrained in times of order by a fear of the law; but in times of revolution, there is no such restraint.

The origins of the French revolution are found mainly in the weakness of the government. Le Bon does not subscribe to the fatalistic theory, nor yet to the theory that the philosophers exerted a powerful influence.

He holds rather that those who inaugurated the revolution did not perceive clearly what they wanted; popular political ideals had been shattered, and the French people consequently passed through a period of demoralization and anarchy seeking new ideals.

Le Bon thinks that there was a logical basis for many acts of the French revolution which heretofore have been passed over as inexplicable. Such bases depend for establishment upon the acceptance of Le Bon's system of reasoning.

In the discussion of the conflict between ancestral influences and revolutionary principles, it is contended that the main issues of the French revolution were early accomplished. The ancestral influences then dictated the return to law and order, which was not accomplished by reason of the fact that the revolutionary principles were still burning issues with the leaders and the mercenary class of the revolutionists. Their preservation depended upon a continuation of the revolutionary régime.

Le Bon concludes that the heritage of the French revolution may be summed up in the words: Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. In the present-day movements toward social equality, he sees the fruitage of the seeds that were planted at so great a sacrifice and cost.

ISAAC A. LOOS

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

Les principes sociologiques du droit public. Par RAOUL DE LA GRASSERIE. V. Paris: Giard et E. Brière, 1911. Prix, broché, 10 francs; relié, 11 francs. Pp. 1-430.

This book is an attempt to interpret public law in the light of social conditions and social history. It is divided into three parts.

The first part, the sociology of constitutional law, considers first at length and by means of historical analysis the sociology of the constitutional law of the state. This might very well be called a sociological interpretation of the history of the forms or machinery of government. It differs little from what a contemporary historian of constitutional law would write even if he did not call his work sociological. Since Lavigny, public law is interpreted by historical conditions. The first part concludes with a very brief section on eccentric and concentric units of the state, namely, colonies, provinces, and communes.

Part II, public administrative law, is similar in treatment to Part I

and almost of equal length. Part III is grouped under two divisions: one relating to the international public law between autonomous states, and the other to that between dependent or interdependent states. Part IV discusses the sociology of the limits and the relations between individual rights and public law.

ISAAC A. LOOS

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

La théorie de l'homme et de la civilisation. Par ERASME DE MAJEWSKI. Paris: Librairie H. Le Soudier, 1911. Prix, 8 francs. Pp. vii-xvi+351.

This book is similar in spirit and method to the same author's *La science de civilisation*, published three years earlier. The book is at once biological and sociological, or perhaps we should say blends the biological and sociological analysis of life by means of the psychological analysis. The author lays great stress on the phenomena of language in an account of the development of *l'homo sapiens*.

The *psychisme* of man is not the result of the *psychisme* of animal; the former is interphysiological (whatever this may mean), instead of physiological. Language and ideas constitute the form and substance of society. The social form is as real as the cell or the plant, but it is not so obvious! The interphysical content in a material substratum is the form of the social reality.

ISAAC A. LOOS

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RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

Le syndicalisme féminin dans les industries textile en Angleterre.—It is in the textile industries that the earliest female labor organizations appeared. These were at first separate from those of the men, but later united with them. It is in these industries also that women receive the highest wages. The question arises as to whether the superior condition of women here can be attributed to organization. Investigation shows that the growth of organization among women workers has been slow, and even in those industries where women out-number the men, the number belonging to unions is nevertheless smaller. Where women do belong to the union they show little interest in its activities, and even in organizations where women are in the majority, the executive work is chiefly done by the men. It must be concluded that the gains which have come to women have come chiefly through the activities of the men, rather than through their own efforts. Though there is still a great discrepancy in the cotton industry, as elsewhere, between the wages of women employees and those of men, yet the women here, where organization is strongest, receive a higher average weekly wage than in any other branch of the textile industry. This result may be fairly attributable to organized activity on the part of the men.—Mlle. A. Tougard de Boismilon, *Le musée sociale, mémoires et documents*, May, 1913.

B. H. S.

Sur l'influence de l'image et de la publicité sur les criminels.—Criminals may be divided into three grades: the lowest and the highest of these, the instinctive, and the "cultured" criminal, respectively, are not influenced by the suggestion and examples furnished in newspaper accounts of crime. Upon the middle class, however, this influence is very marked. This class is largely composed of youths, and is recruited for the most part from children who have grown up in an environment of crime, where criminal exploits are held up for admiration. Newspaper publicity serves to emphasize this attitude, and, by furnishing examples for imitation, tends to multiply criminal acts. It might be thought that the publication of the penalties along with the account of the crime would have a deterrent effect, but this does not seem to be the case.—Dr. Gilbert Ballet, *Revue pénitenciaire et de le droit pénal*, April, 1913.

B. H. S.

L'assicurazione obbligatoria nei lavori Agricoli.—Though compulsory insurance against industrial accidents was provided for in Italy by the laws of 1898 and of 1904, these did not apply to the agricultural workers. There is no reason why the latter should be excluded from the benefits of this law. The agricultural workers bear the same relation to the employer and run the same risk of injury as do the laborers in workshops and factories. Some would make a distinction between classes of agricultural laborers, the tenants or farmers on shares, and the day laborers, claiming that only the latter need the protection of compulsory insurance. Both, however, belong to the general class of hired laborers, and should be included in the law. The principle of employers' liability for all accidents not due to negligence of the employer can be derived from the essential nature of the contract. If it is to be assumed that when an employer enters into a contract to hire labor, he is responsible for the safety of the laborer, just as when he enters into a contract to hire machinery he makes himself liable for the return of the same uninjured. This interpretation, only, is in harmony with judicial and ethical principles, and if the principle of employers' liability were recognized on this basis, the extension of compulsory insurance to the protection of all classes of workers, as a logical outcome of employers' liability, could not be denied.—Romeo Vuoli, *Rivista internazionale di scienze sociali e discipline ausiliari*, May, 1913.

B. H. S.

Le droit dans l'économie sociale.—By right (*droit*) is meant natural right. This concept is denied by many, but the proof of the existence of natural right is found in the inability to prove the contrary. Individual liberty contains in germ all the rights of man. The limitations which may be put upon liberty are (a) those arising from its own nature, i.e., because each man has a right to his own liberty he must not encroach upon that of another; (b) those required for the maintenance of social order, for the individual cannot live apart from organized society and the maintenance of social order is necessary to his existence. Every extension of authority which is not justified by its necessity impairs natural right and can have only bad effects. An example of an encroachment of the state upon individual right is found in the law requiring compulsory contributions for old-age pensions. The exact limits of authority are difficult to fix, but a good government should stop short of, rather than go beyond, them. For all social polity should be directed toward one object: to develop the human individuality, and the human individuality can be developed only in liberty and through liberty.—Edmond Villey, *Revue d'économie politique*, May-June, 1913. B. H. S.

L'Hôpital de Montpezat-de-Quercy pendant le XVII^e et le XVIII^e siècle.—This hospital, which was established in 1360, has preserved its records since the beginning of the seventeenth century. These show that though the philosophy of benevolence had not been developed, there were many forms of public assistance given as a municipal service in Quercy.—R. Latouche, *Annales du midi*, January, 1913. E. H. S.

L'antropologia criminale ed i suoi detrattori.—Criminal anthropology has a rational and natural basis and finds support in the new science of psycho-physics. The fact that many honest people have what might be described as criminal somatic characteristics is no criticism of criminal anthropology, as the latter does not go by these alone, but takes them together with various organic and cranial anomalies. A crime is the effect of three factors: individual, social, and physical. Education and the lack of opportunity for the expression of the criminal tendencies are significant; and finally, criminal anthropology, like all social sciences, has only a relative and approximate value which, however, does not divest it of the character of a science.—Francesco di Luca, *Archivio di antropologia criminale*, April, 1913. M. S. H.

Le réalisme chez les artistes anciens.—One may note in the work of sculptors and painters of different epochs and countries various styles of representing the human body peculiar to the period and place. So distinct are these that often we may locate works of art as to time and nationality by them. The ancient artists in their unaffected recognition of the anatomic differences of sex in their representations of the human form reached an aesthetic conception far higher than that attained by modern artists who are restrained from their best work by sex consciousness.—Gaston Gaillard, *Bulletin de la Société d'anthropologie*, Nos. 5-6, 1912. E. E. E.

Culture morale et féminisme.—The social unit is not, as some social extremists hold, the individual, but the couple. Men and women are different, it is true, but they are not on that account either hostile or independent. They complement each other, and social accomplishment requires their co-operation. In modern society woman may appear in four rôles: as a celibate, as a slave to her husband, as an advocate of freedom of marital contract, or as an equal partner to a natural and voluntary matrimonial union. Looking toward the last as the normal and desirable state, the young women of the nation must be trained—physically, mentally, morally.—A. Bauer, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, May, 1913. E. E. E.

Étude sur la famille instable en Champagne.—In making an investigation of the causes of the unstable family in France the Champagne district was chosen as typical. Among the peasantry the custom persists of equal partition of the paternal estate among the children at marriage. The result is a region of finely parceled out farms, usually too small to furnish their proprietors more than the barest living. Since it is difficult satisfactorily thus to establish many children in life, this custom tends to restrict the birth rate, and correspondingly the expansion of the race. This, combined with the poverty of the soil of the section, is the primary cause of the instability of the

family. The economic life is rigorous, with few real comforts. Family ties are not strong, and many households are disorganized by the departure of the children to find work in the cities. In the urban population signs of family disorganization are most notable, perhaps, among the textile workers, the dockers, and the wine workers, due largely to conditions of poverty, illness, drunkenness, and sloth.—P. Descamps, *La science sociale*, May, 1913. E. E. E.

Akkulturation unter den Magyaren in Amerika.—The immigrants to America undergo few changes except in the superficial forms of culture as the result of contact with American life. Their racial traits, habits of life, customs, and religious convictions do not change. In fact they use every means available to retain their "inner culture"; they subscribe for a native newspaper, and locate in national groups. They adopt in a superficial way the American fashions and other external features of American culture, which are forced on them by the so-called necessary demands of American life. But this process of assimilation is superficial and not real. The real content of foreign culture does not change upon the American soil. Their craving for American freedom becomes a falsified fact; among the American immigrants freedom has no value or appreciation, when the mind and judgment rejects it.—G. von Hoffman, *Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft*, May-June, 1913. H. H. B.

Die Nationalität in ihrer sociologischen Bedeutung.—The general social instinct, the sexual instinct, and the paternal instinct are the three bonds that hold a tribe or group together, and unite humanity into one large group. But these three forces are represented by many sub-forces and institutions in the development of civilization. The solidarity of humanity is essentially based on the fact that our whole system of culture finds its roots in the culture of earlier people. Thus both objectively and subjectively nationality in its sociological significance is becoming the oneness of humanity.—Paul Barth, *Vierteljahrsschrift für Philosophie und Soziologie*, Vol. XXXVII, Heft 1. H. H. B.

The Sources of Rural Credit and the Extent of Rural Indebtedness.—The chief sources of rural credit before about 1895 were mortgage companies and loan agents of life insurance societies. Many mortgage companies that made loans in restricted territories where they knew the people and that did not guarantee the mortgages still do a good business for themselves and their clients. Census investigations (1890-1910) show the growth of the tenant system and of the mortgaging of farms operated by owners. The average value of such mortgaged farms was \$3,444 with an incumbency of \$1,224 in 1890; the corresponding items in 1910 were \$6,289 and \$2,658. That is, the average value of such farm property has increased faster than the amount of the mortgages. The total agricultural debt of American farmers in 1912 is estimated at about \$5,000,000,000. Real estate mortgages constitute 55.9 per cent of this sum; chattel mortgages about 14 per cent; cotton crop liens 7.8 per cent; liens on other crops about 9 per cent; unsecured debts to local merchants about 5 per cent; besides a small percentage of miscellaneous debts. About three-fourths of the total mortgages on farm real estate has been incurred in purchasing the property.—George K. Holmes, *Monthly Bulletin of Economic and Social Intelligence*, International Institute of Agriculture, April, 1913. R. H. L.

Heredity and Responsibility.—Our personalities are not absolutely determined in the original germ cells; yet they have arisen from these cells and have been conditioned by them. That is, our actual personalities are not predetermined in the germ-cells, but our possible personalities are. Anything which could possibly appear in the course of development is potential in heredity and under given conditions of environment is predetermined. The factors determining human behavior include, therefore, hereditary constitution, present stimulus, past experiences of the organism, and the habits of response to given stimuli which have been formed. Is then the individual responsible for his behavior? By "responsibility" is meant ability of the individual to respond to rational, social, and ethical stimuli, and to inhibit response to their opposites. It involves the corresponding expectation of others that the individual will so respond. Since the stimuli increase in variety and complexity directly as the social organization

develops, it follows that human responsibility is a variable. For the character of the stimuli varies, and the capacities of different individuals to respond to rational, social, and ethical stimuli vary. Individual responsibility varies, then, with the number and kind of stimuli, inheritance, training, habits, and physiological states. As a corollary to this conclusion, note the converse social responsibility to provide as favorable an environment as possible for all in the community. For hereditary possibilities become actualities only as result of use, training, and habit. Elimination of reproduction by the unfit, or negative eugenics, will be serviceable in extending the inherited potentialities of posterity. Since great crises usually discover great men, it is apparent that the prime problem of education is to provide a stimulating environment and to develop the powers of self-discovery and of self-control.—Edwin G. Conklin, *Science*, January 10, 1913. R. H. L.

French and American Ideals.—Material gain is the world-wide industrial ideal, but this is becoming modified by the humane interest. France and America differ in the means used to attain this end; the former depends rather on the clear thinking of the individual concerning the moral questions involved, the latter appeals to legislation. The American political ideal of individualism has been influenced by French thought and by the British moral tradition of authority. Personal restraint plus a social laissez faire; and personal laissez faire plus social regulation are the means depended on in France and America respectively to enforce obedience to moral ideals. Such policies for control of adult behavior necessitate opposite treatments of the young, i.e., freedom for American youth, espionage for the French. This difference in methods between the two countries is due, at least in part, to the greater vitality of the religious sanction, cast in theological terms, in America. We derive our aesthetic traditions from the British, and so we lack the creative imagination and delicate sensibility of the French. The ideal of self-control allows the French, on the other hand, the freedom of thought and imagination, so essential to artistic achievement. These differences seem due to differences in social inheritance. But in both countries there are signs of convergence in national ideals and methods. In America greater freedom from social compulsion is beginning to appear; and in France there is growing up a new appreciation of the social obligations of the individual and of the need for a more effective social control. The economic and the moral continue to make their strongest appeal to the American; and the intellectual and the beautiful, as revealer of spiritual values, to the French. Both peoples will profit largely through extensive and sympathetic contacts with each other.—J. Mark Baldwin, *Sociological Review*, April, 1913. R. H. L.

What Is Social Psychology?—It is helpful to determine first what social psychology is not. Thus it does not concern itself with a super-individual, collective mind; for such a mind does not exist, apart from the minds of the individuals that compose the community. The so-called collective mind and the individual mind are both organized systems of mental or purposive forces; but the former lacks the integrity, the isolation and the unity of action that are essential to the very conception of mind. Again, although the action of an individual when alone differs from what it would be if he were a member of a crowd or organized group, the difference is caused by the changed environmental conditions to which the individual mind must respond. So far as unity in group action takes place, it is due to the existence in the component individual minds of common or type elements. But even this unity is modified by the difference in individual reactions to group ideals and practices. Social psychology differs essentially from sociology. Each has to do with the forms of likeness, of interdependence and of difference among individuals, and with the complex social structures that result from the endless and complex combinations of men's purposes and interests. When we study the nature of these structures as created by and fulfilling the needs and purposes of men, we are psychological sociologists; when we study these structures for the revelation they may give of the nature of mind itself, we are social psychologists.—R. M. MacIver, *Sociological Review*, April, 1913. R. H. L.

How Is Wealth to Be Valued?—Scientific valuation must always be inadequate, particularly in psychology and sociology; for it is limited to quantitative analysis. And difference in quality cannot be resolved into a quantitative variation from a norm.

And yet we find the attempt in present-day economics, ethics, and political science to reduce all valuation to a quantitative problem. The true relation between qualitative and quantitative elements in the valuation process is illustrated by the work of the artist. He uses paints and colors in certain quantities and proportions and draws certain lines, always with a view to a qualitative end—the unity of the whole composition. This qualitative end as determining quantities and proportions of ingredients appears in every valuation process, from a painting to a pudding. This stands out clearly in expending money income. For in doing this, the individual, the statesman, the community do not pause to weigh the comparative worth of a certain number of pounds sterling expended for tobacco or good or bad books, or for battleships or education. Quantitative measurement ignores both the unity of the whole, which is qualitative, and the qualitiveness of the parts. Hence it cannot predict the future in human history with any certainty. For qualitative mutations occur, such as a biological sport or a psychological variant; and such mutations have incalculable effects upon human conduct. The process of averaging to eliminate variations from the mean is a false procedure for we have no right to assume that qualitative differences do cancel one another. The foregoing considerations lead to the conclusion that quantities are used to assist in realizing the unified ideal, but that they neither direct nor dominate the valuation process.—John A. Hobson, *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1913. R. H. L.

A Statistician's Idea of Progress.—Since progress is a subjective term implying change toward an end, it cannot be measured directly by statistics. If we assume however, that adaptation is the end, and that there are certain characteristics correlated with this incommensurable end, the use of the statistical method may yield suggestive results. The result of such procedure indicates for the United States a rapid increase of population and probable increase in length of life, an increase in racial uniformity, and perhaps in uniformity of other sorts connected with immigration, and at the same time a decrease in uniformity of economic status and income and a probable decrease in the stability and social serviceability of family life. Some of these tendencies seem to point toward progress, others toward retrogression. As there is no way of reducing these opposite tendencies to a statistical common denominator we cannot get a conclusive answer by this method. It would appear, however, that the main problems of progress in the United States henceforth will differ fundamentally from those of the past. We can no longer justify political democracy and universal education on the assumption of equal endowment among men. But these can be justified on the ground that they are selective influences operating to secure for society the leadership of a larger number of the competent. Again, the economic problem now confronting us concerns production less and distribution more; and our political problem essentially is that of harmonizing our political tradition with the changes wrought by industrialism.—Walter F. Willcox, *International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1913. R. H. L.

The Chinese Drama, Yesterday and Today.—The Chinese drama, originating indirectly in the immortal legend of "The Herdsman and the Spinning Damsel," now played on every stage in China, found its direct origin in "The Guild of the Young Folks of the Pear Garden," a College of Dramatic Art founded by Emperor Huan Tsung (753 A.D.) in honor of his marriage to Princess Yang Kueifei. It has since become one of the most interesting features in the Chinese social life, as well as pre-eminently their one form of national amusement—even more intimate and sacred than the ancient Greek drama to the Greeks. The *Drama of Yesterday*, in harmony with the former retrospective habits of the Chinese, dealt entirely with the history and customs of the past; and the stage was the only medium of knowledge. It was very imperfect and devoid of scenery. Although the historical drama was the real favorite with the Chinese, the modern drama, the *Drama of Today* is much more common because of the lighter expense of its management. The latter is based upon incidents of human life pictured in a witty and humorous way; in the very modern drama topical questions afford the playwrights most of their material for plays. It is, however, making slow progress as to personnel, for although salaries are paid ranging from \$30 to \$6,000 annually, an actor is considered to be of such a low and despicable

caste as to become practically an outcast from society, and women are prohibited from playing on the stage, their parts being taken by men and boys. Yet in the matter of buildings and plays wonderful progress has been made. In Shanghai, three large modern theaters, seating from 2,000 to 2,250 persons, have been erected, and one of the same type is in project for Hong Kong. A strongly modern type of play is being used, and fairly well acted. The possibilities are that the drama will, in the near future, become an effective weapon in the hands of the reform party.—A. Corbett Smith, *Fortnightly Review*, June, 1913. B. D. BH.

Has Arbitration Failed in New Zealand?—The plan of compulsory arbitration is thought by some to be dead, by others to be merely dormant. Begun with the intention of suppressing strikes and of encouraging industrial unionism, it comparatively failed: (1) in that the employers came to be content with it only after long and difficult pressure; and (2) it evoked discontent on the part of the workers owing to a complexity of causes: (a) they mistook their object as increase of wages, (b) they were ignorant of economic principles involved, and (c) socialism gave them the illusion that "industrialism is war." On the other hand the Arbitration Act may be considered a success, (1) with reference to employers, because they now favor it on account of its resulting enormous increase in the value of products, land, machinery, wages, etc.; (2) with reference to the employed, because there has been a period of comparative peace, few strikes, and an increase of wages without loss of time. This practical success can be made permanent when the spiritual tone of society is raised by moral culture and uplifted ideals of citizenship.—E. Tregear, *Progress*, January, 1913. B. D. BH.

The Association Method in Criminal Procedure.—The association method in a complex criminal procedure does not possess practical value as a means of case analysis. This does not, however, mean that the whole series of investigations should be regarded as a complete failure. The chief difficulties of the method are: (1) it involves the error of auto-suggestion on the part of the experimenter; (2) of the three principal complex-symptoms that have been established, that one which is of a qualitative nature can be used only with great care, in such things as assonances, mutilated reactions, failures to react, translations into foreign speech, phrase reactions, repetition of the stimulus word, misreading or mishearing; (3) in cases of chronic alcoholism complex sensitivity is often so reduced that it cannot be determined by the use of this method; (4) the scarcity of psychiatrically trained psychologists, to whom alone the prosecution of investigations should be left. However, there should first be a more complete investigation of theoretical questions by experiments on criminals; every large prison should be provided with a psychological laboratory.—Paul Menzerath, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, May, 1913. B. D. BH.

A Study of One Hundred Juvenile-Adult Offenders in the Cook County Jail, Chicago.—The Juvenile Protective Association of Chicago found that in 1911, 1328 boys and 61 girls under the age of twenty-one were confined in the county jail. Intensive study of 100 of these cases, chosen at random, showed that 91 lived in bad neighborhoods, 37 were born and reared in bad homes, 37 kept very bad company, 15 were addicted to drinking, 11 were totally subnormal; most of them were found to be somewhat below the average in intelligence, and most of them had no education. In connection with some other statistics, it appears that the Greeks, the Polish and the colored juvenile-adults are the most criminal. There is a close relation between a certain kind of occupation and criminality; only 3 per cent of the jail boys had a trade; most of them entered industrial life young, picked up odd jobs, and did not acquire skill.—A. P. Drucker, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, May, 1913. B. D. BH.

La restriction volontaire de la natalité, et la défense nationale.—The grim evidence of statistics show France to be slipping backward in the matter of population. The great cause of this is revealed in the voluntary restriction of the number of births. This is a serious matter, for without a numerous juvenile population constantly growing up to replenish army and navy, France cannot hope to maintain her place among nations which have no problem of a declining birth rate. The matter of over-

coming this national peril is a personal one—not merely to be preached to others, but to be taken seriously and individually to heart by every true patriot.—Paul Bureau, *La science sociale*, May, 1913. E. E. E.

An Account of an Inquiry into the Extent of Economic Moral Failure among Certain Types of Regular Workers.—Casual work is often associated with weakness of character and, yet, to what extent is regular work free from the same weakness? A first approximation of statistical measurement of the extent of moral failure of regular workers has been made by determining the proportion of certain types of workers who are dismissed in the course of a year for moral failings of different kinds, according to the evidence furnished by employers. This shows large absolute numbers of dismissals for moral failures, and an excess of such failures by males, when contrasted with females.—David Cardag Jones, *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, April, 1913.

B. D. BH.

Education for Motherhood.—The suggestion has been made that children should be reared in institutions rather than in families, since the well-to-do and the wage-earning mothers are failing to care for their children. The advocates of this institutional training of children fail to see (1) that no institution can compete with the mother in affection and care in development of the child's individuality; (2) the born educators and specialists are very rare; (3) even these specialists are absorbed by their own sympathies and antipathies, conflicts, and rivalries; (4) that psychological development of the emotions and sentiments indicates that the child should learn to love a few people in the home. The family colony with common kitchen and other equipment is also inadequate, and fails to give seclusion and the opportunity for introspection. But this parasitical family woman is disappearing, and it is not necessary to make a choice of such suggestions.—Ellen Key, *Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1913.

B. D. BH.

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THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF RELIGION

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It ought to be possible in this twentieth century for the scientific man to believe in religion in the same way in which he believes in education: not half-heartedly and quizzically, but positively and constructively. Just as there are many metaphysical questions which can be raised concerning education, which admittedly cannot yet be given final answers, but which, nevertheless, the scientific man does not concern himself about but goes on with the work of education as if they were settled, so, too, there are metaphysical questions concerning religion to which as yet no one would pretend that final answers could be given, but which need not hinder the most scientific-minded man from taking a practical and constructive interest in religious activities. Our faith in education, for example, as being able to shape, more or less, the destiny of the individual and of society implies that this is not a rigid universe, held in the iron grasp of blind forces acting even in the most distant past. Education, in other words, implies not only a modifiable human nature and human society, but also that such modifications can be intelligently planned and executed; in short, that consciousness in the highest form of which we know, the human reason, can and does control, to some extent, human life. Now no one thinks that it is necessary to demonstrate this metaphysical view before one can have a practical faith in the

individual and social efficacy of education. Indeed, it is highly probable that some of the most enthusiastic advocates of education at present might question the metaphysical implications involved in our faith in education as a controlling and reconstructive agency in human life, if such implications were pointed out to them. Nevertheless, when it came to deciding on any practical educational matter, they would not let metaphysical doubts, if they were thoroughly sane, interfere with their practical attitude toward educational policies. They would continue, in other words, to act as though they believed that human life was plastic and modifiable through human intelligence and reason.

Now the case should not be different with religion, and it probably would not be were it not for the fact that, while our educational activities contain only implications of a metaphysical nature, our religious activities seemingly depend directly upon certain metaphysical beliefs, such as the beliefs in God, in the soul, and in personal responsibility. Education, in other words, proceeds upon hypotheses which seemingly do not transcend the world of common experience, whereas religion, some assert, proceeds upon such hypotheses. When we examine the matter carefully, however, from a strictly logical standpoint it is seen that there is really no difference between religion and education as practical activities of our human social life, and that there is as little ground for rejecting the one as the other, because we cannot demonstrate the objective validity of its presuppositions. In other words, the scientific man has exactly the same grounds for a practical faith in the individual and social efficacy of religion as of education. As long as no question is raised as to the objective validity of the concepts of religion, the scientific man, as a scientific man, is entitled to believe in religion in the same sense in which he believes in education; and that, as has already been said, not half-heartedly, but even enthusiastically. This is, of course, not saying that the scientific man should be expected to stultify himself by disbelieving in the metaphysical concepts of religion while at the same time he believes in the practical social power and efficacy of religion. All that is here implied is rather the simple, well-known scientific doctrine that ultimate questions need never

be raised in passing scientific judgment upon any phenomenon. From the point of view of philosophy the question of the objective validity of the metaphysical postulates and presuppositions of religion may, of course, be important, but not from the standpoint of positive science; for science, from its very methods, could undertake no such inquiry. The question of the objective validity of religious concepts, in other words, need not necessarily be raised in order to pass judgment upon religion as a factor in individual and social life, nor to reach a practical faith in religion as a social agency.¹ The practical educationist rarely raises any question concerning the objective validity of the concepts with which he deals; so too, the practical religionist. Why then should the scientific man, as soon as he approaches the matter of religion, in so many instances, immediately insist on turning philosopher and raising questions as to the objective validity of the concepts of religion, and so befogging the whole issue as to the practical utility of religion in individual and social life?

The only answer to this question, unless we assume that the scientific mind has some peculiar vice in its nature, must be that the concepts of religion have puzzled the scientific man much more than the concepts of education. He is, in other words, more troubled to give any practical or positive scientific content to those concepts; and as they are phenomena of a sort which usually he has no methods of investigating, he is tempted to reject them altogether, and to ascribe to them only a negative significance. But the progress of modern science has made it possible to investigate even these phenomena of religious concepts by scientific methods, and to give them a positive scientific content. The negative attitude of scientific men toward religion, in other words, such as was common in the eighteenth century, is no longer justifiable today. That attitude might have been excusable in the eighteenth century, both because of lack of knowledge and lack

¹ The form of argument of those who take a negative attitude toward religion is usually somewhat as follows: Religion is superstition, because there is no proof of the objective validity of its concepts; but superstition is harmful to society; therefore, religion is harmful to society. These persons do not seem to realize that almost exactly the same form of argument could be used against morality, law, education, or any other regulative institution of society.

of scientific methods for the investigation of the phenomena in question. But today we can no longer say that either the knowledge or the methods for understanding religion practically and socially are lacking. Such students of religion as Starbuck,¹ Coe,² Pratt,³ Marshall,⁴ Ward,⁵ Patten,⁶ King,⁷ and Ames,⁸ to mention only a few among many, have laid bare for us the practical meaning and functioning in human life of religious beliefs and practices. It is not the purpose of this paper to add anything to what the above writers have said, but rather to recapitulate and summarize some of their ideas from a sociological point of view, in order to show the bearing of religion upon the social life of the present and its place in social evolution. Nor is it the purpose of this paper to discuss the intricacies of religious psychology, or the much-debated problems of religious origins, but rather to indicate as clearly as possible, with our present knowledge, the practical and psychological connections between religion and man's social life. To do this we must, however, get a clear conception of what religion is in its essence psychologically and sociologically.

What, then, is religion? We must, of course, distinguish between religion and religions. Like everything else in human life, religion has evolved, that is, changed with the changing conditions of man's cultural evolution. The various forms through which religion has passed by no means always give a clear indication of the nature of religion in itself. Just as education has passed through many forms, representing the many different stages and types of cultural evolution, so, likewise, has religion. Just as education has taken many forms which, from our present point of view, we would unhesitatingly condemn, so, too, has religion. Religion can be a power for evil, as well as for good, in man's life. Our only contention is that it is always a powerful

¹ *The Psychology of Religion.*

² *The Spiritual Life.*

³ *Psychology of Religious Belief.*

⁴ *Instinct and Reason.*

⁵ *Pure Sociology.*

⁶ *The Social Basis of Religion.*

⁷ *The Development of Religion.*

⁸ *The Psychology of Religious Experience.* Among the very recent works touching upon the connections of religion and social life are Leuba's *Psychological Study of Religion* and Miss Harrison's *Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion.*

factor, and one which, like education, can scarcely be dispensed with in the more complex stages of social evolution, even though it may be made to serve the evil, as well as the good, in human life. None of the forms of religion which we find in human history is essential to religion as such, and undoubtedly religion has not yet attained its complete development any more than education has yet reached its complete development. However, just as there are certain fundamentals in education which are possibly settled, or in a process of settlement, so also there are certain fundamentals in religion which men may agree upon, for all practical purposes, as settled or in the process of settlement. Our enthusiasm for the evolutionary point of view should not, of course, prevent us from seeing that there are certain truths in science, religion, education, and government, which we may accept as fundamentals upon which to build.

Neither must one confuse religion with theology and mythology. Theologies and mythologies are products of religion in interaction with man's reason and imagination, but they are not themselves religion. Theological creeds may possibly be an essential part of religion in certain stages of its evolution, but religions have often existed without any well-defined theological creeds. Theologies, as intellectual attempts at the interpretation of religion, appear and disappear; but religion remains. It would be a gross error, therefore, to confuse the social effects of religion with the social effects of theological creeds.

How shall we, then, define religion in its essence, as distinct from its specific historic forms on the one hand, and from theology and mythology on the other? Tylor's celebrated definition of religion, in its lowest terms, as "belief in spiritual beings" points the way to a true conception of religion. We must remember, however, that man has always counted himself a spiritual being. Religion, therefore, not only includes man's belief in spiritual life outside of himself, but also man's belief in his own spiritual life; it implies not only an attitude on man's part toward external objects, but also an attitude toward himself. Practically, therefore, religion is *belief in the reality of spiritual life*. It is essentially an emotional, a valuing, attitude toward the universe; it is the

attitude which projects mind, spirit, life into all things. Religion is, therefore, a mental attitude which finds the essential values of human personality and society in the universe as a whole, or, as in the lower religions, in material objects. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose from this description that religion is simply animistic philosophy. This is a view which is often upheld by scientific men who take a negative attitude toward religion. Thus, according to Guyau,¹ religion is simply crude, popular philosophy, "simply a mythical and sociomorphic theory of the universe," which will pass away with the growth of science. Comte is also frequently represented as implying a similar view in his celebrated law of the three states of man's intellectual conceptions; namely, the law that in the first or primitive state man was theological in his conceptions; in the second or transitional state, metaphysical, while in the third or final state he will be wholly scientific. But Comte was at considerable pains in his later life himself to refute this interpretation of his philosophy. Comte's view was that, while man would more and more give up his primitive, anthropomorphic way of viewing things, he would not thereby become less religious, only his religion would become of a more scientific, and so of a more purely subjective, character.

Even if we define religion in terms of belief, it is evident that it is much more than a philosophy, a way of looking at things. It is rather an attitude of the will and of the emotions. *It is primarily a valuing attitude.* Perhaps emotion is the most vivid conscious element in distinctly religious states of mind, and Haeckel's characterization of religion as "cosmic emotion" is not without psychological value. At any rate, religion in all its forms involves an emotional attitude toward the universe, especially toward the unknown powers or agencies which are believed to be behind its phenomena. Practically, therefore, religion is a desire to come into right relations with these unknown powers or agencies.² Hence the "sense of dependence" in religion, which many thinkers since Schleiermacher have thought to be its principal element. The object of nearly all religious practices, whether savage or

¹ In his *Non-Religion of the Future*.

² Cf. Howerth, *Work and Life*, chap. xii, especially p. 264.

civilized, is help, either personal or social; or, as Ward says, "The primary purpose of religion was at the beginning and has always remained salvation," that is, safety in both a social and personal sense. Hence the element in religion of opposition to evils which are believed to be removable in some spiritual way. Religious feeling is, therefore, most profoundly experienced in situations in which the need of help is felt, and in which it is believed that such help can come only from some superhuman source. Thus religious emotion is, usually and normally, profoundly experienced in the presence of death; but it may arise in any situation whatsoever when we look at life or things from the spiritual standpoint, that is, believing in the reality of spiritual things. Thus in the modern world religious emotion is frequently experienced most profoundly in some form of humanitarian work.

If this brief psychological description of religion is at all correct, then it is evident that religion springs from the whole nature of man. The simplest description of religion implies man's self-consciousness, his consciousness of himself as a conscious or spiritual being, over against the rest of the universe, with its unknown powers and agencies. Undoubtedly, the fact that man is the only religious animal is, therefore, to be connected with his self-consciousness and his powers of abstract thought and of reasoning. It is impossible to conceive of man developing these higher intellectual powers without developing religion at the same time. But religion is equally rooted in man's instincts and emotions as much as in his intellectual life. The practical trend of all religion toward social and self-preservation, toward personal and group safety, is sufficient evidence of this, though all the other characteristics of religion which we have just mentioned point in the same direction. Given, then, the intellectual, emotional, and instinctive nature of man, religion inevitably arises as soon as man tries to take a valuing attitude toward his universe, no matter how small and mean that universe may be.

If religion from the psychological standpoint is primarily a set of values, how is it that these values come to function socially? The reply is that religious values are built up socially; they are products, not of one individual mind, but of the collective mental

life of a group. They are built up, in other words, through mental interaction, become a part of the common store of ideas of a group, and are transmitted by tradition from generation to generation. Almost any religious concept will illustrate this. Let us take, for example, the concept of god. When we examine the concept of god we find that invariably it is built up from social experiences. In its earliest stages of development the idea of the divinity represents crudely some particular personal trait or character which is valued. At a later date the idea stands for an ideal of personal character which has been peculiarly appreciated by the group, such as that of the character of an ancestor or a king. But the god is always thought of as a *socius*, as a member of the group. The values found in the god-concept, in other words, are always those which have been derived from social experiences of one sort or another. As Professor Ames says, "The growth and objectification of the god goes hand in hand with the social experience and achievements of the nation." This is well illustrated by the religious history of the Hebrew people. Their concept of Yahweh gradually expanded from that of a tribal national god of patriarchal and king-like character, who was lord of the tribal hosts, to that of a universal deity, father of all the nations of the earth, possessing not only the attributes of patriarch, but also those of a social redeemer and savior. Nearly all of these values, which came to be attached to the god-concept among the Hebrews, were directly derived, it may be added, from the social experience involved in the Hebrew family life. The concept of god thus in time comes to represent the ideal of personal character, while the concept of "the will of god" stands for all the values connected with the social order to which the group attaches importance. It may be here suggested that the reason why the Greeks failed to develop a high concept of god, while the Hebrews did, was because Greek social and national life never presented the unity and harmony which the social life of the Hebrews did at its best, though, of course, we must not forget the part played by the so-called genius of the two peoples, the genius of the Greeks being primarily artistic, while the genius of the Hebrews was primarily social and moral.

Any religious concept other than that of the deity will represent equally well the fact that such concepts are primarily and psychologically projections of social values. Thus the concept of the immortality of the soul, which we find more or less developed in all religions, is unquestionably social in its content. The idea that death does not end all, but that personality lives on, permits at once an indefinite extension of all social and moral values. The justice, or even the revenge, which could not be realized in the present world will be achieved in the existence beyond the grave. Self-seeking, pessimism, despair, and all other enemies of the social order are thus put to flight, while disinterested service, faith, and hope are encouraged because they will receive their reward in the life beyond. The pictures of heaven, or of the abode of the righteous, which we find among both barbarous and civilized peoples, are nearly always pictures of ideal societies, the social ideal, of course, expanding with the growth of the social life of the people.

Again, the concepts of personal responsibility and of individual freedom in working out one's own destiny, which we so generally find associated with religion, are clearly social values. Social groups could scarcely exist without the inculcation to some extent of the doctrines of personal freedom and responsibility. So we might go on with a whole list of religious concepts, and we should find no difficulty in showing that psychologically they are socially derived; that they are projections of social values; and that their main function is social. As Professor Ames says, in effect, religion is identified with the most intimate and vital phases of social consciousness, that is, the consciousness of groups of the continuity and solidarity of their life. "The ideal values of each age," he says, "and of each type of social development tend to reach an intensity, a volume, and a symbolic expression which are religious." He concludes, therefore, that "religion is participation in the ideal values of the social consciousness," a conclusion which our argument has already foreshadowed.¹

¹ *Psychology of Religious Experience*, p. 356. This narrower, sociological definition is, of course, not in conflict with the broader definition earlier given of religion as "belief in the reality of spiritual life," since such belief is the basis upon which

Now, man everywhere, and civilized man in particular, seeks to control his conduct by a series of conscious values. Some of these values are, of course, peculiarly individualistic, or hedonistic, as we say, that is, they are based upon individual feelings of pleasure or pain. Other values, however, are more objective and social. They come to the individual through tradition or are impressed upon the individual through various forms of social pressure. Moral and religious values are particularly of the latter type; they are elaborated, in other words, not so much through individual feeling experiences, as through experiences as to social or group safety and ideals. They come, therefore, as already has been said, to the individual very largely from the group, either through handing down from the past, or through the pressure of the consensus of opinion and sentiment in the group. It is almost unnecessary to argue for the close connection, psychologically and sociologically, of religion and morality. Theoretically, to be sure, they are separable. Morality has its beginnings in custom, and still further back, perhaps, in instinct, while religion had its beginnings in self-consciousness, in man's consciousness of himself as a spiritual being. The moral standards of low civilizations, therefore, may not be greatly in advance of the actual social life, but through intellectual development and especially through the stimulus of religious ideas, moral ideals of a higher sort gradually develop. These ideals, as we have already said, tend to reach in turn an intensity and symbolic expression which are essentially religious. On the other hand, there cannot be reverence or worship of a divinity without implications of obligation; but, as we have already seen, the idea of the divinity itself has been developed essentially through social experience. Hence religious obligations easily become social obligations. Thus, even in the lowest forms of animism and

all faith in ideal values rests. The broader definition looks at religion from the standpoint of the universal (human) subject, the narrower regards religion as functioning in the social life. A definition of religion suggested by Professor Giddings, "faith in the possibilities of life," is essentially identical also with the broader definition, since practically the "faith" is in the efficacy and triumph of the spiritual elements in life. Such psychological definitions have the merit of bringing out clearly the fact that religion is much more than a mere cultural or "social" product; that it is rooted in the whole biological and psychological nature of man.

fetishism, we frequently find already quite fully developed implications of social obligation. From the very method of their psychic and social development, therefore, religious beliefs become early entangled with moral standards and ideals. Moreover, from a social standpoint, there is need for moral ideals of a sanction which is universal, and that sanction can be found only in the belief in the reality and universality of spiritual values. Such a belief is, however, essentially religious. The interdependence of morality and religion, from both the psychological and sociological standpoints, is, therefore, scarcely to be doubted.

Now, the great social significance of religion is, of course, to be found in the support which religion has given in all stages of human culture to custom, moral standards, and moral ideals. For the masses of every civilization moral ideals have gotten their chief sanction, their vital hold, from religion. While we are not warranted in affirming that morality of a high type cannot exist in individuals without religious beliefs of some sort, for that would leave out the influence of inborn tendencies and of habit upon human nature, yet we can say that practically morality has never subsisted in human society without religious sanctions. Let us examine, however, this matter a little more closely, and when we understand exactly the functions of religion in human society, we shall see more clearly the close connection between the two.

There is first of all the conservative influence of religion upon the social life. In all ages and among all peoples religion has been a powerful instrument of social control, because it adds a supernatural sanction to conduct. It would be a great mistake to suppose that primitive institutions, to any extent, had their origin in religious beliefs or sentiments, as their origin is undoubtedly to be found mainly in the human instincts and in the necessities of the conditions of life; but everywhere in primitive society, after institutions of a certain type have been established, we find that religion comes in to sanction them and to give them through its sanction great stability. Religious values commonly attach themselves in such early society to habits of action which have been found to be safe and to conduce to individual and group welfare. They reinforce the habits and so also the institutions founded upon

them. Thus, practically all institutions of later savagery, barbarism, and lower civilization are surrounded and imbedded, as it were, in religious sanctions. So religion becomes the great means of social control in these societies, sometimes consciously used as such by a priest class, more often, however, a means of control which is exercised by the group as a whole quite unconsciously. Here comes in, however, the great danger in religion, that it may become an impediment to progress and an instrument of class oppression. For when a religious sanction becomes attached to an institution, it often becomes very difficult to secure changes in the institution even when conditions demand them. Thus human sacrifice, polygamy, slavery, and practically all other institutions which we now detest have at one time or other received the sanction of religion, and when so sanctioned (as, e.g., polygamy) they are doubly difficult to uproot. The only conclusion that we can reach is that religious values or sanctions may attach themselves to any existing institutions, and by so doing they render them much more stable, and so also the whole social order.

This conservative function of religion in the social life has been perceived by practically all sociologists, but the theory of religion advocated by the late Professor Lester F. Ward states it most clearly.¹ According to Ward, "religion is the substitute among rational beings for instinct among irrational beings"; just as instinct works for a static condition of life, so religion works for a stationary condition of society. This is due to the fact that religion itself is a sort of vague sense of race or social safety, Ward thinks. In rational or reflective beings, he says, there is an antagonism between feeling and function. Feeling tends in rational beings to variations in conduct which are not in accord with race or group safety. Hence, religion has evolved, according to Ward, as a purely natural, half-instinctive device to restrict the demands of feeling, which would hurry the race, if not the individual, to destruction. "Without the religious check," Ward says, "the human race would have been borne to destruction by the extravagant vagaries of unbridled reason." Thus Ward conceives of both feeling and

¹ See his article on "The Essential Nature of Religion" in *The International Journal of Ethics*, VIII, 169-92.

reason as essentially individualistic, needing the restraint of some ultra-rational force such as religion. This is, also, essentially the theory which was advocated by Benjamin Kidd in his *Social Evolution*. Ward concludes that religion may be called "the social instinct"; that its mission in society is to conserve existing institutions; and that its highest word is, "thou shalt not."

Such a view of religion is, of course, partial and one-sided, but it is remarkable in that it came from a scientist whose presuppositions are those of materialistic monism. Ward's description of religion, however, applies with greater accuracy to the lower types of religion than to the higher types. There can be no question, however, but that the conservative tendencies of all religion are strong, and that progressive and idealistic religions are extremely rare in human history, taking it as a whole. However, religion is not of necessity merely conservative in its influence in human society. Whether it is conservative or not altogether depends upon the type of moral ideals which it sanctions. In higher religions, at any rate, we can plainly enough see the inherent tendency to favor social progress. The very fact that these religions have for the most part gotten their ideals from the family life, such as, for example, the ideal of brotherhood, makes them intimately connected with all forms of social idealism; for social and moral ideals come from the intimate, personal forms of association. Moreover, the connection between religion and social idealism is seen in the individual especially clearly at the period of adolescence, which is usually not only a period of natural idealism, but also of strong religious emotions. The concepts of religion, such as those of God, the immortality of the soul, and personal responsibility, which are themselves social ideals, as we have seen, become, when sufficiently worked out, the psychological basis in the normal human individual for social idealism, simply because they project and universalize social values. Religion thus becomes not only a reaction against social degeneration, as Patten says, but a support for utopian social ideals, utopian, that is, in the sense that they have never yet been even approximately realized in human society. Religion is always participation in the ideal values of the social life. If these ideal values are conservative, then of course religion itself becomes

conservative and even a stumbling-block to all progress. On the other hand, if the ideal values of a community are progressive, then its religion, too, will be progressive and may even become the very highest instrument of progress.

The significance of religion in cultural and social evolution must now be manifest, and the reason why the history of a certain type of culture is frequently the history of a particular religion becomes evident. Cultural evolution is possible only through the continuity of ideas and of social values in human society. Civilization, in other words, is made possible by handing down from age to age certain ideas and certain social values. Now it is religion which has hitherto given particular value to the social ideas and social ideals which are handed down. Not only that, but through its peculiar sanctions religion has made it possible easily to enforce the claims of these ideas and social values upon the individual. It has been, in other words, one of the chief instruments by which the individual has been gotten to conform his habits to the group, and to control his conduct in accordance with social demands. The question remains, however, whether human society cannot dispense with religious means of social control in the future, as many philosophers have thought. But it is evident that as human society becomes more complex the need of social control over the individual's habits, conduct, and ideals becomes greater instead of less. The more complex civilizations, in other words, have greater need, on the whole, of the control which religious ideals afford over the conduct of individuals than the less complex. The matter is not, however, one wholly of the mere complexity of civilization, because the civilizations which we call higher emphasize more the value of purely spiritual elements, that is, the value of things which can have no selfish or material import to the individual, but whose import is entirely in the realm of ideal social values. Now, as we have already said, religion is the participation in the ideal values of the social consciousness. It is the fullest activity, in other words, of the spiritual life in man. The supreme rôle of religion, therefore, in the higher stages of human culture, is to enforce the claim to dominance in the life of man of the ideal social values. That is, it exalts the life in which the individual merges

his personal interests, desires, and aspirations with his group, or, as in the highest religion, with humanity as a whole. For this reason, so far as we can now see, the death of religion would mean the death of civilization, or, at least, of all the higher forms of civilization.

But if religion is participation in, and universalization of, the ideal values of the social consciousness, is there any danger that it will ever be destroyed? The reply is that there is danger from two sources. First there is danger from the animal impulses of human nature. Civilization is at best a very fragile affair, simply because it rests upon certain ideal social values. There is a strong, insistent tendency in man, whenever these ideal values lose their grip, to return to the animal level of existence; that is, there is a strong tendency in human nature to be satisfied with sensual pleasures, with mere material things which can be enjoyed. Materialistic standards of life and happiness are therefore inimical to religion in all its higher phases, as has usually been seen by religious leaders. The other great danger to religion is negative philosophy, a way of looking at things, in other words, which denies the reality of the spiritual element in human life. Materialistic or mechanistic monism, with its negation of the spiritual element in life, must be considered hostile to religion, even though not all of its advocates so regard it. Mechanistic monism is hostile to religion because it denies either the existence or the efficacy of a spiritual or teleological element in the universe, and even the practical efficacy of conscious values in the individual life. On the other hand, science cannot rightly be regarded as hostile to religion. It is only when science, by its teachings, tends to support either practical, materialistic standards of life or a negative philosophy that it may become hostile to religion. There may be, of course, and often has been, an antagonism between science and systems of theology, but this, as was said at the beginning, must not be thought to imply any necessary antagonism between religion and science. Science becomes antagonistic to religion only in proportion as it tends to transform itself into mechanistic monism, and to set up the negations of such materialism as a guide to practical life. To be sure, science has of recent years showed some tendency, in the hands of some of its adherents, to transform itself into a universal

materialistic or mechanistic philosophy; but it may be safely said that in proportion as science does this it loses its truly scientific character. The so-called antagonism between religion and science must therefore be resolved into the antagonism of certain scientific men to religion. It cannot be regarded as in any sense an inherent or necessary antagonism. On the other hand, the attitude of science toward religion must necessarily be one of constructive criticism. Just as the attitude of science toward systems of education is necessarily one of criticism for the sake of reconstructing and perfecting education, so should be the attitude of science toward religion. It is the business of science to criticize religion as an instrument of the social life, but not to attack its metaphysical postulates and presuppositions. This critical attitude of science toward religion is often misinterpreted as antagonism; but it is time that religion seeks and welcomes, in my opinion, the friendly criticisms of science. For between humanitarian science and humanitarian religion there can and will be no real antagonism.

What then shall we say of non-religious persons? If religion is participation in the ideal values of the social consciousness, why is it there are so many non-religious persons in present society? Of course we do not expect mentally deficient persons, born criminals, or even "the sporting type" to be truly religious. Neither do we expect those who are satisfied with purely materialistic and sensuous values to be strongly religiously inclined. But we find, besides these, highly intellectual people, specialists along certain scientific lines, as well as sometimes social and philanthropic workers, who declare that they have no religion. In many cases, of course, these people are simply confused regarding terms. They may mean that they do not accept any conventional theology, or else they may mean that they have given up their traditional religion, and have not yet successfully evolved in their own consciousness anything which they think worthy of the name of religion to take its place. In some cases, however, these non-religious persons are truly non-religious, because they have come to take, not only in theory, but also in practice, a negative attitude toward the spiritual element in life. They do not participate, in other words, in the ideal values of the consciousness of their social group,

because they have narrowed their own point of view and their own activities until that is impossible. We must, therefore, agree with Professor Ames,¹ that truly "non-religious persons are those who fail to enter vitally into a world of social activities and feelings. They are lacking in the sense of ideal values which constitutes the social conscience."

If religion is of such importance in the social life, if it is such a power for good or evil, then the question, what sort of religion can society afford to encourage, becomes one of vital interest. Just as there have been systems of education which have blocked all social progress, perpetuated abuses of power, and degraded and enslaved the masses, so there have been systems of religion which have done the same thing. If religion has not always worked to the highest social advantage in the past, so in the future it may possibly work to social disadvantage unless properly guided and controlled in its development. What religion does depends altogether upon the ideals which it champions. Modern society, therefore, needs a religion adapted to the requirements of modern life. Now, the great need, in my opinion, of modern civilization is a humanitarian ethics which will teach the individual to find his self development and his happiness in the unselfish service of others, and which will forbid any individual, class, nation, or even race from regarding itself as an end in itself apart from the rest of humanity. Only such an ethics can solve the social problem, or, for that matter, any of the problems which threaten our civilization with disintegration. But such an ethics, in order to be vital, must become a part of our religion. A humanitarian religion, for the reasons which we have already pointed out, is a necessary foundation and complement of a humanitarian ethics. Therefore the only religion which modern society can afford to encourage is a religion of humanity, a religion which will put the service of man above all other ends and values. Such a completely socialized religion placing the service of humanity above the service of any class, nation, or race may seem to some yet far in the future; and in a sense, this, of course, is true. Nevertheless, it must be added that Christianity thus far is the only religion, among the widespread religions of the earth, which has

¹ *Psychology of Religious Experience*, p. 369.

shown any tendency to become a true religion of humanity in the sense in which we have just used that phrase; and I would further add, as my own personal opinion, that Christianity rightly understood is, in its fundamental principles, essentially a religion of humanity. There can be no question, at any rate, but that its fundamental ethical doctrines are identical with the humanitarian ethics which we have just described.

A word in conclusion as to the social functions of the church. The church, as the institution organized to embody concretely the religious life in society, should, of course, be co-ordinate in importance with religion itself, for if religion is to be a vital influence in society, it must find concrete embodiment in some institution. But all human institutions, after they have reached a certain development, have an insidious tendency to forget the purposes for which they were organized, and to set themselves up as ends in and of themselves. Historically, of course, the Christian church has often done this. But in proportion as it has done so it has abdicated its true function. The church exists to serve the great interests of religion in society; that is, it exists to serve those ideal values for which religion stands. Therefore, the social function of the church is to conserve and propagate religious and moral ideals in society. Its great business is to enforce the demands of the spiritual life. In this work, of course, it may at times take up other activities than the teaching and propagation of moral ideals. It may undertake, for example, to head reform movements at times, to aid in the encouragement and development of philanthropy, or even to minister to men's economic and physical needs. But all of these activities are but side-issues to its great business of the conservation and development of moral and social ideals. I would say, therefore, that the primary function of the church is to be "an ethical culture society," if that phrase had not acquired such a narrow meaning in the minds of some that it might be misunderstood. At any rate, there can be no doubt that the church's main function is to stand for the claims of the spiritual life; and that as yet it is the only institution which has seriously charged itself with the conservation and propagation of moral and social ideals. Even though it has done its work at times very

imperfectly and faultily for the reasons already mentioned, it is evident that it still has a field of social usefulness in some respects greater and more important than that of any other human institution. The social reconstruction of the future must wait largely on the teaching and activities of the church; no other institution as yet, as has already been said, definitely undertakes to propagate moral and social ideals; and civilization depends not only for its further advance, but for its very existence, upon the propagation among the masses of ideal social values. Until, therefore, we have a church that is effective socially, law and government, science and education will not do much to give us a social life that is harmonious and truly progressive, or a human life that is moral and truly satisfying.

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND "WHAT LABOR WANTS"

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In Great Britain some time ago a series of very grave and industrially disastrous strikes led not only to very radical—revolutionary, many Tories called it—legislation in the interest of organized labor, but to a national searching of hearts, and to inquiries into the nature and probable effects of the upheaval that was manifestly taking place. One popular London newspaper opened its columns to a discussion of "What the Worker Wants" from every point of view. Employers, land owners, economists, labor leaders, eminent lawyers, and trained social workers contributed to the symposium, which was subsequently published in pamphlet form. We shall see presently that the suggestions made, or the conclusions reached, in that exceptionally interesting discussion are of great value and significance.

In the United States, in addition to the familiar kinds of strikes and lockouts, which cause much loss, suffering, and bad blood, we have witnessed new types of strikes—strikes in which systematic destruction of property, with grave risk to life, was a conspicuous feature. The McNamara trial and confessions, the recent Indianapolis "dynamite conspiracy" trial, the "Syndicalist" way of conducting strikes, the bold propaganda of class war and *sabotage* have put new vitality and poignancy into the discussion of the labor question. A number of eminent and earnest educators, sociologists, and philanthropists urged upon the President and Congress the creation of a representative industrial commission for the purpose of investigating the causes of such startling phenomena as the dynamite outrages by and for labor, the insistence upon the closed shop, the use of syndicalism, etc. The commission was created and President Taft appointed its nine members. The disappointment which was widely and justly expressed with the personnel of the commission, and the delay caused thereby, need not concern us here; the

important thing is the general recognition of the gravity of the situation and the desirability of a disinterested and profound study of the whole labor problem.

Yet, without the aid of commissions or formal inquiries, official or private, the thoughtful observer and student should be able to give a tolerably satisfactory statement of the demands and aims of labor. The material is abundant—annual reports of national, state, and local unions, speeches, pamphlets, editorials, and articles in the labor press. It can no longer be affirmed that labor is inarticulate; it speaks, it acts, and it has its philosophers, historians, and economists. Whether "what labor wants" is something that society can grant, that other classes can approve and sympathize with and help labor to obtain, is a different question, a question for social science.

Let us make a modest attempt to formulate labor's demands and expectations, and even a more modest attempt to indicate the judgment of catholic scientists and progressive sociologists on the demands and expectations.

And, first, what is labor? There are today three grand divisions in the labor army. There are the "old-fashioned" or moderate trade unionists; there are the socialistic elements, in or out of these unions, and, finally, there are the syndicalists, the advocates of "industrial" forms of organizations.

The modern unionist has not modified his views materially in twenty-five years. He is no revolutionist; he does not dream of overthrowing the whole social order. He has no quarrel with the wage system, private property in the means of production, the profit principle. He merely demands "a fair day's pay for a fair day's work." He constantly strives to secure higher wages, to shorten his work-day, to improve the conditions under which he works. True, his standards change. As Mr. Samuel Gompers frankly states, union labor will never "have enough." It will always be demanding more pay, shorter hours, and safer and healthier conditions of work. It will be demanding these things because society and industry, invention and discovery will never cease to advance, to raise the standards of living. Union labor crosses no bridges until it reaches them; it plumes itself on its reasonableness and practicality. It

deals with immediate problems and has no dogmas or utopian goals. In demanding the right to strike, to boycott, to bargain collectively, to exclude non-union labor, its leaders are prompted by no political or moral formula. These things are means to an end, and labor denies that either the means or the end would endanger the legitimate interests of other elements of society. In discussing either trade-union leaders are entirely willing to abide by the rule of reason; and this is why the average trade union seldom, if ever, rejects a fair proposal of arbitration. It believes that broad-minded employers themselves, after friendly discussion, would cheerfully accede to the demands of labor. It relies strongly on the human factor; it is convinced that "the enemy" is not capital, or the employing class, but prejudice, ignorance, distrust, lack of sympathy and comprehension.

Now what has social science to say to such unionism? Little that is not wholly favorable. Science, like plain hard sense, believes in the virtue of "reasoning together," of adjusting differences by conciliation and arbitration. It believes in union, organization, and system. The sort of science which, some fifty years ago, condemned trade union in principle, and saw neither necessity nor advantage in collective bargaining, was not scientific. A certain school of economics dogmatized arrogantly and mistook assumptions for facts. It talked of wage funds that could not be increased by unionism; it talked of fundamental harmonies; it talked of free markets and absolute mobility of labor and capital. It was severely logical and beautifully simple. The only trouble is that the facts did not warrant its theories. There is no wage fund; there are no absolutely free markets; there is no equality of opportunity; there is no absolute mobility of labor. Today political economy is more modest and recognizes its limitations and its dependence on social science. And social science, again like hard sense, finds that moderate and reasonable trade unionism, while sound as far as it goes, does not go far enough, does not face ultimate problems, does not take sufficient account of inevitable tendencies. Science must go deeper and farther, since more and more workmen go deeper and farther. After all, whatever the moderate union leaders may say, strikes and lockouts are not always peaceful, and

even when peaceful their cost represents so much waste. Industrial warfare and the fear of such warfare are bad for labor as well as for capital. Arbitration is better than tests of endurance, but arbitration does not remove friction. It settles nothing permanently, while society realizes more and more the need of security and stability. So does capital, and so does the philosophical trade unionist when he thinks of the future.

The attempt to dip into the future leads more and more workmen to embrace socialism. This is why the policy of modern socialism with reference to union labor is one of "pacific penetration," of aid and sympathy plus active propaganda. What the socialistic workman wants, we know. He is for government ownership and operation of industry. He is opposed to the wage system, to private control of the means of production. He sees no peace, no economy, no efficiency, no advance, except in a solution based on the establishment of industrial democracy. He is for independent political action of labor on a socialistic or semi-socialistic platform. We find larger and larger doses of socialism in trade-union programs.

This is natural enough, but only the rash and enthusiastic socialist will predict the conversion of a majority of working-men and working-women to his creed. The candid and level-headed socialist recognizes, first, that socialism has been evolving, undergoing a serious transformation, making concessions to the spirit of individualism, on the one hand, and to the spirit of realism, on the other; and he recognizes, secondly, that, in spite of these concessions and revisions, a revolt against socialism, as well as against the method of political action, or parliamentary reform, is spreading among the very elements that were once counted on to carry socialism to victory. A study of so symptomatic a book as *The Great State* by H. G. Wells and others will convince any intelligent reader that socialism is gradually surrendering much of what was regarded as vital by the writers and leaders of the period of Marx, Engels, and Hyndman. Certainly social science has not been induced to put its seal on socialism. The objections to socialism—economic, social, psychological, moral—have not been met, and there is nothing in the trend of current discussion to indicate that

they ever will be, or can be, met. It hardly needs saying that the adoption by states and nations of measures that have been *called* socialistic by friends or opponents signifies nothing in this connection. It is puerile to say that, because we have established postal savings banks and a parcel post, because we have municipal trading up to a certain point, or are contemplating without alarm government ownership and operation of railroads and telegraphs, society is bound to go all the way to complete socialism. If history teaches anything, it teaches that programs are never carried out in life as they are worked out on paper.

Nor is it merely a matter of inference and prediction. Already we observe an anti-socialist movement where it was least expected. The reference is to so-called syndicalism in the world of the proletariat. Syndicalism is as much a revolt against socialism as it is a repudiation of conservative trade unionism. What the syndicalist wants is decidedly not what the socialist wants. The syndicalist ideal is not state ownership and control of industry, but ownership and control by the workers themselves. The syndicalist is opposed to government by majorities of which middle-class voters, intellectuals, and professional men constitute a part. He has no room for "outsiders." The workers in any industry are to take over the industry and run it for their own benefit. And they are to do this without elections, ballots, or political action. The syndicalists are for what they call "*direct action*." By direct action they mean strikes, constant warfare, agitation, and organization against capitalists and employers as a class. Some of them look forward to a great general strike, to total paralysis of capitalistic industry, and to a sort of catastrophic expropriation of the masters. Others admit that the general strike is a myth, their idea being that effective organization of labor, especially of unskilled labor, will render the great strike unnecessary. Much in syndicalism is crude, foolish, and even suicidal. The advocacy of *sabotage* (destruction of machinery, crippling of distribution and exchange, harrying of employers, etc.) will not long remain a feature of its programs. Opposition to conciliation, arbitration, the making and keeping of contracts with employers, is also bound to yield to the teaching of experience, pleasant or unpleasant. There is, fundamentally, no

necessary connection between the principles and ideals of syndicalism and such accidental, temporary excrescences as *sabotage* or the propaganda of hatred and chronic warfare. The quintessence of syndicalism, in short, need not be a criminal or pathological phenomenon. It is, in reality, reducible to three things—the substitution of industrial unionism for trade unionism; the avoidance of political action; and the repudiation of state socialism. We can easily imagine the intelligent syndicalist saying to a moderate trade unionist: "I have far more in common with you than with the socialist. You do not depend on the ballot; you do not seek to form a political labor party. But your form of organization is ineffective; you cannot even strike successfully; and you live from hand to mouth."

Now it is merely stating a fact to say that syndicalism is no more entitled to claim scientific approval than state socialism is. The aggressive tone and confident pretensions of the syndicalist philosophers, who speak in the name of science, history, and metaphysics, no more impose on the sober-minded student than did the equally arrogant claims of the socialists of the last half of the nineteenth century.

But social science has something to say in the premises. It finds a soul of good in things confused, erroneous, evil. It notes what the trade unionist wants, what the socialist wants, what the syndicalist wants—or what these think they want—and finds that the differences between them can be reconciled. Nay, it notes tendencies and beliefs among employers, as well as tentative conclusions among disinterested observers, that point to the same reconciliation, the same adumbration of a synthesis and a solution.

Let me state the indicated solution at once, and then offer significant proof, drawn from various quarters, of its soundness.

As all roads once led to Rome, so today, in social and economic thinking, all arguments lead to one conclusion, namely—that *society is moving toward co-operative industry and gradually displacing the capitalistic or wage system with its inevitable division of employers and employed into hostile camps*. For evidence we may first turn to the symposium on "What Labor Wants" mentioned at the beginning of this paper. That symposium is, indeed, a document of rare value.

The contributions thereto number exactly forty-eight, and of these the leading ones—the best informed, the most judicious and practical—declare for co-operation or profit-sharing, in one form or another, as the only possible solution of the labor problem.

Let me quote a few opinions.

A. H. Gilkies, Headmaster of Dulwich College: "If the directors of labor cannot themselves see the way to deal with those whom they employ so as to avoid successful strikes, then proper arbiters should be created whose verdict should be final. I fancy that, to be fair, they would have to move in the direction of assignment to workers of some share in the profits of every business concern."

The Rev. Lord William Gascoyne-Cecil: "Nothing allays the bitterness of the poor so much as the knowledge that rich people really care for their welfare; and any mechanism which can procure the meeting of rich and poor nearly always produces very good results. . . . I think five things will remove the bitterness: rising wages, contact between classes, co-partnership, truthful politicians, and a reasonable poor law."

Lord Hugh Cecil, M.P. (son of the late Marquis of Salisbury): "Almost everyone agrees that a partnership would be desirable. The doubt is whether its general adoption is possible. . . . It is very earnestly to be hoped that employees will endeavor to try the experiment wherever they think they can. By judiciously tried experiments we should learn very much and from the knowledge so acquired we might see our way to a more widespread extension of the remedy. And we must in frankness recognize that the existing system of self-interested competition is not one which can be absolutely justified. . . . Copartnership is not only an economic improvement, it is a moral advance. It is one step toward introducing a larger element of mutual trust and regard into the business of gaining wealth."

Philip Snowden, M.P.: "Until land and industrial capital are socially owned and industry is democratically controlled, there will be labor unrest."

The Duchess of Hamilton: "Had every workman a personal interest in the success of the whole business for which he is working, as in the old guild organization, the question of work being done would not arise."

Theodore Cook Taylor, M.P., woolen manufacturer and founder of a scheme of profit-sharing: "Some knowledge and twenty years' practical experience convince me that, of all expedients being discussed, none has so few drawbacks and so many advantages as a system of profit-sharing and labor co-partnership. . . . Why should morals and economics be placed in antithesis? The robbery of one class by another is always bad economics. The moralizing of industry tends not to general poverty, but to general wealth."

Seebohm Rowntree, employer and authority on social questions: "The capitalist should entirely shake off the idea that wage-earners are inferior beings, and should learn to regard them as valued and necessary partners in wealth production, partners with whose accredited representatives they may honorably discuss the propositions in which the wealth jointly produced should be divided."

Earl Grey, former governor-general of Canada: "If you wish to maintain the old friendly relations between employer and employed, you should establish your business on lines which will automatically create a feeling of loyalty on the part of all concerned to the industry with which they are connected. How is that to be done? By copartnership. Ideal copartnership is a system under which worker and consumer share with capitalists in the profits of industry."

Dr. Arthur Shadwell: "Copartnership is the most rational of all the proposals, the most in harmony with reality, and the least disturbing. It has more often failed than succeeded in practice, as yet, but when it succeeds, its success is thorough. It certainly has a future, and it might be encouraged by loans to workmen; but it is not applicable to everything. A constructive and successful syndicalism would be a form of copartnership."

These quotations constitute a striking array of testimony. The idea of co-operation and profit-sharing is clearly in the air. Men in all classes and conditions are turning to it as affording a practical as well as scientific solution of the bitter and burning problem. I may mention the late Goldwin Smith, Dr. Eliot, President-Emeritus of Harvard, and Dr. Albion W. Small, the editor of this *Journal*, as influential champions of co-operation, profit-sharing, and industrial democracy. It may be added that the socialist contributors to the

symposium, whom I have not quoted, may properly be called as witnesses for the same side. They may not agree that copartnership is the final solution, but they would certainly accept it as a stride toward their goal. Mr. H. G. Wells, for example, while advocating a great national plan of some sort, which, we may infer, would embody a considerable part of the socialistic program, admits that, for the present, a cure would be found in commercial partnership between employer and employed. The socialist who should obstinately refuse to encourage co-operation and systematic profit-sharing would write himself down a fanatic and bigot. The experience and thought of the last two decades have thoroughly discredited the "all or nothing" school or the school that believes that "the worse things are, the better for the proletariat." At a recent congress of German Social Democrats resolutions were passed favoring co-operation and urging support and recognition of it. A generation ago this would have been deemed treason and detestable heresy.

If we have the right to count socialists as conscious or unconscious champions of co-operation and profit-sharing, it follows that the syndicalists may likewise be summoned to serve the same conservative-progressive cause. As Dr. Shadwell recognizes, with other unprejudiced thinkers, "A constructive and successful syndicalism would be a form of copartnership." And is it not, after all, the central idea of industrial democracy without bureaucracy or outside interference that attracts the intelligent syndicalist? Is it not certain that time must convince him that neither class warfare, nor violent expropriation of present owners, nor a great strike, nor opposition to political action in every form can be regarded as a vital part of his ultimate creed? Would he reject the aid of the state, or of the bourgeois and intellectual elements, toward realizing his ideal if he were satisfied of the sincerity of the proffer? Would he insist on catastrophic transformation at any cost, even if evolutionary transition were demonstrated to be more natural and more favorable to labor itself? Such questions answer themselves.

It is interesting to note that the conclusion indicated above is also the conclusion of Professor and Abbé Dimnet, of the College Stanislas, of Paris, in a singularly impartial article on "Syndicalism

and Its Philosophy" which appeared in the *Atlantic* for January. M. Dimnet is a good Catholic, and to him idealism is life and thinking means Catholicism, but while emphasizing the need of idealism he admits that in co-operative industry and commerce are to be found "the most effective means of social and material improvement." He says: "Nothing can break the impulse which the syndicalist movement has now taken, and nobody with a sense of fairness can be sorry for it. There will be more and more syndicates and it is inevitable that their development should in time largely modify the economic and—to a certain extent—the present political conditions."

The modification of the economic (and of necessity also the political) conditions will not, one need hardly say, be the work of syndicalism alone. Trade unionism, socialism, individualistic opposition to state or bureaucratic despotism will severally contribute to the same general result. The forces will act and react on one another, as well as on the existing highly unstable order of things. We are justified, it would seem, in thinking that all the streams of tendency converge toward a co-operative system.

Reference has been made to the vain effort of socialism and syndicalism to usurp the authority of social and moral science. Have scientific economics and scientific sociology been taken unawares by the recent "discovery" of co-operation as a remedy for industrial unrest? By no means. Fifty years ago John Stuart Mill, a broad-minded and far-sighted economist, attributed strikes and agitation to "the inequalities of the industrial world due to the subjection of labor to monopoly and the enormous share which the possessors of the instruments of production are able to take from the produce." Mill was a fervent advocate of co-operation; he was even accused of leaning unduly toward a moderate form of socialism. What attracted him, the champion of liberty, in socialistic schemes was the element of democracy and equity embodied in co-operative industry.

Nay, we have a better authority than the semi-individualistic Mill. Herbert Spencer, the militant individualist, the bitter foe of the socialistic or half-socialistic state, advocated and foresaw the spread of industrial and commercial co-operation. His chapter on

"Co-operation" in his *Principles of Sociology* is one of the most progressive ever penned by him. In co-operation, he writes, "the transition from the compulsory co-operations of militancy to the voluntary co-operation of industrialism is completed." A wage-worker is not entirely free; he is cowed by fear of discharge, by the superintendent or foreman; he feels that he is under someone and working for another's benefit. Under co-operation the workman's activities are as voluntary as they can be, given man's physical needs and subordination to nature. Under co-operation the workman is his own employer, and no doubtful profit is taken out of his earnings. Spencer, after quoting reports of various co-operative enterprises, closes his chapter as follows: "Such few co-operative bodies . . . might be the germs of a spreading organization. Admission into them would be the goal of working-class ambition. They would tend continually to absorb the superior, leaving outside the inferior to work as wage-earners; and the first would slowly grow at the expense of the last. Obviously, too, the growth would become increasingly rapid since the master-and-workman type of industrial organization could not withstand competition with this co-operative type so much more productive and costing so much less in superintendence."

Other sociologists and economists might be quoted to show that scientific thinkers years ago anticipated the growth of the co-operative idea. The "few" survivals of the time when Spencer wrote have in truth had many imitators. Wisdom in some cases, necessity in others; the initiative of capital here, of labor there, to say nothing of the eloquent example of distributive co-operation in England—all such influences have aided in the steady advance of co-operative production or profit-sharing. Failures are still not uncommon; workmen and even labor leaders are still suspicious of most forms of profit-sharing, and especially of the most natural and modern form of it—investment of labor's savings in the stocks and bonds of the corporations which employ it. Too many workmen still think of their freedom, dignity, and manhood in terms of strikes, boycotts, and anti-injunction acts. When a large employer or corporation suggests a scheme of profit-sharing, a scheme of stock-purchase by the employees on easy terms, some of the men scent

danger and say or think that the whole purpose of the scheme is to weaken unionism, to discourage strikes, to divide labor. It is not probable that one employer in twenty proposes profit-sharing from motives of pure altruism; but to the thoughtful observer and student of history this is neither strange nor discreditable. Enlightened self-interest will do admirably in many spheres, provided the enlightenment is as pronounced as the self-interest.

The truth is, the problem of labor unrest, of strikes that are almost "revolutionary" in their effects, that paralyze industry, commerce, or transportation, is more vividly presented *as* a problem to employers than it is, as yet, to employees. The latter are still struggling to defend their "rights;" any suggestion of compulsory or semi-compulsory arbitration angers and alarms them. Not long have they enjoyed the freedom of organization and collective bargaining. Even today here and there a fossilized court renders a decision prohibiting a sympathetic strike or a union-shop contract. Labor is still militant, distrustful, aggressive. Employers and corporate chiefs, on the other hand, realizing more and more that legal restrictions are a broken reed to lean on, and that labor organizations must be reckoned with more and more, are earnestly turning their attention to preventives and remedies. This means that the classes or professions in closest contact with capitalists and employees are also prompted to inquire into the situation. For a time we may, therefore, expect more vigorous advocacy of co-operation from the classes named than from labor and its accredited spokesmen, and, for a time again, these proposals will continue to excite suspicion or adverse criticism. But in the end, interest, if not sweet reasonableness, must open labor's eyes to the intrinsic advantages of co-operation.

Moreover, the "third party," the great public, is beginning to take a hand in industrial controversies. For many years the interests of the public not only suffered total neglect from the direct parties, the employers and the unions, but were tacitly surrendered by the public itself. That is to say, the public scarcely even complained of the waste and the hardships to which strikes and lockouts subjected it. It supposed itself to be without power in the premises. It did not see what it could do, and it even assumed that to

do anything—beyond pleading for conciliation and arbitration—was to undermine the foundations of our modern civilization. Was not the right to strike, like the right to lock out workmen at will, a corollary from the general principles of free contract, free industry, and private property? Was not the sole duty of the public to stand aside and let capital and labor fight out their battles? This attitude is rapidly changing. The public is beginning to challenge the principles that underlie free strikes and free lockouts. It is beginning to raise its voice in favor of compulsory or semi-compulsory arbitration laws. It supports minimum-wage proposals, as was shown in England during the crisis caused by the general miners' strike. If, it reasons, industrial peace is better for all, why should not society impose peace? Why should it not veto strikes in the whole field of public utilities? Why, in granting franchises to railroads, telegraph and telephone companies, etc., should it not make arbitration of disputes over wages, hours, conditions of work, recognition of unions, a condition of the grant?

Yet it is doubtful whether in English-speaking countries mere compulsion in the form of arbitration laws and minimum-wage statutes will meet the requirements of the situation. The spokesmen of the public—economists, moralists, social workers, sociologists—will increasingly find that the line of least resistance is the line of profit-sharing and co-operation, of forms and methods of industrial organization that remove the necessity for warfare, for trials of endurance and strength. Organized labor will listen with more sympathy and open-mindedness to suggestions from neutral quarters than to suggestions possibly inspired by bias and class feeling.

Nor is this all. Another important, if indirect, factor remains to be mentioned. The gospel of what is popularly known as the peopleization of corporations is not consciously connected with the efforts to solve the labor problem. But it cannot be doubted that the moralization and socialization of corporations—the enforcement of publicity as to corporate finance, the prevention of stock inflation and dishonest manifestation of corporate securities, the suppression of injurious trusts—will, among other large effects, destroy the gravest obstacle to profit-sharing and copartnership. Not long ago

an individualistic economist and a friendly critic of trade-union policies, in arguing against strikes on the score of their futility and cost to labor, asked what the situation would be today if, for the last two or three decades, the powerful unions, instead of accumulating vast funds for offense and defense, instead of financing stubborn contests, had systematically invested the funds in the securities of the great industrial corporations. The ideal of the more intelligent syndicalists, he pointed out, would be much nearer realization than it is. Labor would by this time have acquired ownership and control of a good many industries, would have secured representation on many corporate directorships, and would have extensively democratized industry. It is plain, however, that even if the purpose and plan in question had been conceived by the unions, the mysteries of corporate finance, the public agitation against corporate abuses, the inadequacy or positive viciousness of the laws governing corporate organizations, the helplessness of minority stockholders—all these things would have deterred the unions from investing their funds in corporate securities. The peopleizing of corporations and the protection of investments by eliminating needless risk would enable labor leaders and individual workmen to entertain with growing favor the idea of copartnership by means of stock-ownership. The corporations that really wish to live in peace and security, to cultivate relations of amity with labor, would find fewer difficulties to overcome, and their good faith in offering stock to employees would be far less open to challenge and misrepresentation.

This is not the place, however, to consider why particular forms of profit-sharing have not prospered or succeeded in gaining the favor of intelligent workmen. Nor is it the place to study the various possible or prevalent forms of profit-sharing. There are official and private reports on the subject which show what to avoid in profit-sharing schemes and how to insure a reasonable degree of material and moral success. It may be noted in passing that, according to the latest report issued by the British Board of Trade, profit-sharing has received something of a stimulus in the last few years. Of the 133 firms that share profits after one fashion or another, 46 are less than four years old and 6 were started in 1912.

It also appears from this document that, while many profit-sharing schemes have had to be abandoned in Great Britain, "the experience of the firms which have tried profit-sharing" for a reasonable time "is that it produces excellent results in developing a higher degree of efficiency and brings about more harmonious relations between employer and employed." If excellent results can be produced in spite of deep skepticism and distrust on the part of the majority of workmen, and in spite of a hostile tone in the average labor organ, what may we not expect from profit-sharing and co-operation when heartily supported by strong unions and advocated with conscious reference to an economic and social ideal?

In the long run, "what labor wants" is not essentially different from what labor *ought* to want, from what employers and society ought to want, in the light of industrial evolution and soberly drawn inferences from contemporary experience. The past was what it had to be, but the great industrial revolution brought evils as well as benefits in its train, and another industrial revolution is impending—nay, is taking place before our eyes. It is idle to ask of human intelligence and character more than they are capable of yielding; but there are such things as prevision, as scientific guidance, as the possibility of facilitating inevitable change. In investigating, in criticizing, in resisting dangerous tendencies, we should endeavor to separate the accidental and ephemeral from the vital and endurable. To see the industrial problem steadily and see it whole is to arrive at conclusions that are as scientific as they are optimistic.

SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

THE CONCEPTION OF RELIGION AND MAGIC AND THE PLACE OF PSYCHOLOGY IN SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES: A DISCUSSION OF THE VIEWS OF DURKHEIM AND OF HUBERT AND MAUSS

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There was a time when only philosophers and theologians attempted to define and explain religion. Today ethnologists, sociologists, and psychologists are taking a very active part in this work. A most remarkable recent essay dealing with the conception of religion is that of Emile Durkheim,¹ the distinguished editor of the *Année sociologique*. Religion is presented in this essay as a social phenomenon fundamentally independent of the belief in gods and so closely allied to magic that no adequate means is provided for differentiating them. There is much to admire in this incontestably original and valuable paper. Yet I am forced to dissent from it on several points of considerable significance.

In the first part of the present paper I shall set forth, as far as possible in his own words, Durkheim's conception of religion. I shall then offer some critical remarks, which will lead me to take up the conception of magic developed by Hubert and Mauss, a conception with which Durkheim appears in agreement. A few final pages will be devoted to the consideration of the share of psychology in the study of the origin and of the function of religion.

I. SACREDNESS AS THE FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTIC OF RELIGION

Cult, writes our author, might be defined in a general way as the totality of the practices dealing with sacred things. But this affirmation can have meaning only in so far as the significance of

¹ Emile Durkheim, *De la définition des phénomènes religieux*, *Année sociologique*, II (1897-98), 1-28; see also, Emile Durkheim, "Examen critique des systèmes classiques sur la pensée religieuse," *Rev. Philos.*, XLVII (1909), 1-28, 142-162.

The most important work following in the lead of Durkheim, published in the United States, is Irving King, *The Development of Religion*. Macmillan, 1910.

the word "sacred" is known. A conception of the origin and nature of the sacred is thus at the center of the theory of Durkheim. What sense must be attached to that term? Our author observes first that the distinction in sacred and profane is very often independent of the idea of God. There are religions from which the idea of God is absent (Buddhism, Jainism), and there are sacred objects which are not gods. "In a clan whose totem is the wolf, every wolf is equally venerated, those of today as well as those of yesterday and those to be born tomorrow. The same honors are given to all of them indiscriminately. We have here, therefore, neither a god nor many gods, but a large category of sacred things. In order that one may apply the term god, it would be necessary for the principle common to all these particular beings to be separated and hypostatized under some definite form; it could then become the center of a cult." Certain impersonal objects, such as the flag, or the nation, also assume the character of sacredness. A god is simply "a power to produce certain effects, more or less definite, but always referred to a particular and definite being. When this power, instead of being incarnated in an individual being, remains diffuse in an indeterminate number of things, we have simply sacred, in opposition to profane objects, but no god." It appears thus, according to our author, "that the notion of divinity, far from being fundamental in religious life, is in reality merely a secondary episode. It is the product of a special process by virtue of which one or several religious characteristics are concentrated and become concrete in a more or less individual form." The idea of divinity could not, therefore, have been the one which served originally in the making of a distinction between things profane and sacred.

In religion, then, the notion of the sacred and not that of divinity is, according to Durkheim, the fundamental one. But whence this idea of the sacred? The sacred is a specific quality belonging to the traditional, to that which the individual finds already made, to myths, to dogmas, transmitted by society. The sacred and the profane are respectively synonymous with the social and the individual. Sacred objects separate themselves from the others by the special manner in which we come to know them.

They are not our own work; they are given to us by the community to which we belong. "Things which reach our minds by route so different cannot appear to us under the same aspects." The sacred differentiates itself from the profane, not by a difference of degree but of kind. This derivation of the sacred from the traditional, in contradistinction to the individual, we find again and substantially unchanged in the article published ten years later in the *Revue philosophique*.

From this social-traditional origin of the sacred (therefore, in Durkheim's opinion, of religion also) proceeds this other essential trait: the beliefs or "the representations of the religious order stand opposed to the others in the same way as obligatory opinions stand opposed to free opinions"; religious beliefs are imperative, "the more they are religious, the more they are obligatory." But works are not less essential than faith; one cannot separate cult from belief; they are merely "two different aspects of the same reality."

Thus we reach the following definition: "The phenomena called religious consist in obligatory beliefs connected with definite practices, which refer to objects given in these beliefs." Religion "is a more or less well-organized and systematized group of phenomena of that order."¹

Turning now to a critical examination of the main elements of this conception of religion, let us begin with the notion of the sacred, and the origin assigned to it by Durkheim. An analysis of the qualities entering into the composition of the experience called sacredness will help us to understand under what condition it may arise. We shall see that, far from being the *only* source of sacredness, the traditional cannot even be considered, in any true sense, one of its sources.

Respect and veneration bear some relation to sacredness, but no emotion is so close to it as awe. There is always an element of awe in the experience of the sacred, and awe involves fear held in check by admiration. But, although fear is a necessary ingredient of sacredness, it is not necessarily a prominent one. It is

¹ The above quotations are from pp. 13-23 of *De la définition des phénomènes religieux*.

neutralized by curiosity which the mysteriousness of the sacred object arouses, and by knowledge of ways and means by which to enter into relation with the sacred power. The essential difference between the merely awful and the sacred consists in the existence of unavoidable connections between us and the sacred. It is not sufficient, as with a merely awful object, to turn away from the sacred in order to be done with it. The sacred object has a hold upon us, we stand in dynamic relation with it, and this relation is not one of equal to equal, but of superior to inferior; i.e., we feel dependent upon it. Awfulness (a complex of fear and admiration) and the belief that the great and portentous power reaches down to us and that we may by appropriate actions control it within certain limits seem to me the essential characteristics of sacred objects.

I have not mentioned the tender feeling, for it seems that sacred objects do not necessarily awaken the tender feeling. I shall even venture the affirmation that the presence in an object of qualities generative of the tender emotion is antagonistic to sacredness—an object of love cannot be *at the same moment* a sacred object. Whenever the Christian God is thought of as love, he cannot awaken the emotion of sacredness, although he remains an object of veneration. The God of the Christian arouses the emotion of sacredness only when, his love for man not being present to consciousness, his surpassing greatness, holiness, and his lordship over us are realized together with the possibility of entering into acceptable relations with him.

If, at times, so-called sacred objects are treated in ways showing that they do not possess one or the other of these component qualities; if, for instance, the fetish is abused, beaten, thrown away, I answer that at that moment he has ceased to be sacred to the one who misuses him. We must guard against ascribing to the affective reaction they awaken the stability belonging to the names of the gods, to their abode, and to any conceptual representation of them. The physical object called a fetish remains the same, but the feeling with which it is considered at various moments need not remain constant. When he is being reviled, the fetish is no

longer either an object of magic or of religion. Strictly speaking, a being is a god to a particular person at those moments only when he stands to that person in the particular relation constituting the religious life; outside of those moments he is no more than a potential god.

Now the traditional does not possess *in itself, necessarily*, the quality of sacredness. I do not contest the fact that much of the traditional is sacred, but I affirm as equally true that parts of the traditional are merely customary and insignificant, that the attitude of the conformer toward these parts is one of indifferent automatism. More than that, the traditional is at times rejected as worthless, or even as obstructive. It is therefore not exact to say that "every tradition inspires a very specific respect." The traditions of another nation, or, in the same nation, of another social stratum, often inspire contempt. It is true that in these cases it is not our own tradition, we do not accept it; yet we may, and usually do, realize *it is a tradition*. Tradition as such is not, therefore, sacred.

The full force of this argument appears when it is considered that a movement for social reform necessarily begins with the recognition in individual minds of the inferior value, or the worthlessness, of a tradition. An attempt at social reform in any particular direction is a demonstration of the unsacred nature of some tradition to those who would do away with it. When the new order of things has become law, that is, when it has received social sanction, it possesses the quality of sacredness.

Traditions are sacred when they come to us as the expression of powers superior to us and connected with us, when there are ways of "putting oneself right" with these powers, and when failure to conform to these ways entails danger. Whenever any of these elements ceases to belong to a tradition, the tradition itself ceases to be sacred, though it may still be fearful or admirable; any object—whether tradition or not—possessing these qualifications is sacred. The conditions under which a great unseen being will be sacred, however the thought of him may have arisen, are those just stated.

2. HOW MAGIC IS TO BE SEPARATED FROM RELIGION

Durkheim and his collaborators, Hubert and Mauss, acknowledge the presence of two forms of behavior in primitive tribes, since they endeavor to use discriminatingly the two terms "magic" and "religion." It appears to me, and this I shall now try to make evident, that their analysis of the actions designated by these two names has not been sufficiently complete to uncover that which constitutes an unequivocal means of differentiation. When Durkheim tells us that there are religions from which the idea of God is absent, and that in all religions there are rites the efficacy of which is independent of any divine power, because the rite acts by itself, mechanically, he uses the term religion in a different sense from the one in which most people, among whom I am included, use that term. And when he instances original Buddhism as a religion without a god, he again uses "religion" in a sense which is not commonly accepted. Tiele, for instance, says that "primitive Buddhism ignored religion. It was only when, in opposition to its first principles, it had made its founder its god, and had thus really become a religion, that the way was opened for its general acceptance."¹

A rite acting automatically is never, in the sense which I give to the word religion, a religious rite. It would, of course, be irrelevant to show with Hubert and Mauss,² in order to convince me of error, that sacrifice in the Vedic religion exercises "a *direct* influence upon celestial phenomena; it is all-powerful in its own rights and without any divine intervention." If it be so, these sacrifices belong, according to my principle of classification, not to religion but to magic.

To what facts shall the name religion be given, or what are the characteristics by which religion shall be separated from magic? If one were to inquire into the common usage, I think that it would be found that, on the whole, they call "magic," or "superstition"—in any case, not "religion"—the rites which act directly or are automatically effective; whereas they would call religion the rites in which ideas, feelings, and volitions are supposed to be

¹ *Outlines of the History of Religion*, p. 137.

² "Essai sur la nature et la fonction du Sacrifice," *Année sociologique*, II, 14.

awakened in personal agents, by means that are not mechanical or automatic, but which may be called anthropopathic, that is to say, invocations, offerings, prayers, and the like.

But even if such were not the current use of these terms, the following reason would lead me to believe that it should be the technical sense ascribed to them. When facts are to be classified, those bearing the more fundamental likenesses should be put together. It appears to me that the difference introduced into conscious experience by the passage from the use of a mechanical, coercitive force to the use of an anthropopathic influence (offerings, prayers, penances, etc.) is more fundamental than any other difference existing between the facts to be classified. The results expected and secured may be the same whether one proceeds magically or religiously; but the actions, even though they should be externally identical (supposing this to be possible), are of a different psychological nature. In one case, one compels by mechanical means; in the other, one assumes a "personal" relation and attempts by anthropopathic means to reach one's end. The psychological attitude involved in each could hardly differ more radically.

We are told by Durkheim that "the notion of divinity, far from being fundamental, is in reality merely a secondary episode." Our present problem, the differentiation of religion from other activities, does not involve the discovery of that which is fundamental in religion, but of that which is *differential*. I grant that, when compared, for instance, with the needs and the desires prompting to religious action, the god-ideas are secondary facts. But needs and desires are fundamental to each and every kind of human activity. With regard to the differentiation of magic from religion, the idea of a personal Great Being who can be dealt with anthropopathically is indeed fundamental.

It is to be observed that, although in my view belief in a personal being is necessary to religion, it is not in itself sufficient to mark off religion from magic, for a god may be acted upon mechanically, coercitively, i.e., magically. It is the manner of acting upon the god which separates these two kinds of behavior.

If one accepts the principle of differentiation offered in these

pages, one may no longer say with Hubert and Mauss "the religious rites often constrain; and the god, in most ancient religions, was not at all able to escape from the compelling power of a rite properly performed."¹ Such a rite is, by our definition, a magical rite, even though it acts upon a personal being.

Magic and religion are found very frequently side by side, in the same ceremonies or groups of ceremonies. When, for instance, the hero, Wäinämöinen of Finland, wishes to know what has become of the sun and the moon that have been stolen from the heavens, he seeks the knowledge by a prayer to Ukko the Creator [religion], yet he accompanies his prayer by mysterious and potent acts: first he cuts three chips from the alder, and lays them in magic order, touching and turning them with his fingers [magic]; and only then does he address the supreme God, who is also called "the great Magician."² But, however closely interwoven, magic and religion always bear the clear differentiating marks we have singled out.

If one rejects the principle I offer for the separation of magic from religion, where can one find another acceptable one? Sacredness would not do, for all are agreed that it belongs to both. In the article of Durkheim, from which I have quoted, one does not find definite information on the use of these terms. But his learned collaborators, Hubert and Mauss, have made that question the topic of a long essay to which we shall now turn.³

In reading Hubert and Mauss, one is surprised to find that their effort at defining magic and religion results only in the discovery of shifting differences of degree and not of kind. Instead of separating magic and religion, they have really connected them. If the facts were such as to make a sharp differentiation impossible, one would have to acquiesce; but I have tried to show that the phenomena covered by the terms "magic" and "religion" can be separated on the basis of an absolute difference.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

² From George M. Stratton, *The Psychology of the Religious Life*, p. 136. I have given other instances of this close combination in my book, *A Psychological Study of Religion; Its Origin, Function, and Future*. Macmillan, 1912.

³ "Esquisse d'une théorie générale de la magie," *Année sociologique*, VII (1902-3), 1-146. These authors accept in substance, I believe, Durkheim's view regarding the methods of sociology; and he is, as far as I know, in accord with them regarding their opinion on magic.

They define magic as "any rite which does not belong to an organized cult, which is private, secret, mysterious, and tends toward the prohibited rite." If this definition was intended to be strictly construed; if, whenever a rite belonged to an organized cult, was social and public, we had an instance of religion and not of magic, the definition would be satisfactory. But the words upon which it turns are, according to our authors, to be taken only in a relative sense; we are really to understand that the *better* organized, the *more* social (the less individual), the *more* public (the less secret) the rite, the more religious it is. That such is the meaning of our authors appears plainly in their discussion. One reads, for instance, regarding the individual character of magic: "Magical rites, and magic in its entirety, are first of all facts of tradition. Acts which are not repeated are not magical. Acts in the efficacy of which the whole of a group does not believe are not magical. The form of magical rites is eminently transmissible and is sanctioned by public opinion. It follows from this that acts that are strictly individual, as for instance, the particular superstitious practices of players, cannot be called magical." We are told in this passage that magical rites are not strictly individual, but that they are performed by, or for, a group; whereas in the definition we were informed that magic was a private affair. Among magical practices which have clearly a non-individualistic, non-private, and beneficial character, the rain-making ceremonies stand foremost. It seems then that they should be called religious. Yet our authors speak of them as "quasi-religious," which means, I take it, that they are really magical. Why should they be called so does not appear; unless it be simply because "the rain-maker is a person who generally plays the rôle of evil sorcerer." Maleficent rites are said to be always magical, but we are also told that there are religious rites "which are equally evil; such are, for instance, imprecations against the enemy of the city, against the violator of a sepulchre or of an oath, and all the death-ceremonies which sanction ritual interdictions."¹

The attempt to differentiate magic from religion on the ground of social value, of public character, of beneficence, of fuller organization of the ceremonials, fails because all that can be claimed,

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 14, 17.

even according to our authors, is that religion possesses these qualities more generally and to a higher degree than magic. In order to obtain a differentia, one must look, as I have done in the preceding section, to the different psychological natures of the relations established between the performer and the object upon which he endeavors to act.

The relative differences noticed by our authors, that, for instance, religion is turned to account for social ends more widely than is magic, are a consequence of the fundamental differences in origin and in nature that I have indicated. Since early gods are regarded as tribal ancestors, creators, or nature beings, they are *intimately related, not with isolated individuals, but with the social group as a whole*. The natural tendency would therefore be for the tribe as a whole to maintain relations with these beings. On the other hand, no obvious reason exists for a non-personal, magical Power to be considered as belonging to, or as acting for, the entire community. It is at the service of any individual who chances to get hold of it.

This same fundamental difference explains why, when the separation between the offices of magician and of priest has taken place, the magician is more loosely connected with the tribe than is the priest.

The frequently evil character of magic is also readily explained. The blood-relationship involved between gods and the tribe, in the conception of ancestral and creator gods, necessarily implies a general attitude of benevolence toward the tribe. The gods are, therefore, in theory at least, inaccessible to the enemy of the common weal. The worship, by a community, of personal powers recognized as evil would lead speedily to the destruction of the community, for it would result in a systematic strengthening of antisocial forces. Thus it comes to pass that magic is much used for the gratification of individual and of evil purposes.

3. PSYCHOLOGY IN THE STUDY OF SOCIAL FACTS

Durkheim's conception of the nature of religion and of sociology leads him to the opinion that the origin and development of religion are exclusively a concern of sociology.

It is thus a corollary of our definition that the origin of religion is not to be found in individual feelings or emotions but in states of the *âme collective*, and that it varies as do these states. Did religion arise out of the constitution of the individual, it would not appear to him in a coercitive aspect. . . . It is consequently not in human nature in general that one must seek for the determining cause of religious phenomena; it is in the nature of the society to which they belong, and if they have varied in the course of history it is because the social organism itself has changed.¹

In the writings from which I quote, Durkheim does not once mention *social psychology*. But he opposes throughout "individual psychology" to "sociology." He writes, for instance, "even though individual psychology had no longer any secrets for us, it could not give us the solution of any of those problems [the problems of sociology], since they refer to facts of an order outside the range of individual psychology." I would not dissent from this statement, provided "sociology" means, or includes, the psychology of groups of individuals, in so far as they affect the social body and are affected by its presence. But if this and other similar passages should mean that sociology is not concerned with the interpretation of social action in terms of consciousness, that it can dispense with the introspective method, i.e., that sociology is not a psychological science, but limits itself to the observation of the external activities of man, then the astonishment and the opposition which the methodological writings of Durkheim have inspired are, it seems to me, legitimate. "Sociology" may, however, be used by him as a brief synonym for "social psychology," or at least as including this branch of psychology; if so, his position becomes, to me, unobjectionable. Unfortunately, even after the explanations provided in the preface to the second edition of *Les règles de la méthode sociologique*, there remains ample cause for perplexity.

I wish to make it perfectly clear at the outset that I agree with those who hold that every ceremony, whatever its kind, is a social fact. A ceremony necessarily has reference to other selves. It involves a relation between an individual and the group to which he belongs. Hence the question I am about to consider is not whether religious rites are independent of the social life, but *whether, or how far, they can be fully understood when observed*

¹ *Année sociologique*, II, 24.

from the outside, as overt actions, without the assistance of a psychological interpretation of the states of consciousness which they express. Ceremonies are the outcome of more or less clear processes taking place in individuals, under the influence of other conscious agents, feeling, thinking, and acting as a unit. The so-called "social" forces before which the believer bows are known to him as ideas, feelings, impulses, desires. Therefore I shall maintain that the full understanding of religion, as of social life in general, demands not only the observation of the external outcome of the collective life of conscious beings, but also its interpretation in terms of consciousness.

Although the present discussion is conducted with immediate reference to religious behavior, it has a much broader scope. It applies to the respective shares of psychology and of sociology in the study of social phenomena.

Durkheim's argument may be briefly formulated thus: Societies, as the rest of the world, are governed by laws proceeding necessarily from the nature of these societies and expressing it. These laws are different from the laws of individual psychology because individual life differs from social life; the social constitution is not the same as the individual constitution. He writes, for instance, of the social reprobation of certain kinds of behavior and of the punishment of crime: "If it [society] condemns certain modes of conduct, it is because they shock fundamental feelings of the group; and these feelings arise from the physical temperament and from the mental organization of the group. Thus, even though individual psychology had no longer any secret for us, it could not give us the solution of any of those problems since they refer to facts of an order ignored by individual psychology." Of what use could introspection be, since the greater part of the social institutions is transmitted ready-made? How could we in questioning ourselves find the causes from which they arose? Moreover, we do not always know the real reasons for our actions, neither do we know all of the reasons. And, for the rest, each individual plays but an infinitesimal rôle in the formation of the group life.¹

Whether the difference between individual and social facts,

¹ Preface to 2d ed. of *Les règles*.

between individual consciousness and the so-called "social consciousness," is overstated by him or not, Durkheim is unfortunate when he attempts to support his contention by drawing an analogy between the relation of chemistry to biology, and the relation of individual psychology to sociology. "It is not the non-living particles of the cell [atoms of carbon, nitrogen, etc.] which feed themselves; reproduce themselves, which, in a word, live; it is the cell itself, and only the cell." "The hardness of bronze is not in the copper, nor in the tin, nor in the lead entering into its formation. These metals are soft or flexible. Its hardness belongs to their mixture." Similarly of the fluidity of water and of its alimentary properties. "Thus the separation which we establish later on between psychology proper, or the science of the mental individual, and sociology is seen to be justified by a new argument."¹

If the relation between the individual and society were truly in every respect the same as that between atoms and their chemical compounds, Durkheim's contention for a sociology independent of individual psychology would be valid. But this is one of the instances in which the facts compared, similar in certain respects, are illegitimately dealt with as if they were similar in other respects. Hence the conclusion drawn from the comparison includes more than is warranted by the likenesses between the facts. It is true that neither copper, nor tin, nor lead is as hard and inflexible as the bronze formed by their combination, and the fluidity is a property belonging to neither one nor the other of the component elements of water. But these facts show merely that elements of a *certain nature* form compounds possessing properties of a certain kind, not belonging to the separate elements. Before one is justified in drawing the parallel which Durkheim draws, there remains to be shown that human elements are similar to chemical elements *with regard to the point at issue*. Durkheim assumes that they are. As a matter of fact, the presence of consciousness introduces into the relation of individuals to society an essential element not to be found in the relation of physical elements to their compounds. This difference appears to me wholly to invalidate Durkheim's parallel.

¹ *Ibid.*

In the preface to the second edition of *Les règles*, we find what may be regarded as a concession to psychology, a concession which in my estimation is still far from sufficient, but which lays the foundation for a future agreement concerning the share of psychology in the investigation of sociological facts. Durkheim begins by reaffirming the heterogeneity of individual and social facts. "The states of the collective consciousness are of another nature than the states of individual consciousness; they are representations of another kind. The mentality of groups is not that of individuals. It has its own laws. The two sciences are therefore as definitely distinct as two sciences can well be, whatever relations may in other respects exist between them." This said, he makes the admission that social phenomena are psychological. "One may ask oneself if individual representations and collective representations do not resemble each other in that they are both representations; and if, in consequence of this resemblance, certain abstract laws might not be common to both spheres." "One comes thus to conceive the possibility of a psychology altogether formal, belonging in common to individual psychology and to sociology." But whether this is more than a possibility, he is not ready to say. The imperfect state of our knowledge seems to him to make a categorical answer impossible; we do not know "the laws according to which collective representations [ideas] associate or repel each other."

Before concluding I wish to turn to particular facts in an attempt to indicate, more concretely than I have done so far, the necessity under which the student of social life is to make use both of the objective and of the introspective (psychological) method. I shall find it convenient to choose my instances in the field of the origin of religion.

I may be permitted a preliminary remark concerning the one-sided conceptions which have so far prevailed regarding the origin of religion. Some authors have written as if, when they had accounted for the origin of the god-ideas, they had explained the origin of religion. Others have thought that their work was finished when they had discovered the emotion or emotions char-

acteristic of the earliest religions. Still others have been content to bring to light the original religious practices. But religion is neither idea, nor emotion, nor practice; it includes all of these, for it is a form of life, a type of conscious behavior. The task of the student of origins is to determine the beginnings of religion with regard to these several constituent elements.

The presence of religion implies that of needs and desires: need for food, desire for power, for self-respect, etc. But there are no need and no desire religious *per se*. A need enters into the religious life when it becomes the instigator of the mode of behavior called religion, i.e., when the gratification of the need is thought to be dependent upon a power of a psychic and, usually, personal nature.

1. Religions are commonly separated into ethical and non-ethical religions. This classification indicates the great importance of the appearance of ethical needs in religious life; they transform religious institutions. Would it not be preposterous, in an investigation of this transformation, to refrain from turning to the introspective data which founders and reformers of ethical religions have left us, and from interpreting in the light of our own consciousness of ethical relations their autobiographies, letters, didactic writings, etc.? Are not these writings a unique source of information as to how these individuals apprehended social life, and why they rejected certain of its beliefs and practices, while they struggled and even died in order to introduce others?

Is there, for instance, nothing of importance to be learned in a study of Luther's private life, of his temperament, of his aesthetic and ethical sensibility, by the sociologists desirous of understanding the causes of the transformation of religious institutions in which he was the chief individual instrument? The day is indeed past for believing that an individual, however mighty, can cast society in any mold shaped by his fancy. We know now that the men who have left their impress upon society have been privileged to do so because they were the instruments of communal forces. But the brilliancy of this discovery should not blind us to the share belonging to the individual in the social work. Why is it that Luther and not some other one of the millions of his fellow-

countrymen became the Reformer? Is it merely because he alone was placed in just those external circumstances which would make of a man the reformer that he was? The external influences which acted upon Luther were, without doubt, indispensable, but must not Luther himself be considered an original center of energy? Do not Luther's internal struggles with certain passions, his consciousness of sin, and the final triumph of faith under peculiar circumstances, throw a light upon the Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith which cannot be shed by a merely external study of the behavior of the reformer and of the doctrines he set forth?

Expressed in more general terms, my contention is merely that individuals do more than reflect social life; they modify it, for they are centers of creative energy. Identical circumstances acting at the same moment upon two persons will not produce identical effects, for men are not identical. Why men differ is another problem. Their differences are to be accounted for in part by the different circumstances, physical and psychical, in which they have grown. I say "in part," because it cannot be assumed that men are born identical, and because, different at the start, they grow still more different, though living in the same *milieu*.

When an economist tells us that a study of economic conditions covers whatever need be known in order to understand and predict the number of suicides, he forgets that there are other factors affecting man's life besides poverty. Are there not men who delight in want and privation, who voluntarily seek poverty and starve their bodies, not to destroy but only to rule it? What definite and exact relation would there be between suicide and poverty in a community possessed by the ascetic's ideal to which I allude? And is it not well known that ideas are contagious, particularly in certain persons and in certain circumstances, and that there are epidemics of suicide, the partial cause of which is to be found in individual suggestibility?

2. Whether one holds (as I do), or not, that the proper use of the word "religion" involves belief in unseen, hyperhuman powers, usually personal, the genesis and development of the god-ideas constitute one of the important problems of the origin of religion.

Primitive gods are probably in many instances ancestors

deified. But how and why have ancestors been deified? What are the needs which prompt to deification and what are the mental operations involved in the process? These questions require psychological answers. It is but a beginning of a solution to say, for instance, that the gods of any particular tribe are water-gods, because the tribe's life is dependent to an unusual degree upon the ocean. Fish are altogether dependent upon water, yet they have no gods.

In questioning civilized persons, one discovers that certain of them live in a world peopled by invisible beings and others are entirely free from that belief. This difference appears not infrequently between persons brought up together in the same family. One member of the family has rejected gods, angels, and demons; another has incorporated them in his social group. There are individual psychological affinities and immunities. The sociologist who would go to the bottom of the question of belief and creed not only must perforce inquire into the external influences to which these diverging persons are equally submitted, but he must turn psychologist and examine the individual causes of the observed divergences.

God-ideas may arise in several ways in addition to the direct deification of great chiefs: in naïve attempts to explain certain facts of common observation (dreams, trances, swoons, etc.), in the personification of striking phenomena (thunder, vegetation, etc.), in answer to the problem of creation.

How shall one get in any particular instance to the origin of a god-idea? One cannot question those who first brought it out, they have gone forever. And if one questions the existing savage, one finds usually that he cannot give a satisfactory account of his belief and behavior. Nevertheless, much has been learned from the savage's own account of himself. The psychologist may supplement the knowledge thus secured by an examination of the child's mind. And he may, further, by self-introspection secure much that may serve in the interpretation of the behavior of primitive man. Durkheim's remark that we do not always know the true reasons, nor all the reasons, for our actions is evidently true. But it is just as true surely that we usually know some of

them and that a study of actions considered objectively does not, more exactly or fully, reveal all the motives of behavior. By getting introspective descriptions from many persons of the causes of the same actions, one has as good a chance, it would seem, of making a full and exact discovery of causes as by an external method. *In any case, I do not know why one should neglect either of these methods when searching for the genesis of the god-ideas.*

3. One may hint here at the influence of hallucinations and of "revelations" upon the formation of religions. The content of the alleged revelations is, in part, provided by the social forms and ideals, and in part by that which is peculiar to the seer.

In the higher religions, mysticism is a potent factor of development. In the consciousness of mystical souls, in the peculiarity and intensity of their likes and dislikes, religious forms and ideals are elaborated, not, of course, in absolute independence of the ideals and forms of the life about them, but often in deadly antagonism to the dominating ones. An adequate understanding of certain phases of the development of religion cannot be had without an investigation of the inner life of the great mystics.

4. Another set of problems with which the sociologist must deal in collaboration with the psychologist treats of the effects of religious institutions upon society. The tonic value of belief in benevolent gods; the use made of them for securing physical goods, or subjective qualities with which gods have been endowed by the very persons desiring these qualities; the peace, the assurance, the joy that are the most common fruits of the ethical religions; the sense of divine presence; the transformations, at times marvelous, happening in many persons under the influence of religious convictions—these and other similar problems demand descriptions and explanations which cannot be provided altogether either by the psychologist or by the sociologist working independently; they are problems of social and individual psychology.

The place of the introspective psychological method in the study of social life is implied in the following, to me self-evident, propositions:

1. The consciousness and, therefore, the actions of individuals are deeply and variously modified by the presence of the other

conscious beings forming the group. An individual in a crowd does not behave as he would if he were alone in the same circumstances, for he is moved to action both directly by external events, and by those events as they are reacted to by the members of the crowd.

2. Nevertheless, all needs, all desires, feelings, ideas, and actions, whether they be called individual or social, appear exclusively in conscious individuals.

The term "social consciousness" may be intended to mean the consciousness, in an individual, of the group to which he belongs, for example, of its authoritative demands upon him. In that sense the expression has a definite significance and is legitimately used. If "social consciousness" is given another meaning, that new meaning should be clearly defined and carefully adhered to. The danger of juggling with that expression, defining it in one sense and using it in another, is very great. When "social consciousness" is not used in the sense in which individuals are said to be conscious of a desire, of an emotion, of a purpose, what does it mean? There is no "social consciousness" in any sense other than that of "consciousness of the group in the individuals composing it"; there is no *âme collective*, no *sentiment collectif*, but only collections of souls, and sentiments common to all the members of the group.

3. Life in society is the outcome of the reactions of conscious individuals to their common physical surroundings, and to the other individuals composing the group, both when considered as independent units, and when considered as groups. A full understanding of social facts requires, therefore, (a) a knowledge of the physical environment; (b) a knowledge of the nature of the reacting individuals; (c) a knowledge of the psychical environment, i.e., of the needs, desires, habits, ideas, and feelings common to the members of the group.

4. Since social facts "all consist in ways of thinking and acting," the ultimate explanation will have to be given in psychological terms, i.e., sociology is a psychological science of which the observation of social institutions is merely the starting-point.¹

¹ The discussions which have arisen on the appearance of *Les règles de la méthode sociologique* suffer, I fear, in several instances from the lack of a clear differentiation between individual psychology and a psychology of group of conscious individuals as

Whatever the conclusions upon which psychologists and sociologists may ultimately find themselves in agreement, I am sure the debt owed to Durkheim and his school for the vigor with which they have pushed, in the study of religion, the heretofore neglected objective method, and for the valuable fruits the method has already produced, will remain a heavy one.

they are affected by and as they affect the group to which they belong, i.e., social psychology. Regarding this point, I must limit myself to very brief statements. Individual psychology includes the topics usually dealt with in the psychological manuals of the kind now called "structural" psychology. It deals with the attributes of sensations, the threshold of stimuli, the discrimination sensibility, the relation of sensation to the pleasant and the unpleasant, with the connections of sensations, with the laws of recall, with the psychological and physiological condition of attention, etc., all this without reference to the particular influence exercised upon mental life by the existence of other conscious beings. The recent movement, in evidence chiefly in the United States, called functional psychology, has an inherent tendency to pass into the field of social psychology. Social psychology is primarily concerned with the modifications wrought in individuals by the consciousness of the group to which they belong, and with the common behavior prompted by the consciousness of the group.

The separation of that which is called individual from that which deserves the name "social" in psychology is not in every instance easy. But one may affirm in general that since each of these branches of psychology deals with facts of consciousness, they will have certain fundamental laws in common. What these laws are will appear as our knowledge grows. A complete agreement between individual psychologists and sociologists should not be, however, hoped for until both have carried their work far enough to make evident the kind of contribution which may be expected of them.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE COLOR LINE

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The term "the color line" has come to be a comprehensive designation for all the varied means made use of by the white group to effect the racial segregation of the Negro. As we shall see, its ultimate explanation is to be found in those forces making for racial antipathy, the most fundamental of which perhaps is the refusal of social sanction to intermarriage. The term is particularly obnoxious to many Negro leaders and for reasons which can be easily understood. In their criticisms, however, they seem to ignore the deep-lying racial factors involved and inveigh against it as a flagrant violation of the principles of American democracy as defined in our federal constitution. It is viewed as essentially southern in origin and spirit, the aftermath of slavery, and all manifestations of it in the North are explained as infusions of southern prejudices. A typical illustration is the general tendency of the Negro press to see in the recent introduction into the legislatures of the northern states of bills against the intermarriage of whites and blacks an indication of southern influence (see the editorial "The Race Marriage Question" in the Negro paper, the *New York Age*, February 26, 1913; also the editorial for February 27, "Shall the South Rule the Nation?"). In view of existing differences of opinion it is perhaps well to raise the question as to just what is involved in the color line. The problem is not sectional or national but racial in character.

Wherever the white of English stock has been brought into contact with masses of Negroes and however the geographic, economic, or political conditions have differed, we find two great outstanding facts in which they all agree, namely, the stubborn opposition of the white to race fusion and the strenuous insistence upon the supremacy of his group ideals. Extraneous public

sentiment and the demands of a theoretical democracy have never been able to swerve the local white group from settling all inter-racial questions upon this basis. The attitude of the whites of the southern states finds a parallel in the bearing of the English toward backward races of the colonies, and particularly in the relations of whites and blacks in South Africa.

Where racial contact without fusion occurs, there are, according to Bryce, three possibilities.¹ In the case of tropical or semi-tropical countries the white often rules a people as a military dependency or under a paternalistic government. This is the situation in Java under the Dutch, and in Jamaica under the paternalistic régime of the English, where, perhaps, the relations of Negro and white are the most amicable to be found anywhere. Again, it sometimes happens that a people of different stock enters territory already occupied by the white in search of employment, instances of which are the Chinese immigrations to the Pacific Coast and to Australia. The race friction to which this gives rise can be controlled by legislation. A third possibility is where whites and blacks find themselves forced by circumstances over which they have no immediate control to live side by side in large numbers and ostensibly under democratic institutions. This is the situation in the southern states and in South Africa. It is fraught with the greatest complications and hence is a fruitful cause of race antagonism.

The race relations in Jamaica have often been contrasted with those in this country, and made the basis of criticisms of the American treatment of the Negro. It must be observed, however, that in Jamaica there are a number of reasons why race antagonism has always been at a minimum, reasons which vitiate entirely the parallel Professor Royce and others have drawn between the Negro in the South and in Jamaica, and upon which he bases his kindly though somewhat condescending advice to his "Southern brethren."² Jamaica is far more of a black man's country than the South has ever been; there are over 700,000 Negroes upon the

¹ *Relations of the Advanced and Backward Races*, the Romanes Lecture for 1902, pp. 28 ff.

² Royce, *Race Questions*, p. 15.

island and something over 15,000 whites, but "these whites predominate in the governing and employing class, and as merchants or planters lead and direct the industrial life of the island."¹ In other words, there has never been a time since the English first set foot upon the island when they have not been complete and undisputed masters of its destiny, barring perhaps the tragic episode of the Gordon riots of 1865 which only convinced them of the folly of trying any other policy. The "orderly, law-abiding, and contented" character of the Jamaican Negro which Professor Royce found so charming is the outcome of the benevolent paternalism of the English régime, the fundamental idea of which is the complete subordination of the Negro to the will of the white. The Negro, who has never known any other conditions, accepts this as part of the eternal order of things with the result that the status of the ruling white and that of the masses of the peasant Negro laborers are entirely separated and occasion for friction is reduced to a minimum. The sections of the South where there is the least friction between the races are found on the plantations of the "black belt," where as in Jamaica the Negroes outnumber the whites, and where, the war amendments and the "Bill of Rights" to the contrary notwithstanding, a paternalistic régime is in force similar in many ways to that in Jamaica.

Again, any parallel between Jamaican conditions and the status of the Negro in this country must recognize a difference of the very greatest importance between the two countries, namely, that from the emancipation of the Negro to the present in the United States he has had dinned into his ears the democratic doctrine of his inherent equality with the white, and hence his inalienable right as a class to all the privileges and emoluments of the community on an equal footing with the white. Whatever may be said of the theoretical justice of such a doctrine, the fact remains that never in the history of the contact of the white and the black races has such an ideal been realized; least of all has England, the champion of freedom, ever made it the basis of practical relations with backward races. Nothing would doubtless be more agreeable to the southerner with his nine millions of Negroes than

¹ Olivier, *White Capital and Coloured Labour*, p. 34.

the establishment in the South of a paternalistic government similar to that in Jamaica. But this would involve the utter repudiation of the spirit if not the letter of the Reconstruction legislation in behalf of the Negro and a surrender of the transcendental conception of human rights which it implies and which is today the rallying-point for the Negro contenders for complete equality and their white supporters. It may be seriously doubted whether Professor Royce is prepared to surrender the orthodox conception of democracy as it is embodied in our political symbols. Finally, the period in the relations of the two races when "English administration" and "English reticence"¹ could have been cultivated successfully belongs in all probability to an irrevocable past. It was possible at the close of the war to have instituted a paternalistic relation between freeman and white which in time might have developed at the South conditions parallel to those we see in Jamaica and with the same happy relations between the races. The different southern states did in fact make an attempt to outline some such régime in their "black codes"; but the Reconstruction period and the years that have intervened have built up totally different relations between the races, and have instilled into the black political and social ambitions which it is idle to expect that he can be easily induced to forego.

Out of this period of utterly unnecessary race friction was born the "color line" which is such a rock of offense to the ambitious Negro. It cannot be said that it was due to "the traditional place which he (the Negro) has occupied in the social scheme," namely, slavery.² Slavery of a far worse type than that of the South existed in Jamaica, and yet there is no "color line" in this island, but only "that natural antipathy which regulates the relations of all widely separated peoples, the sentinel which keeps watch and ward over the purity of highly developed races."³ As we have seen, nowhere in history has the white lived in contact with a backward race except on the unconditional acknowledgment of the supremacy of the white group. In every other case except

¹ Royce, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

² K. Miller, *Race Adjustment*, p. 115.

³ Livingstone, "The West Indian and American Negro," *North American Review*, 1907, CLXXXV, 646.

the South the white has justified his supremacy by definite laws and a political order as is shown in the case of the British West Indies and South Africa. Under the pressure of the passion and prejudice of the Reconstruction period, however, the whites were to a large extent eliminated politically by a provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, in reality the first actual drawing of the "color line" in the South,¹ and a political régime was initiated on the basis of Negro rule. The constitutional amendments were designed to perpetuate this clothing of the Negro with the highest political power and they remained, of course, after the white regained home rule.

The white group which had never yet admitted a backward or inferior race to share in the shaping of its political and social ideals found itself facing a situation of peculiar difficulty. The weaker group, which as a whole had little or no comprehension of the real issue at stake, was used as a catspaw by unscrupulous leaders who were supported in their policy by the highest law of the land, the public sentiment of the North, and the military arm of the nation. Under normal conditions the whites would undoubtedly have followed the precedent set by the English in Jamaica and determined by law the status of the weaker group and assured the dominance of the white, and hence a stable social order under which the Negro could have worked out his social salvation under the tutelage of the white. This was impossible, so they fell back upon the more subtle and powerful force of public sentiment and usage from which all law gets its meaning and sanction. The law guaranteed to the black civil and political rights and social privileges on an equality with the white, but in a thousand subtle ways that really invalidated the spirit without breaking the letter of the statutes the whites found means for keeping the Negro in a subordinate social and political position and completely subservient to the will of the dominant group. The "color line" is the result of this effort of the ruling group to make the black constantly aware of his subordinate status and actually to restrict him to it in the absence of legal means for so doing. The real motive here was not so much to humiliate the black or to perpetuate the social habits of slavery;

¹ Murphy, *The Basis of Ascendancy*, p. 7.

the determining factor was the practical necessity of finding and maintaining a *modus vivendi* between a race with long training in the exercise of democratic liberties and another utterly without training and forced by disabilities of its own to occupy indefinitely a subordinate place in the social order. The problem was exactly that faced by the English in South Africa, namely, "the construction of a government which, while democratic as regards one of the races, cannot safely be made democratic as regards the other."¹ After the long and costly experiment of military coercion in Reconstruction, entailing many acts of lawlessness and an outrageous defiance of the forms and principles of a free democracy, besides engendering much heart-burning between the two races, the masses of the nation have slowly come around to the common-sense view never once deserted by the Englishman in his relations to the Negro in Jamaica and South Africa, namely, that the dominance of the white group is the prerequisite of anything like satisfactory relations between the two races. Once more the white race has vindicated its traditions of supremacy, but the experience was a costly one for the South, the Negro, and the nation.

The democratic institutions by which it was attempted through outside coercion to hold together on a parity two widely divergent racial groups were originally created on the supposition of the ability of all members of the community to enter into a sympathetic understanding of them, and thus to cherish that community of interests necessary to their preservation. The laws thus recognized no other basis of social co-operation than that of the most comprehensive democracy, and when this proved inadequate to the situation the groups concerned were thrown back upon irrational group instincts in which case the stronger always prevails and that by the use of means that are too often anti-social. Democracy thus became through the logic of events practically a *carte blanche* for a return to more primitive social conditions. This was most unfortunate for both groups. It educated the higher group into anti-social and extra-legal ways of executing the social will, and gave rise to a feeling of disrespect for democratic institutions. It begot in the weaker group a sense of wrong without educating it into a

¹ Bryce, *Impressions of South Africa*, p. 360.

higher regard for social values. The Negro's sufferings became the fruitful source of outside sympathy and even of much uncritical sentimentality which led to an exaggerated feeling of injustice in the Negro himself without in any way creating in him a sane and healthful sense of his own weaknesses and a regard for his social obligations.

The psychological effect of the *Sturm und Drang* period of the Reconstruction upon the whites in the South can hardly be overestimated. It intensified racial differences and interests in a way most injurious to both groups but especially to the Negro. The whites of the South came out of it with the feeling of racial solidarity as the supreme and determining factor of their thought and life. They have consequently presented for over half a century the most compact and doggedly determined section of the citizenship of the nation in their devotion to group ideals. This can only be understood when we remember that during their struggle against Negro domination: "They were pilloried in public print, 'investigated,' time after time, almost as a holiday task, and 'reported on' by committees of hostile congresses. They were cartooned by the pen of Nast, their every fault was hunted out and magnified and set on a hill, for all the world to gaze at as typical of a 'barbarous people.' Their misfortunes were paraded as the well earned fruit of treason."¹ It took ten years of misrule and bitter humiliation to create the "solid South," but the work was done so thoroughly that it will in all probability persist for years to come. It is a familiar fact that social habits, especially when they become tinged with strong emotion, are the last to change. Claverhouse and the English dragoons are gone but the Scotchman still feels an antipathy for the Church of England. The fires of Smithfield and the Spanish Armada are matters of history only, but the dislike of Catholicism still lingers among the masses of the English people. It was most unfortunate for the Negro whose interests were so intimately connected with those of the white that during this period of crystallization of group feeling he was not only excluded but was identified from the very start with the outside forces making for the coercion of the white.

¹ Stone, *Studies in the American Race Problem*, p. 265.

The difficulties attending the social integration of the Negro at the South are largely the heritage of this period of conflict and alienation. Because of the extra-legal methods the white has been forced to fall back upon to maintain his group supremacy, both races live in an atmosphere of ill-defined and intangible rights and privileges having little or no basis in existing laws. Consequently the black is irritated by the feeling that the rights he really enjoys are far short of those which seem to be guaranteed to him by democratic institutions and he is tempted, therefore, on occasion to assert these technical rights in defiance of the sentiment of the dominant group. The result is very often the "bump-tious" Negro, a phenomenon entirely lacking in Jamaica because there the conditions are lacking that produce him. The white, having no other sanction for his attitude toward a weaker race than a vague public sentiment, is prone to be arbitrary, intolerant, and at times lawless. Since the sanctions of his conduct lie in the sentiments of the local community rather than in the nation at large, he is abnormally sensitive to outside criticism and has the uncomfortable feeling of a lack of poise, of unstable social equilibrium, because his life is one of constant protest and seemingly unwarranted self-assertion. All this the Englishman has wisely avoided by giving legal and institutional sanction to the dominance of the white group while judiciously encouraging those blacks who show capacity for positions of responsibility and power by admitting them to a limited share in social and political emoluments. "The social organization [of Jamaica] is therefore like a pyramid. The whites constitute the apex, the coloured class compose the middle courses, and the masses of the Negroes make up the broad base."¹

Again, the race problems of South Africa throw much light upon the question of race friction and social integration in this country. We have suffered from a lack of perspective and judicial fairness in previous discussions of our race difficulties because we failed to compare the situations here with similar situations in other parts of the world where whites and blacks are thrown together in large numbers. The striking parallel between the behavior of the whites in the South and in South Africa in their dealings with the Negro

¹ Livingstone, *Black Jamaica*, p. 237.

suggests that this race friction which on its face seems so irrational and unchristian may have its roots deep in human nature and may be, therefore, the inevitable accompaniment of contact between divergent race groups. We find there the same apparently childish insistence upon the acknowledgment of his superiority by the white in every relation with the black. Bryce relates the case of a prosperous Kafir for whom a white agreed to work on condition that his Negro employer address him as "boss"; the economic relation made little difference so long as the social relation of superior and inferior was recognized.¹ This seemingly foolish stipulation would be perfectly intelligible to the southern white with whom similar conditions exist. The fundamental law of the Transvaal, like the unwritten law of the South, declares that "the people will suffer no equality of the whites and blacks, either in state or church." All over South Africa the evidence of a black against a white is seldom received, and only in Cape Colony does he serve on a jury. The relations between the races are described in language which might be applied directly to southern conditions: "Even the few educated natives are too well aware of the gulf that separates their own people from the European to resent, except in specially aggravated cases, the attitude of the latter. Each race goes its own way and lives its own life."² The dining of Dr. Booker T. Washington with President Roosevelt on October 16, 1901, which aroused such feeling in the South and was the text for much criticism of that section by the northern press, finds a curious parallel in the entertainment of the Negro prince Khama, "a Christian and a man of high personal character," by the Duke of Westminster in London, 1895, the news of which "excited disgust and annoyance among the whites of South Africa."³

The striking similarity in the attitude of the whites of English stock all over the world when brought into contact with large numbers of the Negro race suggests that we have to do ultimately with a natural contrariety and incompatibility of race temperaments which prevent social assimilation and, therefore, complete social solidarity. This would lead us also to expect race friction

¹ Bryce, *Impressions of South Africa*, p. 367.

² Bryce, *op. cit.*, p. 375.

³ Bryce, *op. cit.*, p. 368.

to be most in evidence where the pressure from group contacts is the strongest. An unprejudiced examination of the race relations in this country will amply support this assertion. It is a fact the traveler may observe for himself that as he approaches the "black belt" from any section of the country the drawing of the "color line" becomes more and more unequivocal. The Negro enjoys many privileges in Massachusetts, where he constitutes but 1.1 per cent of the population and where consequently he is not present in numbers strong enough to make his group traits felt, and where nevertheless he has never enjoyed complete social assimilation. He enjoys fewer privileges in South Carolina or Mississippi, where he forms 58 per cent of the population, and where consequently his race traits and group habits are a tremendous factor in the social economy to be reckoned with at every turn.

With the increasing migration of Negroes from the South to northern cities the pressure from group contacts is inevitable, so that even in Boston, the home of Sumner, Phillips, and Garrison, the "color line" is distinctly in evidence. Negroes are discriminated against at restaurants, soda water stands, hotels, and even churches, while there is a strong opposition to renting flats to Negroes in aristocratic sections—a fact that may be paralleled in all the large cities and one that throws a curious side-light upon the "color line" in the North. This discrimination has been especially galling to the old aristocratic Negro families of cities such as Boston, who trace their lineage back to Revolutionary days and earlier and who, partly through sentiment and partly because they were a vanishing element of the population (census statistics seem to indicate that the Negro would die out in the Far North but for the new blood from the South),¹ had been admitted to privileges enjoyed by few of their race anywhere else in the world. By virtue of superior culture and business associations they belong to the white group and they "cling passionately to the fuller life,"² refusing to submit to the social ostracism that restricts them to the life of their own racial group. But in vain, for the racial differentiations which were always latent are now brought home

¹ Hoffman, *Race Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro*, pp. 35 ff.

² Baker, *Following the Color Line*, p. 219, also 188 ff.

to the social mind with growing emphasis due to increasing numbers. There is a growing tendency in all large cities to confine the Negro to certain sections, the natural result of the refusal of social assimilation.¹

Philadelphia, the city of brotherly love, has given us some of the most violent exhibitions of race antipathy and the history of the race relations in this city will show that race feeling is intimately connected with the pressure from group contacts. At the time when Pennsylvanians were nobly supporting the anti-slavery traditions of Penn and John Woolman even to the extent of threatened political complications with the slave states to the south because of the Fugitive Slave laws, the city of Philadelphia was the scene in 1834, 1835, 1838, 1848, and 1849 of race riots against the Negro of a peculiarly violent and brutal nature.² These earlier outbreaks were directly associated with the increasing number of Negroes in the state and particularly in the city; there were more Negroes in Pennsylvania in 1860 than in any other non-slave-holding state.

According to the testimony of the Negroes themselves, however, they enjoy more privileges in Philadelphia than in Baltimore and Washington with their still larger Negro populations. The race relations in Washington are particularly instructive in this connection, for they are unique in this country and in the world. There are in the first place something like 100,000 blacks in the capital city, while the whites number approximately 250,000. In no other city of the world do the two races live together in such large numbers. The Negroes are perhaps the most cultured and progressive to be found anywhere among the race today. In no other section of the country is there as much of the tolerant and even indulgent attitude toward the Negro as the ward of the nation; the spirit of Sumner is still in evidence, not only on the front of public-school buildings, but also in the free intermingling of the

¹ For Philadelphia, see DuBois, *The Philadelphia Negro*; for Chicago, "Chicago Housing Conditions, VI: The Problem of the Negro," by Comstock, in the *American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1912, pp. 241 ff.; for New York, Ovington, *Half a Man*, pp. 33 ff.

² Turner, *The Negro in Pennsylvania*, pp. 160 ff.; see DuBois, *The Philadelphia Negro*, pp. 322 ff., for race prejudice as it exists today in Philadelphia.

racess in the street cars and at public gatherings. The political situation is the best imaginable for the amicable relations of the races, for since the disastrous breakdown of representative government and the substitution of commission government in 1878, owing to the corrupt and irresponsible Negro vote,¹ practically all source of friction between the races along group lines has disappeared. But the "color line" is unmistakably present. It is in evidence at the restaurants, the theaters, the drinking fountains of drug stores, the hotels, in school, and in church. The two races live and move and have their being in widely divergent spheres. Aside from the legalization of the "color line," the segregation of the two racial groups is hardly more complete in Richmond or Atlanta. In the great dailies of Washington, for example, one finds little or no reference to the thought and life, the clubs, churches, or social functions of the 100,000 colored citizens of the city. So far as any apparent sympathetic interest of the white is concerned, they might as well be living in Haiti or Timbuctu. There is not the least doubt that were the conditions such as those prevailing in other cities, particularly in politics, there would be much more race friction. As it is there is an external attitude of kindly tolerance and indifference on the part of the white, with a deep and unmistakable undercurrent of racial antipathy.

When men realize the essential similarity of the forces at work, wherever race friction between the white and black occurs, whether in the South or in South Africa, in Boston or Atlanta, it is to be hoped that much of the sectionalism and ignorance which have hitherto characterized the study of the race question will disappear. When we recognize that human nature is essentially the same in Philadelphia or in Charleston, in New Orleans or in Cape Town, and that where groups of whites and blacks are brought together in these widely separated parts of the globe they will in all probability behave in much the same way under similar circumstances, we have at last laid the basis not only for the comprehension of this infinitely complex question of race relations, but also for genuine sympathy and mutual understanding between brother-men placed in widely divergent racial environments.

¹ Ingle, *The Negro in the District of Columbia*, pp. 64 ff.

An inevitable result of this racial antipathy found wherever whites of English-speaking stock and blacks are thrown together is the emergence within the social order of two distinct racial groups with very little in common apart from the most general participation in political and social institutions. This division of society into two groups is inevitable so long as there exists an unwritten law refusing social sanction to intermarriage between blacks and whites, and there is no possible way in which democratic or any other social or political institutions can prevent such a division. The group division will of course be less consciously felt by society at large where either the whites or blacks are very much in the majority. This explains the seemingly paradoxical situation that race friction is least in evidence in the Far North, where the Negro is a very small percentage of the population, and also in the heart of the "black belt" where the whites form a correspondingly small percentage.

This dichotomy of the social organism presents a very interesting situation for the student of the social mind. The social self is born and grows to maturity in the midst of a social heritage which is composed of the group habits and group ideals which have been slowly accumulated through generations of homogeneous group life. The perfection and the authoritativeness of the social heritage depends upon a long and unbroken group life. The self-poise of homogeneous and highly civilized peoples and their ability to produce men of high moral and cultural attainment is due to this feeling of the undisputed supremacy of group ideals among all classes of men. When an ideal or a custom fails to find the support of the group as a whole it speedily loses its authoritativeness and its educative power. For the same reason ideals or customs which are of fundamental importance for the welfare of the group as a whole receive the undisputed support of all members and those inclined to ignore or defy them are speedily eliminated.

The situation of the southern white where the social order is equally divided between two separate racial groups with habits of life and thought differing fundamentally from each other is a critical one. The social conscience owes its authoritativeness and even its very existence and with it the existence of the social sanctions

that guarantee a permanent civilization to a feeling of unity and social solidarity among all the members of the social order. But where there are two separate and autonomous groups this is impossible and the logical result of such a situation would be the disintegration of the social order entirely if the forces here at work were allowed free play. A permanent social order is possible only where one or other of the two sets of social values represented by the two groups secures and maintains an undisputed supremacy, or where there is a fusion of the two groups through intermarriage, which alone makes it possible for all the members of the social order alike to attain that similarity of selfhood necessary to complete social solidarity and a common loyalty to common group ideals. Of nothing is it so true as of the sanctions of human conduct that "a house divided against itself shall not stand."

This brings us very close to the heart of the race question as we find it in the South and wherever the white lives among masses of the blacks, and herein lies the justification of "white supremacy." When we eliminate the exhibitions of brutal race hatred which are usually taken by superficial and prejudiced critics as typical of the entire situation the alternatives before the guardians of white civilization are either the admission of the Negro through intermarriage to complete social solidarity which would eliminate entirely the dualism of the social mind in the most natural and complete fashion or the setting aside of the Negro in a group to himself and the insistence upon his recognition of the supremacy of the white group. This makes a *modus vivendi* possible. It seems hard that the Negro should be required to attain selfhood as best he can outside the higher cultural possibilities of the white group and subordinated to that group, and yet what other alternative would the social philosopher offer us? He certainly would not ask of the white group the supreme sacrifice of its ethnic purity which is the bearer of its social heritage and, therefore, the ultimate guarantee of the continuity and integrity of its peculiar type of civilization.

We are now prepared to understand why the full and complete social integration of the Negro is impossible. Such social integration as does exist must be based upon mutual concessions and

compromises. The conditions of the greatest harmony will be, as already suggested, where the weaker group accepts unconditionally the will of the stronger group. Conditions of friction will inevitably occur where the weaker group refuses to accept these conditions. "The most fruitful conditions of race friction may be expected where there is a constant insistence upon a theoretical equality of the weaker group which the stronger denies."¹ Starting with racial antipathy as a fixed and irreducible element in the problem, it is undoubtedly true that the farther we get from slavery and the nearer an approximation of the theoretical claims of democracy the more difficult social integration appears. It has indeed been asserted that slavery is the only condition under which a weaker race of widely different traits can enjoy intimate social relations with a stronger without friction.² It is doubtless true that in spite of fifty years of freedom, the Negro, especially in the South, enjoys as a race fewer points of contact with the white and is less an integral part of the social order than he was in the days of slavery.

¹ Stone, *Studies in the American Race Question*, p. 223.

² Shaler, "Race Prejudice," *Atlantic Monthly*, 1886, p. 516.

THE SOCIAL WASTE OF UNGUIDED PERSONAL ABILITY

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It has been pointed out by a number of writers that the well-known difference between the birth-rate of the well-to-do classes and that of the more rapidly multiplying laboring classes is fraught with serious consequences. It is asserted that the upward movement of the able from class to class, and from the country to the city, segregates the brains and the energy, the ambitions and the capacity of the nation in a section of the population which is dying out by the process of class suicide. Society is thus represented as selecting for extinction its most capable breeds and becoming in consequence an aggregate of increasingly mediocre individuals. One might well suppose from such considerations that the case of modern society is hopeless.

There is the possibility, however, that the machinery of selection does not work with quite the ruthless thoroughness imputed to it. There are a number of considerations which cast doubt upon this assumption. (1) The ability or capacity which leads to success is far from being simple, uniform, or commensurable. It may almost be defined as any variation which proves to be favorable in a given environment. There is probably no variation which would not prove of advantage in some environment. It is because successful people are so indefinitely different among themselves—are so many kinds of variants, in other words—that it is perhaps doubtful whether if they mated exclusively among themselves their offspring would be distinguished particularly from the offspring of the rest of the population. (2) Much ability, many of the valuable variations are the result not of inheritance but of development and specialization of effort only. The attention of one individual for some reason is drawn off from all other subjects and directed to one task exclusively; that individual succeeds; even ill-health by limiting the

number of personal interests sometimes accomplishes this end; a second individual lavishing attention upon several objects attends with conspicuous success to none. Here is apparently a difference in ability, but hardly a difference likely to be repeated in the following generation. Until exact psychic measurements are further perfected, it is hazardous to estimate the importance of the two sets of causes, hereditary on the one hand, and on the other those connected with economy and concentration of attention. (3) Ability receives its reward only when it is presented with the opportunities of a fairly favorable environment, *its* peculiarly indispensable sort of environment. Naval commanders are not likely to be developed in the Transvaal, nor literary men and artists in the soft coal fields of western Pennsylvania. For ten men who succeed as investigators, inventors, or diplomatists, there may be and probably are in some communities fifty more who would succeed better under the same circumstances.

In these failures of well-endowed individuals and in the artificial successes of poorly endowed favorites, there may be a crumb of consolation for the social biologist who might rejoice that a few brands escape the burning in which success consumes itself, but to the social economist the waste of social materials involved appears to be a most serious loss in itself.

Professor Lester F. Ward, in his *Applied Sociology*, has stated and elaborated this point of view most cogently. Following the way which he has blazed, it should not be difficult to point out certain limitations upon the social selections under discussion.

In the present discussion I shall confine myself to education understood in a broad sense as an agency in the selection of personal ability, for, of all the agencies by which individuals may be qualified to play a distinctive rôle in society and one in accordance with their inherited capabilities, education is undoubtedly the greatest.

The imperfect results which our educational system achieves are the result mainly of the undue abbreviation of the period of training for most individuals and of the omission of elements of training of real significance for the purpose of adjusting individuals to social tasks. The crucial question is whether all of those individuals are getting into the running who are capable of putting up the best race,

whether those individuals are being inducted into the traditions of science and of industry who are most likely to render those fields the service of large capacities.

The most striking fact which meets the eye from the pages of educational statistics is the abbreviation of the period of instruction for so large a part of the school population. Only a fraction of those who enter the elementary schools are turned over to the higher schools. The number of those who continue their education does not exhaust the talented part of the population. The handicap imposed by leaving school early consists not merely in being deprived of a vantage-ground from which an appropriate vocational choice may be made but also in the fact that such youth are almost certain to drift into inconsequential and totally uneducative tasks such as our society reserves as a heritage for the working boy. Every industry has its "boys' work" and in extremely few cases does such work afford a stimulus to ambitious effort or to personal development.

In the *Report of the Commissioner of Education* for 1909, the enrolment of pupils in the elementary and high schools of 1,024 cities and villages of over 4,000 population is given by years. The aggregate enrolment of boys and girls in these cities exceeds 4,000,000, so it appears that the returns are sufficiently complete to give them a high degree of significance.

The enrolment of boys is largest in the second grade, and drops gradually until about the fifth grade, where the enrolment is 80 per cent of what it was in the second. In the sixth, however, it has dropped to about 66 per cent, in the seventh to slightly more than 50 per cent, and in the eighth to less than 40 per cent of the enrolment in the second grade. The four years of high school show in terms of the same standard, respectively, one-fourth, one-sixth, one-tenth, one-fourteenth. In other words, making no correction for the somewhat smaller number of boys in the population at the high-school age, only one in 14 of those enrolled in the second grade reaches the fourth year of high school.

In the analysis of population according to age found in the census of 1900, the number of boys in the United States of age seven was 904,428, which may be represented by 100 per cent, and may stand

roughly for those of about first- or second-grade age. (The variation in the total population from one year to the next is not great enough to affect the purpose for which the figures are used.) It will be found that the number of boys of age fourteen constitute nearly 87 per cent of those of age seven; boys of age sixteen constitute 83.6 per cent of the number at age seven. It may be assumed that the age distribution for the United States (between the ages seven and sixteen) would not be found seriously erroneous for the 1,024 cities and villages reporting school enrolment.

With this assumption we find that between the second and eighth grades the enrolment falls from 100 to 38.6 per cent, while between the seventh and sixteenth years the number of boys in the population decreases only from 100 to 83.6 per cent. It may, therefore, be inferred that in these thousand cities and villages less than half the boys who live to a sufficient age are found enrolled in the eighth grade. More than half of them drop out in some earlier grade.

This leads to a point which has received fairly general recognition, that many times the youth who persists to the end of the grammar-school course or even through the high school finds himself even then in possession of no specific knowledge, skill, discernment, or qualification adequate to the selection or the accomplishment of the tasks to which he must presently address himself. A whole series of educational reforms are competing at the present time upon the basis of this general criticism. I shall refer briefly to but one of them—vocational counsel as a part of the education of the boy.

At this point I wish simply to enforce the conviction that the educational net fails by far of catching and holding all whom it is desirable, for the sake of the social good, to drag to the surface.

The explanation of the facts already noted lies mainly outside of the schoolroom. Ward has pointed out that among the really important factors conditioning individual success is "a social position such as is capable of producing a sense of self-respect, dignity, and reserve power which alone can inspire confidence in one's worth and in one's right to enter the lists for the great prizes of life." He quotes approvingly Professor Cooley's remark that "a

man can hardly fix his ambition upon a literary career when he is perfectly unaware, as millions are, that such a thing as a literary career exists." Nothing is more likely to prevent the selection and elevation of able characters than that a considerable section of the population should for one reason or another regard themselves as "counted out" of the running for positions of honor and responsibility. While this is a mental attitude less common in a democracy than in monarchical and definitely stratified societies, yet it is liable to be fostered increasingly among us in proportion as our population is gathered in industrial centers where the family as a whole, not its male head, becomes the unit of economic support, and children in consequence are early sent to work. Whatever the fluidity of American society forty or sixty or eighty years ago, industrial America in the twentieth century is not assured, by any mechanism of selection now in operation, of the automatic detection and utilization of the abilities with which its citizens may be endowed.

It must not be forgotten that ambition is a relative, not an absolute matter and that the horizon of the average youth is limited by the radius of the "vocational imagination" possessed by members of his family and social group. The cue to the explanation of success lies in part in the self-classification of individuals. We try to live up to what we suppose we are, just as the imaginary kings and queens who are sometimes met with give themselves the airs appropriate to their station. It is not only a question of what individuals are *able* to do, but also of what they are "*put up*" to do by the stimulation and suggestion of their social environment. If one were once accustomed to it, it might not prove so much more difficult to think with the prince in terms of provinces, or with the astronomer in terms of solar systems, than it is to wrestle with the exigencies of the cobbler's bench or with the daily problems of the locksmith or the tinker.

With a view to throwing a little light if possible upon the influences which shape the ambitions and plans of boys, at about the age when one-half of them have brought their formal education to a close, a simple statistical inquiry was undertaken at the end of 1910, made possible by the courteous co-operation of the public-school authorities of the city of St. Paul. Boys in the seventh and eighth

grades of eighteen of the larger public schools, 1,076 boys in all, wrote answers to the following questions: "Do you expect to go to high school?" "What is your father's exact occupation?" "What occupation or work do you think you would like best to work at all your life?" "Why do you think you would like this occupation?"

In the replies to these questions there is material for a rough sort of reconstruction in statistical terms of a part of the social environment surrounding these thousand boys. To understand a state of mind is as important as to understand a purely objective state of facts. While the results are in terms of expectations and preferences and will change materially in many cases during the next few years, it is believed that they throw light upon the working of the mind of the boy early in the period when vocational and career-making choices begin to be made. The replies of these boys reflect such factors as family ambition, degree of economic independence of parents, intelligence of parents, and, in general, varying outlooks upon the possibilities which life affords.

In spite of the difficulties in the way of a satisfactory classification of occupations, it has seemed feasible to classify the boys according to the occupational groups to which the father belongs. For this purpose eight classes have been made use of: the first group is the professional and includes such occupations as lawyer, physician, architect, musician, civil engineer, etc. This group numbers 54 cases. The second group is the mercantile, and is composed of proprietors of businesses, superintendents, traveling salesmen, managers, and all the better-paid commercial, industrial, and official positions of a non-manual character. It is a large group (358 cases) and membership in it implies bearing a certain business or administrative responsibility as well as what some imagine to be a kind of clean-handed respectability. The third and fourth groups are small (63 and 66 respectively) and consist of those following subordinate clerical and petty mercantile occupations, respectively. The type of the former is the clerk in an office and of the latter the clerk in a store. Both groups are non-manual. The fifth group consists of the skilled manual workers. This group again is a large one, numbering 298 cases, and the type is the man following a skilled trade such as the carpenter, plumber, machinist, etc. The

sixth group numbers 111 and includes the unskilled or slightly skilled manual occupations, such as laborers, teamsters, street-sweepers, waiters, porters, etc. The seventh group, which is almost negligible, is made up of 14 cases where the father follows some agricultural occupation. The eighth group consists of all cases not assignable to one of the first seven, and is therefore of no special significance.

Without going into further details, I may state briefly the character of the answers to the question, "Do you expect to go to high school?" Of the boys from the professional class 94 per cent replied in the affirmative; of the mercantile class 86 per cent; of the clerical 74 per cent; of the petty mercantile 67 per cent; of the artisan class 61 per cent; of the laborer class 54 per cent.

We may therefore conclude that for boys who reach the seventh and eighth grades (taking no account of those who fall out in the earlier years) the probability of entrance upon a secondary-school education is proportional to membership in the leading occupational groups roughly in the ratio of 94, 86, 74, 67, 61, 54, respectively, as we pass from the non-manual to the manual occupations.

Inasmuch as it is exceedingly improbable that boys of superior ability predominate in the non-manual classes in the proportion indicated, it is evident that here is one source of the leakage of ability, one way in which society does not get a chance to subject all of its sons to such further sifting and grading as is involved in the revelations of aptitude and potency made during a high-school course.

The answers to the questions relating to the occupations which the boy thinks he would like to pursue for life together with his reasons are interesting. In all, 990 boys expressed preference for some sort of work. Of these, 111 chose each their father's identical occupation, or about 11 per cent. Professional occupations were chosen by 59 per cent of the boys whose fathers were professional men. Of the mercantile class 35 per cent chose professional occupations. Of the clerical and petty mercantile classes 30 and 26 per cent chose professional occupations respectively. Of the artisan class 21 per cent and of the laborer class 16 per cent chose such occupations. Mercantile employments were chosen most largely by those whose fathers were so engaged. Skilled manual occupations were preferred by 9 per cent of the sons of professional men,

15 per cent of the sons of merchants, 18 per cent of the sons of petty merchants, 21 per cent of the sons of clerical employees, and 38 per cent of the sons of skilled artisans.

VOCATIONAL PREFERENCES OF BOYS WHOSE FATHERS' OCCUPATIONS
WERE AS FOLLOWS

Sons' Preference	Professional Percentage	Mercantile Percentage	Petty Mercantile Percentage	Clerical Percentage	Artisan Percentage	Laborer Percentage	Agriculture Percentage
Professional.	59	35	26	30	21	16	7
Mercantile.	6	25	11	16	5	13	7
Petty mercantile.	0	1	5	3	1	2	7
Clerical.	6	8	18	16	19	20	14
Artisan.	9	15	18	21	38	25	29
Laborer.	0	1	0	0	1	3	0
Agriculture.	9	6	3	8	5	4	29
Other.	11	9	19	6	10	17	7
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

While the cases in which the fathers are professional men are but 5 per cent of the whole number of cases, the cases where sons wished to be professional men are 28 per cent, or $5\frac{1}{2}$ times as many. Fathers who were in the mercantile class constitute 33 per cent, sons choosing mercantile occupations constitute 14 per cent, or less than half as many; clerical positions were filled by fathers in 6 per cent of the cases but chosen by 14 per cent of the boys. Fathers in the artisan class were 28 per cent, the boys choosing to be artisans 24 per cent. Fathers in unskilled manual occupations were 10 per cent of the whole, boys choosing such were 1 per cent. Fathers in agricultural pursuits were 1 per cent, sons choosing agricultural pursuits were 6 per cent.

There is evident in these figures a considerable tendency to choose occupations in the same general order of vocation as that in which the father is employed; thus three-fifths of the sons of professional men wish to be professional men, one-fourth of the sons of merchants wish to be merchants, two-fifths of the sons of artisans wish to be artisans. A still more pronounced tendency, however, is

to choose occupations of a more remunerative or intellectual and less manual sort than those followed by the father. Thus 35 per cent of the boys from the mercantile class want to be professional men; 37 per cent of the boys from the petty mercantile class wish to be merchants or professional men; 49 per cent of the boys from the clerical class want to enter the professional or mercantile classes and 46 per cent of the sons of artisans wish to follow non-manual or clean-handed occupations, while 76 per cent of the sons of unskilled laborers wish to be artisans or to follow the non-manual occupations. These figures illustrate very clearly the relativity of vocational ambitions. These statements of preference are conditioned by the vocational viewpoint established by the occupation of the father.

When we turn to specific occupations preferred by the 990 boys, the results indicate that the adventurous, the out-of-doors, the mechanical or electrical, and the supposedly profitable professions and crafts, the clean-handed office positions, and the occupations involving travel are strong favorites. The list of occupations preferred by ten or more boys is as follows:

OCCUPATIONS PREFERRED

Civil, electrical, mechanical, and mining engineer	139
Office clerk, bookkeeper, and stenographer	113
Machinist and mechanic	77
Lawyer	69
Agricultural pursuits	59
Engineer (locomotive principally)	56
Merchant and business man	55
Electrician	42
Architect and draughtsman	36
Traveling salesman	34
Carpenter and cabinet-maker	30
Physician	27
Artistic or musical pursuit	21
Store clerk	19
Plumber and steamfitter	17
Printer	13
Surveyor	12
Banking	12
Real estate	11
Druggist	10
Scattering	138
Total reporting preference	990

This is the way in which the vocational horizon impresses the average St. Paul boy in the seventh and eighth grades. That the emphasis is as far as possible from that placed by the actual demand for workers is not at all surprising when the fact is considered that these boys have probably never received a half-hour's formal instruction in their lives with regard to vocational matters, and particularly with reference to the preparation and qualifications requisite for the various tasks to which they vaguely aspire.

We teach our youth about the characteristics of geographical regions, the properties of numbers, and the peculiarities of language. As they go on with their studies we teach them the characteristics of chemical elements and compounds, the physical properties of bodies, the texture and mechanism of organic structures, both vegetable and animal, and their young minds unfold in the presence of a world richer and more complicated than they had ever dreamed. But about the qualities of men demanded by the world's work, about the rôle played by tact, by ability to meet men, by differing traits and tendencies of mind, as related to individual success in specific present-day tasks, we teach little. That the demands of one profession or craft are radically different from those of another, that the application of individual endowment to its appropriate task is a tremendously difficult thing, they learn only in the wasteful school of experience.

If we turn from aspirations to the actual "choice," so called, of occupations by American youth, we find still less of the rational and more of the accidental. As Mr. Everett W. Lord of the National Child Labor Committee (*Proceedings*, 1910, pp. 80-81) has put it: "Boys find themselves in their vocations as the result of custom, heredity, propinquity, or accident far oftener than through deliberate and conscious choice." Geographical and industrial conditions, for example, cut out the work of whole communities of people from birth, almost without option on their part, as Dr. Peter Roberts has shown so clearly of the anthracite coal communities.

A year or so ago Mr. Lord sent out "several hundred letters to people engaged in various occupations, asking them to answer certain questions. . . . Among the answers to the question, 'Why did you choose your present occupation?' . . . were such

as, 'Because that was what the other boys were doing,' 'Because I happened to get a job at that trade,' 'Because that was the principal line of work near my home'" (*ibid.*, p. 79).

After a time quite a number of people who have entered occupations haphazard stumble out of work to which they are ill-adapted, and somehow stumble into other work for which they are better fitted. Multitudes of other individuals, I am forced to believe, succeed just well enough at some ill-chosen task to be held to it until readjustment has become difficult or impossible.

The man who is fortunate enough to hit it in selecting or being put into a vocation succeeds if he has good abilities. The other man of equal or greater abilities, just as industrious, self-controlled, or sagacious, who does not strike that happy confluence of circumstances which makes his efforts bear conspicuous fruit, plods along, tasting most of the pleasures of life in the pursuit of activities outside of his trade or business—activities or interests, whether domestic, religious, fraternal, or recreational, which engage as great capacities as the successful man devotes to the conspicuous and interesting problems of his daily work.

After this somewhat extended although imperfect statement of one phase of the problem of dormant ability, it is unnecessary to do more than point out the very great significance of the movement started by the late Professor Frank Parsons of Boston and by educators in several sections of the country looking toward the provision of scientific vocational advice for young people as a part of their formal preparation for life.

In conclusion, the following paragraphs may serve to summarize the points which have been emphasized:

1. Society is suffering less from the race suicide of the capable, than from the non-utilization of the capacities of the well endowed.
2. One-half of our male population is not carried far enough by our educational system even to see, much less understand, the vocational opportunities afforded by modern life.
3. Of those boys who reach the last years of the elementary school very unequal selection is made, due to the poverty, lack of foresight and outlook entailed by a narrow and difficult social environment.

4. In their preference for occupations boys are guided by whim, contagious admiration, and ambition divorced from sound reason, oftener than by a perceived compatibility between personal traits and the requirements of tasks.

5. In the actual selection of occupations not even whimsical preferences are allowed to guide in very many cases, but rather the first remunerative opening in the local industrial mechanism determines the career of the boy quite irrespective of taste or aptitude.

6. From these causes there results an indefinitely great waste of abilities which remain in some cases undiscovered and in others misapplied.

7. While equality of opportunity cannot be provided by any mere change in educational methods, yet as a step in the direction of diffusing the opportunity of intelligent vocational outlook, every boy before leaving the elementary school should be given an accurate idea of the nature of the principal kinds of human work, the qualities demanded by them, the preparation required, the rewards offered, the advantages and the opportunities for usefulness which they afford. He should, moreover, be taught the rudiments of self-appraisal from the vocational point of view and should have the benefit of counsel with a professional vocational counselor who is thoroughly informed with regard to the industrial opportunities of the community and the means of entrance thereupon.

8. And last: Better vocational adjustments will link the real interests and energies of the spirit with productive tasks instead of allowing them to be turned to merely recreational activities which in the cramped monotony of industrial communities so often verge upon the unsocial and the criminal. Thus new energy legitimately released will increase the material conditions of happiness, and make men better neighbors and members of society as well.

WHAT MAKES A PEOPLE LETHARGIC OR ENERGETIC?

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It is usually assumed that the tone of a community, whether vigorous or apathetic, is determined by the prevailing traits of its individual members. Without disputing the importance of individual traits, the writer believes there are also general factors which condition the dominant tone of a community in respect to energy and inertia. The available productive energy of a society is not always equal to the sum of the physical vigor and mental acumen of all the individuals. Productive energy, like controlling beliefs, is largely dependent upon the social atmosphere by which it is surrounded.

Says Cooley:

The physical law of the persistence of energy in uniform quantity is a most illusive one to apply to human life. There is always a great deal more mental energy than is utilized, and the amount that is really productive depends chiefly on the urgency of suggestion. Indeed the higher activities of the human mind are, in general, more like a series of somewhat fortuitous explosions than like the work of a uniform force. . . . In the absence of suggestion the mind easily spends itself in minor activities; and there is no reason why this should not be true of a whole people and continue for centuries. Then again a spark may set it on fire and produce in a few years pregnant changes in the structure of society.¹

If "suggestion" in the above quotation be extended in its meaning to include anything that stimulates interest and instils hope in an individual or a people, his statement will be in accord with the most recent and advanced theories of the psychology of interest, effort, and energy, and will be very helpful in interpreting the vigor and energy of certain peoples as against the lethargy and inertia of other peoples of equal capacity.

There is a theory,² held by recent French and English psychologists and apparently verified by observations and analysis, that

¹ *Social Organization*, p. 328.

² Claparède, *Experimental Pedagogy*.

the energy by which our activities are performed may be drawn from either of two distinct sources. First there is the central reservoir or reserve store of human energy, available only for work that has an intrinsic interest and which draws the attention, not necessarily away from the work, but through and past its processes, and fixes it upon the purposes, or anticipated results, or upon certain pleasurable accompaniments which are previsited at its inception. Then there is the local production of energy within the nerve centers of the organ acting. With children the distinction between play and work is determined very largely by the source of the energy by which the activity is sustained. With adults the distinction is between interesting, fascinating work on the one hand and tedium and drudgery on the other. The former requires very little conscious effort and produces few toxins of fatigue. The latter requires constant conscious effort and produces many toxins of fatigue. The following table from Claparède represents this theory in graphic or schematic form:

CHARACTER OF WORK	RESISTANCE		EXPENDITURE OF ENERGY		TOXINS OF FATIGUE
	Of the Work Itself	Of the Reflexes of Defense	From the Reservoir	From Local Production	
1. Easy and interesting.	I	0	I	0	Very few
2. Difficult and interesting.....	10	0	10	0	Few
3. Easy and tedious or uninteresting.....	I	10	0	11	Many
4. Difficult and uninteresting.....	10	10	0	20	Very many

From the foregoing it will appear that the problem of accounting for the lethargy and inertia of some peoples as against the energy of others, or of the same peoples at different times, consists in determining the conditions which make unavailable their reserve of energy. Of such conditions we shall here briefly consider six.

Communism in property and industry causes societies to move in lockstep fashion, thus making all to conform in their stride to that of the most feeble and lethargic.—It is self-evident that any set of conditions which places a check or curb on self-expression, innovation,

and initiative, and which causes men to move in herds and to act in unison or in accordance with a prescribed standard will have a tendency to eliminate all rivalry, and will stifle interest by substituting, as the motive to action, the impelling force of necessity for the lure of hope and the suggestion of a personal interest. Kline and France in a study of "The Psychology of Ownership"¹ show that the principal cause of the "mental dulness, physical laziness, and lethargy of primitive races" is due to communism in property and in all their enterprises and undertakings more than to any other cause; and they quote numerous authorities to show that one of the most potent and essential factors in race development is a recognition of the right of the individual in the possession of something which he may call his own and upon which he may exercise his personal desires. Communism can demand no more than that each one come up with the average; and it is a fact of common experience that any attempt to conform to an average immediately lowers that average, since it is so much easier for the superior to slacken his pace or to lower his standard than for the inferior to increase or raise his. Thus does the average, by its own weight, tend to sink to constantly lowering levels.

Hypertrophy of institutionalism compels the individual to conform in his activities and manner of life to the mode or method of the group.—It differs from communism in that the latter lays stress upon the question, "How much?" The former simply asks "How?" Cooley, discussing the conflict between personality and institutionalism, says: "The timeworn question of conservatism as against change has evidently much in common with that of personality as against institutionalism. Innovation is bound up with the assertion of fresh personality as against mechanism. Wherever there is vigor and constructive power in the individual there is likely to be discontent with the establishment."² Again: "An institution is made up of persons but not of whole persons; each one enters into it with a specialized part of himself. Consider, for instance, the legal part of a lawyer, the ecclesiastical part of a church member, or the business part of a merchant. In antithesis

¹ *Pedagogical Seminary*, VI, 429 ff.

² *Op. Cit.*, p. 327.

to the institution, therefore, the person represents the wholeness and humanness of life; he is a corrector of partiality and a translator and distributor of special development."¹

This contributing by each individual of a part of himself to an institution is somewhat analogous to subscribing capital to a corporation. The part subscribed passes from individual to group control. Now if this subscription or investment represents a dominating part, a voting majority, of the individual's interests, then his activities, instead of being the result of choice, assume the character of tasks imposed from without. His successes and failures, indeed his very joys and sorrows, are merely dividends or assessments of the institution, over which he can at most only rejoice or grieve but which he cannot control. And when an institution numbers as its members all or even a large majority of the social group we have institutionalism "gone to seed." Under such circumstances even the "individual of vigor and constructive power," unless he be of that "sterner stuff" of which heroes and reformers are made, and is able to break the spell of orthodoxy and "regularity," will find if he tries to assert his personality that he is only the more heavily weighted by the institution which he serves. He will find himself as one of a number of persons who together are carrying a heavy load, such as a large beam or piece of timber. If the group walks bent and stooped he must do likewise; and the tendency will be for all to bend lower and lower as they proceed.

We are able, in a measure, to realize the great weight of the mediaeval church, as an institution, and its withering influence upon personality when we consider that the spell of its prestige was able to compel "the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, the successor of the Caesars and of Charlemagne," to stand clad in sackcloth and barefoot for four successive days in the dead of winter in the courtyard of the castle of the Roman pontiff waiting permission to kneel at his feet and beg forgiveness. It was the same menacing weight that compelled the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa of the "Haughty House of Hohenstaufen," when "overcome by emotion, awe, and reverence," and "in the presence of a

¹ Cooley, *Social Organization*, p. 319.

vast throng, to throw himself at the feet of the pope and humbly seek a reconciliation."

A too great preponderance of old men in places of authority and leadership is likely to be coincident with conservatism and compromise.—"Innovation is iconoclasm and sacrilege, and enthusiasm is only a milder form of insanity." Restraint and a calm self-control are the prime virtues. "Save your energies," is likely to be the advice of the aged to active energetic youth. But energy like the wine at the marriage feast is energy only when it is drawn out; and, like the manna of the Israelites, to be useful it must be used.

That periods of stagnation or depression in a country's history are likely to be contemporaneous with the domination of affairs by superannuates, while periods that are pregnant with change and reform are marked by the presence and influence of youth in the councils of state, is strikingly shown in an investigation made by B. E. Gowin at the University of Wisconsin in 1909 on the "Correlation between Reformatory Epochs and the Leadership of Young Men." In this a comparison is made between the average ages of the leaders in ten of the world's greatest modern reform movements with the ages of the leaders in times of quiet and conservatism. In the Protestant Reformation the average age of the leaders at the time of their greatest activity was thirty-eight years. In the Puritan Revolution of 1640 it was forty years. In the American Revolution the age of the leaders averaged thirty-eight years. At the beginning of the French Revolution the average of the eleven men who became leaders was but thirty-four years. Other periods and the age of leaders are:

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Modernizing of Japan.....	38
Awakening of China.....	38
Revolution in Russia.....	44
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In contrast to the above he shows that the average age of leaders in these same countries in times noted for their conservatism was from twenty to thirty-three years greater.

It is not true that a man who in his youth is active and energetic will always counsel the same spirit in others when he grows old. Clay and Webster were willing that the nation should fight for its interests in 1812, but in 1849 and 1850 they counseled expediency and compromise. How much of the political apathy and economic instability which culminated in the panic of 1892 and 1893 may be due to the fact that for the twenty-five years preceding we had been giving out as rewards all positions of authority and leadership to the men who had been discovered in the strenuous years from 1861 to 1865? Says Professor Ross: "A nation is easiest to thrash about a generation after a successful war."

A child will scarcely keep up with its parent if it must step each time in his footstep, but if allowed to run at its own stride will usually beat him to the goal. The same principle holds true in business and in government. It is too wasteful a process to require that youth spend all its years of vigor and enthusiasm in acquiring the stride and mastering the methods of its elders. "It was," as Ross says, "a red-letter day for progress when the lad became his own master the moment he could wield a warrior's arms."

Undue reverence for past achievements is likely to render society irresponsive to present opportunities and responsibilities.—It is said that the Emperor Trajan was once remonstrated with by some of the Roman senators for employing the resources of the empire in the conquest of peoples so remote from Rome. He was told that all the nation's resources were needed to hold in subjection the provinces that had already been conquered. The emperor replied that it was for the sake of holding what they had that the new conquests had been undertaken; "for," said he, "if Rome's legions ever conclude that their work is done and that there are no more lands to conquer, they will be unable to maintain their rule where it is now firmly established." Alexander the Great wept because there were no more worlds for him to conquer, but his successors, so impressed with the magnificence of his achievements and the grandeur of their own inheritance, were unable to hold even a part of what had been given them.

Says Bagehot: "A large part, a very large part of the world

seems to be ready to advance to something good—to have prepared all the means to advance to something good—and then to have stopped and not advanced. India, China, Japan, almost every sort of oriental civilization, though differing in nearly all other things, are alike in this, they look as if they had paused when there was no reason for pausing—when a mere observer from without would say they were not likely to pause.”¹ This arrest of development, this nation-wide lethargy, is not due to a sudden epidemic of *hookworm*. Rather, it seems to me, is it due to the fact that these peoples, like Lot’s wife, committed the fatal error of looking backward. Then being so filled with wonder and admiration at the achievements of their ancestors, they undertook as their chief aim in life to preserve these ancient glories from the shocks of change. But ancient glories, like old vases, are pretty fragile things and require gentle handling; and a progressive, energetic people is like a healthy growing boy; it is not easy for either to walk lightly or bear a burden gently. Hence rather than take chances with their precious heritage on an untried way they pitched camp and set themselves as a permanent guard over their treasures where they first found that they possessed them.

Physical, social, and economic isolation removes men from the influence of the stimulus of standards or goals of achievement.—The effects of physical isolation upon progress have been commented upon extensively by students of history and sociology. It has been the peoples who have lived off the thoroughfares of migration and commerce, and have thus been deprived of the stimulus which comes from contact with other peoples, who have furnished the data for constructing a science of social embryology. There are in Asia and even in eastern Europe sections whose populations are as different from the peoples who surround them as the child is different from the adult.

A traveler in some of the hardly accessible sections of the Appalachian region of this country will find Colonial customs and standards preserved with scarcely a modification, certainly with no improvement. F. A. Sanborn in his description of a “Rural New England Community” says:

¹ Quoted by Ross, *Social Psychology*, 209.

In the center of this room [a village storeroom] is a big stove around which almost every evening throughout the year are gathered the more sociable men of the community. Some are seated on a low bench placed near the stove for their convenience—a bench so whittled by a generation of pocket knives as to have lost all resemblance to its original form; others sit on counters or on barrels, and there are always a few restless spirits who lean against whatever is convenient for that purpose with their hands in their pockets. . . . Nobody ever starves in our village, although some of the folk who live on byways and in places which are less accessible are poor, ill nourished, and ill clothed. . . . We do not care much for learning of any sort. Our letters—which we put off writing till about six months after they are due—do not excel in grammar or in penmanship. And it is really astonishing to ourselves how little we care for what goes on in the outside world. There is very little ambition of any sort among us, and the modern principle that everybody ought to work every day and throughout the whole of every day finds no acceptance whatever in our New England corner. There is no man who feels that he cannot afford to take off a day for visiting, for partridge shooting, or simply for resting whenever he wants to.¹

The inertia of communities and societies, where the caste system obtains, furnishes the best example of the deadening effect of social isolation. "Among the Hindoos," says Cooley, "a child is brought up from infancy in subjection to ceremonies and rites which stamp upon him the impression of a fixed and immemorial system. They control the most minute details of life and leave little room for choice." Returning missionaries from India, especially those who have had to do with mission schools, ascribe the indifference and apathy of the Hindoos toward social and economic improvement to the social isolation imposed by the caste system, an isolation as complete and effective as if the different classes were different species of animal life, physically unable to amalgamate. Everyone realizes that he is born to his status and that no amount of personal effort can improve it nor lack of effort lower it.

The greatest value to society of leaders in social reform and economic enterprises who have risen from the lower ranks is that their example appears as a rift in the cloud of isolation through which others of less penetrating vision may see a star of hope. The greatest service that leaders like Booker T. Washington and others are performing for the Negroes does not consist so much

¹ *Atlantic Monthly*, LXXXIII, 89 ff.

n the industrial and economic training which they are giving, however great that may be, but rather in stimulating interest and discovering for them energies and capabilities of which they were unaware.

One of the arguments advanced by the people of the South against the abolition of slavery was that the only way the fruits of the Negroes' labors could be made to support them was to hold them to work at unskilled labor principally upon the plantations under the constant vigilance of the taskmaster. It was argued that to free the Negroes would be to make of them pauper wards of the state or private charity. But with freedom and the prospect of receiving a personal remuneration for their work it has been found that free labor is more economical than slave labor. Instead of their not being able to maintain themselves, they have in the fifty years since their emancipation accumulated property representing almost three times the value which they themselves represented as slaves, and still have left sufficient energy to secure at least a modicum of education for three-fourths of their number. And the reason was not that the Negroes were sullen and rebellious, refusing to exert themselves as slaves, nor that they did not fear the taskmaster's lash; it was because there was no motive in their work but dread, no interest to tap the reserve of energy, and no anticipation to counteract the reflexes of defense. All effort was at the expense of the local production of energy.

The practice that is being adopted by certain corporations employing large numbers of men, of instituting profit-sharing devices and special rewards to their employees is not a form of charity nor a distribution of "conscience money," but a coolly calculated investment. The prospect of a share in the profits of the institution, or a reward for special merit gives an interest to the work which otherwise would be lacking, no matter how conscientious the workmen.

Forms of industry in which emphasis and attention must be directed to processes rather than purposes are more taxing and require a greater strain of conscious effort than those in which the individual is working toward a definite end, and in which the motive is interest

*in the outcome.*¹—When we apply this principle to the study of modern industrial systems we can perhaps appreciate a little more fully the great draft which they make upon human energy. Before the dominance of the machine in modern industry, each workman in nearly all trades fashioned some article in its entirety. His interest was sustained by an idea associated with the finished product. Luther said: "It is only slaves that die of overwork. Labor is neither cruel nor ungrateful. It restores the strength we give a hundred fold, and, unlike financial operations, the revenue is what brings in the capital"—the conditions being, however, that "the worker put soul and self into his work." But how is it possible for a worker to bring a personal interest and enthusiasm to his work when his sole task is to perform a single operation over and over from morning till night upon bits of material that pass as monotonously as the telegraph poles pass the windows of a moving passenger coach?

In the shoemaking industry, for example, as many as one hundred men have a part in making a single shoe; each knowing little and caring less about the work of the man whose task immediately precedes or follows his own. A man takes his place like a piece of machinery with nothing to do (as employers are wont to say) but to see that his part of the machine runs regularly, to pull a lever here or throw a clutch there. The importance of the fact is overlooked that he must maintain an unblinking sentinel over all the reflexes of defense and that at the expense of energy produced in organs already poisoned with the toxins of fatigue.

And the case is all the more serious when these workers are growing children. It is a biological principle that any organ or faculty regularly prevented from functioning will atrophy. These child workers, denied the opportunity for spontaneous self-directed activity, shut away from everything that can touch their interests or provoke their enthusiasm, with no opportunity for developing a reserve of energy—is it not the normal thing to expect that they should develop into either listless, calloused dullards or unstrung neurasthenics?

¹ See Woodworth, *The Cause of a Voluntary Movement*; also Claparède, *op. cit.*

REVIEWS

An Introduction to the Social Sciences. A Textbook Outline.
By EMORY STEPHEN BOGARDUS, PH.D. Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 1913. Pp. 206.

This outline is a notable contribution to the pedagogy of the social sciences. It deserves careful consideration by every American teacher in any department of social science. It is getting to be notorious that we do not know very much about the psychology of social science instruction. The men who are most sure that they know how and when and where different aspects of human experience should be presented to students are most certain to be challenged by other men who may or may not have an alternative program, but they are not convinced that anyone's else program has found the way to do the most cumulative and comprehensive work. In particular, the most enterprising teachers are unable to convince one another as to a best way to begin college instruction in social science.

The first merit of Dr. Bogardus' attempt is that it is not provincial. It is not an introduction to one of our artificially limited departments of social science, but to the whole field of human activities which the different departments of social science survey from their respective points of view.

Because of, or in spite of, their previous school experience, Freshmen have a certain assortment of information and ideas about matters that fall within the scope of the several social sciences. In all probability the logic of the social sciences as it appeals to the maturest scholars is not to be regarded as a sufficient and final guide to the psychology of immature students in their contacts with social science. The pedagogical problems which we have hardly begun to solve in this connection are questions of relation between mental reactions at comparatively early stages of development, and the objective relationships which it is the task of the social sciences to interpret. Otherwise expressed, we have yet to find out what steps in exploration of human experience may be taken to best purpose at different stages of student maturity.

Dr. Bogardus' hypothesis, as represented by this syllabus, is that the best start may be made with college students, not by introducing them first to the special interests of one or another department of social

science, but by enabling them to make a general survey of the development of human activities. Such a survey is of course fundamentally historical in its perspective, and certain historians would say that it is nothing more nor less than history. No one need quarrel about that. At all events it is history which brings into focus all the sorts of things from which all the departments of social science want to make abstractions, and which they want to examine more in detail when their turn comes. The argument behind Dr. Bogardus' proposal is that synthetic views after their kind have their place all along the way of the knowledge process, in alternation with attention to particulars, and that it is good psychology to offer one of these general outlooks at the outset of the college grade of instruction in the social sciences.

Experience will be the teacher that in the long run will be convincing in this matter. It is gratifying that Dr. Bogardus has not only published his hypothesis, but is testing it under favorable circumstances with college classes. If he is right, the students who take his initial survey will presently do more satisfactory work in the more special departments of social science than they could have done without this preliminary orientation.

College teachers who are interested in the pedagogy of the social sciences ought to take the occasion presented by Dr. Bogardus' enterprise to help thresh out the proposition which he is testing. It is to be hoped that many other instructors will experiment with class use of his syllabus. It is not a course that interests sociologists alone. In fact it is an adaptation of the program represented by Schmoller's *Grundriss*. It might have been the work of a historian, economist, or political scientist; and it might be offered by one of these. If the principle on which it is based is sound, it is fundamental to all parts of social science, not to a particular department. Readers of this *Journal* are particularly urged to write Dr. Bogardus any criticisms or suggestions which examination of the syllabus may suggest.

The one caution which I feel like expressing at present concerns the "Suggested Topics for Investigation" at the close of chapters. They are, as a rule, over the heads or beyond the reach of the grade of students for whom the course is primarily intended. For example, I open at random to p. 61. On this and the following page are fourteen topics. They range from (1) "History of Playgrounds in Your City" to (11) "Overwork in the United States," (12) "Koch and His Value to Society," (13) "History of Medical Science," and (14) "The United States Public Health Service." My observation leads me to put a high estimate on

the utility of work assigned to college students on subjects typified by the first named. On the other hand there is great danger that writing essays on ambitious subjects like the last four will abort the process of discovering the difference between knowledge and opinion, and of making progress in finding out what is involved in exact investigation

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Soziale Pathologie. Versuch einer Lehre von den sozialen Beziehungen der menschlichen Krankheiten als Grundlage der sozialen Medizin und der sozialen Hygiene. Von DR. MED. ALFRED GROTHJAHN. Berlin: Verlag von August Hirschwald, 1912. Pp. viii+691.

In this book human diseases are discussed with respect to their social relationships and importance. The discussion of the different diseases or groups of diseases centers about the following points: The frequency of the disease; the most important manifestation of the disease from the social viewpoint as distinguished from that which considers the individual especially; the part played by social factors in the causation of the disease; the influence of the disease on the social conditions and activities; the social effects of medical treatment of the disease; and the influence of social measures and conditions on the spread and the manifestations of the diseases.

The special discussion includes practically all human diseases, notably the infectious and the sexual diseases, the diseases of women with special reference to childbearing, diseases of children, nervous and mental diseases, and diseases of special organs. Then follows a general discussion of the relative social importance of individual disease groups, of the interrelationships of conditions and diseases, of general methods of prevention, of the problems of degeneration and eugenics.

The book deals especially with conditions in Germany, being based largely on German observations and statistics; but the facts are representative and their lessons have wide application. Exception may be taken to the nature of the recommendations for the prevention of sexual diseases, but the book in general is sound, reliable, and has a distinct value.

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The Contributions of Demography to Eugenics. By DR. CORRADO GINI. London: Chas. Knight & Co., 1913. Pp. 99.

This brief statistical study by the professor of statistics at the University of Cagliari aims to bring together the significant figures which throw light upon the principles of literal "good breeding." The data, while scanty in regard to a few topics, are drawn from a wide range of sources, and appear to be painstakingly used.

The first problem considered relates to the effect of the month of birth upon the offspring. In European countries the maximum of births occurs from January to March, and in Italy it is during these months that the percentage of still births rises to a maximum and the mortality of infants is greatest; this is attributed to the inadequate protection of the people against the inclemency of the winter season. Not only is immediate mortality high for those born in winter, but vitality in after life, as shown by statistics of survival to various ages, appears to be diminished. In higher latitudes the summer months exert a similarly unfavorable influence, as is well known.

The next problem treated at length is the effect upon the offspring of the age of the parents. The author concludes (p. 74): "All data examined as to the characters of the children according to the age of the parents—their weight and length, their longevity, their intelligence and temper—agree in showing that the younger the mother at delivery the better are found to be the characters of the offspring." On another page (p. 87) he writes: "It is to be hoped that the knowledge of the improvement in the vitality of the offspring to be derived from the early age of the bride may spread. . . . To have shown and proved these advantages . . . represents, according to our point of view, the chief result of this article."

The author's views on the significance of the difference of birth rate between the higher and lower classes are refreshingly optimistic and afford a pleasant contrast to the cocksure pessimism of some eugenists: ". . . it does not necessarily follow from what we know of heredity that the children of the higher classes—if they were subjected from birth, or better, even from conception, to the same life 'régime' to which the children of the lower classes are subjected—would succeed better than these" (p. 83). He even ventures the opinion that possibly "Artificially to stimulate reproduction in the higher classes and check that of the lower ones would be equivalent to trying to improve society by increasing the duration of the life of the old and preventing new generations from taking their places" (p. 84). Degenerate individuals,

of course, of whatever social class, should be restrained from reproduction by the exercise of social control.

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The Larger Aspects of Socialism. By WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING.
New York: Macmillan. Pp. xxi+403.

This work completes the study of Socialism begun by Walling in his *Socialism As It Is*. The former volume treated the economic and political features of the movement, while the latter deals with its cultural bearings. The Socialist attitude toward science, history, morality, religion, education, and the relations of the sexes is presented chiefly through quotations from authors whom Walling considers most advanced in their views upon these subjects. By no means all of these writers are Socialists, but in Walling's opinion they are pragmatists—at least regarding the subject in question—and for Walling pragmatism is only another name for Socialism. The pragmatism of Professor John Dewey, according to Walling, *is* twentieth-century Socialism.

In one sense the work contains little that is new, being composed largely of quotations from other authors; at the same time, it is probably the most original work yet produced by an American Socialist, for it does not follow the beaten paths of European writers. It is also refreshing in its freedom from the formulas and stock phrases of most Socialist works.

In accordance with his pragmatic viewpoint, Walling looks forward, rather than backward. He believes that man will rapidly increase his power to control his physical environment and social relations, and that consequently social progress will be rapid in the future. His criticism of the science, "evolutionism," biology, and history which dwell too much on the distant past and too little with the present and future is keen, if at times somewhat overdone. These chapters constitute the strongest part of the work and undoubtedly will go far to give Socialists, as well as other readers, a more pragmatic point of view.

On the other hand, the chapters dealing with the position of the individual in the "new society," and the Socialist view of morality, are extremely disappointing. It is hard to understand how a pragmatist should seriously concern himself with the ethics of a society not yet in existence, the form of which can only be conjectured at the present time. We should expect a pragmatist to study the Socialist movement as it is and is becoming, in order to discover the morality that is actually being

developed by the life and activity of the working class. In view of the utopian method employed by Walling in this part of his work, it is not surprising that he selects Stirner and Nietzsche to express the Socialist ideals concerning the individual and morality. The ideals of these writers are far more characteristic of the declining petty *bourgeoisie* aspiring to more "freedom for the individual" than of the advancing proletariat which is becoming ever more conscious of its power through class solidarity, co-operation, and mass action. The psychology of the working class is not so much an "I" as a "We" psychology, and Walling seems to have missed entirely this fundamental characteristic. The ethics of Socialism will not be formulated by a Stirner or a Nietzsche, but by one who has come to feel the full significance of co-operation and comradeship.

In emphasizing the prime importance of a revolution in our educational system, Walling unquestionably sees more deeply than most Socialists. While the majority of his comrades are centering their thought on securing control of the means of production and distribution, he rightly declares that it is of even greater importance for the masses that there should be true equality of opportunity in the right sort of educational advantages for the children of all the people. Most educators as well as Socialists will agree with Walling that it would be a boon to the human race if the ideals of Dewey and Montessori were put into general practice. Here as elsewhere, however, Walling dwells too exclusively on the importance of developing "individuality," for while it is desirable that the individuality of all should be developed, it will also be necessary to create a strong sense of duty in the citizens of a society dependent largely upon co-operation and mass action for its existence.

It is probable that Walling's treatment of religion as nearly represents the Socialist view as that of any other writer, but a large number of Socialists, particularly the Christian Socialists, will take exception to his position, that fundamentally Socialism, like science, is irreconcilable with religion. While it was hardly to be expected in a brief work of this kind, a much broader and deeper study of religion in its social bearings is much to be desired in Socialist literature.

On the subject of the relations of the sexes, as on that of religion, there is much difference of opinion among Socialists. The majority will agree with Walling in giving great weight to the views of Key, Schreiner, and Gilman; but it is likely that both Socialists and non-Socialists will feel somewhat "up in the air" after reading the chapter

on this subject. The reason for this impression is probably to be found chiefly in the fact that Walling deals far more with *opinions* regarding what the relations of the sexes ought to be than with *facts* showing what they really are and are becoming. It would be especially helpful if a more careful study were made of the effects of present-day industrial and social development upon the sex relations among the members of the working class who are the ones who will unquestionably shape the morality of the Socialist society. Of course it is to be recognized that the working class of tomorrow will be considerably different from the working class of today; nevertheless it is by following the actual development of this class in all its relations that we get the best idea of what its life is likely to be in the future.

Throughout this volume as in his previous work, *Socialism As It Is*, Walling makes a great deal of the dangers of state Socialism. He constantly contrasts true Socialism with state Socialism and Collectivism. While it is probable that even the capitalists will favor the increase of state activities along certain lines in the near future, it is not likely that the majority of Socialists will share Walling's fears regarding this development. It is certain, moreover, that the majority of Socialists *are* Collectivists; so Walling is entirely wrong in setting Socialism over against Collectivism. For the work of a pragmatist this book is peculiarly unpragmatic in many of its aspects; one of the most striking of these is Walling's conception of a Socialist society which is to begin some time in the distant future, *after* we shall have passed through a period of state Socialism. A far more pragmatic and scientific view of present tendencies would be to hold that the Socialist society is already developing in our midst and that with the growing power of the Socialist movement these Socialist tendencies will be constantly strengthened until society will be organized predominantly on a Socialist basis rather than on the present capitalistic basis.

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CHICAGO

Sociology. (Russian text.) By MAXIME KOVALEVSKY. St. Petersburg, Russia: M. M. Stasulevitch, 1910. Two vols. Pp. 600.

Matthew Arnold in his criticism of Leo Tolstoy says (*Essays on Criticism*, second series, p. 254): "The Russian novel has now the vogue, and deserves to have it. If fresh literary productions maintain this vogue and enhance it, we shall all be learning Russian." There would be an equally good reason to learn Russian for the sake of its scientific

literature, not excluding sociology. Many sociologists of western Europe and America do not even suspect that, besides Novicow, De Roberty, Kovalevsky, and others who write in either French, German, or English, in Russia there has flourished for the last half-century a sociological literature which is unique and should be known by sociologists at large.

The work we are to review bears the rather too broad title of *Sociology*. Vol. I, Part I, is devoted to the methodological aspect of sociology, with special emphasis on the relation of sociology to the concrete social sciences. Part II contains a historical sketch of the development of sociology and is intended by the author to be an introduction to a larger volume, *Contemporary Sociologists* (Russian text, St. Petersburg: L. F. Ponteleyeff, 1905), which is similar to Dr. Paul Barth's work in Vol. I of his *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie*, and Faustus Squillace's *La classification des doctrines sociologiques*. Vol. II is entitled "Genetic Sociology" or "The Doctrine of the Starting-Points (Literally Moments) in the Development of the Family, the Tribe, of Property, Political Sovereignty, and Psychical Activity." The author also suggests that it could as well be called an "Embryology and Paleontology of Society." The purpose of his book is "to lead the Russian readers into the sphere of questions which interest the sociologists of the West, and acquaint them at the same time with some decisions which sociology gives regarding the origin of the principal social institutions."

In the methodological part of the work various conceptions of "what is sociology" are discussed. The author accepts Professor Ellwood's definition that "sociology is the science of the organization and evolution of society." This definition, however, he thinks, is but a more exact statement of what Comte called the science of the order and progress of human societies.

In the chapters devoted to the relation of sociology and the concrete social sciences the author goes into an interesting discussion of various topics and criticism of authors disagreeing with his point of view, but so detailed as to eclipse the real issue at stake. For example, in the chapter on "Sociology and Law" he rightly insists, and gives good reasons for it, that sociology should supply the jurist with some guiding principles for determining the various stages in the evolution of law and in this manner emancipate jurisprudence from its traditional metaphysical premises. Here he also debates the question whether or not the development of social organization is following some general law, and concludes, after a detailed comparative survey, that the gradual

transition from the clan and tribe organization to civic society has been, in all probability, by way of feudalism. In the chapter on "Sociology and Ethnography" there is a bit of interesting information worth taking the space to mention here. In discussing the claim that totemism is a universal stage among savage peoples, the author assures us that, so far as the observations of himself and those of his pupils go, there is no trace of totemism among the barbarian tribes of the Caucasus, and a thorough search among the rich Russian ethnographic literature reveals none among the peoples of the Russian Empire—a land area equal to one-sixth of the globe.

To come back to the relation of sociology and the concrete social sciences, we may sum up in the author's words: "The concrete social sciences, though furnishing sociology with materials for its synthesis, must at the same time base their empirical generalizations upon those general laws of coexistence and development which sociology, as the science of the order and progress of human society, is called upon to establish." As to sociology itself, he warns against the monistic bias which many sociologists possess. He rejects any one "all-determining social force," be it economic or psychological, and recommends the historical comparative synthesizing method as best adapted for sociological research.

The second volume, as already mentioned, the author calls "Genetic Sociology." He finds this branch of sociology of special interest to the Russians because of the extraordinarily rich ethnographic material possessed by them, which in spite of generations of research is by no means fully treated. He divides his material into the ethnographic—with special attention to the survivals of the matronymic family, of exogamy, of animism, etc.—and the historical-legendary, containing a large mass of folklore. Employing the historical comparative method, he is careful not to overestimate anything and to draw his conclusions from premises which admit of being checked up by comparison. Thus he hopes to be able to point out how all aspects of the social life are psychically related to one another and how they interact, resulting in various social institutions. His argument that it is impossible to establish a criterion of primitiveness from ethnography, since it does not put us face to face with the primitive conditions of mankind, leads him to a hypothesis of primitive man, which is formed by way of successive conclusions not only from ethnography but also from animal life. This leads to an analysis of the social and family life of animals, which then is considered as the starting-point of the human family and the

human horde or herd. In these chapters the much-debated topics of the matronymic family and sexual taboos are thoroughly discussed. The author favors the view which ascribes priority to the matronymic order. He also thinks that the most primitive sex taboo was limited to the mother, as can be also observed among anthropoid apes. The tribe has not grown out of the family, it is rather a human herd which grew through the integrating influences of taboo, of exogamy, and of the elimination of the blood vengeance within the group. Exogamy has originated as a means of stopping the bloody feuds and quarrels for the possession of women and thus protecting the tribe against annihilation. Gradually with the transition into an agricultural state of life and the increase of property, which he thinks had its beginning in the fear of contagious magic, the regulative functions of the group differentiated into simple forms of government, which in its turn hastens the decay of the tribal forms of organization. Agriculture and private property make slavery possible and profitable. The latter institution encourages raids and conquests which coerce the weaker tribes to confederate or be absorbed by their enemies. War and conquest give opportunity for leadership. The successful leader gradually rises over his tribesmen in wealth and power and is able to dictate to and subordinate them. This situation prepares the way for feudalism. Along with these developments of property and government, and from its psychical aspect intrinsically related, goes on the development of religion. According to our author it has its roots in an animistic conception of nature, in fear of departed ancestors, in dreams, etc. Fetishism, totemism, animal and plant cults, and finally the worship of the cosmic forces of nature are the earlier forms of expression in religion. This is briefly the gist of the "Genetic Sociology."

Although the foregoing argument is more or less familiar, it is richly illustrated by old and new ethnographic material, some of which has been gathered by the author himself in his expeditions among the barbarian tribes of the Russian Empire. His interpretation of exogamy is original and finds support in a later independent research by W. M. Strong, described in an article on "The Origin of Exogamy," *Sociological Review*, V, No. 4. His view on the origin of religion is a little out of date, being based on the animistic hypothesis of Tylor. This, however, does not diminish the value of his illustrative material, which would lend itself as well to the recent interpretations of Miss Jane Harrison (in *Themis*), and Émile Durkheim (in *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*). The main defect of Kovalevsky's work is its lack

of terseness and clearness in arrangement of the great bulk of valuable subject-matter. Had he supplemented his volumes by an outline and index of the contents he would have added much to their practical usefulness. Aside from these minor defects we have in Kovalevsky's work a real and valuable contribution to sociology.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

JULIUS F. HECKER

American City Government. By CHARLES A. BEARD. New York: Century Co., 1912. Pp. x+420.

American City Government is, in the words of the author, "a survey of newer tendencies" in municipal government with special emphasis upon its economic and social functions. It is not intended as a profound or comprehensive treatise. Its real worth lies in the happy manner in which a popular presentation in terms of human interest of some modern city problems has been combined with a commendable degree of scientific accuracy. The general reader will here find a most interesting and valuable account of the interplay of the economic, social, political, and legal forces that condition municipal development and which is so essential to an intelligent appreciation of its problems. The volume should materially stimulate popular interest in municipal affairs.

The work is divided into fourteen chapters dealing with such subjects as home rule, budgetary reform, public utilities, municipal ownership, crime and vice, tenement house problems, municipal recreation, and city-planning. The writer's treatment of home rule is especially strong, giving an excellent summary of the arguments pro and con and frankly admitting the difficulties of the problem. The writer's ability to popularize what is unusually dry and barren is best evidenced, perhaps, in his treatment of the city's budget in which the differences in the city's social efficiency resulting from an effective financial administration and the wasting of public funds are vividly set forth. In the final chapter, which deals with city-planning and municipal art, a convincing plea is made for social utility as the basis for all such work, while the superficiality of most efforts along this line is arraigned with telling effect.

The whole work is characterized by a frankness and sanity that is both pleasing and persuasive. The continual insistence that municipal reform is only begun with the passage of appropriate legislation and that the great, unceasing conflict must be for its adequate enforcement is

both forceful and timely. That the mere passage of reform legislation is not a panacea for municipal ills is an idea which the public has seemed incapable of grasping but which the author has argued consistently and effectively. Finally, without minimizing the importance of local problems, he takes the sound position that such problems are ultimately based upon fundamental, social, and economic evils which only the state and nation can successfully assail. Among these evils are long hours, low wages, and extensive periods of unemployment. "A great deal can be done by the city to make the living and working conditions within its borders better, but when the city has done its utmost, many of the fundamental evils will remain untouched at the real source" (p. 386).

A few inaccuracies have crept into the work, as where the statement is made that a state legislature may at any time seize a municipal water plant and "transfer it to a private corporation on such terms as it may choose to provide" (p. 36). It would be quite difficult to find any legal authority for so startling a proposition. On the whole, however, the book is generally free from the inaccuracies, the superficiality, and the bias that too frequently characterize popular treatises of like nature, and it will undoubtedly fill a distinctive need. The usefulness of the volume is enhanced by an excellent index. The appendices contain an outline of sections for a model street railroad franchise, the recommendations of the New York City Commission on Congestion, and a select, classified bibliography.

ARNOLD B. HALL

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

The Quest of the Best: Insights into Ethics for Parents, Teachers, and Leaders of Boys. By WILLIAM DEWITT HYDE. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1913. Pp. vi+267. \$1.00 net.

According to the author, boys are *by nature* slovenly, gluttonous, mischievous, lazy, prodigal, cowardly, untruthful, thieving, tardy, disorderly, vulgar, awkward, contentious, treacherous, conceited, licentious, vindictive, and murderous. The aim of the book is to show the element of good which these vices may indicate, the inefficiency of goodness by constraint and the efficiency of personal friendship and example in building up an inner control and the quest of what is best in the light of one's own largest good and the equal good of others and of all.

One may take exception to the general indictment if it is made to carry more than the fact that adjustments to the social order are necessarily faulty in the immature by virtue of inexperience, poor example,

and defective nurture. Probably an equally good case can be made out for the exact opposites of these vices, and possibly the fact is that, with the vast majority of boys, moral adjustments are made according to the moral efficiency and practices of the enveloping group. If so, what is called badness or goodness *by nature* loses practically all of its individual moral color, the remaining pigment being due to heredity in the form of a sound or damaged nervous system.

In addition to the sane and reflective treatment of the specific ethical problems of boy-life, the author adds a chapter on "The Birth-right of the Child," in which he treats very briefly such subjects as child-labor, industrial education, vocational guidance, the playground movement, the juvenile court, and clubs and associations. The quotation on page 251 is probably from Judge Julian W. Mack, William being a misprint. As is indicated in the subtitle and introduction, the book is not intended for boys, but for those responsible for their training. The adult reader, however, may not enjoy the repetition which seems rather suited to less mature minds.

ALLAN HOBEN

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Le syndicalisme et la prochaine révolution. By DUFOUR, Former Professor of Political Economy.

Within its professed limits this work is an excellent presentation of the position of the French Syndicalists. It should take equal rank with Paul Louis' *Le syndicalisme contre l'état*. These limits are that it deals with France only, and that it presents the arguments of the movement in an abstract and logical form without undertaking in any degree to describe the movement itself. It describes, not the world-wide movement loosely called Syndicalism, but the doctrine of the French school, which the author regards as "perfectly coherent, perfectly demonstrable, and perfectly demonstrated."

A large part of the work consists in the usual Syndicalist reaffirmation of ultra orthodox Marxism. The middle class is absolutely of no consequence (p. 58). The liberal professions are all bitter enemies of syndicalism (p. 180). Labor is absolutely one and indivisible, and every strike is a class-struggle (p. 181). The submission of present governments to financial oligarchies is a permanent feature of every political government (p. 184). Syndicalism will force the small agriculturists to abandon their farms (p. 436).

The expropriation of the middle class and the increase of the misery

of the working class, however, have not taken place to the degree political Socialists had hoped for (*sic*) (p. 222). Moreover the working class is divided, but only by ideas, not on economic lines. Strange, this refusal of Socialists and Syndicalists alike to accept an economic explanation for the increasing class struggles between the upper and lower classes of labor!

Combined with this orthodox Marxism is a large measure of pure anarchy. The mixture is by no means merely mechanical, but is rather to be likened to a chemical combination, for every close student must admit that Syndicalism is neither Marxism nor Anarchism. Typical anarchical statements are the following: The state is a parasite without any economic function; universal suffrage is one of the chief obstacles to social revolution (p. 181); any economic action of the state is an interference with the normal process of production (p. 186); such activities must be reduced, and the sovereignty of the state abolished; to make a revolution means to the Syndicalist to destroy all government institutions, to the Socialist it means to take possession of the state.

But in spite of these anarchist positions, the Syndicalist is no Anarchist even in practical life. Dufour points out that French Syndicalists often vote for Socialists, even when they refuse to allow their unions to have any relations with the Socialist party. This seems to show, then, that the statement that "in France the Socialist party has no serious influence on the working class" is only partially true. There is, on the contrary, much in common between the two movements, especially on this fundamental proposition, mentioned by Dufour, that until the Socialists control society, legislation cannot raise wages in proportion to the increasing productivity of machinery. Nor do the French Syndicalists believe that this can be accomplished by labor union any more than by political action. In this respect they are to be contrasted with the so-called Syndicalists of England and America who are opportunistic, economic Socialists believing in the immediate possibility of forcing capitalism back step by step through labor-union action and without a revolution.

The American and British Syndicalists are interested in partial strikes and sabotage. The French Syndicalists are interested in general strikes, insurrection, and disintegration of the army. The French are more Socialistic than the others, but they are also more tied to traditions of the past, and especially to the traditions of violent revolutions which naturally reign among the French working people.

Dufour, for example, is an evident admirer of Marat. He does not

counsel violence, unless the ruling class resists, but he predicts that they will resist. So, in his concluding paragraph, the most emphatic position possible, he advises the Revolutionists to remember all the infamies that will have been committed against them by the *bourgeoisie* in order to defeat the establishment of a new régime. "Any individual who will then be coward enough to make an appeal to our pity should be immediately struck down. A blood bath must be proclaimed against the ruling class and must equal the total of all those they have practiced for a century on the workers. Even then it will never be possible to settle the debt that the employing class owes to the working class." The book gives an accurate and consistent summary of the French Syndicalist doctrine.

WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING

LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK.

Art for Life's Sake. By CHARLES H. CAFFIN. The Prang Co. 1913.

Mr. Caffin has discussed aristocratic and democratic ideals in art and life, education, nature as the material of art, beauty, ugliness, naturalism and realism, religion, morality, machinery, from the standpoint of aesthetic aims. His purpose may be stated in his own words: "I have tried to show that the idea of Beauty, not metaphorically but actually, involves whatever makes for the Healthful and Happy Growth of the Individual and Collective Life. Inspired by this ideal of Beauty and working through the methods of the artist, men and women may become artists of their own lives and co-operate as artists in the whole life of the community." The very suggestive treatment of this worthy theme did not need the lavish use of capitals to make it vigorous and impressive. The argument is strong and convincing.

C. R. HENDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

La Identificacion Dactiloscopica. Per FERNANDO ORTIZ. Habana: Imp. "La Universal," 1913. Pp. 282.

Our Cuban neighbors keep in touch with the studies of criminology and have given us a good treatise on the "finger-print system" of identification. The various methods are described historically and analytically, and the entire technique is presented with effective illustrations. The applications of the system of identification to civil affairs may prove to be as valuable as they have been found in connection with criminality.

C. R. HENDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Task of Social Hygiene. By HAVELOCK ELLIS. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1912. Pp.xv+414. \$2.50 net.

The reader who takes up this book with the expectation of being given a discussion of public health and sanitation in the purely physical sense will be at first disappointed, then interested, and at length either delighted or shocked, according to the particular type of mind to which he may belong. We recommend those who do not feel able to put up with a tolerably frank discussion of social problems and a well-considered but biting criticism of certain prevalent social and moral attitudes to leave the book alone. Others will find it a stimulating critical discussion of some very live topics.

Havelock Ellis is probably best known to most of us as the author of *Man and Woman* and *The Criminal*, as editor of the "Mermaid" series, and more recently as author of a fascinating series of essays on dreams. His studies in the psychology and ethics of sex, to which *Man and Woman* was merely a preliminary, are naturally familiar to a comparatively small circle of psychologists, medical men, and sociologists. In fact his work in this line—pursued as he tells us in the postscript to the last volume of the *Psychology of Sex* and the preface to the present volume for a quarter of a century—is probably better known in Germany than in either the United States or England. It is perhaps regrettable that his remarkably broad-minded *Sex in Relation to Society*, voluminous as it is with the digested observation and investigation of thirty years, illumined by a genuinely sincere rational earnestness to get at the truth, and extraordinarily free from preconceived conceptions, either "scientific," moral, or religious—unless a firmly rooted desire to see progress follow both nature and reason toward the free and full unfolding of life's finest possibilities be such—should not have a wider circle of readers. For such as do not care to take the time for the fuller and more technical presentation we recommend this more popular presentation of the task of what the author calls social hygiene.

By social hygiene we are to understand "what was formerly known as social reform," or, even more broadly, "the study of those things which concern the welfare of human beings living in societies." Out of the infinite number of problems the author obviously might have selected for discussion under so broad a heading, he naturally chooses those which seem to him very essential and very fundamental. "It is the task of this hygiene not only to make sewers, but to remake love, and to do both in the same large spirit of human fellowship, to ensure finer individual development and a larger social organization."

Social reform, as such, which arose out of English industrialism, has gone through four stages, according to the author's analysis: sanitation, factory legislation, the extension of the scope of education, and finally, puericulture, which last finds its fullest development today in France, but is rapidly extending, under the influence of eugenics and what we may call the modern cult of the child, to England and even (as the establishment of the Federal Children's Bureau suggests) to the United States. With this last movement—"the effort to guard the child before the school age, even at birth, even before birth, by bestowing due care on the future mother"—social reform goes as far as it can, and social hygiene in a broader and deeper sense must be set to work. This next stage, the essential idea in which seems generally speaking to be eugenics, "cannot fail to take us to the very source of life itself, lifting us beyond the task of purifying the conditions, and laying on us the further task of regulating the quantity and raising the quality of life at its very source." When it "became generally realized that it was possible to limit offspring without interfering with conjugal life, a step of immense importance was achieved" because with this knowledge procreation becomes a deliberate act, and through control of reproduction a new conception of social hygiene is rendered possible.

It follows that the unthinking people who decry any limitation of the birth-rate get short shrift with Mr. Ellis. His chapter on the declining birth-rate shows as fine and accurate appreciation of the real ethics of the population problem as we have found, albeit it contains one or two rather obvious overstatements. We recommend that those who hold to the military and selectionist view of population give this chapter a thoughtful reading.

It is not without reason that the second chapter is a republication of a paper on "the changing status of women" originally written in 1888, for in the author's view a complete change is necessary to the carrying-out of the new hygiene which will be quite as much in woman's hands as man's. We find him accordingly a consistent and thoughtful feminist, with a vivid consciousness of the powerful progressive significance of the woman's movement, and at the same time a keen critic of what he considers its shortcomings and dangers, especially in the United States and England. In this volume as in the *Sex in Relation to Society*, he emphatically points out the ethical and biological indispensability of economic independence of women. It will, he says, certainly tend to restore to sexual selection its due weight in human development. One is put somewhat at a loss to know how to judge Mr. Ellis' ideals of what the

woman movement ought to accomplish. He sees great possibilities in the eugenics movement, and his long study of sex matters from a thoroughly rationalistic point of view has made him, one usually feels, a champion of the right and duty of women to free and unhampered development. At times, however, he comes perilously near to falling into the usual masculine fallacy of saying that women "are different" and then proceeding to lay down a law of development for them according to some preconceived masculine conception of just wherein the difference is to be found. One can rarely accuse this writer, however, of ever preconceiving anything. He has been considerably influenced by Ellen Key (or is the debt the other way?) but he is remarkably free from the false and wishy-washy sentimentalism which too often characterizes the worshipers of motherhood. Nevertheless, he finds the true ideals for the woman's movement not in England or America, but in Germany, where Die Neue Generation, the Bund für Mutterschutz are to our notion, putting the emphasis on woman's freedom to self-development *as a sex* rather than as human beings. Mr. Ellis seems to think, with Ellen Key, that there is no median ground between two extremes, the one putting the whole emphasis on woman as mother, the other what Ellen Key "regards as the American conception of progress in woman's movements, that is to say, the tendency of women to seek to capture the activities which may be much more adequately fulfilled by the other sex." "Women," he concedes, "need free scope for their activities—and the earlier aspirations of feminism are thus justified—but they need it . . . to play their part in that field of creative life which is peculiarly their own." Whatever the large element of truth in it, this smacks too much of the sort of thing we get from writers like Dr. C. W. Saleeby. Mr. Ellis should see that this mode of expression, if not of thought, plays directly into the hands of those, now rapidly diminishing in number and influence, who wish to deny freedom and responsibility to women in any field. When he goes on to say that "the really fundamental difference between man and woman is that he can usually give his best as a creator, and she as a lover, that his value is according to his work and hers according to her love," we think he simply lets his literary ability get away with his science. It may be that for Germany the Bund für Mutterschutz in seeking to strike the chains off human motherhood is preparing the way for a larger freedom and service, but in our opinion both the Germans and Mr. Ellis are in danger of forgetting that motherhood, whether with or without matrimony, takes only a portion of woman's time, and, according to Mr. Ellis' own hopes for a continued fall in the

birth-rate, may reasonably be expected in the aggregate to take still less in the future. We recommend to him Anna Garland Spencer's chapter on the "Social Use of the Post-Graduate Mother." Nevertheless, whatever minor differences in point of view there may be, the reader will find his brief discussion of the German woman movement informing.

If we ask what definitely are the tasks of social hygiene, they seem to be the eugenic uplift of the race, the abolition of war between classes and nations (to which one chapter is given), and the establishment of an international language—some offshoot of Esperanto—which claims another chapter. It is not easy superficially to trace a line of unity through the last half of the book, although the chapters on "Religion and the Child," "The Problem of Sexual Hygiene," and "Immorality of the law" all do find a certain unity in the ideas of puericulture and the purification of sex and all that pertains to sex from the foulness and secrecy and commercialism into which, partly through economic conditions, partly through uncivilized human nature, and partly through the mistaken notions of Puritanism and the unholy influence of Christian asceticism, these matters have fallen. Space forbids any estimate of the rightness or wrongness of the author's views on sex education and attempted legal control of prostitution and liquor traffic, but they are worth attention.

A. B. WOLFE

OBERLIN COLLEGE

San Francisco Relief Survey. The Organization and Methods of Relief used after the Earthquake and Fire of April 18, 1906. Compiled from studies by CHARLES J. O'CONNOR, FRANCIS H. MCLEAN, HELEN SWETT ARTIEDA, JAMES MARVIN MOTLEY, JESSICA PEIXOTTO, MARY ROBERTS COOLIDGE. New York: Survey Associates, Inc., 1913. Pp. xxv+483. \$3.50.

This late publication of the Russell Sage Foundation is a highly concrete study of a specific emergency, a disaster involving an entire city in every phase of its life. A notice from the publishers states that advance copies were hurriedly prepared in March and sent to the Red Cross representatives at Dayton and other cities of the flood district. One value of such a survey lies in its application to similar disasters.

The study opens with an account of the tentative methods of organization adopted on the first day of the disaster in meeting the pressing immediate needs and in making some provision for the more extended direction of relief to follow. From this beginning the relief work is traced

in detail through its entire period. The concluding chapters deal with the situation two years later, giving a résumé of the final status when approximately normal conditions were restored, and, in the section on the permanent care of dependents, stating some of the lasting results as shown in those who had become charges upon the community.

The part played in successive periods by the army, the Red Cross, the Corporation,¹ and finally the Associated Charities, is brought out, the management passing to the more normal agencies as the situation developed from critical emergency to an increasing adjustment. The military control of the first months is an interesting phase, with its demonstration of the immediate use of an organized and efficient system in a municipality whose regular agencies and normal connections had been completely destroyed. The military supervision of the distribution of supplies and the management of camps, extending over the emergency period of the first two months, gave way early to a business organization with a definite constructive policy.

The account of the work of the Corporation is given in two of the most interesting sections, those on business and housing rehabilitation (Parts III-IV, pp. 171-278). They are a recital of the attempt to restore the bases of the city's life. The viewpoint was comprehensive: the aim, more or less completely realized, was to maintain and whenever possible to raise the standard of living. The statistics of the revisit of 1908 show that this purpose was achieved in a marked degree.

In conclusion there is a short summarizing chapter outlining "Some Lessons of the Survey," distinguishing successful measures from those less successful. Definite recommendations for future relief work are included. The survey is supplemented by appendices containing various official documents, additional statistics, detailed financial statements, the personnel of the several committees, and reproductions of the official registration and application forms.

Outside of its interesting sociological data and its obvious practical value, the study is significant in demonstrating the modern viewpoint and way of approach in regard to problems of relief. The method in San Francisco was democratic in principle; the plan of action was worked out under an administration maintaining a high degree of efficiency without the sacrifice of the essential human equation.

E. L. TALBERT

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

¹ The Corporation and Board of Trustees of Relief and Red Cross Funds, the official agency of relief.

Constructive Rural Sociology. By JOHN M. GILLETTE. New York: Sturgis & Walton Co., 1913. Pp. xiii+301.

This is one of the most useful books on Country Life which has yet appeared. It combines a wide range of topics discussed briefly but suggestively, with a list of references, chapter by chapter, which tempt the reader to further exploration of the field.

The social life of the country is approached by means of such topics as "Rural and Urban Increase," "Advantages and Disadvantages of Farm Life," "Improvement of Agricultural Production, of Farm Business Operations, of Transportation," "Social Aspects of Land and Labor," "Rural Health and Sanitation." In later chapters the working of the rural social institutions is traced; rural clubs, the church, the school, rural charity and correction are discussed. A chapter might well have been devoted to a unified account of the "Rural Family." Other important topics are treated, including a suggestive final chapter on "Rural Social Surveys."

Both the strength and the weakness of the book are connected with the breadth of the field covered. Any attempt to link the practical problems of rural life with the general principles of social theory within the limits of a three-hundred-page volume is beset with difficulties; in this work a certain expansion of the subject is effected by the attempt which cannot but prove stimulating. In general, however, the chapters in which the concrete predominates, and theoretical preliminaries are gotten over with speedily, are the more successful.

The first five chapters which are of a more or less general nature are probably the weakest portion of the book. Chapter iii on "Types of Communities" is not convincing as a piece of classification, and chapter iv is open to grave criticism from a statistical point of view. For example, on page 39, a considerable mass of entirely undated statistics relating to interstate migration is cited. Again on pp. 36-38 the author argues that since 3,687,564 aliens were admitted to the United States in the nineties, and since probably 78 per cent, or 2,876,300, of them settled in certain industrial states, and finally, since this latter figure "is found to be 67.5 per cent of the total urban increase of those states during the same decade," therefore we may conclude that from 65 to 70 per cent of the urban growth is composed of immigrants. Such a conclusion is hardly justified when we consider that the 3,687,564 upon which the argument rests is simply the total of incoming aliens entirely uncorrected for departures from our ports. The exact number of such departures is indeed unknown for the years previous to 1908, but they were un-

doubtedly numerous during the years of depression in the nineties. Apparently we find in the author's reasoning the double assumption, first, that the uncorrected total of incoming aliens during a decade increases the population at the end of the decade by their exact number, and, second, that all of the immigrants going to these specified states settled in the cities; of course, in general, immigrants do settle in the cities of our industrial states in very large proportions, but it is not good statistics to assume that 100 per cent of them do so.

Great credit, however, is due the author for valuable pioneering in a most fertile and promising field, and the usefulness of this book, it is to be hoped, will justify another edition in which typographical errors, occasional infelicities of expression, and a certain looseness of statistical treatment throughout may be corrected.

ERVILLE B. WOODS

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

Eléments de sociologie. Par P. CAULLET. Paris: Librairie des Sciences Politiques et Sociales, Rivière et Cie. Pp. 356.

The author of this interesting work declares in his preface that he does not intend to set forth any new sociological theory, but to offer a summary of results upon which the most authoritative sociologists are substantially agreed, or of points which, if somewhat divergent as stated by their original authors, may readily be brought into a synthesis.

He precedes each chapter by a bibliography. These bibliographies include only books that are accessible in French, the American authors mentioned being Ward, Giddings, and Baldwin. If one were to attempt to name the authorities upon whom he most depends, in the order of their importance to this work, the list would be somewhat as follows: Roberty, Tarde, Durkheim, Comte, Spencer, DeGreef, Bouglé, Worms, and perhaps Waxwiler, Coste, and Conséntini.

The author proposes a study of sociology, considered as an abstract science. However, he devotes the two closing chapters to plans of social amelioration; and, like others of the sociologists whose work he summarizes, he exhibits the hope that socialism may be so developed and modified as to prove an available program of progress.

In its treatment of "abstract sociology" the book is proportionally fullest on the subjects of method and scope, which occupy the first six of its twenty-two chapters. In replying to the question: What characterizes social phenomena, as a distinct class requiring to be studied by a distinct science? he recalls the answer of René Worms: co-operation

between the thoughts or actions of different persons, whether few or many; and that of Durkheim: external constraint, such as that of law, morality, and conventionality; and that of DeGreef: contractualism, express or implied; and that of Tarde: the contact of spirits in which thoughts and desires become the property of minds in which they did not originate. But he gives chief emphasis to the answer that social phenomena are a realm of finalism, that is, of definite conscious desires which, by a sort of illusion, even seem to play the part of causes. If it were objected that this does not constitute a ground of distinction between social and individual action, M. Caulet would reply that any desires that could be developed by individuals in total isolation would be, like the desires of animals, merely physiological phenomena, having only an indirect interest for sociology. It is true that desires, once evolved, like other elements of social reality, play a part in social causation; moreover, tracing the relation between desires and other social phenomena may be accepted as one of the several methods of sociology. Nevertheless he says that to regard desires as *the* social causes would be to imitate our ancestors who explained fire by "phlogiston" and life by "vital force." The argument at this point is a vivid reminder of the view expressed by the reviewer on "the social forces error."¹ M. Caulett correctly excludes geographic, ethnographic (biologic), and demographic facts (number, density, etc.) from the sphere of social realities, recognizing them only as among the conditions that help to cause and to explain the social phenomena.

In his attempt to synthesize the various answers to the question: What is the essential characteristic of social reality? the author happily imitates Le Dantec's definition of biological reality, with this result: Sociology studies those traits which are common to all social phenomena and absent from all organic or inorganic phenomena.

In classifying social phenomena he adopts the main distinction made by Roberty between social thought and social action. Far from regarding economic facts as the foundation of all other social realities, he teaches that without social thoughts economic phenomena would not be social but only biological realities, and that economic facts are effects, not causes of social thought, although, like many other phenomena, once produced they react powerfully upon their cause. His classification is as follows: (I) phenomena of social thought, (1) scientific, (2) philosophic, (3) aesthetic; (II) phenomena of social action, (1) economic,

¹ *American Journal of Sociology*, XIV, pp. 613, 642; and *Proceedings of The American Sociological Society*, V.

(2) juridical, (3) political. Economics, jurisprudence, and political science he regards as "the hierarchy of special sociological sciences." Some might be inclined to comment that if he were true to his definition which was given above, on the analogy of the definition of general biology, he would reserve the word "sociological" to designate studies of traits common to all the phenomena included in this classification, and not claim, as he does both here and in his later summary, that the special social sciences are provinces within general sociology. To place the phenomena of social thought and of social action in the two separate main divisions of his classification suggests the question whether it would not be truer to facts, and a better guide to investigation, to recognize thought and action as distinguishable elements in social phenomena or nearly every class, rather than as two main divisions of social phenomena. Science and philosophy are indeed made up almost entirely of thought-elements, but the practical arts which he classifies as actions are made up largely of thought elements, and in the aesthetic phenomena feeling-elements largely predominate.

The second "book" of the work is entitled "The Genesis of Social Phenomena," and the third and last is entitled "The Evolution of Social Phenomena." These two titles most American sociologists would have used as designations for phases of the subject-matter belonging in one "book" in a treatise on sociology. The subject of social origin and evolution is only briefly discussed.

The second "book" contains a most interesting introductory chapter on the relation between sociology and psychology. Here is set forth the doctrine of the "bio-social hypothesis," according to Roberly. This doctrine is that mentality, as well as individuality, is a social product, that cerebral physiology and sociology supply all the abstract and fundamental principles for the explanation of mental life; that physiology and sociology are abstract fundamental sciences, as physics and chemistry are, and that they are to psychology what physics and chemistry are to geology, that is to say, just as geology is an application of the principles of physics and chemistry to a special set of concrete problems, so also psychology is an application of the principles of cerebral physiology and of sociology to the explanation of mental life, so that psychology, like geology, is not an abstract and fundamental science but only a "concrete" science, depending for all its ultimate explanations upon the fundamental sciences from which its explanatory principles must be borrowed.

The more usual view among American sociologists has been that

while the content of mental life, which constitutes individuality and composes social realities, is indeed a social product, still the method and mechanism of conscious life is not necessarily dependent upon association but antecedent to association, and while the method as well as the mechanism of consciousness may require biological explanation, yet the investigation of them is a study so important, so exacting, and so different from the rest of biology, that it is proper to regard it as a science by itself; and furthermore, that this science of psychology is fundamental to sociology much as chemistry is fundamental to biology, and as every antecedent science in Comte's hierarchy is fundamental to those which follow.

It may be remarked that M. Caillet adopts the Comtian hierarchy of the sciences, though criticizing Comte's references to psychology, and justifying the absence of psychology as well as of geology from the hierarchical list by the "bio-social hypothesis" in the manner above indicated.

Following Roberty again, the author teaches that the four essential modes in which social thought appears, namely, science, philosophy, art, and action, form a true hierarchy, developments in each of the four following each other in a strict order of causal sequence. Science, in this view, of course, includes rudimentary knowledge of particular things. Comte's doctrine of the three stages is thus set aside as a universal generalization, but it is accepted as applying to philosophy, and as having application to other social realities in so far as they are interpenetrated by philosophical ideas.

In accordance with this view that each of the particular social sciences "constitutes a branch of general sociology," "Book Three" is divided into two parts, Part One consisting of a very brief summary of results in "social geography," "social psychology," "economics," "jurisprudence," and "political science," Part Two offering a statement of general principles of the life and evolution of society as a whole.

The following five principles of social life are emphasized: (1) the principle of limits of variation, due to the boundaries set by human nature and material environment, in consequence of which we find, not an endless variety of social forms, but certain types appropriate to each stage of evolution, which reappear among different peoples who have not imitated each other; (2) the principle of continuity, comparable to the biological principle of heredity, according to which the past shapes the present in spite of the will of men; (3) the principle of correlation, easily lost sight of by social specialists, according to which social activities

of one class modify all the other activities of the same society, and even produce theological, military, industrial, and other social types; (4) the principle of equivalence, based upon the importance of the simplest functions to all the rest, which excludes any hierarchical arrangement of social functions based upon their importance, and exhibits them in mutual subordination—that is, in equivalence; (5) the principle of differentiation, Spencer's principle of continual progression from confused homogeneity to definite and co-ordinated heterogeneity.

To these he adds that the fundamental law of social evolution is that social relationships first engender intellectual phenomena, but that intellectual phenomena, once present, so react upon their own cause that intellectual evolution issuing as it does from social realities yet is the basal determinant of social evolution.

This review cannot attempt anything like a complete enumeration of the points included under the heading of principles of general sociology as distinguished from results of the special social sciences, but one more point specially calling for mention is the fact that our author exhibits the "process" viewpoint, even saying: "There is nothing static in social reality, and nothing of anatomy, in the sense of structure, independent of function."

In referring to the agents of social progress he employs the phrase "social technician" (p. 333). He emphasizes the statement that the progress of any society can be effectively led only by an élite group which that society has itself produced.

No doubt, the rapid development of sociological thought in France precludes the possibility of presenting a complete system of sociology that would command the entire assent of all competent French writers. But the present volume derives great interest from the fact that it formulates not the results of a single system-maker, but that which an able scholar regards as a "consensus of the competent."

EDWARD CARY HAYES

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States.

By CHARLES A. BEARD. New York: Macmillan, 1913.

Pp. vii+330. \$2.25.

To those who have credulously found in the history of our constitution a story of inspired, harmonious statesmen, untainted by economic or financial interests, founding a government on the abstract speculations of political philosophy, this interesting and instructive volume will

afford a rude awakening. But those who believe that the problem of the fathers was the careful adjustment and compromise of the interests of conflicting groups, vesting the immediate controlling power in those groups whose interests were identified with the cause of order and efficiency, and who recognize that economic factors are the bases of the conflicting interests, will accept its main thesis with approval. To this latter class neither the theory nor the viewpoint will be new, although it is the first effort at a systematic treatment of the subject. It comprehends all of the scattering material produced by others and in addition much new evidence that now appears for the first time. Much emphasis is based upon the possibilities and importance of more thorough investigations along this line, the author declaring that the present work is but fragmentary and published with the "hope that a few of this generation of historical scholars may be encouraged to turn away from barren 'political' history to a study of the real economic forces which condition great movements in politics" (p. v).

The author's thesis seems to be as follows:

Different degrees and kinds of property inevitably exist in modern society; party doctrines and "principles" originate in the sentiments and views which the possession of various kinds of property creates in the minds of the possessors; class and group divisions based on property lie at the basis of modern government; and politics and constitutional law are inevitably a reflex of these contending interests" [pp. 15-16].

His application of this theory and methods of proof are indicated in his own words:

Suppose . . . that substantially all of the merchants, money-lenders, security-holders, manufacturers, shippers, capitalists, and financiers and their professional associates are to be found on one side in support of the constitution and that substantially all or the major portion of the opposition came from the non-slaveholding farmers and the debtors—would it not be pretty conclusively demonstrated that our fundamental law was not the product of an abstraction known as "the whole people," but of a group of economic interests which must have expected beneficial results from its adoption? [p. 17].

As evidence of the existence of a class spirit in 1787, the writer in his second chapter submits the facts of Shay's Rebellion and the popular advocacy of various schemes for the relief of debtors, such as the abolition of imprisonment for debt, paper money, stay laws, the substitution of land for specie in the payment of debts, and similar provisions, tending to show a clear community of interests among the members of

the debtor class. They were obviously opposed to a stable government capable of collecting taxes and enforcing contracts. Opposed to them were the southern slaveholders interested in a government capable of protecting the rights of slaveholders and keeping down revolt, the creditors naturally opposing the interests of the debtors, the holders of public securities which would appreciate \$40,000,000 through the establishment of a powerful government, the manufacturers and shippers who associated the adoption of the new constitution with schemes for protective tariff, and the western land speculators whose interests were directly conditioned on a national government of strength and efficiency. Chap. iii is devoted to the proof that the movement for the new constitution was largely created and supported by the representatives of this latter class. That the constitutional convention was in their control seems amply demonstrated in chap. v. An examination into the economic and professional interests of the members of the conventions gives the following results: Most of the members came from the towns or near the coast where personal property was largely concentrated; "not one member represented in his immediate personal economic interests the small farming or mechanic classes" (p. 149); forty out of fifty-five members were interested in the public securities, and fully "five-sixths were immediately, directly, and personally interested in the outcome of their labors at Philadelphia, and were to a greater or less extent economic beneficiaries from the adoption of the constitution" (p. 149). The cause of this is explained in chap. iv by the fact that the delegates to the convention were selected by state legislatures which in turn were chosen by an electorate subject to property or taxpaying qualifications.

In chaps. vi and vii the constitution and the expositions of it found in the *Federalist* are analyzed to demonstrate that its chief concern was with economic problems and not abstract conceptions of liberty and justice. An examination into the political beliefs of the members of the convention seems to indicate that these commentaries of the *Federalist* on the constitution accurately represented the political ideas of the majority. "It was an economic document drawn with superb skill by men whose property interests were immediately at stake; and as such it appealed directly and unerringly to identical interests in the country at large" (p. 188).

The four final chapters deal with the ratification of the constitution. It is contended that not one-fifth of the adult males and not one-half of those voting for delegates to the state constitutional conventions were

favorable to ratification. The final adoption of the constitution was due to the superior skill and greater resources of its advocates. In analyzing the vote, the movement for ratification seemed to center "particularly in the regions in which mercantile, manufacturing, security, and personalty interests generally had their greatest strength" (p. 290). "The opposition to the constitution almost uniformly came from the agricultural regions and from the areas in which debtors had been formulating paper money and other depreciatory schemes" (p. 291). An analysis of the contemporary literature dealing with the contest for ratification seems to justify the foregoing conclusions.

While some may differ as to the relative value of the evidence submitted by Professor Beard and decline to accept in detail all of his interpretations, yet none will deny that new light has been thrown upon this important question and that to a limited extent at least his position is unassailable. The author's attitude throughout has seemed fair and honest. He has scrupulously avoided any moral issues that might be raised, has refrained from commendation or condemnation of either side, and confined his efforts exclusively to ascertaining the real forces that governed in the making of our constitution.

ARNOLD B. HALL

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

American Syndicalism: The I.W.W. By JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS.
New York: Macmillan Co. \$1.25.

Syndicalism is a relatively recent movement; it did not amount to much even in France until 1905. The I.W.W. became a national factor in the American labor union and Socialist movement only with the Lawrence strike early in 1912. If we consider this newness, both our publishers and our publicists are to be congratulated on the prompt and thorough way they are dealing with the subject. The most scientific work is undoubtedly Louis Levine's *Labor Movement in France*. But French syndicalism is also fearlessly expounded by an insider in André Tridon's *New Unionism*—which unfortunately presents itself as the study of the world-movement. Dr. Brooks had the newer and more difficult problem. But as he has been a direct observer of the I.W.W. from its very beginnings he has handled it with gratifying accuracy and sympathy—though he does not deny his hostility to most of its principles and methods.

Dr. Brooks's description is usually just, even when he is most critical. He has taken all pains to be accurate as to his facts, and has weighed

every feature of the movement with the most conscientious deliberation. The result is a highly valuable contribution to the subject, though facts and judgments are so commingled that they are rather difficult to separate.

As most people have ideas of their own about this movement, Dr. Brooks's conclusions and interpretations will prove rather suggestive than misleading to the educated public, even when they seem pretty clearly to contain an element of error. Nor do they take away anything from his eminent success in accomplishing his central purpose, to bring about a better understanding of the subject.

The basic propositions of Dr. Brooks's analysis, moreover, can hardly be questioned. The I.W.W. and syndicalism, he contends, are an essentially new and a highly important movement, not an organization of "bums" or of the "lumpenproletariat" as Socialist and labor-union rivals contend. Nor is it a mere transmigration of the soul of anarchism into the body of labor unionism. It is essentially a "revolutionary section" of the Socialist movement, and has arisen as a protest against the merely political action of the older Socialists and the unaggressive policy of the older labor unions.

At this point, however, Dr. Brooks makes the error of following Tridon's method rather than that of Levine. His statement of I.W.W. activities, being the result of direct observation, is excellent. But he proceeds to fuse it, more or less, with French, Italian, and English movements—where vast contrasts as well as similarities should be considered. So he speaks of the I.W.W. as strictly a revolutionary uprising against capitalism—whereas it is just as much an uprising of the unskilled workers against low wages. Dr. Brooks mentions this latter view of the movement, but passes over it without much discussion, apparently because it scarcely appears either in the French or Italian movements or in their literature.

Then he contends that if the wage-earner is to get a relatively larger share in wealth production "he will have to fight for it." As a general rule this is true. But it does not strictly hold of the submerged tenth in this country at the present time. There was a widespread "popular sympathy" with the Lawrence strikers extending "from the *Atlantic Monthly* to the great dailies," as Dr. Brooks himself points out. If he had confined his attention to this country and England, he would doubtless have been able to explain this with ease. The new progressive and social reform movement in these countries proposes to raise the submerged tenth to the level of industrial efficiency. However costly this

may be to individual employers, like the American Woolen Company of Lawrence, it will be profitable to the country's employers generally. And secondly, the progressive politicians are only too glad to have a little revolutionary red-fire at the extreme left—provided it is really not in the least menacing. It helps to throw the political balance of power their way.

But the struggle for "a relatively larger share in wealth-production," which Dr. Brooks justifies, is undoubtedly one of the chief motives of the I.W.W., as this struggle if successful would obviously lead toward Socialism. Why then does he fail to stick consistently to the point that this is the basic principle of the movement? His other explanations that it is anti-governmental, that it represents industrial vs. craft unionism, etc., are only confusing to anybody but an insider, unless presented as mere corollaries to this proposition.

Dr. Brooks lays great weight, for example, on the syndicalists' disparagement of reform. It is true that, together with dogmatic and partisan Socialists generally, many syndicalists, especially in Europe, declare all reform futile or valueless from the workers' standpoint. But this is evidently a mere *obiter dictum*. The question is not whether any given reform policy benefits the workers, but whether it benefits them enough so as to amount to giving them a larger relative share of wealth-production.

If he had regarded the I.W.W. steadily as a movement to win by fighting a constantly larger relative share in wealth-production, Dr. Brooks would have made many of its features comprehensible that seem inexplicable in his treatment. A movement so defined would have to take in a whole class if it was to succeed, and would be fought by all existing governments. And it would have to get its support chiefly from the masses of wage-earners and not from the skilled workers of the older unions. For the skilled are divided and do not lend themselves to class action, and, being more or less privileged themselves, have no desire to take large risks. Only when labor is organized by industry and even then, only taken the skilled are in a helpless minority, can the latter be forced to co-operate. And finally, such a movement represents a minority of the population, so that political action will have for it only a very secondary value.

With this key, which he already held in his hand, Dr. Brooks might have understood that sabotage, and strikes aimed to damage the employer as much as to advance wages, are indispensable weapons to a permanent minority, which, as he says, must fight for its chief demands,

no matter how justifiable. And he might have understood, too, that "the general strike" merely expresses the goal this movement desires, and not its practical aim, since it is utterly impossible without the aid, at least of the other Socialists and labor unionists, if not also of a large part of the progressives.

But in spite of every possible error of which Dr. Brooks can be accused, his book has brought us a long way on the road to a scientific understanding of a highly significant movement. And we can be confident now that, in proportion as the movement itself crystallizes and assumes a more definite form, it will receive a correspondingly more thorough and adequate treatment.

WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING

LONG ISLAND,
NEW YORK

Vers le salaire minimum. Étude d'économie et de législation industrielles. Par BARTHÉLEMY RAYNAUD, Professeur à la Faculté de Droit de l'Université d'Aix-Marseille. Paris: L. Larose et L. Tenin, 1913. Pp. xi+518. Fr. 14.

The minimum wage is coming. It is to be adjusted both to the subsistence-wants of the laborer and to a definite quantum of work done; it is to be worked out through trade organizations of employers and employees, with legal requirements in the background to facilitate collective bargaining through the agency of wage-boards. Such is the conclusion of M. Raynaud, and his book is a survey of the progress in various directions, in many countries, toward the establishment of the minimum wage on this basis.

After fifty pages given to the exposition of the theory of the minimum wage as advocated by social Catholicism, by Socialists, and by those who argue its social utility, the author presents the facts that show the present-day tendencies toward the realization of the idea. He finds an indirect realization in the wage-stipulations of government contracts, in the abrogation by the courts of wage-contracts in which the laborer's ignorance and necessity have been exploited, and in insurance at the employer's expense against accident, illness, and other industrial risks. Next are discussed the direct methods of attaining a minimum wage, namely, collective bargaining and the trade agreement, the action of governments in fixing a minimum for their own employees, and legislation prescribing minima for persons employed in industries under private management. Here the legislation of the Australasian colonies

is favorably considered and the British Trade Boards Act of 1909 and Coal Mines Act of 1912 are strongly approved. The outlook for the future is reviewed country by country; plans and laws proposed are cited, and the data are brought down to the summer of 1912. Two points stand out clearly in this general survey: the wide and rapid spread of interest in the question, and the influence of the British act of 1909 both in stimulating action and in supplying a model for details of method. The development of public opinion is seen in the review of the action of the International Association for Labor Legislation, which in 1893 rejected the proposition of a legal minimum wage but in 1908 gave it tentative approval and in 1912 complete indorsement as a remedy for the evils of the sweating system.

The work is valuable as a comprehensive and scholarly presentation of the status of the movement for a minimum wage. The data for Australia and England are compacted conveniently from the report of Mr. Aves and other official documents accessible in detail to American students. An appendix gives the text (in French) of the laws in question, including extracts from a law of Roumania of 1908, designed to secure a minimum for agricultural laborers. A page is given to the bill introduced in the legislature of Wisconsin in 1911. American legislation is better understood by the author than American geography, to judge from the enumeration (p. 432), "Dans le Wisconsin, au Massachusetts, dans l'État de Milwaukee." The situation in France is described with some fulness of detail, although it appears that progress here has not been rapid. Interest centers in the conflict between the authorities of the department of the Seine and the central government over the inclusion of minimum-wage provisions in municipal contracts, and in the persistent efforts of the advocates of the minimum wage to insert an entering wedge in the form of amendments to tariff acts and to bills for the encouragement of the silk industry. To the weakness of the trade unions is laid the slow progress of the movement in France. It is to be regretted that the author does not discuss, in this connection, the question which he merely raises elsewhere as to the effect upon the minimum-wage movement of the diversion of the labor movement from collective bargaining to "direct action."

M. Raynaud is stronger in dealing with facts and with law than in economic argument. He does not develop the Catholic basis for the minimum wage as a consequence of the right to existence, which he seems to accept—as thoroughly as does Father Ryan in *The Living Wage*, nor does he meet the economic argument against the proposal

with the skill and force shown by Sidney Webb. The chapter that takes up the objections to the legal minimum is one of the less satisfactory portions of the book. The limited experience of England and Australia is relied upon as a final answer to all a priori argument. The entire scope of the objection on the score of diminished productivity seems hardly to be comprehended, embracing, as it does, the questions of economic progress and of increase of population. In discussing the effect of higher wages on prices why not admit, once for all, that prices ought to be raised if based on starvation wage-rates, instead of trying first to show that prices do not always rise with wages? Further, the author's praiseworthy limitation of his attention to that which bears directly on the minimum wage has apparently prevented him from bringing out the full strength of the minimum wage as a part of a comprehensive social policy. The legal minimum has everywhere been put forward as the last weapon in the fight on the sweating system. It cannot succeed as a permanent policy unless accompanied by adequate measures to care for the incompetent and the aged, to educate the young for profitable employment, to provide proper safeguards for health and suitable opportunities for recreation. If it is supported by such measures the prospect of its success and the argument for its adoption are much stronger than when it stands by itself.

ROBERT COIT CHAPIN

BELOIT COLLEGE

Report on the Condition of Woman and Child Wage-Earners in the United States. In 19 volumes. 61st Cong., 2d Sess. Senate, Doc. 645. Prepared under the direction of Charles P. Neill, Commissioner of Labor. Vol. XVIII. "Employment of Women and Children in Selected Industries." Washington, 1913. Pp. 531.

In the present volume the purpose was to supplement the investigations published in previous volumes with a general investigation giving some idea of conditions affecting women and children in the wider field of industry. Hence, twenty-three industries were selected, either because of the number of women and children they employed, or as showing certain important aspects of their employment. Canning and preserving, candy making, cigarette and cigar making, paper box making, jewelry, woolen and worsted goods, and others were among those studied. The inquiry covered seventeen states and included between 50,000 and 60,000 women and girls.

Several significant facts appear from the investigation. The work done by the women in these industries was on the whole unskilled. The women were not employed most numerous in their traditional trades. For example, they were relatively most numerous in the making of paper boxes and cigars, not in the preparation of food-stuffs, spinning, and weaving. Again, one of the salient impressions gained through the investigation was the "absolutely haphazard and unstandardized character of the industrial world as known . . ." to women. Miss Van Kleeck's studies of the bookbinding and artificial flower-making trades in New York City as well as many other facts lend additional evidence to the impression gained from this investigation. The lack of preliminary training, the fact that sanitary conditions, length of hours, overtime, extent of machinery used, its safeguarding, etc., depend upon the whim of the particular employer, the chaos which exists regarding wages, which here again seem to depend largely upon the attitude of the individual employer, all point to the weakness of women's position in industry and to the imperative need of standardization for her protection. Trade training in the public schools, the fixing of minimum sanitary conditions, the establishment of minimum wages in different trades, and other such efforts cannot be too strongly urged. It is to be hoped that the great body of facts regarding conditions surrounding women and children in industry made available through this monumental government investigation will not merely remain between the pages of the nineteen volumes, but will form the basis of wisely planned federal and state action for the protection of this great body of wage-earners.

FRANCES FENTON BERNARD

GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA

The Old-Fashioned Woman. By ELSIE CLEWS PARSONS. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913. Pp. viii+373. \$1.50 net.

Woman and To-Morrow. By W. L. GEORGE. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1913. Pp. 188.

The Unrest of Women. By EDWARD SANDFORD MARTIN. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1913. Pp. 146. \$1 net.

It is a satisfaction to turn from the heat and partisanship of the woman movement to the pages of Mrs. Parson's *The Old-Fashioned Woman*, in which feminist and antifeminist may "get some ethnological inkling of themselves." In this book Mrs. Parsons, with a humor and lightness of treatment that yet do not disguise real seriousness, has

brought together a fund of material from wide sources, the quaint fancies, customs, taboos of both primitive and advanced peoples regarding women. A part of the significance as well as charm of the book lies in the connection and analogy which the author has everywhere drawn between primitive and modern attitudes with the result of showing the irrational basis upon which many of the ideas and conventions of modern women and regarding modern women rest.

Women have always been set off as a distinct class, differentiated by certain prescribed privileges and inhibitions. Especially during the critical periods of woman's life have these differentiations been very marked. Indeed, their survival in our modern world in modified form and their influence upon woman's social, economic, and political status will be a matter of surprise to many unfamiliar with primitive ways or unused to the critical analysis of their modern environment. For example, while female infanticide no longer prevails among us, one hears, nevertheless, such discriminatory phrases as "I am just as glad to have a girl as a boy." Cloisters and harems are not as popular as they once were, but girls are still sent to convents and "girls schools." Débutantes and all the ritual surrounding that period of "coming-out" still survive and occupy an even longer period with us than among savage peoples. The place of the old maid has today been taken by the married woman. "She is forced either into idleness or into fictitious jobs by the pride of her family or by the nature of our economic organization, there being no place in it, outside of depressed industries, for a half-time worker. She is 'protected' at home. She is discounted, excused, and sometimes pitied abroad. Her wedding-ring is a token of inadequacy as well as of 'respectability.'" Examples might be multiplied indefinitely.

The book contains, besides seven pages showing the location of the less well-known peoples cited, a very complete bibliography and references for each chapter. Three misprints should be noted: "the" on p. 200; "often" on p. 203; "one rainy" on p. 11.

The two small volumes of essays, *Woman and To-Morrow*, and *The Unrest of Women*, while they are by no means fundamental in viewpoint or treatment, and exhibit little grasp of certain social problems discussed, nevertheless, do contain some insight into certain phases of the woman movement.

The author of the former is a strong partisan of women and of the feminist movement, but on sentimental and literary rather than on

rational grounds. Women should have the vote as a means of education, he thinks. At the outset her vote will be cast for sentimental reasons and in ignorance of the facts of the question upon which she is voting. The following instances will show the author's own ignorance of certain social facts. He says, "They [the women of England] coalesced to procure the repeal of the Contagious Diseases Act, the working of which they were not familiar with, because their feelings and not their minds were stirred." This act introduced into England the continental system of police regulation of prostitution, and the women, led by Mrs. Josephine Butler, upon the basis of evidence gathered as to the evil effects of regulation in England and on the Continent, waged a successful fight for its repeal and finally fought for the abolition of prostitution itself. All of the facts available at the present time seem fully to justify this attitude on the part of the women. Yet the author says, "The regulation of vice in Europe has done nobody any good or any harm . . . it has neither improved nor damaged the health of nations."

Again, he pronounces the activity of the women of New Zealand and of some of our own states in procuring the enforcement of local prohibition fanaticism. He says, "I argue more definitely against prohibition than against the repeal of the Contagious Diseases Act, for the latter does not matter while the former is important. Prohibition means that perfectly normal pleasures have been stolen from man's scanty store, that conviviality and friendship have been impeded and whole districts charged with weakness of mind. Alcohol may be an evil, but we have yet to learn that the brave man is the one who runs away from it. If women supported prohibition, it was because they jumped to conclusions and believed that if men were allowed to drink they would become drunkards."

The author's sentimental soarings reach their highest flight in the chapter on "Woman and Passion." He idealizes passion for its own sake, wishes it and the desire for offspring to be kept quite distinct, and goes so far in his musings upon the wonder and beauty of woman and passion as to state that the "courtesan . . . carries higher than the mother the standard of the race."

The chapter on "Woman and the Home" has in it a very good criticism of the waste in the present system of private housekeeping.

In *The Unrest of Women*, although the method is superficial, yet the author shows considerable understanding of the weaknesses of phases of the woman movement. He examines the demands and aspirations of

well-known advocates of the movement. Of Miss Thomas' "disquiet" he says, "The fault, as I see it, that is to be found with her kind of unrest is that it overvalues independence for women, overvalues the wage-earning, untrammelled career, and undervalues the career that goes with marriage and domestic life." The fallacy in the "agitation of Mrs. Belmont" is that "she thinks that when women get the vote they are going to be different." In the "admirable Miss Addams," the author finds much to admire and approve, but considers the connection she makes between the ends for which she is working and women's votes entirely speculative. He also very justly criticizes the opinions of Miss Milholland on the sex question, especially her plea for the liberation of women if that is to mean, as she implies, lowering the sex standard of women to that of men.

A single instance will suffice to show the author's own lack of grasp of social situations. Speaking of Beveridge's federal child-labor law, prohibiting the interstate shipment of goods made illegally by child-labor, he says, "Miss Addams seems to have approved that bill (which to me seems scandalous), as did most of the social workers. State rights and the fabric of government seem to be nothing to her, and even parental and family rights seem to be very little. . . ."

FRANCES FENTON BERNARD

GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA

The Making of a Town. By FRANK L. McVEY. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1913. Pp. 221. \$1.00.

There is such a great need for literature on that community in American life between the large cities and the open rural districts that it was hoped *The Making of a Town* would help supply that need for the "town problem." In the light of that hope the book is a disappointment. It has little value to the specialist. It may help arouse the citizens of the towns to their responsibilities. The expressed purpose of the author is to "bring to light some of the more essential features of town growth and the need of careful planning."

SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

A School for Health Officers.—The public and public officials are awakening to the great possibilities of modern prevention medicine. It is coming to be realized, moreover, that the health affairs of a municipality cannot be efficiently administered excepting by thoroughly trained health officers, who give their undivided time and energies to this work, and who are adequately compensated therefor. Evidence of these facts is furnished by the rapidly increasing demand for trained experts to fill the positions of city and state health officers and their assistants, a demand which it is quite impossible adequately to supply in this country at the present time. The supply must be furnished, for the most part, through the universities, by the provision in their departments of medicine and engineering of courses in hygiene, sanitation, and allied topics. Such curricula have been arranged by a few of the leading universities, and among the most recent developments is the organization of a School for Health Officers in Boston, in which courses are to be given by Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the faculties of these schools co-operating in this movement. A large number of courses are offered in the following groups: (I) Prevention Medicine; (II) Personal Hygiene; (III) Public Health Administration; (IV) Sanitary Biology and Sanitary Chemistry; (V) Special Pathology; (VI) Communicable Diseases; (VII) Sanitary Engineering; (VIII) Demography; and (IX) Medical and Other Sciences. The director of the school is Dr. Milton J. Rosenau, professor of prevention medicine and hygiene, Harvard University.

Students of sociology, who are fitting themselves for practical work in this field, will find many of these courses of especial interest and value.

JOHN M. DODSON
Dean of Rush Medical College

Verbindlung städtischer Zwangsversicherung und freier Privatversicherung nach den bisherigen praktischen Ergebnissen und der Möglichkeit weiterer Fortentwicklung zur wechselseitigen Ergänzung und Vervollkommnung.—Obligatory insurance should include insurance against sickness, accident, invalidity, old age, widowhood, etc. Any other amelioration of the economic condition of the less fortunate classes should be pursued only through the development of voluntary insurance, in which the greatest liberty possible should be left to the individual as to the nature and amount of insurance and the mode of paying premiums. This development must be in harmony with existing institutions so as to avoid technical difficulties. Preference should be given to the plan of insurance that combines most effectively the principle of economy and the principle of insurance. There should be direct and indirect co-operation of state, communes, employers, and welfare associations. Private insurance must be made accessible to those not subject to obligatory insurance. It must be improved so as to offer such advantages as: capital-sum or annuity insurance, profit-sharing, loans, etc.—Geh. Reg. Rat. Bielefeldt, *Bulletin des assurances sociales*, 1912, Supplement.

R. F. C.

Reporting of Industrial Accidents.—A careful examination of the inquiries concerning industrial accidents in various states shows a wide variation in the sort of information upon which most states agree. The twenty-one states collecting statistics upon industrial accidents are unanimous in respect to one inquiry only—the name of the injured. Such a condition clearly indicates a need for greater uniformity in schedules and methods and for agreement on essential facts required. A clear under-

standing of the nature of the problems, in the solution of which statistical data are essential, is necessary and should be preliminary to the collection of facts. The problems which should be considered are: (1) relation of fatigue to accidents; (2) hour of day at which accident occurs; (3) experience of the injured; (4) nature and duration of disability; (5) mechanical causes of accident and nature of injury by industries; (6) sex, age, and conjugal condition of injured.—R. E. Chaddock, *American Statistical Association*, June, 1912. J. H. K.

Die Frage der Arbeitslosigkeit in der klassischen Nationalökonomie.—The classical school of political economy stood dominantly for the view that the general cause of maladjustment of supply and demand in the labor market was the persistence of the industrial *réglementation* of the earlier times, and that the remedy for this kind of unemployment was the abolition of that *réglementation*. The unemployment due to a general and absolute surplus supply of labor was the result of overpopulation and could be prevented by teaching the laborer that he was responsible for such unemployment, in so far as he was responsible for overpopulation. This theory of unemployment was a definite expression of their individualistic thought and of the interests which it represented.—J. Lipowski, *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, Heft IV, 1912. E. H. S.

The Fluctuating Climate of North America.—Ruins and physiographic evidences from the arid parts of North America indicate that people inhabited regions and cultivated land where now no crops can be raised. These arid and non-irrigable regions must have had moister climate than at present. There are also indications that there have been successive changes of civilization accompanying periodic changes of climate. The rate of growth of trees indicates that the climate of the earth is subject to pulsations having a period of hundreds of years, and that in the distant past the moist epochs were moister than similar epochs in more recent times. There are also indications that periods of exceptional moisture have occurred at the same time in all the temperate continental regions of the world. More exact knowledge of the nature and degree of these historic climatic changes will furnish a basis for a truer appreciation of their effects upon society.—Ellsworth Huntington, *The Geographical Journal*, October, 1912. V. W. B.

Anthropology, Psychology, and Sociology.—Sociology and anthropology, though properly classified as separate sciences, are so closely related that a scientific knowledge of one involves a knowledge of the other. They deal with the phenomena of life, but in its collective rather than in its individual phases, bearing in mind that such are distinctly different from individual phenomena, and that the so-called "social conscience" is merely a convenient abstraction. They do not rest upon fixed rules as does mathematics, nor concern themselves with dead tissues as does anatomy, nor are they immediately interested in defunct social periods as is history. They are essentially sciences of the living, and their method is the more natural one employed in biology—that of observation and experience. And from this method of investigation the employment of psychology is inseparable.—M. J. Maxwell, "Anthropologie, psychologie, et sociologie," *Arch. d'anth. crim.*, June 15, 1913. E. E. E.

Progress.—Progress is synonymous with development, evolution, not considered with regard to whether it is good or evil, but simply in itself with regard to whether it is an onward movement. Science consists of the body of positively established knowledge, as distinguished from faith, or unestablished belief. Intellectual progress consists of the augmentation of knowledge and the diminution of credence in matters unestablished scientifically. Political progress consists of constantly increasing the possibility of meeting the needs of an increasing number of persons, and of establishing a social relation in which the element of constraint by means of physical force—as typified in modern class conflict—is reduced and its place taken by voluntary human co-operation. To bring this about a new notion of human values must be developed, and the highest quality of economic, intellectual, and material forces must be applied.—Andre de Maday, "Le Progrès," *Rev. int. de soc.*, June, 1913. E. E. E.

The Problem of Population.—The family average of children in France during the last century decreased from 4.24 to 2.18. The past fifty years have seen a decrease from one million annual births to about three-fourths that number. At this rate deaths have for several years out-numbered the births. The causes are: (1) children are no longer income-producers; (2) development of instruction, personal ambition, keener competition in many lines, desire for luxury, have retarded marriage and decreased the number of births; (3) prolongation of the education of children leaves them a long time the charge of their parents; (4) pride for a good inheritance for their children is more easily accomplished with fewer children; (5) disagreeableness of parenthood to upper classes. Remedies advocated: More church emphasis upon the sacredness of parenthood; give the official with a family preference; reform in the inheritance laws; enforce measures upon the young army men at the time they are becoming fathers.—A. De Metz Noblat, "Le problème de la population," *La réforme sociale*, June 1, 1913. P. E. C.

Juvenile Courts.—The juvenile courts of France have three special features: special magistrates, special procedures, and special penalties. There are two courts, one for children of thirteen and under, and another for adolescent children. However, a single court would acquire more experience, would be more regular and less complicated. Very praiseworthy is the provision forbidding any publicity whatsoever of the cases of the children. For each crime or misdemeanor, an investigation is made of the moral and physical conditions of the child arraigned, of his parents and ancestors. The children in almost all cases are put under guardianship or sent to an institution. The child under thirteen, when repeating an offense, should not, as provided now, be tried and exposed to the same punishment as the delinquent or criminal, but should go unpunished. Deputies are appointed as visitors and they give reports to the court on the conduct of the child.—E. Voron, "Les tribunaux pour enfants," *Revue catholique des institutions et du droit*, June, 1913. P. E. C.

Chance and Auto-determinism.—Those who believe in the law of chance frequently make the mistake of classing accidents and irregular happenings as "chance" occurrences. As a matter of fact, the most inconsequential movement takes place in conformity with fixed physical laws. *Chance* and *irregularity* are by no means synonymous. A matter is not exempt from law just because it occurs in a way unexpected. Let us regard the notion of chance as nothing more than an idea-limit toward which the idea of determined causality tends; for, scientifically regarded, chance as a determining element is an impossible notion and universal laws do not turn from their courses for its accommodation.—Alfred Fouillée, "La contingence et l'auto-determinism," *Rev. int. de soc.*, June, 1913. E. E. E.

Influence of Heredity and Environment upon Growth.—We have three problems: (1) to point out the hereditary differences in each characteristic stage of development; (2) to discover the environmental influences upon the rate of growth; (3) the question of the possibility of distinguishing between hereditary and environmental influences. As yet, the only material available is that concerning the different rates of growth of the sexes. The two sexes in the same environment have different anatomical and physiological characteristics and different rates of growth. These differences are noticeable very early. The comparative study of the heads of girls and boys shows that the girl develops one and one-half years earlier than the boy. In studying the acceleration and retardation in the process of growth we must not ignore the influence of nourishment and condition of health. During the period of sex development a disturbance of the regular accelerative rate of growth takes place, then occurs a quick increase in the rate of growth, followed by a period of retardation in the growth of the size of the body as a whole. This does not mean that all the different parts of the body develop at the same rate, for there is a certain variation in the growth of the different organs. Investigations of the sizes of the heads, of both parents and children, of mixed and pure races, in the same, and in different, environments seem to show that there are not only variations in individuals but also certain common differences in large groups due to environment. Similarities in the form of the body are not necessarily hereditary similarities.—Franz Boaz, "Einfluss von Erblichkeit und Umwelt auf das Wachstum," *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, 45. Jahrgang, Heft 3, 1913. V. W. B.

The National Insurance Act, 1911.—The basic principles of the national insurance act of 1911 are: (1) Insurance against sickness and injury. This is a national health insurance, compulsory for all persons, of both sexes, over sixteen years old, who are employed in manual labor, regardless of their citizenship. Persons with an income of £160 per year, skilled laborers, militia, or others who are already insured are exempt from the compulsion of the law. The insurance is optional with those who do not come under the prescribed regulations, but have an income of £160 or less, or who were under the compulsory provision for five or more years. (2) Unemployment insurance, compulsory for all manual laborers over sixteen years of age. The compensation, of 7s per week, begins the second week of unemployment. The compensation does not begin until the sixth week of unemployment if the laborer is guilty of incompetence. The fees are paid by the employees, the employers, and the state.—Regierungsrat Nehse, "Das englische Arbeiterversicherungsgesetz, *Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen*, Heft 1, 1913. V. W. B.

Industry and Fashions.—The subject of fashions has been treated by Vischer, Kleinwöches, Simmel, and J. Lessing, chiefly from the philosophical viewpoint, and by Sombart, Schellwien, Gaulke, Rosch, and Troeltsch from the economic viewpoint. Some writers include under fashions all likes and dislikes which are subject to change, but we consider fashion to be the reigning form of human wearing-apparel, whose existence and adoption are dependent upon the psychic tendency of the masses. This tendency is largely determined by the inherent desire for variation, and by our imitative proclivities. Fashion has a far-reaching influence on production and consumption. It creates and destroys entire industries, thus demanding the utmost alertness to its whims of both the producer and distributor. Its effect upon social and economic life is, at first, to sharply distinguish, but gradually to blend the social and economic classes of society. Efforts to counteract the demands of fashion have failed because its psychic demands were overlooked.—Alexander Elster, "Wirtschaft und Mode," *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, August, 1913. M. C. E.

Hungarian Industrial Politics.—The industrial problem in Hungary has four distinct features, viz., household industry, manual labor, manufacturing industry, and social legislation. The household industry is not of a permanent nature; however, it is of considerable importance. Lacemaking, which is its most important phase, is aided by the government, both in the securing of a market and in providing training for women and girls in that line of work. In dealing with manual labor, Hungary has found its greatest problem. It is being met by providing trade and continuation schools, of which there were last year, in Hungary, 583 manual-training, and 105 continuation schools. This same method is being adopted to meet the industrial situation. The first social legislation was the factory inspection law of 1891. This was followed by the Sunday observance and compulsory industrial insurance laws. More recently, there has been legislation on housing, child-labor, and the prohibition of the manufacturing of white phosphorous.—Szterenyi, "Die Hungerische Industrie," *Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Socialpolitik und Verwaltung*, July, 1913. M. C. E.

New Forms of Credit Insurance.—There is a very pressing demand in all departments of business life for a workable credit insurance. The efforts to establish a good system have failed in the past, not because there was no need, but because it was believed that one system could be applied to all phases of business without differentiation. A new system has been proposed which combines some of the features of the transportation insurance, and of a general credit insurance, compelling the listing of the entire industry. While it would increase premiums to some extent, it would place business on a much firmer basis, and eliminate, to a large degree, the present risks involved in unsound enterprises.—Emil Herzfelder, "Neue Formen der Kreditversicherung," *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungs-Wissenschaft*, January, 1913. M. C. E.

Principles for the Moral-psychological Examination of Juveniles.—Based on a test of 1,250 children from the common and finishing schools, three difficulties were encountered when asking the children questions to discover their moral motives: (1) without thinking the children gave set answers, suggested by the religious cate-

chisms; (2) differences in the children due to influences of localities, social strata, and religious faiths; (3) fear in the presence of elders caused them to hold some things in reserve. Results from this method of test do not indicate the child's actual stage of moral perception but his account of it. These results, however, suggest general types of motives behind the child's moral attitudes: (1) religious motives, (a) egoistic, fear of purging fire, (b) fear of offending God; (2) non-religious, social, or political motives, (a) consideration of self-interest, fear of physical harm or punishment, loss of good opinion of comrades, (b) consideration of family honor, (c) consideration of society, sense of justice, respect for law, love for friends.—M. Schaeffer, "Elemente zur moral-psychologischen Beurteilung Jugendlicher," *Zeitschrift für pädagogische Psychologie und experimentelle Pädagogik*, January, 1913. F. S. C.

Race Betterment.—The only new emphasis in the study of race-hygiene vs. eugenics is that of its absolute social character. The declining birth-rate is not due to any definite racial peculiarities, but it is, rather, on account of poverty and an underfed and sickly proletariat, or purely social conditions. On the other hand, it is generally understood that this decrease in population is greatly effected by a more advanced civilization. The problem, however, is not to stem this tide, but to guard against its results. The relative vitality and efficiency of the last-born children of large families is not so much of social import as the vitality of the first-born children of normal families. It is not only observed that the first-born children weigh less at birth, but that their fitness for life is below the average. Thus the question is not only to limiting the number in a family, but to do so without lowering the family's average quality. This is yet an unsolved problem of eugenics.—Søren Hansen, "Om Raceforbedring," *Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift*, January-February, 1913. J. E. E.

Conditions of Vice and Crime in New York and the Relations to These of the Police Force of the City.—In curbing a city's vice and crime, state legislation will do little good. Under home rule, the measures for supervision of crime and vice will be according as the standards of the people. Laws unenforced because in advance of the ideals of a majority will cause a contempt of government and offer temptations to officials with a demoralizing effect. Home rule would, as an example, undoubtedly sanction Sunday liquor-selling and gambling. However, advertisements of the latter should be forbidden. The great responsibilities involved demand from the police force a discipline equivalent to military standards. The chief of police should be appointed by a group of city officials; the term should be during good behavior or long; entire control should be given to him; also an adequate salary; his removal should be only by the same group that appointed him. A city like New York cannot be freed from crime and vice, but its exploitation by greedy police officials can be largely prevented.—George H. Putnam, *Nat. Mun. Rev.*, July, 1913. P. E. C.

Modern Feminism and Sex-Antagonism.—Broadly defined, feminism has three aspects: the furthering of women's interests, the leveling of the sexes, and the social and political emancipation of woman. The first attempts have been at higher education. The result in the United States is not, so far, a stringing-up of the female to the male pitch, but a tendency to bring all education to a feminine level. The admiration gained now by the child-free woman tends to demoralize women, otherwise contented with their normal functions. Meanwhile, the main effect of modern education is to complicate instead of solve the economic questions. Though men are fairly well adjusting themselves to modern life, women are growing more at issue with their environment. They think that the farther humanity advances, just so much farther must the female sex, for the sake of motherhood, remain behind. They fail to see that woman's difference is not entirely in sex relations, but that physiological modifications are continually affecting her. They underestimate the part played by their sex in building up fundamental social values. The true woman's movement must be one which, recognizing the principal of natural division of duties between the sexes, aims at strengthening woman in her normal sphere and developing her along lines suggested by her sex needs and characteristics.—Ethel Colquhoun, *Quarterly Rev.* July, 1913. P. E. C.

The Virginia Mountaineers.—The ordinary portrayals of the southern mountain folk are striking misrepresentations of the mountain people. The number of physicians, lawyers, ministers, schools, colleges, and churches, rural mail-routes, telephones, and railroads, all show that the mountaineers are not as backward and are not so completely isolated from civilization as popular reports claim. The following unscientific methods of study account for much of the false information: (1) describing past conditions and ascribing these to the present; (2) generalizing from few particulars, i.e., the picturesque, the uncommon, and the unique persons and things are called "typical." These false conclusions from unscientific methods are the outcome of (1) ignorance, and (2) unscrupulous misrepresentation by (a) newspaper and magazine writers, (b) prospectors and engineers, (c) missionaries.—John H. Ashworth, *South Atlantic Quarterly*, July, 1913. V. W. B.

The Relationship of Scientific Management to Labor.—Scientific management tends to drive workmen to their physical limit, through the setting of tasks, the payment of bonuses to workmen for greater production, and the paying of premiums to foremen. It tends to prevent the proper development of mechanical skill, and it tends to emphasize quantity as above quality. It fails adequately to include the human factor. It does not favor collective bargaining. In these respects scientific management is unscientific.—John P. Frey, *Journal of Political Economy*, May, 1913. V. W. B.

The Head-Forms of the Italians as Influenced by Heredity and Environment.—The head-forms of man change under the influence of new environment. A careful investigation of the extended anthropometric tables in Ridolfo Livi's *Anthropometria Militare* shows that the highest variabilities of head-forms are found in the central parts of Italy and the lowest in the north and the south. This, perhaps, is due to mixture of several types as revealed by the history of that part of the country. Besides the head-index undergoes changes in cities owing to the long-continued influx of foreigners into the cities. Attention may also be called to the apparent massing of high variabilities in mountain areas, due, perhaps, to the fact that such areas have been for long periods places of refuge for individuals from different parts of the country.—Franz Boas and Helene M. Boas, *American Anthropologist*, April, 1913. B. D. BH.

The Biological Status and Social Worth of the Mulattoes.—Skin color among the mulattoes has been the scientific index of those who have declared with Le Bon that the hybrid is lost to his country or have tried to interpret his biological status in terms of certain zoological paradoxes which tell us that hybrids become quite barren when they inbreed among themselves. Various experimental facts stare us in the face demanding recognition that mulattoes are, by far, physically, and mentally, superior to the Negroes, whose higher mental capacities have so often been suspected with reasons. The mulatto in Jamaica is an acquisition to the community. In America, he is practically solving the much-dreaded Negro problem. Struggling against difficulties, he is setting an admirable example to the Negroes. He is much more efficient and clever than the latter. Psychological experiments have shown that his mental capacities are in no way inferior to those of the whites, whose rivalry he legitimately envies. It is ethically imperative to the white population of the country to encourage him in all his attempts to reach for the higher status he has learned to cherish.—H. E. Jordon, *Popular Science Monthly*, June, 1913. B. D. BH.

The Relation of Culture to Environment from the Standpoint of Invention.—Most geographers lay too much stress on the part played by the environment in the development of culture, which is a complex of elements as varied as those making up our own lives. Culture depends upon (a) inventions, and (b) social selection or socialization of inventions. The passive limiting character of the geographical environment may, to a large extent, modify the inventors' original plans, but it hardly plays any active rôle in the psychological processes involved in inventions or the socialization of the inventions. Just what attitude will the social mind assume toward the inventions is in no way determined by the geographical environment, it rather depends upon the traditions, customs, and the sense of utility of the society.—Clark Wissler, *Popular Science Monthly*, August, 1913. B. D. BH.

On the Use of the Theory of Probabilities in Statistics Relating to Society.—By the method of sampling, and applying the theory of normal frequency or probability, perhaps we can draw legitimate conclusions in regard to the social conditions of any group that is a logical class and not a mere multitude. The application of probabilities to constructive sampling, such as the experience of hospitals and social conditions of a community, may not prove so powerful an aid to the ordinary methods of induction, even if supplemented by the refinements of "association" or "correlation." The character of progress in human institutions is unfavorable to the employment of analytical curves and surfaces to represent groups of statistics. If "relating to society" might include biology, the conclusion would be that those statistics most nearly related to our physical nature, in particular vital statistics, are most amenable to the application of the calculus of probabilities.—F. Y. Edgeworth, *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, January, 1913. F. S. C.

Transforming the Eskimo into a Herder.—Sometime ago, Dr. Sheldon Jackson, United States general agent of education in Alaska, brought a herd of sixteen reindeer across from Siberia and started the first reindeer colony at Unalaska. In 1894 the United States government made an appropriation of \$6,000 and since has increased it to \$25,000 annually. With the herds doubling every three years, the question of a food supply for Alaska will soon be a thing of the past. Reindeer furnish the 30,000 natives with food, clothing, and means of transportation.—E. W. Hawkes, *Anthropos*, March, 1913. B. D. BH.

Pensions for Mothers.—Weekly or monthly payments to mothers from public funds raised by taxation is not in harmony with the principles of social insurance; is not insurance at all, merely a revamped and in the long run unworkable form of public outdoor relief; has no claim to the name of pension and no place in a rational scheme of social legislation; is embodying no element of prevention or radical cure for any recognized evil; is an insidious attack upon the family, inimical to the welfare of children, and injurious to the character of parents; is imposing, in the form in which it is usually embodied, an unjustifiable burden upon the courts; is illustrating all that is most objectionable in state Socialism, and failing to represent that ideal of social justice which the Socialist movement, whatever are its faults, is constantly bringing nearer.—Edward T. Devine, *American Labor Legislation Review*, Vol. III, June, 1913. J. E. E.

The Industrial Schools in Berlin.—Looking over the Berlin industrial schools as a whole, we see that here, as elsewhere in Germany, industrial education does not shorten the period of apprenticeship. Generally speaking, the schools increase the interest of the pupils in their work, but this does not apply to all pupils, for in the compulsory-improvement schools many of the pupils are not there from choice and are lazy and indifferent. There is a special demand by employers for those who have studied in trade schools, wherever such study is optional. This demand shows itself in the better positions and wages secured by those who continue in the trade schools more than the minimum period required. With minor exceptions, the Berlin industrial schools accept as students only those actually working as apprentices, journeymen, or otherwise, in the trade studied. There is thus no undue increase of the numbers entering single trades, for the number studying each trade is automatically adjusted to its needs. Practical work in industry is always regarded as prerequisite to trade-school training received to good effect; and the expense of the industrial schools, though heavy, is regarded by the taxpayers as well worth while.—U.S. Bureau of Education, *Bulletin No. 19*, 1913. J. E. E.

Courts and Legislation.—Application of law must involve not logic merely but discretion as well. Indeed, under the influence of the social, philosophical, and sociological jurists, who have insisted that the essential thing in administration of justice according to law is a reasonable and just solution of the individual controversy, application of law has become the central problem in present-day legal science. A lesson of legal history is that the lawmaker must not be over ambitious to lay down universal rules. While the lawyer thinks of popular action as subject to legal limitations running back of all constitutions and merely reasserted, not created, thereby,

the people think of themselves as the authors of all constitutions and limitations and the final judges of their meaning and effect. There is an aversion to straightforward change of any important legal doctrine. The cry is, "Interpret it." But such interpretation is spurious. It is legislation. And yet the lawyer is trained to it as an ancient common law doctrine, and it has a great hold upon the public. Thus an unnecessary strain is imposed upon our judicial system, and courts are held for what should be the work of the legislature. Our task then is (1) to rid ourselves of absolute theories, and in particular of the remains of the dogma of finality of the common law; (2) to repeal, what ought to be repealed, directly, and not to demand indirect repeal by spurious interpretation; (3) above all to develop a sociological method of applying rules and then, if need be, of developing new ones by the judicial power of finding the law.—Roscoe Pound, *American Political Science Review*, August, 1913.

J. E. E.

The Doctrine of Evolution and Anthropology.—To anthropology the vital problem is the existence or non-existence of innate equipments for particular cultures. The evidence, so far, seems decidedly in favor of their non-existence. When the anthropologist sets over the historical against the evolutionary conception in his science, he is not for a moment denying that cultures evolve or grow, he is only denying that this growth is an integral part of biological evolution. That cultural phenomena are a part of, parallel to, or continuous with biological phenomena is not accepted by anthropology. The historical method assumes that there is a history of cultural activity for each particular group of mankind and that the culture of any given moment is only to be interpreted by its past. There is a clear distinction between cultures on the one hand and the psycho-physical mechanisms that produce them on the other. Consequently anthropology holds that the mechanism is general, in so far as it is not limited to any particular culture, and that it enables the individual to practice any culture he may need, though not necessarily to equal degrees.—Clark Wissler, *Journal of Religious Psychology*, July, 1913.

J. E. E.

The Problem of Illegitimacy in Europe.—In some of the European countries, there are more illegitimate than legitimate children. In almost every European country, if the father of an illegitimate child can be discovered he must wholly or partially support it, except in England only. The governments are assuming the responsibility of building up institutions where illegitimate children can be cared for by trained nurses and guardians. European societies are learning to regard cases of inevitable illegitimacy with less severity.—Victor V. Borosini, *Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology*, July, 1913.

B. D. BH.

Mr. Andrew Lang's Theory of the Origin of Exogamy and Totemism.—Exogamy arose in early group life through the expulsion of the young males by the jealous sire. No small society could have survived the strife of sons and sires consequent upon promiscuous love-making within the group, for primitive man was fiercely jealous of this relationship. In later periods the sire, softened by his female mate, allowed the sons to remain in the group so long as they secured their wives from without.

Totemism began when, with no mystical significance, human groups adopted the names of objects. Each group, hostile to all the rest, distinguished them by a nickname from the group "we". They found out their names through taunts or from their stolen wives. The objection that no group would adopt a nickname is refuted by the evidence of existing facts. Later generations forgot how they got their names, for they invented myths to explain it. When they realized that they had the same name as an animal they speculated as to the mystical connection, for to the savage the name was the very essence of the thing named. If the animal and the group had the same name they must go back to a common ancestry, for savage man drew no line between animals and human beings. Thus the animal whose name the group bore was a brother possessed of magic wisdom and it became their duty to protect and cherish it—hence totemism.—Andrew Lang, *Folk Lore*, July, 1913.

F. S. C.

The Unconscious Reason in Social Evolution.—The origin of such rational and purposive institutions as exogamy, the family, division of labor, monetary system, and so on, cannot be explained as the result of conscious reflection. Such an institution

as the family is to be explained only as a mechanical adjustment to physiological needs, and is an "exact social parallel to any individual, unconscious reaction, such as eating when hungry." Man is essentially a reasoning creature, but nine-tenths of his mental activity is below the threshold of consciousness. Intuition is unconscious reasoning, and impulsive action is unconscious response to stimulus. The less conscious we are of the subject of intelligence the more perfect is our adaptation. So the rational and purposive structure of social institutions arose as adaptations of means to ends, as mechanically logical (in a word, rational), as the biological adaptations in the individual, and the sequence of psychical reactions engineering the structure was as purposive and as unconscious as the chain-instincts in the lowest animals.—A. E. Crawley, *Sociological Review*, July, 1913. F. S. C.

The Problem of Social Insurance: An Analysis.—Industrial workers have been in great part reduced to a condition of dependence in respect to the enjoyment of opportunities for gainful labor. When disabled through old age or failing powers, and when not needed through reduction in the scale of operations, they are discarded as are other useless parts. These inherent, inevitable causes of need, social insurance seeks to meet at their source. That it may do so involves the recognition of social as well as individual action. Stated in another way, social insurance sets to itself the task of meeting the problem of the economic insecurity of labor.—William F. Willoughby, *American Labor Legislation Review*, June, 1913. J. E. E.

Eugenics: With Special Reference to Intellect and Character.—(a) The general average tendency of the original intellectual and moral natures of children is like the original natures of their ancestry. Environment may modify it but very little indeed. (b) In intellect and morals, as in bodily structure and features, men differ by original nature and by families. (c) There are hereditary bonds by which one kind of intellect or character rather than another is produced. (d) Selective breeding can alter a man's capacity to learn, to keep sane, to cherish justice, or to be happy. People will soon learn to realize the most important principles of eugenics.—Edward L. Thorndike, *Popular Science Monthly*, August, 1913. B. D. BH.

A Brief Survey of the Field of Organic Evolution.—The theory of the descent with modification is an established fact. As an explanation of descent, Lamarckism is a possible but unlikely factor because of the improbability that the inheritance of acquired characters takes place. Darwinism, or natural selection, on the other hand, is apparently a real factor in organic evolution, at least roughly outlining natural species. Its chief defect, the inability to produce useful traits from small beginnings, is apparently fully met by the mutation theory, which, however, is too novel to be passed on with any degree of certainty. The popular distrust which has recently arisen concerning evolution is based on a confusion of natural selection with descent. As to the effectiveness of the former the biologist has good reason for doubt; as to the reality of the latter he has none whatever.—George Howard Parker, *Harvard Theological Review*, July, 1913. J. E. E.

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A VISION OF SOCIAL EFFICIENCY¹

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The less numerous of the two prominent British schools of sociology cherishes the proposition that the business of sociology is to construct social ideals. There is no evidence to show whether or not that view would be adopted by the American Sociological Society. I should certainly not accept it as a definition of the functions of Sociology. On the other hand, I have scant respect for any sociological technique which does not at last contribute to credible forecasts of better things in the future, and thus at least indirectly to foreshadowings of improved society in general, along with partial revelations of ways and means of achieving those improvements.

Accordingly I shall take the liberty this evening of throwing science to the winds, and of installing imagination in its place. I do not call what I am to say *Sociology*. It is that better type of thing than can be produced by any strictly cognitive process whatever. It is the composite outlook upon life projected upon the background of the thinker's total knowledge, with the assistance of all the intellectual processes at his command, but at last frankly toned and colored by his own personal estimate of all the values

¹ Address delivered before the American Sociological Society.

involved. This testimony may have little intrinsic value, but at all events it is the thinker's own. It reflects an authentic self. It is an actual human reaction, and as such it is entitled to its proportionate place among the evidences which go to establish the conclusions of life. Accordingly, without committing sociology or the American Sociological Society to the slightest responsibility for what I am saying, I shall allow myself the luxury of sketching the picture of a relatively rational society which my own judgment projects.

As a vanishing-point for the picture, let us suppose that the occupants of the cabin of the "Mayflower," when the famous pact was drawn and signed, were not the historical company, but the present members of the American Sociological Society. Suppose further that by some preternatural discernment these adventurers were able to bring before their view our present national domain, with its present population, its present technical equipment, its present accumulations of wealth, its present scientific methods and results, yet without an inkling of the present political and economic organization, or of the social stratification. Let us suppose also that the company had not the Pilgrims' type of social consciousness, but ours—for when the imagination decides to take liberties it is foolish to scrimp them. While we are about it, we may as well abstract our social consciousness, as far as it is a complex of valuations, from our knowledge of national history and present conditions, although this knowledge has been a chief factor in forming the valuations.

Now then, with this forecast of scope for action, and of the numbers of actors to be concerned, and of the types of achievement designated, and with our present criteria of social values as our standard, what would be our idea of the quality of relations fit to form the social framework of the millions who should succeed to these national resources, and accomplish the aggregate results that are familiar to us today?

As I have taken pains to confess, the answer that I am to give may not be the answer of the members of the Sociological Society at all. It is merely my own answer. Yet in order to avoid as much as possible the first-personal form, while admitting the sub-

stance, I indulge the fancy that the Society is of one mind in this matter and that I am merely the mind-reader.

Sweeping the spatial perspective then from Provincetown to the Golden Gate, and the temporal expanse from 1620 to 1914 and on to our farthest reach into the future, what stipulations would we make for the spirit and purposes of the society destined to carry on that section of humanity's process which is to occupy the quota of space and time allotted to the American people?

While I can speak with authority of my own opinion alone, I still have no doubt that, if we could agree on the meaning of the words, so that we should not fear that to some of us some of them would mean one thing and to some another, there would be substantial unanimity in this Society along the following lines. They are specifications of the general conception which we entertain of our whole national experience, of the physical conditions which make that experience possible, of the goal toward which that experience is to be directed, as fast as it becomes conscious, and of the operative principles which will insure the efficiency of the experience. The form in which I recite the items is not that of law-givings for the enterprise, but of presumptions, or prophetic forelookings which we should rely upon as the matrix in which, from time to time, constitutions and statutes and ordinances in pursuance of these valuations would grow.

We should presume then, *first*, that as a matter of course the enormous enterprise of utilizing this space and time, these material deposits, and physical energies and moral opportunities is a *community* undertaking; an affair of co-operation in duties and copartnership in enjoyments; with the common interest always effectively paramount to minor aims.

We should assume, *second*, that the innermost and ultimate meaning of the whole undertaking is not to be found in its mastery of physical conditions, but in its transmuting of this control of forces into realization of types of persons surpassing one another, generation after generation, in progressive realization of completer physical and mental and moral attainments.

We should take it for granted, *third*, that the total of external resources will always be regarded as a trust to be administered by

the community as an endowment for the *human* process in which the enterprise finds its ultimate expression.

We should regard it as settled, *fourth*, that the undertaking will always be conducted with a view to encouragement, in each individual, of every excellence, and the highest degree of every excellence which can be harmonized with the efficiency of the whole process of human development.

We should be confident, *fifth*, that all normal adults concerned in the undertaking will be agreed that certain regulative principles of conduct are indispensable. They will consequently be sure that all the resources of the community must be pledged to the procuring of conduct consistent with these principles.

That is, a system of control will be demanded which will be inexorable in its insistence upon certain conduct held by the general community judgment to be necessary for the good of the whole. The system of control will shade off into non-compulsion and even non-prescription and non-intervention in the degree in which it is the consensus of the community that, in certain ranges of conduct, spontaneity of action makes more for the good of the whole than group constraint.

Sixth: Because the "realization of completer human types" and "the good of the whole" are concepts which must redefine each other in an incessant reciprocity during the term of this enterprise, we should anticipate that the system of control will be flexible, and adaptable, both in its structure and in its functions, to the changing implications of the undertaking.

Consequently, types of conduct which may be secured by forcible means at one stage of the process may not need to be required nor even enjoined at another. Thus the system of control may never usurp the place of an absolute authority. On the contrary, in its structure, its policies and its programs the system of control must always be itself controlled by the evolving requirements of the enterprise.

It would be understood, *seventh*, that there will be no arbitrary limitations upon the freedom of each normal adult member of the community to exercise his abilities in promotion of the enterprise, and that the partnership of each in all the franchises and emolu-

ments of the undertaking will correspond with the value of his contribution to the common operations.

We should foresee, *eighth*, that from year to year and from decade to decade the enterprise will show an increasing surplus of material and spiritual goods. This accumulation will of course be held as a trust fund by the community, and it will be used as a special endowment to reinforce those operations which in the general interest from time to time most require stimulation. Experience will develop a code of equity to govern the administration of this material and spiritual wealth. It will be dedicated to the assistance of all persons and processes that increasing enlightenment discovers to be worthy of exceptional support. It will be jealously guarded against concession in the form of permanent privilege, and it will be held without prejudice at the service of every interest in the community which needs temporary encouragement in developing activities that give assurance of contributing ultimately to the good of the whole.

We should have no doubt, *ninth*, that those persons who, more through misfortune than through culpable fault, are only slightly or not at all able to contribute to the common enterprise will be enlisted for the most useful employments of which they are capable, and that the deficit between their services and a reasonable appraisal of their needs will be a charge upon the insurance reserve.

We should be agreed, *tenth*, that those persons who, more by their own choice than by misfortune, are unfit to contribute to the common enterprise will be held to such disciplinary constraints by the community that they will acquire some social fitness, and that they will at length prefer a tolerable measure of usefulness in the general undertaking to the alternative constraint.

In the case of persons whose social unfitness is due in part to the predetermining negligence of the society, attempts to correlate these persons with the whole functional process will have due regard to the different causes of the abnormality, and will always be guided by supreme reference to establishment of normality, both in the erring society and in the delinquent individual.

We should look forward, *eleventh*, to progressive recognition of gradations in the scale of accredited values. That is, material values

will be appraised in the proportion of the uses of the respective things to people, and moral values will rank in accordance with the social worth of the various types and qualities of human activity.

It would follow, *twelfth*, that adequate provision must be made for the function of keeping all the members of the community aware of the reciprocal nature of the enterprise in which they are engaged, and of the implied liabilities of all to each and of each to all.

For similar reasons, *thirteenth*, a part of the common undertaking must always be to see that no specific plans adopted or permitted by the community should tend to prejudice the general purpose.

It would be our conviction, *fourteenth*, that the general purpose will be prejudiced if either of the following things occurs:

a) If tendencies are tolerated which give to some types of people more than their proportional share of the returns of the enterprise, or which deprive other types of any portion of their due share of those returns.

b) If tendencies are tolerated which encourage the increase of less desirable types of persons, or which discourage the increase of more desirable types.

c) In particular, if tendencies are tolerated which make it possible for some people to enjoy without being useful, and which veto other people's will to be useful for the sake of enjoying.

d) If it becomes harder for some parts of the community than for others to obtain justice.

e) If the belief becomes current among some members of the community that the best way to get their rights is to repudiate parts of their obligations.

f) If a creed becomes current that things are more important than people.

g) If, whether as cause or effect of this creed, programs become fixed which set the interests of wealth above the interests of people.

Fifteenth, and finally, but first and constantly the precondition of all the rest: we should presuppose that the members of the community will be instant, in season and out of season, in discovering for themselves, and in passing along to their children, zeal for discovering every accessible detail and interpretation of knowledge which may reveal conditions upon which promotion of the whole

moral enterprise depends; and which especially may disclose failures of the persons concerned to apply their resources and abilities most efficiently to promotion of the undertaking.

Please observe that I have not referred to this scheme as a vision of social *righteousness*, or a vision of social *justice*, or a vision of social *reform*. There might be a suspicion of something weakly sentimental about such visions. I have been talking about the literal business in which humanity is engaged; the most matter-of-fact affair which mundane people have on their hands—this central and circumferential business of transforming all the resources of the world into the highest grade of physical, mental, and moral persons evolvable out of the given elements. I have been enumerating some of the basic requirements of *efficiency* in this business. Such intelligence as we possess tells us that the large business of life is not economically conducted unless it sustains the efficiency test which these specifications enforce.

Of course, the vision which I have drawn reminds us all of our own social system. Far be it from me to assert that the United States of America, the most enlightened country of the world, the path-breaker of human freedom, the pacemaker of moral progress, is deficient in a single one of these particulars! This is a time for felicitation. Carplings and criticisms would be bad form. Besides, the newspapers of the Twin Cities are doubtless not behind cosmopolitan journalism in general in their promptness to denounce the due damnation of a pessimist upon the ill-advised academic theorist who in public betrays a doubt that everything American is not only the best that ever was, but the best that ever can be. No! I am not the pessimist that the reporters dearly love to find in academic circles. There have been savage peoples that have not come up to the mark which our vision sets. Possibly trivial details of it are not yet in full force in Dahomey and Thibet and Mexico; but "practical" Americans are assuredly not lacking in anything that pertains to efficiency! Wherefore my epilogue is evidently à propos of nothing in particular. I am simply musing, as the manner of some is when their minds are not otherwise engaged.

I recall that one of the differences between an individual and a society is that the latter may actually begin where a completed

cycle of its career ends, and may shape a later type of career in the light of its previous experience. Individuals frequently ring changes on the futile reflection: "If I could live my life over again, knowing what I do now, I could do better." In the case of the individual this is less certain than is assumed. Societies actually may, and so long as they are virile they actually do, reconstruct themselves after failure and even disaster. Germany did it after the Thirty Years' War. England did it after the second probation of the Stuarts. France did it after the Revolution and again after the *débacle*.

The social problem of the twentieth century is whether the civilized nations can restore themselves to sanity after their nineteenth-century aberrations of individualism and capitalism.

Bear with me for pointing out that I have neither said nor implied that the actual company in the "Mayflower" ought to have seen as far as we see into the functional requirements of civilization as highly evolved as ours. It was not their fault that they did not see all that we can. It is not our merit that we see more than they could. The judgment of history upon us will turn, however, upon the programs which we follow since meaning factors of the human problem which our predecessors could not see have been forced on our attention.

Referring to these factors in the most summary way, there are four functional fallacies in the institutions of modern civilized states; four radical ignorings of the demands of social efficiency:

First: The fallacy of treating capital as though it were an active agent in human processes, and of crediting income to the personal representatives of capital irrespective of their actual share in human service.

Second: The fallacy of excluding the vast majority of the active workers in capitalistic industries from representation in control of the businesses in which they function.

Third: The fallacy of *incorporating* the fallacious capitalistic principle, thus promoting the legal person to an artificial advantage over natural persons, and consequently, by social volition, giving the initial fallacy cumulative force by an uncontrolled law of accelerated motion.

Of course I am not asserting that incorporation in itself is a social fallacy, but only incorporation inadequately controlled by the whole social process. Corporations as they will one day be articulated into the inclusive human process will be as different from corporations as they are, as the wrench serving the uses of a skilled mechanic is from the wrench thrown into the machinery.

Fourth: The fallacy of a system of inheritance which assigns the powers and privileges of incorporated capital to sentimentally designated individuals, instead of reserving their benefits primarily to the actively functioning agents of society. This fourth fallacy, in conjunction with the other three, creates phenomena of hereditary economic sovereignty which must eventually become more intolerable than the hereditary political sovereignties overthrown by the republican revolutions.

Back of these four fallacies of operation is a malignantly subservient fallacy of logic. It is the naïve sophistry of dogmatizing an obvious analogy into an identity. The analogy starts with homely everyday aspects of the lives of types of persons who are every day growing more rare in capitalistic societies, but it shades off by imperceptible degrees into the radically different things with which these remote parallels are supposed to be identical. This accounts for the plausibility of the argument, while it is egregiously superficial. In a word, the detached individual, with his labor, his savings, and his implicit right to reasonable freedom in use of his savings, is presumed to be the ground pattern of all the economic rights and duties in present society. Thereupon, what is true of this unaided individual, dealing with similar unaided individuals, is predicated of natural and legal persons alike in their property rights. That is, not merely analogy, but identity of principle is alleged between the literal individual and incorporated capital!

What is incorporated capital? It is a few individuals applying a nucleus of wealth and credit to natural opportunity, *but not with their own unaided powers alone*. It is a few individuals exploiting wealth and credit and opportunity *with the perpetual alliance of the state*; and this alliance is a talisman which confers a virtually magical touch upon the persons incorporated. The increment of power with which the state thus artificially endows corporations

makes them social factors with which the powers of natural persons are ridiculously incomparable. This transparent logical fallacy is the key to the theoretical defense of the four chief operative fallacies. The chief social task of the next great stage of civilization will be this—to dissipate this nebulous defense and to instal rational substitutes for the fallacious operative principles.

Returning from this digression into literal fact, and resuming for a moment my flight of fancy, I predict that the effective refutation of these confederated fallacies will receive its next great impulse, not from recognition of claims of justice, as between man and man, or class and class, but from discovery that *the combination mightily obstructs social efficiency*.

If it were not commonplace, it would be astonishing that, after so many thousands of years of human history, we have no consensus of opinion as to why we are living at all. I see no reason to believe that we shall ever reach a common conclusion about the ultimate meaning of this planet and the occurrences upon it for the whole cosmic reality in which it is a speck. On the other hand, it looks to me altogether probable that men will one day be substantially agreed in this—that efficiency in living involves as a minimum the utmost correlation of human powers in endeavor after those concerted social achievements which prove by experience to do most toward placing physical resources at the disposal of all the world's people; and which at the same time do most toward inclining all the world's people so to use those resources that they may become progressively admirable people. No sooner has this construction of life commended itself to anyone than he begins to understand that the dominating principle of our capitalistic civilization is a suspensive veto upon realization of this ideal. The illusion that the way to live is to subordinate life to the lifeless thing *capital* is the most astounding of the paganisms.

I do not imagine that the practical refutation of capitalism will be accomplished when proof is furnished that the system is not efficient in producing progressively admirable people. That might pass as a nonessential, to be worried about by no one except pedagogues and preachers. It doubtless would not powerfully interest the type of people whose measure of the world's efficiency

is dividends. But more to the immediate point than that, I predict that before long the statisticians and the accountants will begin to show that capitalism is not solvently efficient in raising the funds to pay its own bills. Then the judgment day of capitalism will be due.

For a number of years men wise and simple have been puzzling over the problem of the rising cost of living. Among all our national leaders, not one has had the wit to point out that capitalism steadily increases the overhead charges upon national industry, and that sooner or later the burden of this increase must be felt in its enlarging ratio to the output. Under the capitalistic system, when we pay for today's dinner we are paying also for dinners served and paid for long ago, and we are also paying instalments on other dinners that will be served generations hence. Yet we go jauntily on adding percentages of yesterday's and tomorrow's accounts to the price of today's dinner, while we marvel at the growing size of the bill!

For example, we are still paying interest on four hundred and forty-one million dollars of national debt incurred previous to 1865. But the interest payments on this sum have already equaled the original loans twice over. Through continuance of the annual interest payments which do not reduce the principal, we are now engaged in discharging those loans a third time. Looking in the other direction, Americans for the next fifty years will be paying at the rate of from 2 to 3 per cent for certain portions of the cost of the Panama Canal. In 1961 or thereabout we shall have repaid the original borrowings to defray these particular portions of the expense. This repayment of the principal, however, will not have retired a single one of the bonds, but the principal and the annual interest will still be due, just as though no payments had been made.

As another type of illustration, it would be easy to schedule improvements of railroad terminals completed or projected in various cities, and bonded to the amount of one hundred million dollars. Nothing affecting the point of the illustration could be gained by attempting to make a complete estimate of this sort of liability. The interest on such bonds will become a permanent charge upon the earnings. It will press down upon wages, and it will lift up on demands for higher traffic rates, while the next

twenty-five years are making full return of the principal. Whether the original bonds have a longer or shorter life, they will probably be represented in the funded debt of the companies for an indefinite period. That is, our industries will repay these loans over and over again to the children and children's children of the original lenders, and in the apparently innocent form of a reasonable rate of interest on an honest debt!

My argument would deserve no attention if I asserted that all capitalistic operations, or even all financing operations, are of this improvident and fallacious type. I neither assert nor believe that this is the case. I do say that this fallacious type of capitalistic operation bulks so large in modern affairs that it may turn out to be the prime factor in our age of transition.

Unless Americans fifty years hence are less stupid than we are today, they will go on repaying old debts an indefinite number of times, and heaping up new ones, while they wonder why it grows harder every day to provide the necessities of life. It is barely possible that the multiplicity of object-lessons may have taught our successors something by the end of another half-century. Perhaps the next generation will have learned that capitalism is not the Utopia in which everyone may eat his cake and have it too. In another fifty years it may have been discovered that capitalism is a merger of famine and lottery. The majority pay for cakes they do not get, and the surplus provides prizes for the minority.

Payments under the head of interest that correspond with value received, including proper rates of wages for the necessary labor and minor charges connected with the transactions, may or may not be items in a needlessly extravagant way of living. In principle they are not otherwise fallacious. The premium element in payments of interest, however—that is, the excess over payment of the principal and fair remuneration for real services connected with the loan—is without justification in economics or in morals, and the civilization which presumes the contrary is riding for a fall. Some day not far off the statisticians will disclose the amount of this premium element loaded upon our national production, and collected from the non-capitalistic classes both in low wages and in high price of commodities. I do not venture to predict the subsequent course of events.

Not opponents only but supporters of the last three presidents of the United States have reached the conclusion that each of these worthy citizens is convinced that something is the matter with our social system. Each of them is eager to find the remedy. Obviously to others, however, and perhaps also to himself, each is unable to arrive at a convincing diagnosis. The earliest of these chief magistrates thinks that, whatever the difficulty is, its main evils might be removed by controlling monopoly. The latest of them is equally sure that health may be restored by controlling competition. The intermediate incumbent radiates a hardly less futile optimism in the belief that our social ills would be reduced to a minimum if we would resign ourselves to control by a few masterful gentlemen who on their part do not propose to be controlled at all.

Our program toward the central problems of our time will amount to nothing but impotent and irritating tinkering with details, until the leaders of our thought and action consent to a policy of candid and thorough inquiry as to whether there is something radically mistaken in the capitalistic system itself.

Returning for a moment to my point of departure, it is a more comfortable job to card-index the past or the present than to work on construction of the future. By far the bulk of American scholarship in the social sciences has gravitated in the line of least resistance. We are not doing our share toward helping our confused modern social consciousness to become articulate, and toward concentrating our divergent purposes upon wisely chosen aims. No scholars in the world have had a fairer field than we for durable social service. Reorganization of social relations is going on, with us or in spite of us. It might be a more constructive and less wasteful transformation if the best that we can contribute were cast into the lot with the labors of our fellows. We may consent to be mere bookkeepers of other men's deeds, or we may be "instead of eyes" to men with more force than insight for rational progress.

RECENT MANIFESTATIONS OF SECTIONALISM

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At the Madison meeting of the American Sociological Society in December of 1907 Professor Frederick Jackson Turner said, in the conclusion of his discussion of the question, "Is Sectionalism in America Dying Away?": ". . . . I make the suggestion that as the nation reaches a more stable equilibrium, a more settled state of society, with denser populations pressing upon the means of existence, with the population no longer migratory, the influence of the diverse physiographic provinces which make up the nation will become more marked. . . ."¹ In the discussion which followed, the participants agreed that at least three causes could be looked for to underly the sectionalism of the future: different industrial and social conditions, the peculiar economic needs of certain areas, and the conflict of races on the Pacific coast.² In the five years that have intervened since that discussion there have been repeated evidences that these causes are at work. Of the expression of the first as shown in votes in Congress this paper gives some account.

In the election of 1908 Taft lost to Bryan in but four states outside of the South: Oklahoma, Nebraska, Colorado, Nevada—trans-Mississippi states in which Bryan had a majority of 19,000 in a total vote of 825,000. Three-fifths of the Taft electoral vote came from states west of the Alleghanies. Yet within a year no statement was more generally accepted than that the "West" was the enemy's country, in that it was opposed to the leadership dominant in the Republican organization and dissatisfied with the Taft administration. The rules fight in the House of Representatives and the tariff debate in the Senate in the spring and summer of 1909 revealed Insurgent Republicanism as the protest of western men. Although the personnel of the Republican organization changed somewhat in 1910 and 1911, the renewal of the rules fight

¹ *American Journal of Sociology*, XIII, 661-75.

² *Ibid.*, 811-19.

and the recurrence of the tariff alignment in the succeeding sessions emphasized the continuance of Insurgency. The President's acceptance of the organization leaders and the activity of western men in opposing his renomination justified the continued assumption that the East was the home of official Republicanism, even though the landslide of 1910 gave three New England states and New York and New Jersey Democratic executives. At the same time the very general indorsement of the western Insurgents that stood for re-election gave additional impetus to the movement for the control of the party. The early preliminaries of the campaign of 1912 disclosed large backing for the Insurgent Republican proposals and a movement for a western candidate. Then for six months the largest part of this western revolt was temporarily lost sight of in the Roosevelt campaign for the Republican nomination. But the nature of the split in the Republican convention, the advent of the Progressive party, and the nomination of Wilson, all served to revive and nurture the growth of sectionalism, as will be seen in the distribution of the vote of November of 1912. The tariff session of 1913 has revealed the continuance of western sectionalism.

I

The overthrow of the Republican majority in the House of Representatives in the election of 1910 ended a complete control of the national government which that party had held for fourteen years.¹ During this period of supremacy, although not seriously threatened by a divided and consequently weakened Democracy,²

¹ The Democratic party had been out of power since March 4, 1897. The Republicans then had a majority of 12 in the Senate and 72 in the House. On March 4, 1909, there was a Republican majority of 28 in the Senate and 47 in the House. The elections of 1910 reduced the Senate majority to 11, giving the balance of power to the Insurgents, and gave the Democratic party a majority of 66 in the House.

² The Democratic convention in 1896 in repudiating the Cleveland administration had reflected the growing disagreement of the East and the West as to the solution of problems of the new period. The capture of one of the great parties by the elements of discontent emphasized the growing importance of the West in the nation. Of the candidates before the convention all but one came from states west of the Alleghanies, and the two leading candidates from west of the Mississippi. Under the apportionment of the census of 1870 twenty-three representatives had come to Congress from west of the Mississippi; by the act of 1882 there were forty-three; by the act of 1892 there were fifty-three.

Republican leaders had found it necessary to formulate a constructive policy to meet the demands of a new industrial era. As huge aggregations of capital assumed a more complete control of the natural resources, necessities of life, and means of transportation, the national administration, responding to a public apprehension that manifested greater intensity in the first years of the new century, embarked upon a policy of stricter control of industrial development. In this period of the widening of government activity, in the state as well as in the nation, it became evident that the two ideals of individual freedom and equal opportunity, richly nurtured and steadily upheld in the recently completed pioneer movement, had become irreconcilable. Unrestricted individual freedom in the new period tended to hasten the elimination of equal opportunity. It became clearer that business had entered politics in order to conserve by indirection the principle of unrestricted liberty that it might be applied to the corporation. Western political leaders, still maintaining the ideal of equal opportunity, urged a more adequate control of the activities of the corporation. Representative government was put to a test by these conflicting forces. New alignments first appeared in states of the Mississippi Valley¹ where the manifest weakness of the Democracy emboldened the Republican organization to refuse to accede to the demands of some of the younger men who were desirous of "driving the System out of politics." The disagreement more often than not took form in the opposition of the younger group to the influence and methods of the railway companies. Dissatisfaction with party forms and practices found expression in bills providing for primary elections, campaign publicity, restrictions upon lobbying, and a more careful legislative procedure, all aiming to enhance the control of the electorates even though one strong political party remained in office.

These conflicts within the dominant party brought an increased public interest in the problems and machinery of government. Voters began to care less for the complimentary references to their representatives and to watch more carefully the roll-call upon

¹ In Wisconsin and Iowa; Populism and Bryan Democracy had failed to make serious inroads in either state.

important measures. The government was brought nearer to the people perhaps as much by this renewed interest as by the changes in the machinery of elections. Yet as the field of the struggle widened there arose a conviction that the representative principle had failed. It became apparent that an absolute faith in representative government led to the lack of interest among the mass of citizens and resulted in a concentration of power in the hands of a few men. Such concentration of power was not in keeping with the aims of a democratically minded people.

In several states these insurgents within the dominant party achieved a degree of reform in political forms and methods. As an attitude of mind rather than a political creed and having its rise within state alignments the appeal of insurgency cut across old party barriers. Each fight attracted the interest and aid of a large group of independents, men who for twenty years had been voicing a growing discontent. More and more after 1900 the independent voter lost interest in third-party movements and in the rather indefinite promises of a weakening Democracy and turned attention to the control of the dominant party.¹

For almost a decade the insurgency manifest in certain states did not trouble the national Republican organization. In the few cases where the clash was revealed the national power was used to crush the insurgents. And attention was diverted from the dominant figures in the Republican party organization by the energetic personality in the White House. Roosevelt's understanding of the West made it possible for him to voice its feelings more completely than had any prominent federal official up to that time, and the elimination of Bryan's influence in the Parker campaign of 1904 gave the Republican candidate an enthusiastic support in former Populist areas. The extent of his western triumph was the most startling feature of the two and one-half

¹ Not only did the Republican party remain in complete control, but Independents have been missing in Congress during the ten years after 1900. In the Fifty-seventh Congress, 1901-3, there were in the House six Populists and two Silver party men; in the Senate four Populists and four Independents. These sixteen men came from the following western states: Washington, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Colorado, Nebraska, South Dakota, Kansas. From 1903-11 only the two parties were represented.

million majority.¹ Yet the national character of the Roosevelt vote showed that the Republican organization was still responsive to eastern interests. During his second administration Roosevelt voiced with increasing emphasis the distrust of party organization that has been developing with great rapidity in the Middle West.² His expressions lent aid to additional state conflicts.³ As his term approached a close his continued assaults upon predatory wealth and unrepresentative government brought estrangement from his party organization in both Senate and House.

Less than a year after the opening of the second Roosevelt administration Robert M. La Follette had appeared in the Senate. For ten years he had fought the organization leaders of the Republican party in his state. His objection to the undue influence of corporation interests led to the assault upon the political practices that had made possible the repeated subversion of the popular will. As governor of Wisconsin, 1900-1906, he secured provisions for primary elections and a more equitable taxation of public service corporations, and insured the enactment of measures providing for a more careful legislative procedure and for restrictions upon lobbying. He appeared in Washington at a time when party methods were coming under closer public scrutiny. Voicing the distrust of prevailing party practices that had been developing throughout the Middle West, he advocated the measures of publicity that had led the way to the restoration of popular control in Wisconsin. His disagreement with the Republican organization leaders was constant and rose to bitter denunciation in the railway debate of 1906. He asked for a roll-call upon significant amendments and this record was read widely in the Middle West. Interest was aroused in the methods and personnel of the Senate.

Not until the meeting of the Sixty-first Congress did the new alignment appear in the national councils of the Republican party.

¹ He carried every western state. Of these Missouri, Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Idaho, and Nevada had been Bryan states in 1900. South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Utah, and Washington had been in the Bryan column in 1896.

² In Wisconsin and Iowa anti-machine campaigns had been successful.

³ The organization of the Lincoln-Roosevelt League in California led to the election of Hiram Johnson as governor in 1910 on a platform emphasizing reform in political methods.

At the critical moment of a promised tariff revision the party lost its astute leader, and as the organization in both House and Senate rested in the hands of veterans who were not responsive to demands for changes in method, western insurgency, confident and experienced in many a state conflict, swept into the national arena. In the ensuing three years the West grew increasingly restless. "Restore the government to the people!" became a winning slogan for the dominant party in at least twelve states west of the Alleghanies. It had a familiar sound and it came from territory previously defected; but now it was used most insistently by a group within the Republican party rather than by the followers of Bryan. This does not imply that progressive Democrats ceased to advocate more democracy as a solution for present-day problems.¹ But in determining the influence of the West in national affairs the attitude of the Insurgent Republicans is of first importance, inasmuch as the Republican party has been dominant in the Middle West since 1899.

The western Republican, by the time that the Taft administration was well started, admitted his hostility to the organization dominant in his party, but refused to admit that true Republican doctrine and practice came from leaders who seemed to be opposed to popular government. To the charge that western states had not shown political capacity he pointed to constructive legislation that had conserved popular control and in which legitimate business rejoiced. To the claim that the West was not basic Republican territory he pointed to its very necessary allegiance to the dominant party. To the charge that he would destroy parties he renewed his allegiance to the Republican faith and announced his intention to make the old party respond to new demands. He stated that if his demand for publicity, primaries, and popular control had made the West the enemy's country it was high time that men of the insurgent faith captured control of the Republican organization and placed that party in as enviable a position as it occupied under the leadership of the West a half-century before.²

¹ The National Democratic Progressive League, organized to insure control of that party, had an extensive platform "to drive special interests out of politics."

² See J. P. Dolliver, in the *Outlook*, September 24, 1910; R. M. La Follette, *Autobiography*, chap. xi.

We shall find, in reviewing the political alignment in 1908, the struggles of the Sixty-first Congress, and the Congressional preliminaries of the campaign of 1912, that the region of revolt has revealed a sectional unity that coincides with the area in which during the last decade state conflicts within the Republican party have been waged "to restore the government to the people." Bearing in mind the development of American democracy in the pioneer movement, we should expect to find in the northern Mississippi Valley strong forces for the maintenance of that democracy through "the strengthening of government."

II

It was twelve years after a sectional revolt split the Democracy at Chicago that the Republican convention of 1908 meeting in that city had occasion to consider western radicalism. Its representative was presented to the convention with this form of recommendation: "We point to the most perfect system of constructive legislation written on the statute books of any state in the Union. The Wisconsin idea—the restoration of the government to the people—is today an uplifting force in every commonwealth in this republic."¹ Thus was Senator La Follette urged upon the convention as "the man who justly should be the successor of Theodore Roosevelt." This convention was prepared to do the bidding of President Roosevelt because of the body of public sentiment back of any indorsement that he might make, and the outspoken president was in his turn too good a politician to ask the nomination of the lone insurgent who had fought the battle in the Senate but who was as yet the leader of a few western folk.² The nomination of Secretary Taft might be expected to carry assurance to the West that the "Roosevelt policies" would be carried forward in the event of Republican victory. But in the framing of the platform the organization controlled as completely as it did in the nomination of Representative Sherman for the vice-presidency. The western radicals offered amendments in the committee and

¹ Nominating speech of Henry F. Cochems.

² In the spring of 1911 in speech and editorial ex-President Roosevelt commended to the nation the governmental policies "instituted in Wisconsin under the leadership of Senator La Follette."

filed a minority report from the Committee on Resolutions. Here were proposals for the physical valuation of railway properties as a basis for government rate-making, a revision of the tariff on the basis of the difference in cost of production at home and abroad, a permanent tariff commission; and planks favoring popular election of senators and the publication of campaign contributions and expenditures. This report of the minority was termed "Socialistic and Democratic" by the chairman of the Committee on Resolutions. The largest vote for a minority amendment was 114 for the popular election of senators, and the minority report as a whole received 28 votes on the final question of the adoption of the platform as submitted.¹

The ultra-western character of the Denver convention and the nomination of Mr. Bryan led to the opinion that much of the West might re-enter Democratic ranks.² But the changes of the last few years in the Republican party in certain western states had not only won local support but also engendered a confidence in the national possibilities of the party. Moreover, the "Roosevelt policies" were constantly to the fore. The national Republican appeal to the West may be found in these words of Mr. Taft in his acceptance speech on the twenty-second of September: "He [Roosevelt] demonstrated to the people by what he said, by what he recommended, and by what he did, the sincerity of his efforts to command respect for the law, to secure the equality of all before the law, and to save the country from the dangers of a plutocratic government, toward which we were fast tending."³ The West, adhering to the principle of protection, accepted the Republican promise of revision, finding confidence in the repeated declarations of Mr. Taft during his campaign tour in the Middle West that "the Republican party [was] pledged to a genuine revision of the tariff." Finally, in answer to Mr. Bryan's attacks, he said: "I can say that our party is pledged to a genuine revision, and as temporary head of that party and President of the United States if it

¹ The appearances of these rejected proposals from time to time during the Taft administration have made interesting history.

² It was charged, not without reason, that Oklahoma had more influence in the making of the Denver nomination and platform than had New York.

³ *Republican Campaign Textbook*, 1908, p. 2.

be successful in November, I expect to use all the influence that I have by calling immediately a special session and by recommendations to Congress to secure a genuine and honest revision."¹ Secretary Taft was accepted in the Middle West as the political heir of President Roosevelt.

III

Insurgency immediately became of national importance when the extra session of the Sixty-first Congress opened on March 15, 1909. This session, called to give consideration to the revision of the tariff, opened in the House of Representatives with a struggle over the organization of that body in the election of a Speaker and the adoption of rules. This situation was brought about by the opposition of a group of Republican members both to the re-election of Mr. Cannon and to the readoption of the rules of the former Congress. The Insurgents claimed to have the sympathy of President Taft in their fight upon Cannonism. But when the test came it was found that the President had thrown the influence of the administration in favor of the organization leaders of the Republican majority. In spite of this development the Insurgents made their protest. Twelve Republicans refused to vote for the caucus nominee for Speaker.² They were distributed as follows: Wisconsin, 6; Minnesota, 2; Iowa, 1; Nebraska, 1; Kansas, 1; Washington, 1. This defection was not sufficient to defeat Mr. Cannon but the insurgency of thirty-one Republicans defeated the motion to adopt the rules of the former Congress.³ These votes were distributed as follows: Massachusetts, 2; New Jersey, 1; Wisconsin, 8; Iowa, 6; Minnesota, 4; Nebraska, 3; Kansas, 2; North Dakota, 1; Ohio, 2; Washington, 1; California, 1. But these Insurgents voting with the majority of the Democrats were unable in their turn to secure the adoption of their proposals. The struggle closed with the adoption of a resolution, introduced by Fitzgerald, a Democratic member from New York, and carried with the votes of the Republican organization and of twenty-two Democrats. Twenty-eight of the thirty-one Republicans opposed the adoption of this resolution.

¹ *Chicago Record-Herald*, September 25, 1908.

² *Congressional Record*, XLIV, 18.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

When the appointments of Speaker Cannon became known, it was found that of the 61 committees the chairmanships of 44 important committees had been given to representatives from 8 states, of which Pennsylvania had 10, Illinois 7, and New York and Massachusetts 6 each. Representatives from 25 states held no chairmanships, and, of these, 16 were Republican states sending 52 representatives, 30 of whom were men of at least one term's experience. Four states holding 29 chairmanships sent 118 representatives; 25 states holding no chairmanships sent 129 representatives.

Little opportunity was given in the House for a manifestation of insurgency upon the tariff revision program of the organization and the debate was very early transferred to the Senate.¹ The non-committal tariff message of the President had excited apprehension among those western Republicans who had campaigned for a downward revision. Apprehension grew when Chairman Aldrich of the Committee on Finance did not, in an explanation of an hour and a half, mention the word "revision," while devoting himself to this question: "Will the bill as reported from the Committee on Finance produce sufficient revenue when taken in connection with the internal revenue taxes and other existing sources of revenue to meet the expenses of the government without the imposition of additional taxes?"² This introduction called for expressions of surprise from western Republicans. Then it was that Senator Daniels, ranking Democratic member of the Committee on Finance, made this statement: "The Democratic members of the Finance Committee have as yet had no opportunity to read this bill or to know anything about its contents."³ The bill then as presented to the Senate came from a committee of nine Republicans: Aldrich of Rhode Island, Burrows of Michigan, Penrose of Pennsylvania, Hale of Maine, Cullom of Illinois, Lodge of Massachusetts, McCumber of North Dakota, Smoot of Utah, Flint of California. Of these, Aldrich, Hale, and Lodge, all of

¹ Republican representatives from these states voted against the bill: Minnesota, 7; Iowa, 4; Wisconsin, 3; North Dakota, 1; Kansas, 1; Washington, 1; New York, 1; Ohio, 1; Illinois, 1.

² *Congressional Record*, XLIV, 1275.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 1377.

New England, and Smoot of Utah appeared most often in defense of the bill.

The provisions of the reported bill were at once assailed by a group of Republican Senators from the Middle West. Chairman Aldrich had stated that "the Senate would have ample opportunity without any limitation whatever to read the bill, discuss it, and amend it." In doing so the western men complained of inadequate information, questioned the statistics submitted by the chairman, reminded the committee of the platform pledges and of Taft's utterances in the campaign, and most emphatically demanded more knowledge of the methods employed by the committee in arriving at the duties provided for in the bill. In the face of these protests Chairman Aldrich repeatedly contented himself with the statement, "The gentleman is misinformed," and several times refused to give the committee's method of procedure. In answer to the request of Senator Dolliver that "the general underlying principle of the committee's provisions in Schedule K" be explained, Senator Aldrich said: "I am so anxious to get a vote upon this bill, and every feature of it, that I am willing to forego any desire to make a speech and go on and vote now."¹ Finally he was provoked to retort: "Mr. President, where did we ever make a statement that we would revise the tariff downward?"² And Senator Heyburn added: "There is nothing in the platform of the Republican party that pledges us to reform either the Republican party or its principles."³

Such reform was demanded by the ten Republicans that voted against the bill when it went into conference: Beveridge of Indiana, Bristow of Kansas, Brown of Nebraska, Burkett of Nebraska, Clapp of Minnesota, Cummins of Iowa, Crawford of South Dakota, Dolliver of Iowa, Nelson of Minnesota, La Follette of Wisconsin.

When the bill was again reported to the Senate after passing the conference committee, it was subject to the renewed attack of Senators Cummins, Dolliver, and La Follette. Finally in closing the debate on behalf of the committee Senator Aldrich gave official recognition of the sectionalism of the revolt: "If senators shall

¹ *Congressional Record*, XLIV, p. 2791.

² *Ibid*, p. 2889.

³ *Ibid*, p. 2966.

see fit to vote against this bill on account of their individual opinions, that is a matter for them to determine; but I suggest to those senators that they cannot attempt to speak for the party without a protest from men who represent states here that have elected and can and will elect Republican presidents whatever may be the attitude of individuals."¹

Senator La Follette, one of the seven senators who voted against the bill on its final passage, later said: "I say in response to the criticism of the Senator from Rhode Island that the Chicago convention was not controlled and the Chicago platform was not made by his kind of Republicanism, and I say to him here tonight that if he had been running for the presidency of the United States upon a tariff platform such as this bill seeks to embody into law he could not have carried four states in the Union."²

In considering the basis for the statement of the leader of the Senate organization it may be suggested that the vote of 1908 gave little reason for such confidence. The states from which came one or two Insurgent Republican senators cast 74 electoral votes in 1908; 66 of them were cast for Taft. Had they been taken from the Republican column, had Missouri failed to give 629 majority for Taft, and had two additional votes in Maryland, where the ticket was split, been Democratic, Bryan would have had a majority of thirteen.

Throughout the debates in the summer of 1909 the attack of the insurgents was aimed not so much at the provisions of the bill as at the methods employed by the committee in making the bill. As a partial explanation of the immediate cause for this cleavage in the Republican party these considerations may be offered. Of the nine states represented by Republicans on the Finance Committee Rhode Island, Maine, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania in national contests had given steady Republican majorities for twenty-five years and more; Michigan, Illinois, North Dakota, and California, had not changed since 1892; Utah had been Republican since 1896. Party organization to which these Senators were attached had held unbroken control. The lowest majority given by any one of these states in 1908 was 18,444. Political upheaval

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2892.

² *Ibid.*, p. 3021.

seemed very remote. Of the seven states one or both of whose Senators voted against the bill as it went into conference, Iowa had never left the Republican column, although the majority for governor in 1908 was the lowest in history; Kansas and South Dakota were Democratic in 1896; Indiana and Wisconsin were Democratic in 1892; Minnesota and Indiana elected Democratic governors in 1908; and Nebraska gave its 1908 vote for Bryan. In Kansas, Iowa, and Wisconsin the progressive wing of the Republican party had caused much strife and consequently more alertness.

IV

In spite of the fact that President Taft signed the Payne-Aldrich bill, a great portion of the West maintained confidence in the successor of Roosevelt. But his defense of the law in his speech at Winona definitely made the Middle West "the enemy's country," the enemy in this case being the group of Insurgent Republicans in both Senate and House against whom the federal organization was prepared to wage a war of extermination. As the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy rose to first importance these Middle Western leaders asserted their conviction that a battle had been lost in the elevation of Secretary Taft to the presidency.

When Congress convened in regular session the continued Insurgency of a group of western Republicans was at once apparent. The House voted to have an investigation of the "Ballinger affair." To take from Speaker Cannon the power to appoint the members of the committee a motion was made on January 7, 1910, to have the House elect the members to serve in that capacity. Twenty-six Republicans voted for the motion: Iowa, 6; Wisconsin, 5; Minnesota, 4; Kansas, 2; Nebraska, 2; North Dakota, 1; New York, 2; Massachusetts, 2; Washington, 1; California, 1. When on March 19, 1910 the "rules struggle" was renewed in the House the resolution of Insurgent Republican Norris, of Nebraska, polled the largest Insurgent vote—forty-one: Wisconsin, 8; Iowa, 7; Minnesota, 5; Nebraska, 3; Kansas, 2; North Dakota, 1; South Dakota, 1; Massachusetts, 2; New York, 3; New Jersey, 1; Ohio, 4; Michigan, 2; Indiana, 1; California, 1. Throughout

the remainder of this session the fight upon the party organization was continued.¹

In the Senate a group of western Republicans opposed the party organization upon all important measures, not often on motions for final passage but invariably upon the preliminary votes. Upon twenty-five important roll-calls of this session the following Republican senators voted more than ten times against the Republican organization: Beveridge of Indiana, 22; Borah of Idaho, 23; Bourne of Oregon, 17; Bristow of Kansas, 21; Brown of Nebraska, 15; Clapp of Minnesota, 23; Crawford of South Dakota, 18; Cummins of Iowa, 15; Dixon of Montana, 16; Dolliver of Iowa, 22; Gamble of South Dakota, 14; La Follette of Wisconsin, 21.

The November elections of 1910 revealed the strength of Insurgency in the West. Men in sympathy with the revolt against the methods of the Republican organization named candidates or wrote platforms in every Republican state west of the Mississippi River except Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and Montana; as well as in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Indiana. In Wisconsin Senator La Follette stood for re-election and encountered the concentrated opposition of the national Republican organization. The Insurgent senators entered the campaign, made Wisconsin the battle-field, and won the crucial engagement in the overwhelming popular indorsement of the pioneer of Insurgency. With two exceptions the western voters returned those Insurgent representatives who stood for re-election, and added to their number new members who in campaign pledged themselves to "a scientific revision of the tariff," to "more direct control of legislative procedure," and to "more careful supervision of corporate power." When contrasted with the Democratic landslide in the East and the very general weakness of the support given to prominent organization leaders everywhere, it was clear not only that Insurgency was a winning issue but also that the West showed faith in the attempt to accomplish reform within the Republican party, and had directed its representatives to continue their struggle for control of the party.

¹ An unsuccessful attempt was made to amend the railway bill and to force a debate on the postal bill (June 7, 1910).

To meet the new emergency the National Progressive Republican League was organized in Washington, D.C., on January 21, 1911. Its founders came from various sections of the country but those holding political office came from the following states: California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Indiana. The statement of principles did not deal directly with any economic question. The founders advocated: direct election of United States senators; direct primaries for all elective offices; direct election of delegates to national conventions; submission of amendments for the initiative, the referendum, and the recall in the states corrupt practice acts. This was the program of the Insurgent leaders to achieve the reformation of the Republican party. The struggles of a decade in the states and the initial conflict in the national arena had convinced these men of the hopelessness of making representative government responsive to the will of the electorate without changes in the machinery of parties and government.

When the Sixty-second Congress met in extra session in April of 1911 seventeen Republicans refused to vote for the caucus nominee for Speaker:¹ Wisconsin, 6; Minnesota, 3; Kansas, 2; New York, 1; California, 1; Washington, 2; Oregon, 1; Idaho, 1. As the House was in the control of the Democratic party there was less opportunity than in the previous session for a manifestation of Republican insurgency.² Of eighty-five Congressmen from west of the Alleghanies sixty voted against the reciprocity agreement with Canada,³ and later, in the regular session, a smaller group broke from the party organization and voted with the Democratic

¹ *Congressional Record*, XLVII, 6.

² The resolution for the popular election of United States senators, rejected by the Chicago convention, passed the House (April 13, 1911) with only fifteen Republican votes against it.

³ Distribution of the votes against reciprocity: California, 2; Oregon, 1; Washington, 3; Idaho, 1; Utah, 1; Wyoming, 1; Montana, 1; Pennsylvania, 7; New Jersey, 2; New York, 9; Vermont, 2; New Hampshire, 1; Massachusetts, 1; Maine, 2; North Dakota, 2; South Dakota, 2; Nebraska, 3; Kansas, 4; Oklahoma, 2; Minnesota, 5; Iowa, 8; Wisconsin, 6; Illinois, 7; Michigan, 8; Ohio, 1; Kentucky, 2.

majority in favor of the "woolen" bill,¹ and the 35 per cent reduction on iron and steel.²

The Republicans still constituted a majority in the Senate. When in April the committee assignments were announced by the Republican organization, a formal protest against the method of selection was read by Senator La Follette on "behalf of thirteen Republican Senators."³ These Republicans held the balance of power and prevented the election of a president of the Senate until December 16, 1912, when a resolution introduced by Senator Smoot, providing that Senators Gallinger and Bacon, Republican and Democrat respectively, should serve alternately, was finally adopted. Ten western Republicans voted against this compromise resolution.⁴

As in the discussion of the tariff bill of 1909, the great part of the debate upon the Canadian reciprocity agreement took place in the Senate. The Insurgent Republicans maintained that this treaty-tariff was in keeping with the former revisions when the dominant party organization had lowered certain tariff duties without careful investigation, and with no other purpose than that of saving the whole system from public wrath. They reiterated their demand of 1909 for a generally accepted principle as a basis for all tariff-making and general access to reliable and adequate statistics. A number of organization Republicans voted against the adoption of this treaty, but the bulk of the Republican opposition came from the West and was voiced by the Insurgents as in 1909.⁵

Throughout the spring and summer of 1911 the attitude of Congressional Insurgents became more and more hostile to the renomination of President Taft.⁶ In April an informal conference of Insurgents held in Washington on their arrival for the extra

¹ Twenty Republicans to pass over veto (*Congressional Record*, XLVIII, 3280).

² Nineteen Republicans for the bill (*ibid.*, p. 4170).

³ *Op. cit.*, XLVII, 714.

⁴ *Ibid.*, XLIX, 634.

⁵ Of twenty-four Republican senators voting "Nay," all except four were from west of the Alleghanies.

⁶ A nice balance of political forces prevented action on the tariff in this Congress. Thirteen Republicans voted for the "woolen bill": California, 1; Oregon, 1; Washington, 1; North Dakota, 2; South Dakota, 1; Nebraska, 1; Wisconsin, 1; Kansas, 1; Iowa, 2; Minnesota, 2.

session urged Senator La Follette that he become a candidate. Members of Congress in attendance or immediately in sympathy with the movement came from the following states: California, Oregon, Washington, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin. The progress of the reciprocity debate emphasized the weakness of the Taft candidacy in the West, and the coalition of the Democrats and the Insurgents in the Senate in passing the tariff revision bills added momentum to the movement for a western candidate to contest the nomination with President Taft. The active campaign in the interests of Senator La Follette opened in July, and on October 16 three hundred delegates composed a Progressive Republican convention at Chicago which indorsed his candidacy.¹

The reciprocity debate had finally made it clear that a reduction of the tariff was not the leading cause for western Insurgency. The opposition of the Congressional Insurgents as early as 1906 had invariably been against the methods of the party organization.² The program of the Progressive Republicans now emphasized this disagreement as to party methods and governmental machinery. Here was revealed the essential nature of the western revolt. For a decade and more the movement for a more direct government or at least for safeguards to prevent its indirection had been growing steadily in the West.³ It had arisen out of vain attempts to make the government responsive to the popular will, particularly with reference to the control of public utilities.⁴ In September of 1911

¹ List of delegates not published. Western men composed three-fourths and more of the membership of the two committees.

² The question of methods cut party barriers. Twenty-two Republicans voted with eighteen Democrats against the motion of Senator La Follette that "the Senator from Illinois was not duly and legally elected." On the resolution for the popular election of senators nine Democrats united with twenty-three Republicans to retain the old method.

³ A prominent southern Senator was "unalterably opposed to the Initiative and Referendum" measures warmly advocated by ten of his western colleagues in that party. An eastern Republican in the Senate "would scorn to consider Primary Elections or Direct Legislation," measures which were a part of the creed of twelve of his party colleagues.

⁴ State parties have habitually followed the national alignment. Since 1900 the struggles within the states have been of first importance. The platform of the Progressive Republicans embodied for national discussion the issues brought forward in these state conflicts in the West since 1900.

direct legislation obtained in the following states: South Dakota, Oregon, Oklahoma, Montana, Colorado, Nevada, Arkansas, Arizona, New Mexico. Legislatures had referred it to the voters in California, Washington, Wyoming, North Dakota, Idaho, Nebraska, Florida, and Wisconsin. Popular election of Senators was already the practice in Oregon, Nebraska, Nevada, Minnesota, Ohio, New Jersey, Kansas, California, and Wisconsin. Primaries to elect delegates to the national conventions were at that time provided for in North Dakota, Nebraska, Wisconsin, Oregon, California, and New Jersey.

Just as President Taft reached the Pacific coast at the end of the transcontinental tour that had opened in Massachusetts with his denunciation of the Congressional Insurgents, California adopted by popular vote the constitutional amendments providing for direct legislation and the recall. Not all western Republicans were agreed upon these constitutional changes even within the states, but all united in demanding changes in machinery and methods in nominations and elections. In particular at this time was a widespread direct primary desired to select delegates to the national convention—urged throughout the West in order to permit “the rank and file of the party to express its choice.”

Although a great portion of the Republican West seemed eager to repudiate the Taft administration—perhaps as bitterly hostile in that opposition as the Democratic West had been in the preliminaries of the campaign of 1896—a comparison of the western demands in the two campaigns makes clearer the real nature of Insurgent Republicanism. Sixteen years before the West had reiterated the Populist demands for “honesty and economy in government,” “a fair field for all,” had opposed “commercialism and banks,” and denounced “Wall Street,” the “money power,” and the “corruption and cowardice of party organization.” Similar protests still came from the agricultural Middle West. After almost two decades of steadily increasing prosperity the westerner was still asking: “Are the trusts and combinations still stronger than the government?” But in answer Senator La Follette asked that “the Republican platform be in the last degree a constructive platform” and offered the following as his tentative suggestion:¹

¹ Issued March 13, 1912.

direct nominations and elections; income and inheritance taxes; parcels post; government ownership and operation of the express business; physical valuation of the railways and "trusts" as a basis for control. As a representative of the western protest within the dominant party, this leader seemed convinced that the correct solution was not to be found in the adoption of any panacea, but in a closer grip upon the organs of government and in a careful investigation and greater consideration by the electorate.

V

Sufficient evidence has been cited to make clear the sectionalism of the Insurgent group within the Republican party in Congress prior to the primary campaign for the presidential nomination in the spring of 1912. The advent of the Roosevelt candidacy destroyed the unity of the Insurgent movement in Congress as in the nation. Temporarily large elements in the West ceased to express sectional convictions in an effort to gain ascendancy in the party organization by a union with discordant elements from other sections of the country. In spite of this defection a considerable protest was registered in the Republican convention on behalf of the sectional demands of the West and its candidate. In Congress the fight upon the party organization was continued.

In the midst of the presidential campaign the Senate commenced the consideration of the following resolution that had been reported out of the Judiciary Committee by Senator Cummins: "The term of office of President shall be six years and no person who has held the office by election or discharged its powers or duties or acted as President under the Constitution and laws made in pursuance thereof shall be eligible again to hold the office by election."¹ The original resolution had been introduced by Senator Works of California. The greater portion of the debate took place subsequent to the November election. Except for the support of the two Senators named, the adoption of the resolution was opposed by the Insurgent group in the Senate. But in the preliminary votes upon the nine amendments that were offered

¹ *Congressional Record*, XLVIII, 11255.

to the resolution the ten Insurgent senators were distinguished as a group from their Republican colleagues.¹

Evidence of the recurrence of the alignment in the Sixty-third Congress is as yet fragmentary. Thus far it has revealed the Insurgent or Progressive Republican movement weakened in the House of Representatives and in the Senate about where it was prior to the Roosevelt candidacy. In the organization of the House five western Republicans refused to vote for the caucus nominee for Speaker: Wisconsin, 2; North Dakota, 2; Michigan, 1. Upon the tariff roll-calls in the Senate a group of western Republicans has voted frequently with the Democratic Finance Committee. The following is a list of the Republicans who during the first three weeks of the debate voted with the Democrats more than four times: Borah of Idaho, 12; La Follette of Wisconsin, 10; Gronna of North Dakota, 9; Kenyon of Iowa, 8; Cummins of Iowa, 7; Jones of Washington, 7; Crawford of South Dakota, 7; Bristow of Kansas, 7; Poindexter of Washington, 6; Sterling of South Dakota, 6; Clapp of Minnesota, 5; Norris of Nebraska, 7. The significance of the continuity of the western revolt is increased by a reference to the sentiments of the members of the group as expressed in this tariff debate.

For the western Senators have attacked the Democratic procedure; first, because the bill was prepared by the Democratic members of the committee and then submitted to, and approved by, a secret Democratic caucus, and second, because of the discrimination against western products. Senator Cummins prefaced his argument as to the discrimination shown in the making of the bill with this statement: ". . . with the exception of the final caucus, the proceedings this year are a practical repetition of the proceedings attending the Payne-Aldrich bill in 1909. They were indefensible then; they are indefensible now. The Republican leadership in 1909 was willing to exclude the minority of the finance committee from participation in making up the bill, but, bold as it was, it was not rash enough to attempt the revival of the tyran-

¹ Republicans in the group: Poindexter of Washington, Bristow of Kansas, Clapp of Minnesota, Dixon of Montana, La Follette of Wisconsin, Bourne of Oregon, Borah of Idaho, Kenyon of Iowa, Cummins of Iowa, and Works of California.

nical rule of the caucus."¹ In putting forward the proposals of the western men he said: "The Progressive Republicans charted the way in 1909, and they will chart it again in 1913."

That may be the keynote of a campaign that is going to furnish additional material for the students of sectionalism. For when this section, many of whose Republican representatives have spoken as a group during the past five years including two tariff sessions, shall conclude a satisfactory alliance with another section and become powerful enough thereby to constitute a majority power in Congress and to enact legislation, an opportunity will be given for a more satisfactory analysis of its program both political and economic.

In attempting to assign a cause or causes for these recent manifestations of sectionalism, we may wisely recall the suggestion of Dr. Turner that the influence of the physiographic province would become more marked, and point out that the northern Mississippi Valley is not only such an area but is characterized by unity of products and a common remoteness from markets. Here, moreover, there is a great preponderance of independent business men and farmers. The fluidic conditions of a pioneer community have not as yet disappeared.

This area has for twenty years and more been the home of movements "to restore the government to the people." Not always has it stressed peculiar economic needs upon the tariff or the currency, but invariably it has waged war upon the "power of money in politics." It early became convinced and at last has made articulate the conviction that private liberty must be restricted in the interests of public liberty. Its demand for improved machinery of parties and governments is an effort to attain that end. The Progressive Republican leaders have first and last achieved election and held it, not because of position upon the tariff revision or the regulation of railways, although each of these has had greatest influence at certain times in certain areas,

¹ Total production west of the Mississippi, under the proposed bill: free, 61 per cent; dutiable, 39 per cent: total production east of the river, under the proposed bill: free 40 per cent; dutiable, 60 per cent (*Congressional Record*, L, 3033; map on p. 3037).

but because they represented the desire of the great portion of their constituency actually to direct their government, state and national.

The success of the advocates of publicity in the West, and consequently their appearance in Congress, has been due not so much to the peculiar economic needs of the Middle West as to the independent position of the greater number of the voters. Economically they have been free and politically they have been alert to follow the leader who voiced their desire to make the government the agent, not of aggregations of men banded together for private profit, but of the individual men who make up the electorate. For industrially and socially they have come into contact with the government as individuals.

Their leaders, raised to power, have voiced these desires in Congress. It has brought them into conflict with the Republican organization not in sympathy with the proposed changes because based on different industrial and social conditions, and later into conflict with the Democratic organization still largely in the hands of men who are not as yet familiar with the demands of the independent voters. Thus as East and South have successively been in power the West has manifested sectionalism through its votes in Congress.

GRAFT AND GRAFTING: WHAT ARE THE REMEDIES?

CLINTON ROGERS WOODRUFF
Philadelphia

For years it has been the fashion to hold the politician responsible for everything that has gone wrong in the body politic: for corruption, inefficiency, indirection, indifference. One and all have laid the blame at his door. While he deserves a share, there are others who are equally blameworthy.

Then, again, it has been the fashion in many quarters to lay our political shortcomings on the shoulders of the ignorant foreign vote. Boston's delinquencies and New York's were due to the preponderance of the Irish vote; Milwaukee's conservatism (although that has gone a-shimmering with the advent of the Socialists) and Pennsylvania's were due to the preponderance of the German vote; and so on through the list.

It is not possible in a phrase, or an article even, to analyze the blame for our political ills. George William Curtis' diagnosis perhaps comes nearest: "It is not a government mastered by ignorance; it is a government betrayed by intelligence; it is not the victory of the slums; it is the surrender of the schools; it is not that bad men are politically shrewd; it is that good men are political infidels and cowards." Or, as another had put it, it is "the bad citizenship of the good citizen that lies at the bottom of much of our present troubles, and especially in this matter of graft about which we hear so much these days."

It is easy to assume that the politician is responsible for graft and then "let it go at that," but will the facts sustain this assumption?

Gentlemen, the business men of this country have debased the meaning of that good word "commercialism." It is they alone who are responsible for the sinister significance that now attaches to that term. I tell you, further, that it is the business men themselves who are chiefly to blame for the political graft and corruption so widespread throughout the nation.

So declared Julius Henry Cohen, the New York lawyer, who has so successfully prosecuted a number of commercial swindlers. This was in an address before credit men.

We hear a great deal about the grafting legislature and the bribe-taking public official in these days, but, gentlemen, I want to ask you who makes possible this graft and who offers these bribes? It is not necessary to make any wild charges. We have in Chicago and in New York two specific instances.

In my own city we had a legislative scandal, in which a member of the legislature is accused of accepting \$1,000 as a bribe for his vote. When we go back to the fundamental facts of that offense we find that the bribe was offered by a bridge company. My friends, bridge companies are not run by legislators; they are managed by business men.

In Chicago we discovered that certain city officials are accused of helping to defraud the city by paying shale-rock prices for the digging of sand. Who was it profited by that transaction? It was a contractor. A contractor, gentlemen, is a business man, and if there is fraud in the shale-rock deal, then that contractor is the chief villain in that crime.

This is plain talk, but how can the business man evade the answer? As a rule he does so by a plea in confession and avoidance: "Yes, we do these things, but we have to do them or go out of business!" As Mr. Cohen says:

In the one year we have prosecuted and convicted in New York twelve men for going into bankruptcy fraudulently. I know about all those cases personally, and I tell you, gentlemen, that the fundamental reason for those twelve crimes was that the swindler believed in his heart that the men he was swindling would swindle him if they had a chance, and that the only difference between him and the people he was swindling was the fact that they had a little more money. And in most cases, gentlemen, the swindler was right.

"As is done in private business" describes what most people want to see government do. In commenting on this, the New York Bureau of Municipal Research pointed out that there was a general assumption, which was very rarely challenged, namely, that there is something about "private" that makes for honesty and efficiency, and something about "public" that encourages dishonesty and inefficiency.

Nothing could be farther from the truth, the bureau pertinently points out, for private janitors force milk companies to pay them a commission of so much per customer in the apartment houses which the private landlord pays the janitor to attend

without commission. Private cashiers need cash registers. Private railroad conductors and inspectors need innumerable checks on tickets sold. Private hospital superintendents have made perfunctory inspections of goods furnished by favorite customers who made them presents. Private bankers are bonded. Private universities have recently been undergoing business reorganization, because of wastefulness and diversion of trust funds. Private department stores pay fabulous salaries plus interest in business profits to experts for cutting out waste, incompetence, and dishonesty. Private railroads save fortunes every year by central purchasing agencies. Private scales and measures defraud customers.

Looking after one's taxes is private business. Yet what a poor standard this private business has heretofore set for public business!

Caveat emptor is the old common-law rule; it still holds sway over the business practices of the day, and until a different rule is followed we may expect just such conditions as recent revelations have exposed.

If we are going to get rid of graft, we must get rid of the graft germ in human nature, we must get rid of the deep-rooted idea that we owe no obligation to the man on the other side of the bargain, that we have no concern for anyone, either the other man or the great third party—the public. The doctrine of “every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost” must be eradicated.

Here, to my way of thinking, is the great, comprehensive remedy to be applied. But how is this to be accomplished? That is the great question. We must adopt those policies that will make the body healthier and therefore more abundantly able to resist or throw off the germ; and all the time make the germ weaker.

A successful diagnosis is an essential prerequisite to a complete cure. We must get at the symptoms and their causes. Mr. Cohen has touched on one. The prevalence of the doctrine of “let the buyer beware” in the world of business is another. We must get it clearly into our minds that graft is not a disease of politics only. It inheres in business, and in the views of many publicists it finds its origin there.

It is a common enough belief that politicians are more corrupt than business men, but such figures as we have at hand do not bear this out. The *Outlook* some years ago quoted the United States Fidelity and Trust Company as authority for the statement that in 1901 the banks of the country lost \$1,665,109 from defalcations, and in 1902, \$1,709,301. The editor of *Midland Municipalities* is responsible for the statement that the loss of federal, county, and municipal governments from the same cause was \$1,283,055 in 1901, and in 1902, \$1,067,789. So that for these two years the employees and officers of banks defaulted in the amount of \$1,024,569 more than did all the public officials in the country.

This is an interesting and in some ways a remarkable showing, as the opinion quite generally prevails that there is more dishonesty in public than in private service, and especially on the part of municipal employees. To be sure, these figures do not take into consideration the exorbitant prices which oftentimes the city, state, or nation is compelled to pay; no more do the others take into consideration the profits accruing from watered stock and other peculiar devices for making money. They concern solely the question of honesty, and show that the average public officer is as honest as the bank officer.

As the editor of *Midland Municipalities* pertinently remarks, however: "The fact is that neither the bankers nor the officials are as a class dishonest, but, on the contrary, look after the interests in their care much better than the average man looks after his business. With the vast sums handled each year by the officials of the banks, the amounts lost in defalcations are exceptionally small—so small that when compared with the whole they are hardly worth notice, much less an excuse for general condemnation."

I hold no special brief for the politician, but I believe the sooner we come to take a just view of the situation, the sooner we shall get relief from grafting, the sooner we shall have self-respecting politicians. Moreover, what this country needs from its business men today is service—and a good example. If there are no bribe-givers, there will be no bribe-takers. The business man of the time must raise his standards of morals. What should we think of

a doctor or a lawyer who, all the time he was serving us, is thinking how much money he is going to get out of us? Well, what about the business man who never thinks of anything else in a business deal except how much money there is in it for him? The business man must put moral values into his figures of profit and loss. Service must bulk as large with him as with the professional man.

"It is a splendid city," said Field Marshal Blücher to the king of Prussia about the city of London, "a splendid city—to loot!" This, alas! is the attitude of all too many business men. The city and the state—they appeal only for the loot they represent. Whatever interferes with this end must be suppressed, even to graft prosecuting, as in San Francisco. During the height of the excitement in that city the Good Government League addressed the following communication to the editors of the metropolitan papers:

During the past three years San Francisco has undertaken to punish its criminals, high and low, rich and poor, without prejudice. In doing so, it has reached into the biggest circles, social and financial. Men high in the business world have been indicted and prosecuted with great vigor.

The argument has been used that these prosecutions are hurting business, and that therefore they should be discontinued. Here at close range we possibly cannot obtain a clear view of the situation. We are therefore desirous of obtaining a consensus of national opinion, with particular reference to the following:

1. Does the prosecution of wealthy persons charged with civic crimes injure business; or does it improve the financial standing of a city in the eyes of outside investors? Why?
2. Would San Francisco profit financially by abandoning the present prosecution; or would it be to the permanent material advantage of the city to prosecute to a final determination the indicted "high-ups," so called? Why?

The answers were mostly to the effect that the cleansing of a city was right morally and a good policy financially. As one put it:

There never was a crusade in behalf of justice and good morals but it was deprecated because of selfish interest. The men of Babylon offered their virgin sisters on the market-place once a year as a means of making Babylon a great commercial center. And Babylon perished from its own corruption. There never was a crusade in behalf of civic purity but some

seller of silks and ribbons, of powder and rouge, of wines and liquors, and some landlord protested that to clean out the bad resorts would hurt business. There never was a scourge of contagious disease but the newspapers were appealed to to suppress reference to the facts because publicity hurt business. What is business that it should be put above the law, above the enforcement of right dealing or good morals? Is it a sacred thing? Are dollars all? If so, the publisher ought to sell his editorial space, the councilman his vote, the minister his conscience, the physician betray his trust because he can enrich himself by so doing.

But of course enforcement of the law against criminal offenders does not hurt a town. When the offenders are rich and powerful they can make a great noise and influence men with whom they have dealings to say that business is being hurt by the prosecution of guilty men. Corporate wealth was never so ingenious as when at bay. If it can save itself by false cries it will do so. It is no different position from the man in the dock who points to his weeping children or his sobbing mother as a reason why he should be given his freedom. His conviction would hurt them.

A prominent manufacturer of San Francisco put the case in this way:

I will not say that, personally, I want to see the graft cases pushed to a determination; but if Francis J. Heney is a candidate I am going to vote for him and do all I can to elect him, simply for the good effect his election will have upon public sentiment regarding the San Francisco situation. I know what outsiders think about us. I know that practically every banker, every manufacturer, every big business man east of the Rocky Mountains is watching us to see whether we dare prosecute cases like this, to see whether we act like men or like poltroons. I am not saying what I think ought to happen in these cases; but when I know what the rest of the world thinks I hope I have sense enough to try to help San Francisco rebuild her reputation.

While holding that Pittsburgh was no worse than other large cities, a well-known lawyer of that city declared some time ago that Pittsburgh had lost a manufacturing plant which would have employed 10,000 men because living-conditions were so bad there. Many similar concerns, he said, were being lost because they could not get in without paying graft. One man, he quoted, had said to him that he was unable to obtain switching-rights there and so went to another city. "This man said to me," declared Mr. Wallace, "'I'll be blamed if I will pay any graft and run a chance of getting into the penitentiary to get into your city.'"

If the business men once get it into their minds that grafting does not pay, the country will have made a great stride forward.

When the Hon. E. R. Taylor was mayor, San Francisco appointed a commission to consider the whole problem of graft, which did not hesitate to report in favor of canceling franchises procured by fraud. The language it used was:

Laws should be enacted for the cancelation of franchises procured by fraud or crime of the owners of the franchises, or of their predecessors in interest. These laws should be of a civil nature, cognizable in a court of equity, so that the extreme technicality of our criminal procedure will not embarrass their enforcement. The mayor and the district attorney, each on his own motion, should have the right to initiate such proceedings in the name of the municipality upon which the fraud has been committed. Their power should be concurrent with that of the state to take similar action in *quo warranto* proceedings.

This recommendation is a corollary to the observation that grafting does not pay, nor should be permitted to pay. If the grafter cannot keep the cake, then he does not want it. If he may be compelled to disgorge, he will hesitate before entering upon a policy of corruption. The suits instituted by the state of Pennsylvania to recover \$5,500,000 were as potent as the criminal prosecutions, but both should be availed of. Bishop Brooks on one occasion said: "The escape from being jailed of every thief of the public money breeds a half-dozen more malefactors. If the public won't punish, it deserves to be plucked."

Fear is still a potent factor, and for that reason, if for no other, the laws against bribery and corruption should be rigidly enforced against high and low both, and, to follow the recommendations of the San Francisco Commission, the laws creating the crime of bribery should be so amended as to provide for the punishment of corporations in their corporate capacity. Very heavy fines should be imposed, and the forfeiture to the state or city of prior acquired franchises should be made a part of the punishment. Let it be thoroughly understood that grafting is dangerous, and it will become unpopular. Perhaps it will never be altogether done away with, any more than murder is, but the stringency of the laws against murder and the vigor of its prosecution act as a powerful deterrent.

As an effective aid in the prosecution of grafters it would be well, as the San Francisco investigators advised, that the law of evidence in criminal cases should be so amended that a corporation accused of crime cannot claim immunity from producing or giving evidence against itself, and the testimony of its officers and all its documents should be admissible in criminal proceedings against it. As a corporation can commit a crime only through an officer or an employee, in a prosecution for such crime the officer or employee should not be permitted to remain mute on the ground that his testimony would tend to incriminate him.

There has always been more or less discussion as to the advisability of offering immunity to the informer. While normally minded men, who have no connection with the enforcement of the criminal laws, may feel repugnance to allowing such a turn state's evidence to go free from punishment in exchange for testimony, nevertheless experience has abundantly demonstrated that such a course is not only justified, but is necessary.

This much, however, has already been accomplished—the awakening of the people. They are now discussing specific remedies, some of which have already been considered. Let us take up some of the others which have been seriously advanced by thoughtful observers. These deal with various phases of the problem, but all have for their object the protection of the body politic from dangerous and undermining influences.

President Pritchett of the Carnegie Institution, in an address before the Massachusetts Reform Club, outlined one comprehensive and fundamental program. The argument of Doctor Pritchett was in substance this: The fundamental need in American political life is the recognition of a political career. Untold harm has been done by the creation of a contempt for politics in the minds of young people. Never shall we get efficient popular government in a democracy until the profession of politics becomes desirable and honorable in comparison with other professions and other callings. This is a *sine qua non* in a democratic republic. The question is how to make the profession of politics desirable and honorable; how to make it possible for young, ambitious, and patriotic Americans to find in politics attractive careers.

Three practical measures, Dr. Pritchett avers, if carried out, would go far toward making possible in Boston politics such opportunities and such careers as will invite efficient and earnest and ambitious men. These are: (1) to provide, first of all, an administrative system capable of dealing with the problems of the city; (2) to pay salaries in the legislative and administrative service of the municipality comparable to the salaries paid for similar ability in private administrative work; and (3) to make the tenure of office long enough to give an efficient and able man opportunity for making a record, and to make the responsibility and the power of executive place sufficient to attract strong men.

The San Francisco Commission, in addition to the recommendations already quoted and commented upon, also submitted the following:

The charter of the city should be so amended as to prohibit partisan nominations for election to municipal offices, and the ballot, when printed, should show nothing more than the name and the office of the candidate.

A separate tribunal of permanent character should be established for the judicial determination of the rates and charges for public utilities.

Laws should be enacted requiring all quasi-public corporations to keep their books in collaboration with the communities they serve, and according to a system prescribed by law.

Laws should be enacted making it a crime for any newspaper to publish as news any matters for which compensation is directly or indirectly paid, or agreed to be paid, unless the fact that such compensation has been paid or agreed to be paid is indicated by some plainly distinguishing mark next the news so printed. The jury or judge should be given liberal power of inferring complicity from considerations indirectly given. A person paying such compensation should be permitted to recover the consideration given by him, and immunity granted him if he disclose the crime. A part of the punishment should consist in forbidding the publication of the paper for a period fixed by the judge. All of which reforms are in a fair way of being carefully tested at various points in the United States.

"If you'll vote for my bill, I'll vote for yours," is a grafting proposition. The legislator who supports a bill desired by special interests because of his expectation that he will not be opposed for a renomination by those interests, or who refuses to vote for a righteous measure for fear that he will not be able to raise a campaign fund from influential people who object to the provisions of the bill, places himself in the category of grafters. Log-rolling in legislative bodies must therefore be eliminated.

Direct legislation, its advocates claim, reaches this condition of affairs as no other remedy. The compulsory initiative and referendum and their corollary, the recall, get at the very source of the trouble. To use the language of a recent writer:

We do not act upon the honest-man theory in our everyday affairs. We know that there are honest men, but we also know that there are others; and because we cannot discriminate at a glance, we lock our doors, instal burglar alarms, hire policemen, and in every way prepare against the possibility of being visited by the wrong kind of a man!

It is upon the broad policy of prevention that direct legislation by the people is based.

We know from numerous examples in other countries and our own that it works. It compels political parties to define the measures for which they stand.

It does away with bribery. Corporations will not pay for legislation which the people may veto at the polls.

It ends the career of mercenary politicians. They cannot survive when corruption funds are wanting.

It opens the way for the people to discuss concrete questions of policy instead of mere personal mud-slinging.

In short, it is the final and effective method of real self-government, the culmination of genuine republicanism.

Publicity is certainly a great factor in making graft difficult of accomplishment. Secrecy is an essential to its successful conduct. If the transactions of corporations and individuals doing business with the public must be open and above board, where is the grafter to get this opportunity? If every item in the ledger must be vouched for and if every public transaction is to be closely watched and keenly criticized, the ways of the grafter will become hard indeed. And this is just what the people are learning to do—to watch, to criticize, and to correct—and they are being helped by an increasing corps of lieutenants.

The stage and the pulpit are doing their share. The latter is preaching "budget sermons" as well as showing the incompatibility of the double life in business and public affairs—the life of the two standards, one for the home and the church, one for the counting-house and the legislative hall and the political committee. There is also a strengthening tendency to present plays dealing with political corruption. This is a symptom of the disease, and, what is better still, a sign of hope, for there can be no doubt that the presentation of plays of this kind has a quickening effect on political life. The heroes of these plays, though of different types, are no more remarkable than are actual characters like Hughes, Folk, and Whitman.

I have left to the last, however, a consideration of the most potent factor of all, the schools. In the San Francisco report to which reference has already been so frequently made, it was pointed out that the trial of Mr. Calhoun had disclosed a considerable number of citizens who, when examined under oath as to their qualifications for jury service, complacently declared that they would not convict a man for bribery, however convincing the evidence, if, since his crime, he had successfully broken a strike which was threatening his investments. A system of public education which produces such men must be radically defective in both its ethical and political teaching. It is our belief that no child should be permitted to leave the grammar school until he has had thoroughly instilled into him a strong sense of his obligation to the state to set aside all prejudice or private interest and act as jurymen in any case in which he may be summoned. He should be taught that this obligation is sacred, that its performance is the highest kind of public service, outranking the mere physical courage and devotion of a soldier.

The schools have not kept pace in their ethical instruction with the many complex changes in our commercial organization. Every child should be taught that in all probability he will, for a large period of his life, be an agent for some corporation. He should be taught the elemental facts concerning the workings of the corporate organization, and particularly the location of the immediate responsibility for any wrongdoing with the directors

who elect the manager, and the ultimate responsibility of the stockholders who, in turn, elect the directors. He should be taught that, if a disclosure of any impropriety in the relations of the corporation to the state does not receive the attention of the directors, he can make a direct appeal to the stockholders through the agency of the press.

"Above all, he should be taught that the corporation is a mere creature of the state, and that it is as much the duty of the citizen to cry 'stop thief' to its attempt to steal a public franchise as it is to raise the cry when it discovers the treasurer, or any other official, robbing the public of its coin."

The struggle against greed and social injustice will not be ended with our generation. Those who come after must continue the battle for the preservation of sane democratic government, and the "vigilance" which is the price of our liberty must be intelligent and organized as well as eternal.

Here, then, we have the nub of the whole problem. The American child must be taught the new ideas of public loyalty to the common good, which have found expression in the following "Rochester Prayer":

For all the love and virtue in the homes of our city, for the green of our parks and the flowers within them, for the trees along our streets and the bird songs above them, for the banks and waterfalls of our lovely Genesee, we lift our hearts. For the loyalty and friendliness of our people, for the helpfulness and guidance of our good, for the spirit of wakefulness and eager aspiration of all, we render hearty thanks, but for our vision of the Rochester that is to be, we are thankful most of all.

May there be a growing righteousness in the administration of all our affairs, a growing honesty in all our commercial relations, a growing desire in the minds of all that justice and equal opportunity shall be the portion of all our citizens. Let our hands be merciful to all who wrong us, our purpose earnest against all wrong. Let the spirit of our comradeship be widened and deepened, that together we may labor for justice, prosperity, and beauty in our midst.

Bless the boys and girls of Rochester, that, disciplined and undisheartened, healthily and merrily, they may lay in store the power that shall one day lift our city to the democracy of our vision. Amen.

AVOIDANCE

ELSIE CLEWS PARSONS
New York City

In a study of "conventionalities" I have recently made, certain social facts known to ethnologists under the rubric of "avoidance" have taken on a somewhat new look to me, and I now venture to present them thus recolored with only a preliminary word or two about the light cast upon them.

Social conventions, I take it, are determined by two deep and far-reaching instincts, the instinct of gregariousness or the desire for companionship, and the instinct for routine or the desire for the habitual. These instincts are seemingly incompatible, for our habits are readily upset by the habits of others and personality is most easily influenced by personality. This incompatibility is the task, more or less covert and subconscious, for social conventions to overcome, by supplying the kind of companionship that will be most innocuous to the routine of our life and by eliminating chances of companionship with those likely to disturb our routine. The task is enormous, but the method we in society take is very simple. We merely see to it that we associate only with our own kind and avoid those unlike us, or if physical contact is inevitable, that we raise up psychical barriers between them and ourselves. These barriers are the conventionalities of age, of sex, of "position," of nationality, or of race.

In the conventionalities of family life I see like barriers, and among them "avoidance" and its variations.

Conspicuous examples of avoidance occur between relatives by marriage. In some Victorian tribes a woman's mother and aunts may never in their lives speak to her suitor or husband or even look at him. Nor may a man mention his mother-in-law's name.¹ If a Wemba sees his mother-in-law coming along the path, he must at once retreat into the bush. If he meets her face to face, he must keep his eyes fixed on the ground,² a perfect picture

¹ Ernest Crawley, *The Mystic Rose* (London and New York, 1902), p. 400.

² C. Gouldsbury and H. Sheane, *The Great Plateau of Northern Rhodesia* (London, 1911), p. 259.

for the modern cartoonist. A Zulu woman may have nothing to do with her father-in-law or with any of her husband's relatives in the ascending line. She may not even name them to herself.¹ According to the *Lî Kî*, a Chinese sister-in-law and brother-in-law "do not interchange inquiries about each other,"² a degree of avoidance we ourselves may practice quite as fully by the opposite method of "asking about" him or her as a form of respect. "How do you do?" is a simple but most efficient formula for cutting off a personal communication.

The popular explanation of avoidance as an expression of respect comes nearer the truth, I think, than the orthodox scientific explanation of it as an incest rule. For respectful conduct is merely treating persons in a way which puts them at their ease, which does not disturb their settled habits; whereas to require anyone to make a sudden personal adjustment is never good manners, because it is never easy. Hence when a newcomer is introduced into the family, such a requirement may be precluded altogether, particularly, let us note, between those of a different age or of the opposite sex.

It is the fact that they may be of a different sex which is taken as an argument for explaining the practice as an incest rule. But a Zulu has to *hlonipa* her mother-in-law as well as her father-in-law. So has a Fijian woman,³ and in Fiji and among the North American Indians a man may have to "avoid" his father-in-law as well as his mother-in-law.⁴

No, although in particular communities avoidance between those of the opposite sex related by marriage may be or may have become an incest inhibition, it is in general, I think, merely a case of the avoidance between the sexes usual in all communities,⁵

¹ Crawley, p. 400.

² Book I, sec. i, Part III, 32.

³ T. Williams and J. Calvert, *Fiji and the Fijians* (New York, 1859), p. 107.

⁴ Crawley, pp. 402-3.

⁵ It is not, however, an expression of sexual taboo in quite the sense Crawley gives it. Here as in his whole theory he seems to me to exaggerate, if not wholly to manufacture, the mystical element he sees in sex taboos. Difference of sex carries with it a sense of danger, to be sure, and this sense may express itself in supernatural ideas; but fundamentally sex taboos are devices against the encroachment of persons unlike oneself.

rendered particularly conspicuous by the introduction of a new-comer into the family circle.

It is as an expression of hostility aroused by this introduction that Tylor explained avoidance. As a stranger he or she is cut.¹ I differ with Tylor merely on the point that avoidance is first a natural and then a ceremonial method of shirking an adjustment in a personal relationship, rather than a method of deliberately marking a difference between the stranger and the family he or she marries into.

In support of what may be called the self-protective theory of avoidance it is to be noted that although avoidance may be for life, becoming a steadfast habit, in some cases, after a lapse of time, after people have had a chance to accustom themselves to their new relatives, shall we say, the practice of avoidance is given up. A Wemba may talk to his mother-in-law as soon as he is a father;² so may a Cree Indian.³ An Armenian bride has to wear a veil of crimson wool over her face and is not allowed to address any senior member of her husband's household, but in course of time the house-father, well assured of her behavior, removes her veil and unloosens her tongue.⁴

Avoidance as we know is practiced not alone between relatives by marriage. What may be called avoidance symbolism figures in the initiation ritual of many tribes, notably in Australia, and tribal initiates have commonly to avoid women, particularly their own kinswomen, for varying periods. In the Elema district of New Guinea initiates leaving their *eravo* must not go near home, to preclude all possibility of being recognized by their kinswomen. A mother who brings her son food must by some noise signal her approach to give him time to run back into the *eravo*.⁵ Although a Hottentot boy is so tied to his mother's apron-strings until his initiation that he is not allowed to talk with men at all, not even with his own father, after initiation—at eighteen—

¹ *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, XVIII (1888-89), 247-48.

² Gouldsbury and Sheane, p. 259.

³ Tylor, *loc. cit.*

⁴ Lucy M. J. Garnett, *The Women of Turkey: The Christian Women* (London, 1896), p. 203.

⁵ Holmes, *J.A.I.*, XXXII, 418.

he has to avoid his mother altogether, at the risk, if ever he speaks to her, of being derided as a baby—no doubt quite as trying an insult in Africa as in the United States.¹ A New Britain initiate enjoys the utmost freedom with women not of his own marriage class, but from his kinswomen he must sedulously hide away. If unfortunate enough to meet one in the bush, he must hand over to her anything he happens to have with him. This forfeit his friends have then to redeem for him, he being in disgrace until in this way they compensate the woman "for the shame of having met him."²

It seems to me that such furtiveness on the part of initiates is an expression of the sense of awkwardness felt on both sides, by youths and kinswomen alike, through the break in their habitual relations. It is also an expression of reluctance to enter into new relations with those who have been associated with on other terms. In this case as in others the need for an adjustment of personal relations is most easily met or dodged by the raising of fresh barriers.

Such barriers, such variations in the practice of avoidance are to be seen again and again in family life. A New Caledonian boy is circumcised at three, given the *marron* or emblem of manhood, and expected thereafter to have nothing at all to do with his mother.³ In the Society and Sandwich islands a boy takes food in his mother's company only when he is at her breast.⁴ In China, when married aunts or sisters or daughters return home on a visit, they may not sit on the same mat or eat from the same dish with the males of the family.⁵ "You had no business to be here, Boyne," says an American mother in one of Howells' stories.⁶ "I don't like boys hanging about where ladies are talking together, and listening." In these instances, by the way, is not the incest hypothesis a little far-fetched? Is not the exclusiveness more easily accounted for on the theory that the difference of sex or of age is more considered than the likeness through kinship, or on the theory that the kinship feeling itself has altered? A Pacific Island or an American boy is

¹ Hutton Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies* (New York, 1908), p. 24.

² B. Danks, "Marriage Customs of the New Britain Group," *J.A.I.*, XVIII, 287.

³ Webster, p. 23.

⁵ *Ii K1*, Book I, sec. i, Part III, 35.

⁴ Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, I, 263.

⁶ *The Kentons*, chap. vi.

shy with his mother when he recollects her sex and age. A Chinese father is *distant* with his daughter when her marriage not only emphasizes her age and sex, but means that she has joined another kinship group.

Keeping one's distance in family life, disguising one's personality or masking many phases of it, family reserves, family humor, the evasions of family conversation are psychical forms of avoidance perhaps more significant and more general than we realize, but avoidance in its narrower technical sense is not after all such a common occurrence. It is really an exception to the usual way of encountering—or shirking—a change in personal relations—the way of ceremony.

THE CRISIS FACTOR IN THINKING

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In view of the fact that one reasons only when there are problems to be solved and that conditions of surprise provoke mental activity, and in view of the further fact that, historically, the greatest progress has been made when peoples have been plunged into new environments, as in America and Australasia, it is interesting to note current tendencies with reference to probable effects upon racial and individual initiative and reasoning.

It is no longer, if ever, necessary to understand principles and constructions to be able to use machinery. Commercial rivalry has resulted in the production of engines, watches, typewriters, and mechanisms of all sorts that require but a minimum of intelligent management. Many machines are put on the market "fool proof." Even the carton of breakfast wafers tells us where to open the box—"Cut on this line."

Along with the tendency on the part of manufacturers to minimize the need of mechanical insight on the part of the public, there is a centralizing of intelligence in managerial offices and a corresponding removal of problems from employees and agents. A dead level of almost automatic performance is forced upon factory employees, departmental workers, and quite generally upon salaried classes, not excluding even a large percentage of those employed in educational service. True, the individual of natural initiative may break through the organization and regimentation to which he is subject and achieve some measure of creative experience, but can it be doubted that the element of surprise and thought-compelling situations may diminish under modern conditions?

Contrast the regimented lives of city workers and persons whose activities are directed from central offices with the frontiersman's life, or with a single day of camping out. The improvising of utensils, the meeting of emergencies, and reactions to the unexpected,

give an exhilarating taste of a life which seems of a different world. The life of the frontier has given the world many of its most valuable assets, from Lincoln and Mark Twain to the Torrens title-registration law and the Australian ballot. And one may add that to peculiarly free conditions of nurture we must attribute much of the resourcefulness of Edison and Darwin.

It is common to refer to modern life as highly complex. This should not be taken to mean that the complexity is necessarily thought-compelling. Often quite the contrary. One's relations to this complex life may be so simple as to preclude those conditions of surprise required for intellectual advancement. The question to be asked is, to what extent does the individual find himself actually burdened with the problems arising out of modern life? If he shares but slightly or not at all in the management of the enterprise with which he is associated, if he is surrounded by authoritative rules and conventions, if his work is blocked out for him, it may be that anything like initiative and resourcefulness will be virtually out of the question. More grave than the economic menace of big business is the intellectual menace of centralized intelligence, represented by the management of vast enterprises from central offices, accompanied on the part of employees by rule-following self-effacement, mechanical compliance, and automatic performance. The arid intellectual atmosphere of large regimented groups in business and industry forms a striking phenomenon in society today. Business and industrial complexity certainly creates many problems, but by a centralized solution the rank and file of employees tend to become far less thoughtful than if they were scattered about pursuing individual and precarious vocations.

In contrast with industrial conditions which present fewer new situations compelling thought on the part of the rank and file, civic and political conditions seem now, as never before, to demand reasoning of the citizen. The psychological requirements for evoking the highest mental processes are fulfilled in the many problems of the day which knock at every door for solution.

In our many political problems appear both evidence of lack of skill in reasoning and promise of gaining that skill, provided the electorate is admitted to the practical solution of political prob-

lems, especially under direct legislation, and is not ultimately displaced by the governmental expert representing highly centralized political intelligence. If questions of government are thrown out to all voters, as in the pamphlet to voters in Oregon containing 40 measures under the initiative and referendum, there will surely exist sufficient opportunity for exercising popular thinking. If on the other hand, the average voter were to feel that he had no more part in the administration of society than has the factory employee and the newspaper reporter in the administration of the enterprises with which they are connected, one of the greatest opportunities for developing resourcefulness and reasoning ever presented would be lost. The mental welfare of the race demands that political questions be increasingly forced upon the electorate, and that the electorate be expanded to include those who have minds to develop.

It is not to be inferred that situations of surprise immediately elicit reasoning of good quality or even reasoning at all. A cry of fire throws many into random and hysterical actions. Repeated experiences with fires, however, produce more intelligent reaction.

The persistence of strikes is an evidence of inability to respond to historically new situations by thinking. Strikes suggest the random, ill-co-ordinated actions of a horse frightened at a newspaper, or the embarrassment of a schoolboy before an unexpected question. A strike is a short-sighted method of securing economic justice. The efficient method of striking by votes and expressing demands through the established channels, through laws, implies a connectedness of thinking that has not yet been fully attained.

The election of mutually incongruous representatives by equal majorities of the same voters is an evidence to the same end. The preference for indirect rather than direct taxation and the assent to specious arguments for war are significant. To these might be added a multitude of vote-winning tricks with which the practical politician is familiar but which are a reflection upon the analytic intelligence of those influenced.

That the new situations of the day in civic affairs have found the public unprepared for their rational solution, and that even leaders who might otherwise be statesmen are found lacking in administrative ability of the highest grade is evidenced by failures

of government. The object-minded man, the man trained too narrowly in the methods of money-making businesses, the man who never had any use for the intangible and the theoretical, and the man whose mind has never been subjected to the discipline of abstractions in literature and liberal science are largely responsible for the bunglings of legislation and the absence of consistent and real statesmanship. One of the most hopeful signs of the times, however, is that the people are turning instinctively for guidance to the university doctrinaire who but a few years ago would have been contemptuously retired in favor of the "practical" man.

Under the leadership of wise theorists the extent to which the general public may gain power to deal with the principles of social administration will no doubt prove remarkable. Uninstructed, the average man feels inadequate to the problems of political science. But the celerity with which considerable numbers get hold of general principles and theory in ethical and sociological fields proves the possibilities of popular thinking. The essential conditions are the imminence of new situations, the feeling of serious personal responsibility for their proper solution, and a fair amount of intellectual leadership. Too heavy problems thrown at once upon an unprepared public lead to discouragement and irrational response. Under right leadership the popular reactions to conditions of social surprises are increasingly rational, and the intellectual development of the race demands both the problem and the thoughtful reaction.

To insure the full benefits of new situations as compelling thinking there must be a willingness to attack difficulties. The presence of new situations does not mean much for thinking unless these are such as cannot be avoided or such as the individual elects to grapple with. Unwillingness to grapple with difficulties and undergo mental stress and strain, which appears especially in levels of luxury, and affects great numbers of young people unwisely brought up, is a bar to the evolution of intelligence. The spirit to find novel situations with which to grapple is, from the standpoint of mind in evolution, most admirable of all.

The part played by education in developing reasoning should be unambiguous. Nowhere should there be presented so many new situations and conditions of surprise as afforded by education. The school may provide more problems in an hour than the student

would consciously meet elsewhere in months. From one point of view the schools are agencies to precipitate upon students unexpected situations and thought-compelling emergencies. The very nature of education for thinking implies that stubborn problems surprise the student at every turn. To the extent to which the student picks his way easily through a course, to that extent he is deprived of the invaluable experience of being compelled to think. A curriculum should represent a gauntlet of emergencies, each necessitating initiative, resolution, a grasp of new relations, resourcefulness, mental readjustment, and constructive thinking.

One who deals with students must observe that the higher processes seem to be largely unexercised in many cases. Whether less exercised than formerly may be a matter of debate. But there can be no doubt as to the meaning of certain facts and certain tendencies.

The essentially uneducated university graduate is not a myth. When one can tell neither by range of interests nor sureness of diction and thought whether a suspect is a university product or not, there is reason for pause. The fact stated by James Bryce recently, that the greatest advances in science have been made by men not trained as specialists, suggests a question as to the possibility of producing broad thinkers by intensive specialization. The gaining of the whip hand over the faculty by student interests, representing spectacular athletics and social diversion and social caste supported by wealth that discredits the impecunious professor, tends to make it difficult for instructors to hold students to grinding tasks. The instructor is perhaps more likely to find that he is subjected to problems by the student than that he is subjecting the student to thought-compelling conditions.

While thinking rests upon information, the proportion of information to thinking is a vital point. The educational world is emphasizing information as never before. This emphasis appears in attention paid to the kinds of knowledge regarded as most useful and in fulness of data and details in bulky departmental courses and swollen syllabi. It is even not yet a crime for a writer to take more pages than his contribution to thought actually demands. Whole volumes appear devoted to the expansion of a single proposition which an intelligent reader could grasp in a few moments.

Over-elaboration of details leaves little need to fill in outlines and tax one's own inventiveness. An excessive amount of reference reading and the lecture system alike emphasize mass of material at the possible expense of thought activity.

As an example of an almost perfect educational situation the hypothetical case of the law schools suggests itself. Here the student is called upon to apply known principles to a new set of facts. He must meet an emergency with the aid of memory, but with the inevitable use of reasoning. Were the example of the hypothetical case more freely followed in general classes, instructors would less frequently encounter chambers of vacuity in the student's mind or sink through a quicksand of feeble associations, illustrated by the inability of a college student to decide whether any of her relatives were living two thousand years ago.

Society has a right to look to education to maintain standards of reasoning. If it fails here there is nothing in education to guarantee that along with the diffusion of useful data there will not ensue a dearth of inventiveness and a decline of civilization. A spurious educational activity is conceivable unattended by real intellectual improvement.

Assuming the dementalizing influences of centralized industry, and cognizant of the distrust of popular ability to assume the duties logically devolving upon democratic citizenship, one realizes the importance of the question of the sufficiency of education to provide effective demands upon the higher mental powers. If our complex life is actually an increasingly simple and unexacting life for the individual, and if living is to become steadily easier in demands upon thought, the importance of assuring every individual insistent problems is not to be underrated.

Railroad tickets are delivered at the door, and the exigencies of travel quite forestalled. Every care and worry are taken over by agents and experts—for a consideration. Struggle and confusion, judgment and enforced experimentation are ruled out by over-prosperous parents and coddling functionaries. It was never more easy for a simpleton to live. But let us not forget that an easy environment, with few conditions of surprise, throws the individual down to the lower reactions and swings the beam toward devolution and degeneracy.

AN OUTLINE OF SOCIAL STUDY FOR ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS

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A. INTRODUCTION

The recent developments in our country have abundantly shown that much of the abuse which has arisen in our political and industrial affairs has taken place because of the one-sided and exaggerated individualism which has been fostered in our educational and political system. Our psychology has been individualistic and our moral precepts and teaching have been in the direction of viewing the individual as a separate agent, alone accountable for his success and without obligation to the community which has really produced him. The cure for the bad conditions and the establishment of a better order of things must, in large part, proceed out of a better knowledge on the part of individuals of their place and function in society and of their duty to it. This knowledge cannot be given in a year by way of mere precepts bearing on duty in the abstract but must arise from a long inoculation through concrete teaching about the social relations of the individual and institutions as they are found in action in the community about the youth.

Among the many new educational conceptions which have appeared during the last few years the perception of the need and worth of socializing the child by the use of his social environment is a valuable one. More especially it is to be observed that this socialization is in reality a moralization, for, as Professor Dewey indicates, there is a vast difference between "moral ideas" and "ideas about morality," and what is now needed is the former. Moreover, moralization should be a process in which the emotional attitude of the child is developed relative to social situations so that his moral ideas are moving ideas and in his judgments and reactions to a given situation he identifies himself with the side of

justice and right, thus exercising the very functions in his school career that will be demanded of him in after life.

Much time is now given to discussing "how morality shall be taught." Very largely these discussions run to formulating schemes of teaching morality by precepts and textbooks. It is to be questioned if this formal teaching of morals would make moral people. To quote Professor Dewey, "these moral principles need to be brought down to the ground through their statement in social and in psychological terms. We need to see that moral principles are not arbitrary, that they are not 'transcendental'; that the term 'moral' does not designate a special region or portion of life. We need to translate the moral into the conditions and forces of our community life, and into the impulses and habits of the individual" (*Moral Principles in Education*, pp. 57-58).

It is conceived that the embodiment of the social context of the child in his educational process, thus giving him an understanding of its nature and operations and a sympathy with its best ideals, would be in reality and in a large way moralizing the individual.

As in the case of nature-study, which begins in the early years of the school and gives simple lessons about objects in nature and which becomes more and more complex in the objects considered or in the study of the objects and processes of nature until at the end of the elementary schools it is found capable of being differentiated into the several natural sciences, so there should be a range of social studies which begins with the simple things, the persons or functionaries of the community, in the early years of the school and takes in larger and larger areas of social facts and processes until at the end of the elementary schools the differentiation into the various social sciences may proceed. This is both a preparation for the higher work which will follow if the individual goes on in his educational career, and is a preparation for life in case the pupil is forced to drop off along the way.

It is not intended that this should displace history and civics which we now have. It would rather be supplemental and foundational for both. We are not immediately concerned with what history is considered to be by competent historians. There is a

wide discrepancy between what they would assign as its task and what our textbooks of history in elementary schools actually give. As these have been written, for most part they have emphasized four things: the past, commanding persons, community life on a vast scale, and the disconnected event. Perhaps it could be summed up in saying they have lacked an interpretation of the past life of our nation which would be significant for present life. Could Droysen's definition of history be made more actual, namely, "the effort of the present to understand itself by understanding the past," even then the child mind is likely to be swamped in attempting to secure a vital, working idea of community life, because of, first, the magnitude of the community studied, second, the difficulty of dealing with the past so as to make it directly fruitful for the present.

With only an appreciation of what our competent historians are doing, and with a desire to avoid the appearance of discrediting the teaching of history in the schools, it may be said, I think, that a kind of study is needed as a supplementary study which has for its end the development of the community consciousness as a vital, working part of the individual's life. In my estimation social study, when developed by discussion and experience, should be able to accomplish this. It would be fitted to do this for these reasons: First, it emphasizes the small communities, groups that are within the mental grasp of the child. Second, it makes use of local communities, chiefly, for attaining this aim. The factor of immediate interest or interest in the most immediate things and conditions is brought into requisition. Third, while communities remote in time in the evolutionary sense may be used, nevertheless the point of emphasis is on the present and most of the subject-matter is current. Fourth, the content of the course and the ideational matter is concrete instead of abstract. Interdependence and function may appear to be abstract, but when taught by means of living agents and personages which the child sees and knows they approach the concrete.

Social study thus seeks to build a working community-consciousness. At the same time it keeps in the foreground the ideal community, the ideal conditions of human life, the ideal relation-

ships of man in the service of humanity. Because of this it is a needed foundation for the unraveling and the understanding of the story told in history. It is a value study and gives the child standards of value to measure the worth of the historic events as they are met. It enables history to assume larger significance than it otherwise could.

In like manner it is not civics, though civics may be articulated with it as a phase of social study. For illustration, botany is nature-study but the reverse is not true because the whole is greater than its part. Nature-study, proper, opens up all sections of concrete nature to view. It is the basis of all the sciences, physical, biological, and anthropological. The same is true of social study. It gets at all parts and phases of community life, not merely the political or governmental. There are five or six fundamental phases of social life, or we may call them interests, which are expressed in human institutions or organizations, namely, the means or instruments through which men operate to satisfy these various wants. Some of these important segments of society are domestic, political, economic, religious, aesthetic, cultural, and sociability or "social." Civics covers that small section included in the political. It gives but a fragmentary view of man in his social relations. Social study would therefore supplement this valuable study.

It would also be a foundation for civics. Civics takes up the somewhat specialized study of the functions in society of a section of society, as was just said. Social study would first establish the idea of a larger entity called society, its interdependent, organic, and co-operative nature; secondly, give the idea of the function or service of every person or organization as a part of society; third, give ideals of what society and community life should strive to be, what the individual should be, and what his attitude should be to make possible the realization of progress and betterment. As Professor Small says of sociology:

Sociology declares that every thing which every man does is connected with every thing which every other man does. Before it is possible to learn this truth except by rote, we must get acquainted with a great number of facts which exhibit the principle. We must learn to see how one act affects another in our own lives; how one neighbor's conduct has to do with another neighbor's

comfort; how the things that we do depend on the things that others have done [A. W. Small, Introduction to Thurston, *Economics and Industrial History*, p. 13].

The following outline for a course in social study must be regarded as being only tentative in nature. It is intended to be a suggestion of what such a course might possibly be. No doubt if others were to undertake the task of formulating an outline, quite different results would ensue. Theoretically, a multitude of such courses might be formulated in which the contents would be somewhat different from course to course. But it is not so easily conceived that the principles involved in their organization could vary greatly. A thorough consideration and discussion of this particular outline would doubtless result in suggestions which would greatly improve and strengthen it.

A course of study of this nature is not entirely theoretical at the present time. At least one state in the Union is conducting an experiment in giving social instruction in its public schools. The essentials of this present social study course covering the first six years' work have been placed in the state course of study for the elementary schools in North Dakota. The experiment is in its second year and the writer of this article has gathered considerable information relative to its use and success. Since this topic is to be a matter of discussion in one of the sessions of the American Sociological Society meeting at Minneapolis in December, the data gathered will be reserved for that occasion. The bibliography which appears in connection with the various portions of the course is intended for the use of teachers. It is apparent that much of it is not adapted to their intelligence, or is inaccessible to them. The greatest difficulty is experienced in finding accessible and usable helps and readings in this line. Special effort will be required to develop it.

B. FIRST FOUR YEARS

In the first four years of school life the child is at the beginning of the larger conception of the world, the idea that there is a larger world of activity than he has enjoyed in the home. The child of six must have played with other children to a degree and discovered that similarities and differences exist between himself

and others. He has found satisfaction in the presence of other children and in carrying on activities with them. Now he is to carry this farther and to gain a larger insight into his powers of enjoyment and action and of pleasure which comes through closer concord and identification of interest. The object of social study in this period is not to get the child to build up and formulate a doctrine of social life or of social give-and-take, but to establish such conditions that the advantages of co-operative action and of mutual usefulness may be recognized.

FIRST YEAR

Expression of the associational sense and the beginnings of converted volition should be accomplished in this year. In so far as the children have attended kindergarten previous to this year, these preparatory steps have been made in a measure. In most cases this privilege is denied. The most natural and obvious means of accomplishing the object mentioned are play and games. Games of the simple sort are especially adapted to put into effect a germinal organization in which a common aim is set up and each participant has a part which makes or mars the success of the whole enterprise. Hence the child discovers that he must control himself and his bodily members in order to play successfully, his disposition is improved, he gains some understanding of human nature, picks up some technique of plans of procedure, may develop some initiative and leadership and some idea of group zeal, loyalty, and devotion. It is perhaps possible in this first year that the intelligent teacher may lead the children to discover the facts of interdependence and co-operation as facts.

It is assumed that play in the succeeding years will be used to further develop the social sense and associational ability. As this is an outline of social study the play phase will be dismissed.

The following suggestions of works helpful to teachers may be made:

Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, Book II, Part II, chaps. iii and iv, shows the origin of the consciousness of kind and of concerted volition. Fundamental to give insight and understanding.

Johnson, *Education by Play and Games* (Ginn & Co.). Deals with nature of play and games, play ages, and lists and description of games for each play period.

Bancroft, *Games for the Playground, Home, School and Gymnasium* (Macmillan Co.). Gives repertoire of games and also social and pleasurable elements in them.

Heller, Mrs. H. H., *The Playground as a Phase of Social Reform*, Russell Sage Foundation, No. 31. Proceedings of the Third Annual Congress of the Playground Association of America, a very full outline of all phases of organized play.

Mangold, *Child Problems*, Book II, chaps. i and ii, on play and the playground movement.

The Playground, November, 1912, "Rural Recreation."

Perry, *Wider Use of the School Plant*, chap. vi, "School Playgrounds."

Mero, E. B., *American Playgrounds*, etc. (American Gymnasias Co., Boston, 1908).

SECOND YEAR

A Study of the Home Group

It is quite as obvious that the home group is the social group with which to begin to teach the facts of association as that play is the place of expression of the sense of association and the power to act in concert. It is the medium in which the child has developed thus far, and it enfolds him during the extra-school hours. Further it is the epitome of the larger world in its simpler terms and phases. The beginnings of the larger social life and institutions may be laid bare, such as the common welfare, need of co-operation and division of labor, mutual rights and obligations, law, government, culture, religion, and protection.

Common welfare.—This is probably represented by the word "living" to the child, and may be brought into sight by questions as to what articles and material things are needed for the health, happiness, and support of the home, and as to what is most needed and what the family could get along without.

Co-operation and division of labor.—What does father, mother, sister, brother, hired help do to furnish the things and services needed to make the home? Suppose one should get sick or die or go away, what would happen? What article or service would be missing?

Mutual rights.—How much belongs of food, clothing, heat, room, etc., to father, mother, brother, sister? May one eat all the butter or cake or pie and why? Should mother do all the washing, cooking, etc., if children are large enough to help her? Why? And so for each member of the family.

Law and government.—Are there any rules in the home? Who makes them? Who enforces them? Who decides if the offending member is guilty and what the penalty is? Are there any witnesses in trials? Who is the judge? Do all obey the same rules? May father come in with muddy feet if Johnny may not?

Culture.—Is there a library? Books? Papers? What for? Does anyone talk, tell stories, teach any child? Why? Suppose no one talked or read in the home. Is there music? Pictures? Is not home a kind of school?

And so for religion and protection in the home.

Some helpful books on this year's work for giving suggestions of the function and importance of the family are these:

Small and Vincent, *Introduction to Sociology*, Sections 83-87 (American Book Co.).

Henderson, *Social Elements* (Scribner), chap. iv, "The Family."

Elwood, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems* (American Book Co.), 2d ed., chap. iii.

Sealey, *The Sociology of the Family* (Macmillan).

Gillette, *The Family and Society* (McClurg, 1913), chap. i.

Cooley, *Social Organization* (Scribner, 1909), Part I, chap. iii, "Primary Europe."

THIRD AND FOURTH YEARS

A logical advance over the work of the second year is the study of the neighborhood. This should be expansive and suggestive as in the case of the family. Ideas of relationship should develop without dogmatic teachings. The essential ideas obtained through a study of the domestic group may be discerned in the next larger and more complex group, the neighborhood. Questions should be asked to bring out the nature, location, means of carrying on, the purpose, and authorization of the work of the various kinds of workers of the community. Further questions elicit information as to the mutuality of the work done by each, whose needs are fulfilled by it, whether those of the worker, the employer, the neighborhood group, or larger society, or all.

Compensation for service in various ways and the exchange of products and services may also receive interrogations.

The average rural community furnishes the following workers or functionaries who may be the object of the questions: farmer,

teacher, preacher, mail-carrier, blacksmith, carpenter, thresher, farm-hand, house girl, justice of the peace, marshal, school officers, road supervisors, etc. In a village or city other functionaries may be added at will, such as merchants, transfer men, lawyers, doctors, bankers, delivery men, car men, railway employees of various sorts, etc.

A suggestive treatment of the rural and village communities in the development of their functions and division of labor is found in Small and Vincent, *Introduction to Sociology*, chaps. iii, iv.

C. GRAMMAR GRADES

By a gradual evolution in the method of presenting to the child the social matter which surrounds him the teacher has thus far proceeded from mere suggestion and motor attitude to something approaching analysis and exposition of a systematic nature. The grammar grades should see the completion of this development, the more systematic efforts being left to the last years. The more complex phases of groups and situations may be taken up in the fifth and sixth grades and the study should be made more intensive by extending the range of the questions to more ultimate causes and conditions. Perhaps another distinct advance occurs in the ideal pursued by the teacher. The object is to make society appear to the pupils as quite as real and vitalized an object as would the insect, animal, or plant in the nature-study class. In fact, the very object of this social study course is to create in the child's mind that conception of the social world which regards it as a working organism, an interdependent and co-operative system of individuals, which is to serve as an advance on the common idea of so many discreet and independent individuals.

Further, the teaching should be so dynamic with ethical motive that the sentiment of justice and social right, of ideal actions and attitudes shall appear, the social judgments shall be built up and exercised, and the child be led to identify himself with the principle of democracy and fair dealing.

FIFTH GRADE

Either of the groups already studied may be reconsidered in a more intensive manner. But it would probably be better to

develop some other group in this way since a new field might arouse fresh interest, permitting the reconsideration of the others later, if desired. In the following suggestive outline of the intensive study of the school the teacher may adapt the material to the situation by omitting the consideration of such officials or functionaries as are not involved in the school the pupils are acquainted with.

This outline study of the school is taken from the articles on a social science outline by J. S. Welch, *Elementary School Teacher*, May and December, 1906:

[Intensive study of the school.] *a) Principal.*—Consider: selection of teachers and books; arranging course of study; programming studies; noting progress of pupils and advancing them in their school work; care of school property; of individual and school rights; health and safety of pupils; proper janitor service, etc.; service to the social group.

b) The teacher.—Consider: what she is for; how she does her work; the preparation she has made; who benefits by what she does; how she is helped—hindered—in her work; whose loss when she is hindered; how hindrance may be avoided; what she has a right to expect; her service to the school group; to the social group.

c) The janitor.—Consider: what he does; why he does it; why it is important; what the result if neglected; how it may affect us; how he is helped—hindered—in his work; what should be our attitude toward him; why; what are his needs; how are they satisfied; what he exchanges his labor for; we satisfy his needs for what; what he gains; what we gain; what effect his absence would have on our work.

d) The pupil.—Consider: what he is here for; basis of the right; who makes the privilege possible; what he gives in return; the benefit to those who pay for it; who furnishes him the conditions for growth; what his attitude should be toward property; why; toward school books; toward his own books; why; how he is helped to make wise use of books and materials; how the teacher is helped—hindered—in doing this; how the pupil is affected when the teacher is busied with nonessentials; what he has a right to expect from teachers; what teachers have a right to expect from him; what factors make a school; what conditions determine growth.

An alternative study or a supplementary one to the school may be found in a study of a primitive group as a complete organic social body. It is another means of gaining an idea of the simpler forms and institutions of society. Such a group may be the Siouan or the Iroquoian for example. Questions on family, clan, and tribal government, on war and peace, on civil and military chiefs,

on medicine and medicine-men, on religious ideas and rites, on modes of hunting, fishing, raising crops, housekeeping, division of labor between men and women, on education of the boys and girls, on keeping records of events, on communication and language, on implement-making, on mythology, etc., may bring out the salient points.

Expansive helps for teachers in a cheap and accessible form relative to primitive life can hardly be said to exist. But the following references contain some of the matter from which such helps may be derived:

These annual reports of the Bureau of American Ethnology contain sociological studies of the American Indians mentioned: Seminole, 5th report, pp. 475-531; Siouan sociology, 15th report; the Omaha tribe, 27th report, pp. 199-605; the western Eskimo, 18th report, pp. 19-518; both the Prinia and the Tlingit Indians are treated in the 26th report.

Graphic pictures and descriptions of primitive life are contained in Miss Dopp's *Cave Dwellers* and *Tree Dwellers*, and in Waterloo's *Story of Ab* and London's *Before Adam*. Chapin's *Social Evolution* (Century Co.) contains much attractive material on primitive man, tribal society being especially treated in chap. viii.

SIXTH GRADE

As a study for the sixth grade, pioneer conditions may be selected. Such a study would be representative of recent frontier conditions or of those a century ago. This would be especially valuable to give a working idea of how societies got started and how they developed. It would show also how the interdependencies began, and how very desirable they were after people had had to do without them.

a) *The land*.—Consider: what the prairie (or forest) was like; what was the character of the soil; what kind of vegetation grew; what kind of animals and birds; what advantage the soil, vegetation, and animals would be to settlers; what was the climate and how it affected the newcomers or hindered them.

b) *The immigrants or settlers*.—Consider: where they came from; whether they were savage or civilized and what difference it would make in them and in what they did; what they brought with them in property, equipment, animals, books, and why; what their personal equipment in knowledge, education, skill, ideas of government, religion, and education, taste, and character; their motives in settling in an unsettled country as related to getting a living and property, their sacrifices in companionship and conveniences, and their curiosity about the region.

c) *The beginnings*.—Consider: why the particular piece of ground was chosen; why the home was located where it was; how the house and stables were built; how the ground was broken (and cleared perhaps); what the man did; what the woman did; which could get along best without the other; how they protected their home from fire and themselves from disease; how they procured or made the articles they needed; what the daily round of work for man and for wife; what amusement or recreation; what was done with their produce; what they got for it.

d) *The coming of others*.—Consider: the birth of children and the differences it made in work and incentive to man and woman; the hiring of a hand and its effect on the household cares, on the man's work, on production, on companionship; the appearance of emigrants; why they came; where they settled; what they brought of goods and information; the changes it made in the life of the original family; how they differed in ideas and personality from each other and the difference it made.

e) *The neighborhood*.—Consider: how the farms are located; the necessity of a survey; how trails and footpaths are used; the likeness of family life and what it makes possible; the exchange of work and co-operation; the beginnings of specialization, the ferry, transportation; exchange of produce; the new store and how it becomes a social center; the appearance of a blacksmith-shop and its effects; the school, and why, results; the church, and why, results; organization of a township, why, effects and services.

Especially helpful books on the fifth-, and especially the sixth-, grade work are:

Small and Vincent, *Introduction to Society*, chaps. i, ii, on which the outline for frontier life is based.

Thurston, *Economic and Industrial History*, first few chapters on occupation. *Proceedings of the North Dakota Historical Society*, Vols. I and II.

F. J. Turner, *The Significance of the Frontier in American History*, extracts given in Bullock, *Selected Readings in Economics*.

An alternative or supplementary study to the pioneer community may be found in the correlation of the geographical and social factors of a physiological unit.

Consider:

a) The topography in its area, configuration, altitude, and water courses, showing how each of these bears out the distribution of population.

b) Climatic conditions in the way of temperature, length of seasons, and amount of moisture precipitation with reference to farming and other occupations, products, etc.

c) Soil and natural resources, such as forests, fish, mines, and waterfalls, in their significance for farming, lumbering, fishing, mining, and manufactur-

ing industries. The kinds of soil and the fertility of the soil would further differentiate occupations.

d) Populations, races, and nationalities, as to origins and characteristics, only in so far as they are necessary to explain differences which retard or promote the regional well-being and in so far as they illustrate the larger world.

e) Industries, in their bearing on the location and distribution of people, their reasons for particular locations, their relation to the life of the region, and their conditioning influences in the establishment and maintenance of commercial relations with the larger world.

f) Transportation and communicating facilities, in their bearing on the prosperity and satisfaction of the region and their influence on locating larger collective populations for commerce and manufacturing. In connection with these last two points much supplementary reading might be done. This is a good place to get out into the larger world by following the threads of communication and transportation to see how they really relate and unify the region with others.

g) Influence of pursuits and occupations on the life of the people of the region in the way of customs, habitations, dress, education, religion, culture, and government.

In addition to one or both of these studies, the civics of the district and township should be taken up by the use of some standard text on civics which treats those items in a working manner.

SEVENTH AND EIGHTH GRADES

Social study in the seventh and eighth grades becomes more mature, reaches out to grasp principles for the solution of problems, gets organized so as to illuminate specific situations, yet must remain essentially concrete, because the pupils are still children. In the seventh year the study of civics may comprise the civics of county and state, the better type of texts affording adequate syllabi for the purpose. The emphasis in teaching should be thrown on functions and duties of officers, good as opposed to bad systems of nomination and election of officers, rather than on the enumeration of offices and mere memorization of election dates. The average civics, especially those on local government, are purely static things, synopses of election dates, names of officers, and dry statements of duties. They are lifeless, and unless the teacher has fire and imagination, a real understanding of our political life, and an enthusiastic conception of what government should be and do, the study will be of slight value. Some of the newer

texts are dynamic and functional. Careful selection will arm the teacher with a competent text as syllabus. In the eighth year the civics study should be devoted to the study of national government, particularly in its working aspects.

A study of how government is actually conducted by means of organized parties which control nomination, election, and therefore legislation and principles of administration, and the popular movements to bring the government closer to the people should be placed in the foreground. Such texts as Foreman's, or James and Sanford's seek to accomplish this end.

The other phase of the social study might be devoted to a consideration of rural social problems. If country pupils are to gain a conception of the specific problems which exist in rural life, the process of enlightenment should take place in school before the bulk of the boys and girls have passed out. In the rural regions there is an especially heavy elimination from school in the later years. In many portions of the nation only a small percentage actually complete the elementary grades. Hence some discussion of these problems should be given at least as early as the seventh grade.

In the absence of published texts on rural social matters which are available for rural teachers, the outline may be made a little fuller. The particular problems or general topics presented here, if the teacher faithfully prepares the material for suggesting a variety of questions on each subtopic and phase, and for interesting information and data, will probably develop the chief points of importance. Naturally the information cannot be offered in a suggestive outline. Sufficient references are given to develop the facts pertinent to most of the topics and subtopics.

I. The Rural Problem.

1. Origin of: Recent agitation; no agricultural deterioration; exists in perception of improvable conditions; work of the Roosevelt Commission.
2. What it is:
 - a) Improvement in the business of farming: Scientific agriculture; scientific accounts; scientific marketing.
 - b) Improving in education to make schools meet demands of farm life.

- c) Improvement in living conditions: The home; the roads; the church.
- d) Improvement in association and organization.
- e) Improvement in health and recreation.
- 3. How to meet it: By agitation; by discussion; by co-operation; by organization.

References.—Butterfield, *Chapters in Rural Progress*, chap. ii, "The Problem of Progress"; Fiske, *The Challenge of the Country*, chap. i; Kern, *Among Country Schools*, chap. i, "The New Country Life"; Bailey, *The Housing of the Farmers*, pp. 6-25; *Rural Life Commission Report* (Sturgis & Walton Co.); Gillette, *Constructive Rural Sociology* (Sturgis & Walton Co.), chap. v.

II. The Problem of Better Agriculture.

- 1. Soil sterilization: Methods of its accomplishment: one-crop method; poor cultivation.
- 2. Soil improvement: Rotation of crops following fertilization; soil inoculation; improved cultivation.
- 3. Advantages of diversification: Makes farming more stable and certain; uses labor supply to better advantage; feeding stock produce makes double profit.
- 4. Keeping accounts of farming:
 - a) What it covers: Fields seeded, with area, location, varieties, time, cultivation, amount of seed, amount of produce; cost of labor, seed, machinery used, of feed and horse-power; amount of sales.
 - b) Advantage: Gives record of what is profitable and unprofitable, and degree of profit of given produce; puts farming on business basis.
- 5. Marketing organization:
 - a) Agencies which absorb farmer's profits: Middlemen; line elevators; railways.
 - b) Protective agencies: Co-operative societies; American Society of Equity; Farmers' Union.

References.—Butterfield, *Chapters in Rural Progress*, chap. iii, "The Expansion of Farm Life"; Bailey, *The State and the Farmer*, chap. i; Fiske, chap. iv; Harwood, *New Earth*, chaps. iii, vi, x, and xv; Gillette, chaps. vii, viii; United States Agricultural Department, *Farmers' Bulletins*, Nos. 28, 44, 54, 132, 242, 245, 257, 315.

III. Social Phases of Grain Raising.

- 1. Wheat raising (as sample): Social importance.
- 2. Soil and seeding:
 - a) Importance of good seed: Purity; vitality; adapted to the region.

- b) Preparation of the soil.
 - c) Seasons for seeding.
 - 3. Climate and wheat growing: Conditions or ranges of temperature; moisture; distribution of rain in seasons.
 - 4. Machinery and wheat growing:
 - a) Kinds used in production.
 - b) Comparison with former methods.
 - c) How they are made and sold.
 - 5. The farmer and the wheat market:
 - a) His dependence on the market by reason of his specialization.
 - b) The fact of competition with other producers.
 - c) Supply and demand, and price.
 - d) Middlemen organizations and control of price.
 - e) Transportation system as necessary to connect with market: What it gets; can farmer set freight rates?
- IV. Rural Labor.
- 1. Deficiencies in rural labor:
 - a) Supply lacking at time of need.
 - b) Vicious and unreliable characters.
 - c) Unspecialized and untrained for farming.
 - 2. Reasons for labor problem:
 - a) Dislike of farm work.
 - b) Dependence on floating city population.
 - c) Irregular, partial, and seasonal demands for farm labor.
 - 3. Betterment of conditions:
 - a) Develop work for labor throughout the year, so as to hold the supply in the country.
 - b) Provide for labor families to encourage permanence and give living advantages.

References.—Gillette, chap. x; Fiske, pp. 74-82.

V. Making Farm Life More Attractive.

- 1. Why people leave the farm:
 - a) Social attractions of cities.
 - b) Improved living conditions in cities.
 - c) Low estimate of farming and farmer.
 - d) Hard work and drudgery.
 - e) Cultural disadvantages.
- 2. Making home attractive:
 - a) Improved homes: Heating plants; bathing facilities; inside toilet; improved kitchen devices.
 - b) More books and periodicals.
 - c) Beautification of home.
 - d) Beautification of grounds.

- e) Music.
- f) Making cooking scientific.
- 3. Making outdoor work attractive:
 - a) Use of labor-saving machinery: Windmills; gasoline engines or other motor power for machines run by hand; milking machines; riding machinery.
 - b) Shorter hours and faster pace.
 - c) Diversification of crops and industry to distribute work and decrease need of rush.
 - d) Scientific agriculture to increase intellectual element.
- 4. Improved roads for quick communication, travel, and visiting.
- 5. Social center for associational purposes.

References.—United States Department of Agriculture, *Farmers' Bulletins*, Nos. 1 and 5, "Beautifying the Home Grounds"; No. 270, "Modern Conveniences for the Home"; No. 126, "Practical Suggestions for Farm Buildings"; Henderson, *Social Spirit in America*, chap. ii, "Home Making as a Social Art"; Gillette, chaps. vi, ix, xii; Fiske, chap. iii; McKeever, *Farm Boys and Girls*, chaps. iii, iv, v, x, xiii, xv.

VI. The School and Farm Life.

- 1. Conditions of a vigorous living school: Professionally trained teachers; large number of pupils to create interest; grading and classification; good buildings and equipment; regular attendance.
- 2. Defects of rural schools: Untrained teachers; small number of pupils; irregular attendance; lack of graded system; small, poorly heated, poorly ventilated buildings; city-made course of study, books, and ideals; absence of training for the chief business of the community—agriculture and domestic economy.
- 3. Remedies: Consolidation most advantageous because it attracts better teachers, makes attractive, differentiated, and equipped buildings which permit grading, teaching of agriculture, manual training, and domestic economy; transports pupils, thus securing better attendance; multiplies pupils, which makes for enthusiasm; provides a center for the varied social needs of the community; and furnishes organized play and recreation so much needed in country life.

References.—Foght, *The American Rural School*, chaps. i, v, vii, ix, xi, xv; Kern, *Among Country Schools*, chaps. ii, x, xii, xiii, xiv; United States Department of Agriculture, Bulletin No. 232, "Consolidated Rural Schools and Organization of a Country System"; Gillette, chap. xvi; references at end of chapter; Fiske, chap. vi; McKeever, chaps. xvi, xvii; C. C. Schmidt, "The Consolidation of Rural Schools," *Education Bulletin No. 3*, University of North Dakota, 1912; probably the best work on the subject.

VII. Rural Hygiene.

1. Social importance of good health:

- a) The poor, the defectives, and the criminal classes spring from devitalized classes.
- b) Physical weakness produces unhappiness, irritation, bad disposition.
- c) Sickness a great inconvenience and expense.

2. Menaces and suggestions as to rural health: Infected water supply; neighboring barnyard filth; uncleanness in production of milk supply; emptying slops in yard; uncared-for closets; stagnant pools; exposure and colds; bad teeth; eyestrains, poor hearing, and poor breathing, especially of school children; bad methods of preserving and keeping food; propagation of germs by drinking-cups, pencils, books, etc.; patent medicines; want of proper bathing facilities.

3.⁵How schools may be made sanitary: Scrubbing floor; whitewashing plaster; painting woodwork; jacketing the stove; window ventilators; covered water tank; cleansed and disinfected closets.

References.—Allen, *Civics and Health*; Foght, *The American Rural School*, chap. xiv; Gillette, chap. xi, with references; Isaac Bemer, *Rural Hygiene*; Kern, *Among Country Schools*, chap. v.

VIII. Good Roads and Farm Life.

1. Significance for civilization: Roads in Roman Empire; roads in Europe today.

2. Social function of roads: Local transportation of produce; interchange of courtesies; growth of ideas and fellowship; basis of prosperity of schools, lodges, churches, sociables, entertainments, spelling-matches, musical classes, etc.

3. Economy of good roads: Saving in hauling; saving in wagons and horses; increases value of land; speed and pleasure in travel.

4. Methods of securing roads: "Working the roads"; cash wages; working prisoners; state aid as local support.

5. Kinds of country roads: Earth roads and split-log drag; sand-clay roads and puddling; burnt clay roads and lining; dust preventive; hard roads—gravel, shell, stone.

References.—United States Department of Agriculture, "Roads and Road Building," "Macadam Roads," "Use of the Split Log Drag," *Farmers' Bulletin*, No. 321; Fiske, chap. iii; Gillette, chap. ix; Henderson, *Social Spirit in America*, chap. vi.

IX. Socializing Country Life.

1. Facts of lack of social life in country as compared with city: Churches; theaters; neighbors; public balls; amusement places; recreation; libraries; culture clubs, etc.

2. Causes of social poverty: Isolation; bad roads; absence of large and specialized buildings; individualistic philosophy; depreciation of play and recreation; lack of reading-habit; the work-habit.
3. Means of socialization: Good roads; automobiles; telephones and rural delivery; schools and churches built for social purposes; farmers' organizations such as institute, grange, American Society of Equity, farmers' unions, etc.; mothers' clubs and literary clubs among women; athletic meets and tournaments at school grounds; literary and debating clubs; spelling-matches; lectures and entertainments; moving-picture shows; banquets, feasts, and "socials."

References.—On social isolation: Butterfield, *Chapters in Rural Progress*, pp. 17-22; Bailey, *Insufficiencies in Country Life*, "The Training of the Farmer," pp. 15-19; Butterfield, "The Country Church and Progress," chap. xii; *School Buildings for Social Purposes*, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bulletin No. 232, on consolidated schools; Foght, "Libraries for Rural Communities," chap. xiii, and Kern, chap. vi; Johnson, *Education by Play and Games*, "Organized Play and Recreation"; Butterfield, "Farmers' Institutes," chap. vii, and Kern, chap. ix; Butterfield, "The Grange," chap. x, "Opportunities for Farm Women," chap. xi; Fiske, chap. v; Gillette, chaps. xiii-xviii; McKeever, chaps. vi-x.

THE LARGER SOCIAL WORLD

The larger side of social life, that which reaches beyond the local community into the nation and world, may be developed by means of a brief discussion once or twice a week of the events which are transpiring in the world at large. This should be done in a manner that would make each event treated mean something for life by showing how it changes conditions and thus makes for improvement or deterioration.

A brief treatment and discussion of certain phases of our industrial history would also be useful to cultivate the idea of the articulation of ourselves with the world and to give an understanding of some of the pressing economic issues. The little weekly paper entitled *Current Events*, published in Springfield, Massachusetts, is recommended as exceedingly useful to accomplish the former purpose. Thurston's *Economic and Industrial History* would give the material for the second, and an account of its size is quite usable. Coman's *Industrial History of the United States*, or Bogart's *Economic History of the United States* are fuller and more pretentious. It would be sufficient to select only the more recent problems of labor and industry.

VARIABILITY AS RELATED TO SEX DIFFERENCES IN ACHIEVEMENT

A CRITIQUE

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This paper is the outcome of prolonged reflection on the doctrine of greater male variability. It comprises an attempt to assemble and review briefly data at present accessible as to the comparative variability of the sexes in mental traits, and to discuss critically the hypothesis that the great difference between the sexes in intellectual achievement and eminence is due to the inherently greater variability of the males. This hypothesis is stated clearly and concisely by Thorndike¹ thus:

The trivial difference between the central tendency of men and that of women which is the common finding of psychological tests and school experience may seem at variance with the patent fact that in the great achievements of the world in science, art, invention, and management, women have been far excelled by men. One who accepts the equality of typical (i.e., modal) representatives of the two sexes, must assume the burden of explaining this great difference in the high ranges of achievement.

The probably true explanation is to be sought in the greater variability within the male sex. . . .

In particular, if men differ in intelligence and energy by wider extremes than do women, eminence in and leadership of the world's affairs of whatever sort will inevitably belong oftener to men. They will oftener deserve it.

It is at once evident how important are the implications here stated for those who hope much from the present tendency to remove all disabilities of law, custom, and prejudice from women. If the explanation of women's failure to achieve significant things in the fields named by Thorndike is really to be found in the inherently greater variability of males, then complete liberation of women from excessive maternity and from all the consequent customs and legal disabilities that have developed, will result

¹ E. L. Thorndike, *Educational Psychology* (1910), p. 35.

only in raising the *average* intelligence and happiness of the race. We shall not expect any increase from this source in the number of eminent individuals, nor in achievement of that high order which forces knowledge and wisdom farther.

Thorndike¹ states the implications for pedagogy thus:

This one fundamental difference in variability is more important than all the differences between the average male and female capacities . . . a slight excess of male variability would mean that of the hundred most gifted individuals in this country not two would be women, and of the thousand most gifted, not one in twenty. . . . Women may and doubtless will be scientists and engineers, but the Joseph Henry, the Rowland, and the Edison of the future will be men; even should all women vote, they would play a small part in the Senate. . . . Not only the probability and the desirability of marriage and the training of children as an essential feature of woman's career, *but also the restriction of women to the mediocre grades of ability and achievement should be reckoned with by our educational systems.* The education of women for such professions as administration, statesmanship, philosophy, or scientific research, where a very few gifted individuals are what society requires, is far less needed than education for such professions as nursing, teaching, medicine, or architecture, where the average level is the essential. . . . Postgraduate instruction, to which women are flocking in large numbers is, at least in its higher reaches, a far more remunerative investment in the case of men.²

The first discussion of the comparative variability of the sexes bore on anatomical traits, and began about a century ago. The anatomist Meckel³ concluded on pathological grounds that the human female showed greater variability than the human male, "and he thought that since man is the superior animal and variation a sign of inferiority, the conclusion was justified." Later, when anatomists and naturalists arrived at the conclusion that the male is more variable, variability came to be regarded as an advantage, a characteristic affording the greatest hope for progress, and finally as the probable explanation of the fact that all the world's greatest deeds of intellect have been the deeds of men. This latter view obtains at present among men of science, though not without exceptions, the most notable of whom is Karl Pearson.⁴

¹ E. L. Thorndike, "Sex in Education," *The Bookman*, XXIII, 213.

² The italics here are mine.

³ Meckel, *Manual of Descriptive and Pathological Anatomy* (see Ellis, *Man and Woman* [1909], p. 410).

⁴ Karl Pearson, *Chances of Death* (1897).

It will be well at this point to consider not only the social and biological significance of variability, but also the connotation of the term itself, and whether every author who discusses variability means the same thing. There is, in fact, complaint among authors that the term is indefinite. Even in their controversial matter,¹ Ellis and Pearson complain of each other that there is failure to define the word. Theoretically greater variability always implies *greater range*, if the trait distributed conforms to the Gauss curve of probability. Empirical data, however, are not yet forthcoming to demonstrate that mental traits conform to the theoretical curve; and there is at present no conclusive empirical evidence to show that in cases where the coefficient of variation is greater for one sex than for the other, this greater variability consists in *greater range*. If we neglect theory and confine ourselves to facts as demonstrated, greater variability is found to consist in any or all of three typical conditions:

1. Greater range (Series B as compared with Series A).
2. Equal range for both groups, but greater frequency at the extremes for one group (Series C as compared with Series A).
3. Smaller range for the more variable group, with slight flattening at the top of the curve of distribution (Series D as compared with Series A).

A fourth condition is found in the work of Bonser, where the males are seen to be more variable than the females, though the *range* for the sexes is equal, and the *frequency at both extremes* is nearly twice as great for the females. This case will be taken up later in connection with other results from Bonser.

Let us now consider a hypothetical case. Table I gives four possible distributions of the same trait, including the same number of cases. This trait may be, for example, ability to perform an amount of work in a specified time, this ability being indicated by units varying from 1 to 15. Let Series A be a group of 1,000 women, and let Series B, C, and D be groups of 1,000 men each. It is seen that these Series all show greater variability on the part of the males (reference to Table I will show just how much greater is the *A.D.* in each case), but the social implications differ widely.

¹ H. Ellis, *Man and Woman* (Appendix).

In Series B the greater variability of the males consists in greater *range*. It is on this Series that we might base the explanation of the fact that *all* the world's greatest deeds of intellect have been the deeds of men; for here no women equal the best men.

In Series C the greater variability of the males consists in greater frequency at the extremes, *the range being equal*. On this Series might be based an explanation of the fact that *more* men than women have reached the *same* degree of eminence. It would not explain why no women have reached the greatest eminence.

In Series D the greater variability of the males consists in a flattening at the top of the curve of distribution, the *range* for the men being actually *less* than for the women.

Now it is clear that if social significance is to be attached to greater variability, not only the coefficient of variation must be stated, but also *what form the distribution takes*. Obviously a greater male variability like that shown in Series D would have no validity at all in explaining why the greatest deeds of intellect have been the deeds of men. If greater male variability takes this form, all the greatest deeds will be those of *women*.

In his discussions of greater male variability and its implications for pedagogy, Thorndike¹ theoretically means greater range: "Though the central tendencies were the same, there would still be two men of the hundred who were better than the best woman and two men who were worse than the worst woman." This condition would be represented under Series B. But, in discussing certain statistics regarding third-year high-school classes see Table I, p. 514.

This condition would be that of Series C. The range for the sexes is equal, but the frequency at the extremes is greater for males. Such cases of greater variability do not suggest an explanation of the fact that no women have achieved the greatest intellectual eminence. They would only explain the condition in which twice as many men as women achieved the *same* intellectual eminence. But our chief problem is to explain why no women have equaled the best men.

Havelock Ellis,² in a chapter on "The Variational Tendency

¹ E. L. Thorndike, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

² H. Ellis, *op. cit.*, p. 412.

of Men," discusses certain anatomical and pathological data which show, on the whole, the greater variability of the male. Karl Pearson, in a polemical article, undertook to disprove the conclusions of Ellis, stigmatizing them as "scientific superstition." This controversy between Ellis and Pearson is very familiar to students of social science, and each of us may weigh the evidence for himself, since we have here two authorities, of perhaps equal competence, in diametrical disagreement.

TABLE I

DEGREE OR AMOUNT OF THE TRAIT MEASURED	FREQUENCY	FREQUENCY	FREQUENCY	FREQUENCY
	Series A	Series B	Series C	Series D
1.....	0	1	0	0
2.....	0	3	0	0
3.....	1	7	6	0
4.....	10	14	18	11
5.....	45	42	60	57
6.....	117	115	112	130
7.....	205	200	197	190
8.....	244	236	214	224
9.....	205	200	197	190
10.....	117	115	112	130
11.....	45	42	60	57
12.....	10	14	18	11
13.....	1	7	6	0
14.....	0	3	0	0
15.....	0	1	0	0

	SERIES A Women	SERIES B Men	SERIES C Men	SERIES D Men
(Standard group)				
Number.....	= 1,000	= 1,000	= 1,000	= 1,000
Central Tendency.....	= 8	= 8	= 8	= 8
Average Deviation.....	= 1.238	= 1.544	= 1.406	= 1.330

On the whole boys are twice as frequent as girls in the youngest and oldest age, and about one and one-half times as frequent at ages fourteen and nineteen.

But if it were definitely proved that there is greater male variability in anatomical measurements, it would only suggest, not prove, that there is greater male variability in *mental* traits also. Very, very little precise evidence has been adduced as to the comparative variability of the sexes in mental traits. Such general evidence as that previously brought forward, for instance

by Ellis, that the great geniuses of the world have been men, and that there are at the same time more idiots among men, is obviously fallacious. For the geniuses on the one hand may be accounted for by the fact that woman's biological function of reproduction has so conditioned her that eminence in the fields where mental energy is publicly recognized has been extremely improbable; and we should expect statisticians to find more idiots and feeble-minded individuals among men, because they take their data from institutions, where defective men are more likely to be admitted than women of the same degree of defectiveness. Women have been and are a dependent and non-competitive class, and when defective can more easily survive outside of institutions, since they do not have to compete *mentally* with normal individuals, as men do, to maintain themselves in the social *milieu*. This conclusion is well confirmed by the records of the Clearing-House for Mental Defectives at the Post-Graduate Hospital in New York City. Among 1,000 consecutive cases of mental defect (including idiocy, imbecility, and feeble-mindedness), taken from all cases diagnosed at this Clearing-House during the years 1912 and 1913, there were 568 males and 432 females. But of individuals *over sixteen years of age* there were only 78 males, while there were 159 females; and of individuals *over 30 years of age* there were 9 males and 28 females. A detailed account of this study may be found in an article recently published.¹ At present it suffices to point out that the fact that females escape the Clearing-House till beyond the age of thirty years three times as frequently as males, fits very well with the fact that more males than females are brought to the Clearing-House, on the whole. The boy who cannot compete mentally is found out, becomes at an early age an object of concern to relatives, is brought to the Clearing-House, and directed toward an institution. The girl who cannot compete mentally is not so often recognized as definitely defective, since it is not unnatural for her to drop into the isolation of the home, where she can "take care of" small children, peel potatoes, scrub, etc. If physically passable, as is often the case, she may marry,

¹ L. S. Hollingworth, "The Frequency of Amentia as Related to Sex," *Medical Record*, 1913.

thus fastening herself to economic support; or she may become a prostitute, to which economic pursuit feeble mentality is no barrier. Thus they survive *outside of institutions*. The writer has frequently questioned those who accompany these feeble-minded women over thirty years of age to the Clearing-House. Their tardy appearance there is usually accounted for by the fact that some accident has at last happened: "her husband has just died"; "she has rheumatism, and can scrub no more"; "an illegitimate pregnancy has again befallen, to the distraction of relatives"; "she was a prostitute, but physical illness has driven her in from the street." No one can doubt that there are scores of feeble-minded women at large, to whom these accidents have not happened.

It will be well at this point to survey and compare precise data already at hand to show sex differences in mental variability. Such data have been assembled here from scattered sources. Thorndike¹ gives precise data tending to show greater mental variability in men and boys. He calculated as well as might be from data given, the variability for each sex in the traits tested by Helen Bradford Thompson.² His results show that men are about one-twentieth more variable than women, in these experiments. He also concludes from certain measurements of reaction time, spelling, arithmetical ability, etc., that "it is extremely probable that, except in the two years nearest the age of puberty for girls, the male sex is slightly more variable."

Wissler's results with college students show female variability to be in general about nine-tenths that of males. The number of women measured was, however, only 42, and the ratio of female variability differed greatly in the different traits, so that the nine-tenths would, by itself alone, be of no great reliability.³

Thorndike deplores the fact that there is so little precise data at hand, but leaves us to suppose that he considers what is available as sufficient to lend a very, very high degree of probability to the conclusion which he states, and which was quoted at the outset. Several articles and monographs, however, have appeared

¹ E. L. Thorndike, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-43.

² H. B. Thompson, *The Mental Traits of Sex* (1906).

³ Thompson, *op. cit.*

since 1910 which are in disagreement with the results cited by this author.

Wells¹ in a study of "Sex Differences in the Tapping Test" reached the conclusion that men are more variable than women. He had, however, only ten subjects, five women and five men—too small a number on which to generalize. In another study including five women and five men this author concludes:

The groups of subjects are perhaps too small to expect any special sex differences to be illustrated. . . . In the addition test the performance of the women is much more variable than that of the men, in the number-checking test it is much less so.

H. L. Hollingworth² made a study of judgments of persuasiveness, using advertisements as material. He had as subjects 20 Juniors in Barnard College and 20 Juniors in Columbia College. Among his conclusions he states: "Men correlate with their group average about 25 per cent more closely than women," and "the range of variability in the above coefficient is for the men only 43 per cent as large as for women." In the course of discussion this author says:

Another set of measurements of interest is found in the figures which show the approximation of the individual's judgments to the average judgment of his group. . . . The coefficients for the women range between -0.13 and 0.66 , thus giving a total range of 0.79 , with the average at 0.48 . For the men the coefficients cover a much narrower range, varying between 0.40 and 0.74 , thus giving a total range of only 0.34 , a range only 43 per cent as large as that of the women. The average for the men is 0.59 , the median is 0.61 , being thus about 25 per cent higher than the same for the women. Only four women exceed the median for men, while all the men but four exceed the median for women.

Both of these facts—that of higher correlation and that of narrower range—point in the same direction, that is, toward the greater homogeneity of the group of men. The high coefficients indicate that any one man selected at random will be a better example of the characteristics of his group than will a similarly selected woman of her group. And the narrow range again indicates the tendency of the men, not only to depart but slightly from the type, but also to depart in approximately equal degrees from it. Whether

¹ F. L. Wells, "Sex Differences in the Tapping Test," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1909.

² H. L. Hollingworth, "Judgments of Persuasiveness," *Psychological Review* XXVIII (1911), 4.

these facts point to a greater general variability of women as compared with men, or only to the particular composition of the two groups taking part in this experiment, one cannot say. But the present method seems to indicate a concrete and interesting way of studying this much disputed question of the relative variability of the sexes, in what may be called the higher mental processes.

E. K. Strong, Jr.,¹ in a study of the merits of advertisements by the method of relative position, had twenty-five subjects—fifteen men and ten women. Among his conclusions he states the following:

An inspection of the diagram of Table I shows that the range of judgments for the men is much less than for the women, i.e., from $+0.84$ to 0 for the men, and from $+0.75$ to -0.43 for the women. Both have 55 per cent of the entire range below the median judgment. But the average *A.D.* of the medians of the individual judgments for each advertisement for the women is 69 per cent greater than for the men. This is the more striking, as the women would apparently be a more homogeneous group than the men, as they were all Juniors or Seniors in Barnard College, and within a very few years of each other in age, while the men included graduate students and professors and vary at least twenty years in age. . . . A comparison of the two groups shows us that the *P.E.* of the women averages 69.7 per cent greater than that of the men.

In the arrangements of another series of advertisements, where a greater number of subjects was used, this author found the women to be less variable than the men. He remarks upon these contradictory findings as follows:

It is true that the methods employed in the two chapters are different. But if different methods can give exactly opposite results as to variability, they can be of little value as to its determination. Personally I believe that the situation is this. The results of chap. vii show that when women are given an equal opportunity with men to rate appeals (advertisements) they are able to classify their dislikes as readily as their preferences, which the men do not do. Such a condition naturally results in a greater total range where methods of experimentation similar to those in this chapter are used, and consequently in a seemingly greater variability. A careful analysis of the data will not really show greater variability of judgment among the women. What it does show is that women have more and greater dislikes and are surer of them.

Hollingworth, however, used the method employed by Strong in chap. vi, and his results show women to be more variable than men by this very method. It is also true that to say that the

¹ E. K. Strong, Jr., *Relative Merits of Advertisements* (1911), pp. 78, 79.

women varied more *because* "they have more and greater dislikes, and are surer of them" is not to conclude that "a careful analysis of the figures will not show greater variability of judgment among the women." It is only to restate the fact that women *do* vary more in this case than men do, *in affective processes*.

Table XVI in Strong's monograph gives details from which he concluded that men are more variable. These figures show that the group of women does not differ as much from the first group of men in variability as the first group of men differs from the second group of men. For the group of women $Q=3.5$; for the first group of men $Q=4.0$; for the second group of men $Q=5.0$. Thus the group of women differs from the first group of men by .5, and from the second group of men by 1.5. Averaging these we get $d=1.00$. For the two groups of men $d=1.00$. On page 59 of his monograph Strong explains the great variability of the second group of men ($Q=5.0$) on the ground that the group is composed of uneducated persons who were possibly unable to differentiate complex appeals. Thus he explains a difference in variability between two groups of men on incidental grounds, but describes the same amount of difference in variability between a group of men and a group of women as a sex difference!

Gertrude Kuper¹ studied children of various ages and classes in their responses to a series of appeals. "The children numbered over 200, 10 boys and 10 girls for each year's age from 6.5 to 16.5. They were almost entirely attendants of the public schools of New York City, and came from quite varied sections of the city." This author draws the following conclusion:

A great sex difference was found in the variability measures as calculated for the various ages, appeals, social classes, and nationalities. In every case but two the girls exceeded the boys in their *P.E.*, and in these two exceptions the boys' *P.E.* was once greater than the girls' by 5 per cent, and another time exactly equal to the girls' *P.E.* The girls' average *P.E.* was 1.66; that for the boys was 1.36.

A monograph just published by Garry C. Meyers² offers an opportunity to note sex differences in variability, and is more

¹ Gertrude Kuper, "Group Differences in the Interests of Children," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods* (1912), p. 377.

² Garry C. Meyers, *Incidental Memory* (1913).

valuable from our point of view than any of the studies already cited, because he investigated a much greater number of subjects. His study of incidental memory of objects of common experience—bills, coins, and stamps—comprises 704 subjects—337 males and 367 females. Meyers classified these subjects into groups, and these groups range from third-grade pupils to college students, teachers, merchants, and bankers. The tables in which he gives the data for these groups separately have been studied and from them have been tabulated the number of groups of males showing greater variability than the corresponding group of females, and the number of groups of females showing greater variability than the corresponding group of males. The total number of groups is 182. Of this number 65 groups show greater variability for the males; 107 groups show greater variability for the females; 10 groups show exactly equal variability for both sexes. On the basis of these figures one might infer that females are much more variable than males. In his general conclusions about incidental memory for these objects Meyers himself says:

The amount of overestimation and underestimation of the sizes of the one dollar bill, stamp, and coins decreases as age and experience increases, and is as a rule greater for the females than for the males. Generally the males are better performers than the females, and less variable.

Meyers also studied incidental memory for words, using 1,663 subjects—773 males and 890 females. He states among his general conclusions:

The females are markedly superior to the males for average number of words remembered and for average efficiency; they have a high central tendency, vary more in the high schools and fourth grades; but in the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth grades they vary less than the males.

It must be noted here that the finding scarcely agrees with the exception previously quoted, i.e., that girls are more variable at the years nearest puberty, for on the average it seems likely that these two years would fall in the seventh and eighth grades, rather than in the fourth grade and the high school.

William Brown¹ in a study of *The Correlation of Mental Abilities* found that in groups of about equal homogeneity with respect

¹ W. Brown, "Correlation of Mental Abilities," *British Journal of Psychology* (1910), 296.

to age, training, etc., females are more variable in crossing out E, R; males are more variable in crossing out A, N, O, S; the sexes are equally variable in motor performance; males are more variable in the addition test, in speed, and females in accuracy; in the Müller-Lyer Illusion the male children are more variable, and the female adults are more variable.

Fox and Thorndike¹ studied arithmetical abilities of school children, using as subjects 28 boys and 49 girls. As to variability they conclude that in addition girls are only 93 per cent as variable as boys, and in multiplication only 96 per cent as variable.

Stone² also studied arithmetical abilities of school children in various school systems, using as subjects 250 girls and 250 boys. Six tests were given in four systems. Out of the 24 groups thus yielded, 9 show a greater variability for the boys, 14 show a greater variability for the girls, and 1 shows the same variability for both sexes. If we average the coefficients of variation for all groups, a procedure for which there seems to be little justification though not infrequently employed, the boys are found to be only 99.5 per cent as variable as the girls. Stone himself says:

This table shows that for the first two systems—the boys are somewhat more variable, and in systems 8 and 14 about the same amount less variable. This is interesting, and points to a need for further investigation, for the common opinion is that men are more variable than women; and supposedly boys more so than girls. But as seen by the averages for these four systems, so far as these 250 boys and 250 girls show the true tendency, there are no more exceptionally bright or exceptionally dull pupils among the boys than among the girls at this age.

Bonser³ in a study of arithmetical abilities of school children had a greater number of subjects than Stone and a much greater number than Fox and Thorndike. He tested 757 pupils—385 boys and 372 girls. He found that in arithmetical ability boys are only 66 per cent as variable as girls.

Bonser studied the reasoning ability of these 757 pupils with the result that in controlled association girls are once more variable

¹ Fox and Thorndike, "Sex Differences in Arithmetical Ability," *Columbia Contributions to Philosophy, Psychology, and Education*, XI.

² Stone, *Arithmetical Abilities* (1908), p. 36.

³ Bonser, *The Reasoning Ability of Children* (1910), p. 20.

and once less variable than boys; in selective judgment the girls are once more variable and once less variable than the boys; in arithmetical ability, as noted above, the girls are much more variable than the boys; in literary interpretation the boys are more variable; in spelling the boys are slightly more variable. Bonser's final conclusion regarding sex differences in variability in reasoning processes is as follows:

Taking the totals of all, the boys are slightly higher, the ratio being 1.047. The fluctuations are so numerous, and the differences so slight, that it seems unsound to make any general statement to the effect that the boys of these grades are more variable than the girls, in so far as these tests have shown.

Bonser's study affords a case¹ which illustrates very well the prime importance of considering the *whole table of frequencies* when we wish to infer social consequences. He distributed his subjects as to age, sex, and grade, and the medians and quartiles show much greater variability in age on the part of boys. Bonser states this fact as follows:

The variability in age is seen to be much greater among the boys than among the girls, as shown by a comparison of the Q's.

But fortunately for our purpose, Bonser gives the complete table of frequencies. From this we are able to see *in what* the greater male variability consists. We see that *the range* for the sexes is *equal*. At the *oldest extreme* we find 1.04 per cent of the boys and 1.88 per cent of the girls, while at the *youngest extreme* we find 0.51 per cent of the boys and 1.06 per cent of the girls. *The boys are more variable, but the highest achievements are more than twice as frequent, and the lowest achievements are nearly twice as frequent, on the part of girls.* The social significance would be the *exact opposite* of what greater male variability is ordinarily supposed to imply.

None of these studies was made for the chief purpose of studying sex differences in variability. The variations were calculated and stated more or less incidentally. There has been no attempt to select for reference here studies which found greater female variability. All studies known and accessible to the present writer,

¹ Bonser, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

where the variability of the sexes in mental traits has been computed, have been noted. In view of the facts that in many of the cases the conclusions are based on a small number of subjects, and that the evidence is conflicting, it seems necessary to conclude that the comparative variability of the sexes in mental traits has not been determined experimentally. If the evidence can be said to point in one direction rather than another, a greater female variability seems actually to be indicated in experiments so far made on the higher mental processes.

But even if it were determined that men *actually do* vary more in mental traits than women do, still nothing would be proved regarding their *inherent* variability. In order to establish the greater native variability of either sex it is necessary to show (1) that in the trait being distributed the opportunity and training of the sexes have been exactly equal, and (2) that in neither group has variability had more or less survival value than in the other group.

Under these conditions the only measurements of the sexes that may properly be compared with respect to variability are the measurements of infants at birth and for a short period thereafter. These are limited to anatomical traits, and objections are made to the validity of even these data. No measurements, especially mental measurements, of adults under the social customs which have obtained in the world of men and women fulfil either of our two necessary conditions. Men and women have devoted themselves to different activities because of the very different parts they play in the reproduction of the species. Women are under the biological necessity of bearing and rearing the children, and in the present almost as invariably as in the past, child-bearing has implied and compelled as a consequence the one occupation of housekeeping. Thus intellectual variability had no survival value for women, but rather the opposite. Women married, or were married by their parents, at an early age. They bore children—and *many* of them, since until the present century the very existence of a nation depended on the increase in its numbers of fighting men. All the influences of social pressure, religious precept, and even of the legal restriction of knowledge

have been brought to bear on women to the end that there might be enough increase in the population to offset the wastage of war and disease. Physiological facts made it natural, and consequent public expectation made it well nigh imperative, that women should contribute to the care of these numerous children by *housekeeping*. This was formerly almost absolutely the case, and even in this century the cases of women who have found a way to vary from the modal occupation and status, and yet procreate, are rare indeed. Individual prejudice hinders, poverty forbids, or society enacts legal measures against it, as in the case of a New York City teacher, which was recently given much publicity in the daily press. But men, except slave men, could always procreate and at the same time be as diverse in occupation, trade, and inclination as possible.

Thus (1) the opportunity and exercise of the two sexes in the traits which make for intellectual achievement have been very dissimilar in kind and amount, and (2) for one sex variability has had survival value; for the other sex it has had no survival value—this by virtue of the different parts played by the sexes in perpetuating the race. Darwin¹ says:

With respect to the causes of variability we are in all cases very ignorant, but we can see that in man, as in the lower animals, they stand in some relation to the conditions to which each species has been exposed during several generations. . . . We see the influence of diversified conditions in the more civilized nations; for the members, belonging to different grades of rank, and following different occupations, present a greater range of character than do the members of barbarous nations. . . .

This statement by Darwin involves, of course, a fallacy. For we do not know whether the civilized nations are more variable because they are civilized, or civilized because they are more variable. We can, however, paraphrase this statement and apply it to the situation of the two sexes. Men have been influenced by diversified conditions; they have followed the greatest possible range of occupations, and have at the same time procreated unhindered. Women have been limited to *one* set of activities, *because* of the part they play in the perpetuation of the species.

Men of science studying the ever-interesting subject of genius and leadership have pointed out women's inferiority to men in

¹ Charles Darwin, *Descent of Man* (1871), p. 44.

art, science, war, politics, and invention. They have diligently sought to explain the causes of this failure on the part of women. Ellis finds the causes in the greater primitiveness, less variability, and greater affectability of women. Lafitte finds the cause in the fact that women's minds are concrete and incapable of abstraction. Upton finds it in the fact that woman "is emotional by temperament and nature, and cannot project herself outwardly." Thorndike finds it chiefly in the greater variability of the male, and partly in the fact that women lack the fighting instinct. Countless men have found it in the "less ability" of women. None, so far as I know, has announced that he finds it in the conditioning influence of woman's biological function, the inescapable fact that she bears and rears the children. Frederic Harrison among general writers, in an essay on "The Future of Woman," recognizes the great influence that excessive maternity has had on woman's achievement:

We look to the good feeling of the future to relieve women from the agonizing wear and tear of families far too large to be reared by one mother—a burden which crushes down the best years of life for so many mothers, sisters, and daughters—a burden which, while it exists, makes all expectation of superior education or greater moral elevation in the masses of women mere idle talk.

Yet Harrison ends by forgetting this entirely, finding the final causes of woman's inferior achievement in "slighter nervous organization," "smaller cerebral mass," and in the fact that she is subject to the catamenial function and men are not.

J. McK. Cattell¹ in his study of the thousand most eminent persons of history says:

I have spoken throughout of eminent men as we lack in English words including both men and women, but as a matter of fact women do not have an important place on the list. They have in all 32 representatives in the thousand. . . . Belles lettres and fiction—the only department in which women have accomplished much—give ten names. . . . Women have not excelled in poetry or art. Yet these are the departments . . . in which the environment has been, perhaps, as favorable for women as for men. Women depart less from the normal than men—a fact that usually holds throughout the animal series. . . . The distribution of women is represented by a narrower, bell-shaped curve.

¹ J. McK. Cattell, "Statistical Study of Eminent Men," *Popular Science Monthly*, LXII.

It is interesting to notice that the "only department in which women have accomplished much" is one in which work could be carried on more or less successfully in conjunction with the modal occupation—providing there was wealth enough to hire servants for the actual drudgery. Cattell does not say explicitly what he means by the implied unfavorableness of the environment for women in lines other than art and poetry. He is not entirely certain that the environment has been as favorable for them as for men even in art and poetry, since he qualifies his statement by "perhaps." But it is clearly implied that this author recognizes an *environmental* condition unfavorable to women.

It seems indubitable that great numbers of women of intellectual gifts, confronted with the necessity of choosing a "career" or "domestic happiness," have chosen, either consciously or unconsciously the latter. And it must be remembered that even the possibility of a *choice* has existed only in recent times; that throughout almost the whole course of history women were predestined to their work of housekeeping. It is not and cannot be known how much nor what grade of potential leadership has thus been turned into energy-absorbing channels where eminence is impossible. Housekeeping and the rearing of children, though much commended to women as proper fields for the exploitation of their talents, are, unfortunately for their fame, not fields in which eminence can be attained. No one knows, for instance, who at present is the best housekeeper in America, nor who has borne and reared the largest and finest family of children. It is not known how much intellectual acumen is being brought to bear on these ends. Eminent housekeepers and eminent mothers *as such* do not exist. Yet to say that women of great intellectual gifts have not thus expended their energies is to affirm either (1) that there are no women of intellectual gifts, an affirmation now *passé* in the scientific world, (2) that intellect is unattractive to men, and that thus the most intelligent women are left unmarried, (3) that the most intelligent women will not marry, or (4) that the bearing and rearing of children, and the performance of household tasks at present coincident therewith constitute no handicap to the highest attainment in the fields where eminence is possible.

Such statements as these are very likely to be construed as an attack on maternity as such. It is certain, however, that no such attack is intended. The whole and the sole purpose of this paper is to criticize the hypothesis that inherently greater male variability is the cause of woman's failure to attain intellectual eminence. Such a criticism involves the unsentimental statement of biological facts, and of their social consequences. Men of science, seeking the cause of woman's failure, have not sufficiently recognized these facts and consequences, or else they have deemed it unpedagogical to announce them. We do not need, even, to look to the high ranges of achievement for light on our thesis. We need only to take the grade of intellectual attainment represented by the Ph.D. degree. It is proposed soon to make a comprehensive study of the percentage of women who have taken this degree after becoming mothers, as compared with the percentage of men who have taken it after becoming fathers. It is likely that any person of academic experience would forecast the result that few or no women have taken this degree after becoming mothers.

Cora Sutton Castle¹ in her study of eminent women has attempted to determine why women have not played a greater part in the history of intellectual progress. She has treated eminent women with respect to their matrimonial relations, occupations, ages, nationalities, and epochs. But she has not yet determined *the number of children* borne by those women who attained eminence through *their intellectual labor*, as compared with the birth rate among women in general during the time when these women lived. Castle implies that woman's failure may be due to lack of educational opportunities, but we have farther to seek than that. For how did it come about that woman lacked educational opportunities? What was the genesis of this situation, since in the beginning there was no "educational opportunity" for either sex?

Thorndike has gone farther than almost any other man of science in declaring that woman's failure may to some extent be due to a difference in instincts *connected with reproduction*. He declares also that "We should first exhaust the known physical causes"

¹ Cora Sutton Castle, *Statistical Study of Eminent Women* (1913).

before we proceed to any assumption of mental inferiority in explaining woman's lack of achievement. But have these "known physical causes" been exhausted if we end with the conclusion that "the probably true explanation is to be found in the greater variability within the male sex"? Surely we should consider *first* the established, obvious, inescapable, physical fact that women bear and rear the children, and that this has always meant and still means that *nearly 100 per cent of their energy is expended in the performance and supervision of domestic and allied tasks, a field where eminence is impossible*. Only when we had exhausted this fact as an explanation should we pass on to the question of comparative variability, or of differences in intellect or instinct. Men of science who discuss at all the matter of woman's failure should thus seek the cause of failure in the most obvious facts, and announce the conclusion consequent upon such search. Otherwise their discussion is futile scientifically.

Undoubtedly one of the most difficult and fundamental problems that today confront thinking women is how to secure for themselves the chance to vary from the mode of their sex, and at the same time to procreate, in a social order that has been built up on the assumption that there is and can be little or no variation in tastes, interests, and abilities within the female sex. It is a problem that has never confronted men. At times it seems well-nigh insoluble. But to affirm that it is insoluble is at the same time to affirm that there will always be a hard choice confronting women whose tastes vary from the mode; that there will be restlessness, unhappiness, and strife with the social order on the part of these individuals; and that society must tend to lose the work of its intellectual women or else lose their children.

Briefly our thesis may be summed up thus:

1. The greater variability of males in anatomical traits is not established, but is debated by authorities of perhaps equal competence.

2. But even if it were established, it would only suggest, not prove, that men are more variable in mental traits also. The empirical data at present available on this point are inadequate and contradictory, and if they point either way, actually indicate greater female variability.

3. But even if it were established that there *actually* is greater male variability in mental traits, it would only suggest, not prove, that there is greater *inherent* variability. For (a) the opportunity and exercise of the sexes have been dissimilar and unequal; (b) intellectual variability has had survival value for men, but for women it has had little or none—this by virtue of the different parts played by the sexes in the perpetuation of the species.

4. It must be remembered that variability in and of itself does not have social significance, unless it is known *in what* the variability consists—whether in greater range, greater frequency at the extremes, or in flattening at the top of the curve of distribution.

5. It is undesirable to seek for the cause of sex differences in eminence in ultimate and obscure affective and intellectual differences until we have exhausted as a cause the known, obvious, and inescapable fact that women bear and rear the children, and that this has had as an inevitable sequel the occupation of house-keeping, a field where eminence is not possible.

As a corollary it may be added that

6. It is desirable, for both the enrichment of society and the peace of individuals, that women may find a way to vary from their mode as men do, and yet procreate. Such a course is at present hindered by individual prejudice, poverty, and the enactment of legal measures. But public expectation will slowly change, as the conditions that generated that expectation have already changed, and in another century the solution to this problem will have been found.

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ASSEMBLIES

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When a number of persons are assembled the mental processes of each are modified, so that his thinking, feeling, and acting are different from what they would be were he alone. Each is more or less conscious of the presence of the others, and this consciousness affects in some measure his mental state; this modification of his mental state is reflected, however slightly, in his bearing and action and, in turn, reacts upon the mental state of those in his presence. There is initiated at once a series of interactions between the persons assembled which cannot stop until they are again dispersed. This class of psychical phenomena is of peculiar interest, and increasingly so in this age of dense massing of population and of great popular gatherings.

We may for convenience divide assemblies into several classes. The three chief classes we shall distinguish according to the conditions under which the assembled persons are brought together.

1. There is the purely *accidental concourse*. A number of persons find themselves near to one another by accident, as each pursues his individual way. They are there with no common purpose, and have no other sort of common interest in being there. They have no psychical unity. If we may use the expression, their unity is only spatial; they are in the same locality at the same time, and perhaps this unity is only for the moment.

Now, the proposition as to mental interaction was stated as universal, but it may fairly be questioned whether it holds good as to an accidental concourse. When, for instance—to take an extreme case—a number of people, each of whom is bent upon his own separate purpose and going his own way, find themselves in juxtaposition on the street, can it be claimed with reason that there results a modification of the mental life of each? Certainly in such cases the interaction is at a minimum; and yet a little careful introspection and observation seem to me to show that even under such

circumstances the thinking of the individual, although absorbed in his own affairs at the time and oblivious of the presence of others, is not quite the same as it would be if he were isolated. If in no other way, he is probably subconsciously influenced. This, however, is a matter of only theoretical interest and may be passed by. From the psychological point of view the matter of chief importance about such chance assemblies is that they may be so easily converted into crowds with a decided mental unity. A slight incident may arrest the passing throng on the sidewalk and focus the attention of all; and instantly the interaction of many minds, even if it were wholly absent before, becomes obvious and more or less powerful according to circumstances. A mob may originate in this way, when the incident that focuses the attention of the throng is of a highly exciting character, and especially if it arouses to a high intensity some of the more powerful emotions and some strong leader is ready with the appropriate suggestion.

To the preacher the psychology of the street throng is of interest because of the revival of street preaching—a method of reaching the masses which has been so effectually used by the Salvation Army and is now copied by an increasing number of Christian workers. Its effectiveness consists, first, in the contrast which a religious service and appeal offer to the environment of street life, where men are engaged in the diligent pursuit of material values. The soft, sweet strains of a Christian hymn rising amidst the din and roar of traffic is a most effective means of arresting the attention; and the appeal to men to turn their thought toward the things that transcend time and sense often succeeds, by its very strangeness in such surroundings, in awakening a thrill in a heart that would under ordinary circumstances be wholly unresponsive. In the second place, the voice of the singer or preacher often falls upon the ears of a passer-by at the “psychological moment;” for a man is often peculiarly conscious under these conditions of the strain and pressure of life, of the sordidness of materialism, of the mocking vanity of a life of transgression, of the need of moral cleansing, and of spiritual consolation and support. At such moments his mind and heart are quite susceptible to the religious appeal. But notwithstanding these advantages, street preaching is not easy.

Only a few are sufficiently interested to be held; the urge of business is upon them; many stop for a moment and then move on; newcomers are constantly arriving. The speaker addresses a moving procession which swarms by a little nucleus of interested listeners. It is extremely difficult to secure a sufficiently stable group to induce mental unity. The diverting and distracting influences are very hard to overcome. There is required something which excites powerful emotions in order to form a unified psychological group under such conditions.

2. *The inspirational gathering.*—This is a coming together of people with the common purpose of being stimulated or inspired by appeals to their intellectual or emotional nature. To be more specific, this kind of assemblage has three characteristic marks. First, it is physically segregated—usually shut up within the walls of a building, though in some cases it meets in the open air. This gives it the unity of locality in such a way as to emphasize the consciousness of unity. The persons so brought together feel their unity all the more from the fact that they are separated as a group from other men, i.e., the local unity itself develops a certain measure of psychic unity. Second, its members have a unity of purpose in being present. Often this sense of common purpose in being together is only relative and indefinite; and in the case of the average church congregation, some of whom are present solely and many partly from force of habit, other motives operate which are only remotely related, if related at all, to the purpose which is supposed to have influenced them. However, on the whole, such gatherings have a certain unity of purpose, loose and indefinite as it may be, which constitutes a psychical bond of considerable strength. Third—and this is a very important characteristic which differentiates it sharply from other kinds of assemblies—its members are there to be entertained or stimulated or influenced in some way. They may take part, more or less, in some of the exercises or proceedings, but primarily they are there for the purpose of receiving some intellectual or emotional stimulation. Such an assemblage is the audience at a lecture, the crowd at a theater, the congregation at a church. In the latter, however ritualistic or informal may be the service and however much or little the people

may participate in it, their fundamental purpose is to receive religious inspiration, which they expect to come chiefly through the leader. This receptive attitude is a very significant factor in the psychological situation, an important condition of the psychical effects which may be developed. It manifestly renders it easier to bring about mental unity or fusion than under any other conditions. In gatherings of this type we may distinguish three stages of mental unity.

(1) In the primary stage the psychical fusion is low and there is a high degree of self-conscious individuality among the members. There is, as already indicated, a certain degree of mental unity due to the local separateness of the assembly, to the similarity of purpose in being present and to the common attitude of receptivity. But this is all. Each person is self-centered, and there is little common feeling. The critical faculties of each are in the ascendant, and the words and acts of the speaker or leader, in so far as they succeed in securing attention, are coolly weighed in each auditor's mental balances; while the thoughts of those whose attention has not been secured are busily engaged with their personal interests, or idly drifting according to the laws of association, or sinking toward the level of drowsy extinction. Perhaps the interest is keen but predominantly intellectual, and is thus of a character to accentuate the individuality of each and keep the psychic fusion at a minimum. But whether there be an exclusively intellectual activity or an anarchic wandering of the attention or a somnolent relaxation of consciousness, there is little common emotion, very little blending of the separate units into a psychical mass in which each realizes that his mental reactions coincide with those of others. The speaker addressing such a group will feel that his words are falling upon critical or indifferent or sleepy ears.

(2) The secondary stage is marked off from the primary by no hard-and-fast lines; but is characterized by the lowered individuality and the increased mental fusion of the personal units composing the assembly. The intellectual activity of each is less independent and autonomous, is more limited by a common emotional state into which all have been brought. Emotion has a very important influence upon the activity of the intellect. Up to

a certain point it stimulates intellectual action, and beyond that point hinders it more and more; but whether stimulating, as in its lower degrees, or inhibitive, as in its higher intensities, emotion is always *directive* of whatever intellectual activities are going on; because feeling defines, if it does not determine, the line of interest and it is interest which engages the intellect. Consequently in a gathering in which a common feeling of considerable strength has been developed the individuals are partially blended into a psychical mass in which the one pervasive emotion intensifies the consciousness of unity and orients the intellects of all in a given direction. The tendency to individualistic thinking, i.e., thinking independent of or diverse from that of the assembly as a whole, is to a large extent inhibited. Mark that it is the *tendency* to diverse thinking that is inhibited; the individual is not conscious of the limitation that is upon him. In so far as he is fused with others he simply does not tend to think differently from the mass; or to state it in other words, to the extent to which his individuality has been merged he feels no impulse to assert his mental independence. He is not aware that his mental autonomy is curtailed.

But in this secondary stage the individuality of the units has not wholly disappeared. The fusion is partial only; a measure of independence remains to the average person. He is more suggestible; is more thoroughly under the influence of the speaker; he is less able to recollect and utilize all the resources of his intellect by bringing them to bear upon what is said or proposed. He is less critical, more easily convinced and led. But his will has not been paralyzed; his action still represents his personality, though not the outcome of so thorough and deliberate a consideration of all the issues involved. There are many cases in which the individual has become so thoroughly subject to habit, so warped in his inclinations, so biased in mental action by long persistence in certain courses of conduct that he is incapable under ordinary conditions of weighing with approximate fairness the pros and cons of an issue which involves those habits and inclinations. The scales of his judgment are loaded. He sees the better way but is unable to choose it when the test comes. The habitual drinker, the sensual libertine, the veterans of vice and the victims of bad habits, in

general, see the evil of their ways but have become so perverted that the reasons against indulgence are not effective with them, are borne down or smothered by the clamorous insistence of appetite, which gives exaggerated force to the considerations in favor of indulgence. Frequently in these sad cases of one-sided or perverted natures it is the emotional contagion of the crowd, if it does not reach the point of excess, which, by acting as an inhibition upon these vicious inclinations, balances the man up and gives his rational nature a better chance to express itself; and by the aid of this influence he may be able to reach and fortify himself in moral decisions which give a new direction to his life.

(3) The third stage of psychic fusion is reached when the individuality of the personal units has disappeared; or perhaps we should say when the only elements of individuality left to them are the reflexive or instinctive peculiarities of their individual nervous constitutions. The modifications of their emotional natures resulting from their intellectual organization have disappeared. The fusion is complete. This is the mob state. The individual no longer thinks, reasons, chooses. His action does not represent his personality, but is simply his reflex or instinctive reaction under the powerful influence of the crowd-suggestion. He has reached a state which is very similar to, though not identical with, hypnosis. It should again be noted that he is not conscious of the limitation upon him; he does not realize that the action of his rational faculties is suspended. He simply does not differentiate himself in thought from the mass. His actions no more represent himself than those of the hypnotic subject under the influence of the operator; indeed his true self is more completely annihilated for the time. The hypnotic subject nearly always refuses to obey a suggestion which runs counter to his deep moral instincts. But the personality is so completely suspended in the mob-state that a man may be induced to do things which are in absolute contradiction to his self-respect and his profoundest moral convictions. How often is a man thus led to commit murder who would be horrified at the suggestion under ordinary circumstances and would resist it even in the hypnotic trance! Not only ridiculous but disgraceful acts are sometimes performed under the sway of crowd

suggestion, the sense of personal decency being lost in the wholesale collapse of the personality. It is doubtless true that when the psychic fusion of the crowd reaches its limit it involves a disintegration of the personality more thoroughgoing than can be accomplished by any other known means, except certain forms of disease. Of course, there is no responsibility, in the ordinary sense of the word, for the deed performed under such conditions. The individuals in such a mass—I speak only of the extreme phenomena of this type—are like so many leaves in a tornado. They are simply a herd of cattle in a panic or a fury—except that there is in each one a temporarily paralyzed rational and voluntary power, which may by some means be again awakened into activity. Until that is done their action, because of the complexity of the forces involved, is more incalculable than the shifting of the wind. But the mob may also do deeds that are chivalrous or heroic. Whether its action is despicable, horrible, or noble depends upon the character of the emotion which at any time is in the ascendant, and, as the emotions are exceedingly unstable and variable, the mob's performances may quickly shift from one extreme of the moral scale to the other; and yet, strictly speaking, a mob is not an ethical entity and its acts are non-ethical.

The passing of an assembly into the second and third stages of unity may be accurately described as a process of inhibiting the intellectual or rational control of conduct, which is accomplished by collective suggestion in a state of high emotion. But the rational control itself is essentially of an inhibitive character. The normal personality consists, first, of a substratum of inherited nerve co-ordinations, reflexive and instinctive; and, second, of a system of ideas which are the deposit of personal experience, plus a certain inscrutable and indefinable power *of choice* which develops along with the organization of the mind. Now, the impulses of the instinctive nature are controlled by the mental organization which is the result of individual experience; and this control is exercised mainly, if not exclusively, by the arrest of many among the conflicting impulses which originate in the numerous contacts with our environment or in our organic sensations; by the stopping of some impulses the right of way is given to others, which thus pass on into

realization as our volitions. In a fused mass of men the collective suggestion simply suspends these individual inhibitive functions; and in so far as they are suspended, the reflexes and instincts are left exposed to be played upon by the external influences of the crowd or mob.

Now, these reflexes and instincts constitute our racial inheritance; they are the parts of our nature in which, notwithstanding individual peculiarities, we are most nearly identical with our fellow-men. They are a common patrimony. It is in the mental systems built up in personal experience that we are most widely differentiated, and it is by the interstimulation of their common instincts and the parallel suppression or suspension of their unlike intellectual systems that men are fused into a psychic mass.

If we should ask whether it is more important to stress the common elements in our human nature, to develop in men the consciousness of their community of life, or to emphasize their divergent variations, to make them sensible of their distinctive individualities, the true answer would be that both should be done in about equal proportions. We are living under conditions which promote a very high differentiation of men, and conditions which at the same time bring the population together in increasingly vast and dense communities and favor and facilitate the assembling of men in ever larger masses. A notable phenomenon of urban life everywhere is the building of mammoth auditoriums for the gathering of people in great numbers; and there is a tendency to the enlargement of lecture halls, theaters, and churches. These frequent, large aggregations of people, in which, as we shall see, collective suggestibility is greater and the units are more readily fused than in smaller ones, constitute one of the most effective means of developing and strengthening the consciousness of the unity of men in an age of high specialization of individuals and groups; if only the process of psychic fusion can be kept from going to the excess which effaces the sense of individual responsibility, disintegrates and weakens personality, and results in hurtful collective action.

The first stage of mental unity of the assembly is best suited to instruction. The class in the lecture room has this degree of unity, and a certain measure of common feeling is desirable as a means of

intellectual quickening. But the development of the feeling beyond a low intensity should be avoided. Wherever the didactic purpose is the controlling one in bringing people together, care should be taken to keep the crowd in the primary stage of fusion. When the purpose is inspiration rather than instruction, aiming, not at the impartation of ideas or their correlation, but at the organization of emotional dispositions around certain ideas, the development and strengthening of common sentiments and ideals, the secondary stage of fusion is desirable. Suppose the preacher, for instance, desires to teach his congregation, to enlarge and improve their conception of God. This cannot be done by developing a tide of emotion which puts limitations upon the action of the individual intellects and leads to uncritical acceptance of the ideas which he imparts. The method should be an appeal to their individual rational powers with the aim of producing conviction. On the other hand, suppose it is his desire to cultivate the sentiment of loyalty to Christ; then he should strive to develop in connection with the intellectual conception of Christ the appropriate feeling of devotion to him—to organize in the minds of his auditors a fixed association of certain emotions with their idea of his character; and this involves, of course, strong and repeated stimulations of the affective side of their natures. But if the emotional tide runs so high as to submerge the intellectual life and drown all definite ideas in its flood, the second purpose as well as the first is wholly defeated. No sentiment is then developed, no ideal established, but only a thirst is created for wild and senseless emotional intoxication which is disorganizing and debilitating in its effects upon personality. The third stage of psychic fusion should, therefore, always be avoided.

But our division of the process of fusion into three stages is a logical one and does not correspond to the reality except in a very general way. As a matter of fact, while these three stages are in a general way distinguishable, the assembly does not pass as a whole from one into the other. There are in it persons of very various degrees of suggestibility. Those of the greatest suggestibility are the first to suffer the arrest of the intellectual processes and lose their individuality, while those who are least suggestible maintain

their mental autonomy until the extreme limit of emotional excitement is reached. Children, women (as a rule), persons of limited experience or of loose mental organization are apt to fall first wholly under the spell of the crowd-suggestion; but as the tide rises others, according to the measure of their experience or of the stability of their mental organization, succumb to its pervading power. It is like cutting the dykes and flooding a region. First the lowest lands, then the plains, then the uplands are submerged by the rising waters, until only the higher hills stand out above the waves. It is this fact of greatly unequal suggestibility which constitutes a grave problem for the leader of the assembly when it seems desirable to develop a considerable degree of emotional fusion. That which is necessary to stimulate in some members of the congregation a proper sense of their community of life with their fellows may prove to be too powerful a stimulation of others; so that while the leader is accomplishing good results in one direction he is doing harm in another. In dealing with this aspect of the matter, the highest judgment and skill should be exercised by those who are responsible. Especially does this apply to the preacher. In order to awaken the consciences of some and create in them a thrill of spiritual affection, the children, the weak women, and the ill-balanced men may be led into demonstrations which are not only meaningless but permanently hurtful. Discriminating wisdom and a thorough understanding of psychological laws are needed by men who are making religious appeals to promiscuous assemblies.

Doubtless nobody can maintain himself wholly independent of the contagion of the crowd. But strong personalities of the resistant or aggressive type can in some measure retain their self-possession even in extreme situations. Such strong personalities may even prevail against the contagion and break the spell which threatens to swamp the individualities of all. If there be several such persons in the crowd their natural impulse will be to get together so that they may reinforce one another in their common resistance and form a more effective breakwater against the tidal wave. In doing this, however, they will inevitably develop a considerable measure of mental unity among themselves, so as to act concertedly; their reaction against the contagious influence

forces them, to some extent, into psychical fusion with one another; they are much more able to stem the general tide when close together and acting as a unit than when scattered throughout the crowd as isolated centers of resistance. It is another case of "united we stand, divided we fall." But if there is a considerable number of such persons, and they come together so as to form a distinct group, there is always danger that the assembly will develop into two opposing groups, each of which will be under the sway of the mob-mind—forming a sort of double-headed mob. This not unfrequently happens, and then it is that irrational violence reaches, perhaps, its maximum. On the other hand, if such persons remain scattered through the crowd and from several centers undertake to resist the contagion and break up the unity by interruptions or counter-demonstrations of any sort, the situation is likely to become one of extreme agitation; the intellectual process will be inhibited in all, partially if not wholly; but the only emotion which will be dominant will be confused excitement, and there will be what may be called a chaotic crowd. In such a situation one part of the fusion process takes place—the inhibition of the rational process. All individualities are reduced to a common denominator, but that is only a powerful but vague agitation caused by psychical cross-currents; and in no other sense does mental unification take place.

We should turn now to consider the means and methods by which the process of fusion may be promoted.

The first is the close crowding of the people. Bodily proximity of a group of persons renders the passage of influences from one to another much more easy and rapid. Slight movements, subtle and fleeting changes of countenance are more readily observed, and the ideas and feelings of which these are the expression are more surely and rapidly communicated. Wide separation tends to produce mental isolation and the peculiarities of the mental individuality become relatively more prominent. The equalizing and leveling effect of the interaction of the individuals is reduced about in proportion to the distances which separate them. When they are thinly scattered about the place of assembly it is difficult to focalize their attention upon the same idea or to start a general current of feeling.

We should guard carefully against the fallacious notion that there passes from one to another and envelops the whole crowd a subtle fluid or ethereal substance. We are prone to interpret the facts in such materialistic terms. There is not the slightest evidence that anything of the kind takes place. It has been maintained that in the fusing of individuals into a crowd there comes into existence, by a process of "creative synthesis," a new psychical entity, a "social mind." But there is no convincing reason for supposing that anything more takes place than the modification and common orientation of many distinct minds through their reaction on one another. What we *know* takes place is the communication of ideas, feelings, mental attitudes by means of their physical expression, which we instinctively, and in large part subconsciously, read with lightning-like rapidity, and which modifies the activity of each communicating mind.

But when the people are crowded it promotes the fusion process in other ways. The bodily movements of all are thus limited. They cannot shift their positions, change their physical attitudes, turn about, stretch out their limbs, etc. This has the effect of lessening their sense of individuality in two ways. First, their all being in similar bodily attitudes and unable to vary them without difficulty reacts upon their mental states, tending to give them unity of mental attitude. Second, this physical restraint tends to depress the self-feeling. Sidis says: "If anything gives us a strong sense of our individuality it is surely our voluntary movements. . . . Conversely the life of the individual self sinks, shrinks with the decrease of variety and intensity of voluntary movements."¹ Ross, quoting the foregoing words, adds: "Often a furious, naughty child will suddenly become meek and obedient after being held a moment as in a vise. On the playground a saucy boy will abruptly surrender and 'take it back' when held firmly on the ground without power to move hand or foot. The cause is not fear but deflation of the ego."² Crowding appears, then, to promote the spread of ideas and feelings, the bringing of all individuals to a common state of mind and, at the same time, the lowering of the self-feeling or the

¹ *Psychology of Suggestion*, p. 289.

² *Social Psychology*, p. 44.

sense of individuality; and is thus one of the chief means of merging many separate and differentiated personalities into one psychical mass.

A second important means of accomplishing the same result is concerted bodily movement. Just as the necessity of keeping the body in the same attitude of standing or sitting because of close crowding has the tendency to induce mental unity in a group, so does the performance of the same act at the same time by all the persons present. For all to stand, or to leap and shout, or to kneel, or to hold up the right hand, or to bend forward, or to sing, or to repeat a formula, or to do anything else which may occur to the leader, develops a consciousness of oneness, and breaks up the personal isolation in which the sense of individuality is at a maximum. One reason why the prevention of bodily movements by crowding is a condition of the fusion process is that persons widely separated in a gathering will move *individually* without respect to the movements of others, and this keeps alive the sense of individuality, whereas the same movements, if performed by all, would have the opposite tendency. An expert leader will always, when he is seeking to develop mental unity and solidarity in the assembly, insist upon all "joining in" whatever concerted action he proposes. For some to refuse to participate manifestly obstructs the unifying process, while if all will take part the unifying effect is very great.

It is upon this one means of inducing mental unity that ritualistic bodies, whether churches or lodges, chiefly rely; but, although its whole tendency is in that direction, the ritualistic use of it is not so well adapted to produce intense effects as the non-ritualistic; for the reason, doubtless, that the formulae and concerted actions required by the rituals are not, as a rule, such as to stir intense emotions and that their frequent repetition takes off the keen edge of the feelings which they do excite. In non-ritualistic bodies it is used more effectively as a means of fusion because prescribed formulae are not used and the concerted actions suggested in informal exercises are not fixed and habitual; but, being unusual or at least infrequent, are more stimulating to the emotions, and when used in connection with other means to the same end generally secure a more complete submergence of the individuality than ever

occurs in ritualistic observances. Hence the phenomena of psychical fusion are observed much more frequently and are much more striking in bodies which use a minimum of ritual. In fact the ritual, by reason of its habitual or customary character, tends to prevent more than a certain moderate degree of mental fusion.

Singing, especially if it is congregational, is a quite effective means of melting the assembled individuals into a psychical mass. Its effectiveness lies both in the fact that it is a concerted action and in its power as a stimulus of the emotions. By reason of its rhythmical quality it is one of the most natural expressions of the feelings, and conversely, one of the most unfailing means of arousing feeling. This is true even when the music is devoid of ideational content. The rhythmical sounds alone, according to their length and combination, develop corresponding effects. "A short musical unit tends to light, vivacious, or joyful effects, irrespective of the rapidity of succession of notes or of the melodic intervals employed. A unit which 'draws out' the specious present [i.e., the span of consciousness] slightly beyond the normal length produces a sombre effect. A still longer unit which is divided between two not long spans of consciousness, gives an effect which is solemn but not sad."¹ But in all our songs there are ideas which are organized with appropriate emotions into definite sentiments, and which greatly contribute to the total emotional effect when the music is suitable. There is, therefore, no surer and easier way to develop mental contagion than to have a gathering of people join in singing. But for this purpose much depends both upon the character of the music and the ideas of the song. The rhythm of the music must correspond to the rhythm of the simpler feelings, and the ideas must be correspondingly simple. "In music of the so-called intellectual sort there is no regular relation between the musical unit and the span of consciousness; the unity here is intentionally ideational and does not appeal to the average hearer."² In such music the emphasis is placed upon the intellectual processes of appreciation, and this tends to prevent complete fusion. Who has not observed the difference between the hymns and tunes used in Sunday school and evangelistic meetings, on the one hand, and those used in "regular church

¹ Dunlap, *A System of Psychology*, p. 312.

² *Ibid.*, p. 313.

services," on the other? In a word, to be most effective in producing fusion the singing must be such as strongly stimulates those elements of our mental life which we have in common with our fellow-men rather than those elements in which we are most highly differentiated. Since children and youths are undeveloped men and women, they represent that which is most generic in human nature; and that is the reason why songs of the same general type are best adapted to use in the Sunday school, in evangelistic meetings and in all gatherings where a high degree of mental unity is sought for. It is hardly possible to overestimate the psychological value of our patriotic songs, the ballads which are expressions of the more universal sentiments of love and longing and the more popular religious hymns, as means of developing and maintaining a sense of community of life with our fellow-men.

Mental fusion may also be promoted by imaginative, passionate oratory. If a speaker has intense feeling himself, is gifted with the power of conveying his ideas and emotions by means of concrete and vivid images and dramatic action, it is often possible for him without the aid of any other means, and sometimes even when other influences are adverse, to convert a cold and critical audience into a highly fused and suggestible crowd. Doubtless there is not on record a more signal demonstration of the sheer power of oratory to overcome psychological difficulties than the triumph of Henry Ward Beecher in England in 1863. In his defense of the policy of the North in the great Civil War, he faced every time a coldly critical and largely hostile gathering of Britishers. He was interrupted from the beginning by questions, taunts, insults, rotten eggs, etc. As, despite these violent attempts to silence him, his magnificent patience, self-possession and good humor, reinforced by a matchless imaginative and histrionic power, won over sections of the throng, the desperation of his opponents increased; and they rebouled their efforts to break up the mental unity which they felt to be growing, but without avail; and always in the end he remained master, though his mastery was not always equally complete. He had only one condition in his favor—the close crowding of his audiences. Of course, when all the other conditions are favorable, the task of the orator is comparatively easy. For

instance, when Mr. Bryan made his remarkable address at the National Democratic Convention in Chicago in 1896, nearly all the psychological conditions were in his favor. There was, to be sure, an opposing group in the convention, but they were in a decided minority; and the debate, which his address concluded, had stirred intense feeling. He was the magnetic and eloquent voice of the majority; his sentences, made rhythmical by his own emotion, and the masterly use he made of imagery which associated his cause with some of the deepest and most powerful sentiments of our human hearts, developed a tide of emotion which set the convention wild (perhaps literally) and overwhelmed his opponents.¹

We should turn now to a consideration of the kinds of emotion which are most effective in welding heterogeneous individuals into a homogeneous crowd. These are to be found among the generic emotions which are most deeply embedded in the instincts of human nature. When aroused they are the most powerful, the most pervasively contagious, and the most difficult to control.

First we may consider fear, which in the psychology-books is generally mentioned as the first of the simple emotions. How powerful it is, how completely in its intense developments it paralyzes reason, how thoroughly suggestible it renders its subject—or victim—needs no demonstration or illustration. Every man's experience furnishes numerous examples of its power to upset the rational processes. When a group of people are seized by this emotion and it is intensified by reflection from face to face or by screams and shrieks it quickly overwhelms reason and conscience, and all the other emotions as well, in its turbid flood; and men are converted into maddened beasts each of whom seeks only his own safety. While, therefore, it annihilates the higher individualizing factors of the several personalities and fuses them in the sense that they are all reduced to a like mental state which is intensified by reflection from one to another, it desocializes them, so to speak; it deadens the social instincts of each and so has a certain disintegrating effect. This is especially notable in panics. It reduces the individuals to a common denominator, but that common denominator is an impulse to take care of self without regard to others.

¹ See Scott, *Psychology of Public Speaking* pp. 165-66.

There is no emotion which, when it gains exclusive sway, is so absolutely demoralizing. And yet when it is refined and moralized, kept under the control of intelligence and conscience, it becomes a worthy motive. When dominated by conscience, blended with love, and transfigured into reverence, it becomes one of our noblest sentiments. In this regenerated form it retains, though in a much lower degree, its fusing power and may be most properly used by the orator or preacher. But in its baser form of physical fear it should never be appealed to by one who aims at spiritual results.

Another emotion which is most effective in welding a crowd is anger. This is one of the most powerful emotions, and all normal persons are capable of it, although there are great variations in the development of the pugnacious instinct among men. When a common hostile feeling against any object is aroused in a group of persons, its power to unify and blend them is unsurpassed. The heat of the anger which envelops them all melts them into conscious oneness, and the conscious unity is considerably strengthened by the sense of conflict with the person or persons against whom the hostility is directed; for conflict with an outside enemy is a very efficacious means of unifying the members of a group. This is the emotion that usually sways a mob. It is a matter of very common experience how it may convulse a whole neighborhood, or section, or nation, instantly quieting or suspending all internal antagonisms, and solidifying all interests. Here we consider it only as it develops and manifests itself in an assembled multitude. It is so easily aroused, is so intensified by reflection back and forth between the individuals, and so quickly overwhelms reason that only extreme situations will justify an appeal to it. There is always great danger of inducing the mob-state, if not mob-action. But while its crude form is always demoralizing and the orator, especially the preacher, should rarely or never make his appeal to it, it may, nevertheless, like fear, be redeemed and transformed by being moralized, and thus converted into one of the noblest, most healthful and valuable of all human feelings—indignation; and this by continual association with our ethical principles may be organized into a sentiment of hatred, not for men, but for all conduct that is low and selfish. The development of this sentiment is one of the

great tasks of the preacher. Even in this higher form the emotion of anger is a potent means of fusing a crowd; and the ability to stir the moral indignation of an audience has been a chief element of the power of many great orators, and should be cultivated by all preachers.

What writers on psychology call the "tender emotion" is another which is powerful as a means of melting an assembly of heterogeneous individuals into a homogeneous psychical mass. The forms in which it is most serviceable for the orator are the love of parents for their children, the love of children for their mothers (the love for fathers taking rather the form of reverence), the love of men and women for little children, and the compassion which all normal people feel for the unfortunate, the weak and the helpless victims of injustice. In a general way the order of mention indicates the order in which the forms of the tender emotion have historically developed in power. It is probable that the last three have only in comparatively recent times attained to approximate universality as powerful sentiments, though now one can rarely be found who is not susceptible to these appeals. Such appeals may, of course, be overdone, but they rarely produce unhealthful psychological effects. Persons of weak intellectual organization may easily be overcome and thrown into a mental state from which no rational action can be expected. This, it is to be feared, not unfrequently happens in "high pressure" evangelistic services, when the danger of failing to meet one's mother in heaven is urged too strongly as a motive for consecrating oneself to Christian service. But in general these sentiments are so pure, so free from intermixture with the grosser passions of our nature, that they rarely produce excessive or demoralizing effects. They always tend to incite men to courses of action which they believe to be good; and when the appeal to them is overdone the correction is usually found in the disgust which it excites in the minds of all normal people. The orator whose motives are pure but whose judgment is not discriminating may, of course, make an unfortunate use of this emotion, but it cannot be used as a means of promoting a cause that is manifestly bad. If the preacher fails to make an extensive (though, of course, discriminating) use of it, he will

certainly not only fail on many occasions to "carry his audience with him," but will also fail to do what he might in the ethical education of the people.

The sentiment of liberty, which has its basis in the instinct of self-assertion, is of increasing importance in modern life as a social force; and when skilfully appealed to is capable of producing strong emotional effects. The fundamental trend in human society is toward democracy, which in the last analysis has its genesis in the individualizing tendency of the social process. It cannot be finally resisted and can be retarded only by slowing down the social process; but this becomes more dynamic all the time; and hence the sentiment of liberty continually grows more powerful. The conception of liberty is modified from epoch to epoch; but the modifications are in the direction of increasing depth and breadth. Men do not crave less liberty but more; though, on the whole, their idea of it is less confused with license and more consistent with stable social order, in which alone it can be realized. The emotion, therefore, which may be evoked by a skilful appeal to this sentiment will always be strong, and powerful as a means of fusing an audience; but will not lend itself so readily to the development of the mob mind. When the conception of liberty is chiefly negative, the appeal to this sentiment in its crude stage is apt to produce excesses, because it awakens the impulse to unregulated self-indulgence and arouses anger at the social forces that limit one's individual action—unchaining emotions that are primal, basal, crude and undisciplined. This is the true psychology of the French Revolution and of similar, though less intense, social convulsions in other lands. When the conception of liberty is positive, men may be deeply stirred by appeals to their desire for self-realization; but in this case the sentiment is more highly developed, and the emotions called forth are of a higher order, more ethical and amenable to rational considerations. As the impulse to unregulated living has been replaced by the desire for self-realization, so the emotion of anger evoked by appeal to this sentiment has been transformed into moral indignation. In religion the passion for liberty grows deeper every day; but it does not seek satisfaction so much as formerly by the blatant denial of the religious verities and the contemptuous

ridicule of the religious sentiments so characteristic of the "infidels" of the last and especially of the eighteenth century. On the contrary, it is more and more clearly perceived that the true religious liberty is found in the interpretation of the universe as religious and the voluntary acceptance of the law of God as supreme. The appeal to this sentiment by the preacher receives a deep emotional response which is rationally controlled and profoundly ethical.

I shall mention but one more of the emotional dispositions which are available to the orator as specially efficacious means of unifying and mastering an audience. That is the sentiment of attachment to that which is old, which has its base in the conservative instinct. This instinct was once nearly all-powerful; but the rapidly changing conditions of modern life have greatly weakened it and must weaken it yet more. Indeed, our life has become so varied and changeful that some people are in danger of falling victims to the passion for novelty. The stimulation of change becomes a habit and forms the basis of a craving for the continual repetition of the sensation which the unexpected produces. But notwithstanding this tendency, the attachment to the old and the customary still retains a strangely potent sway over the average human mind. Through long ages the monotony in the conditions of life, and the consequent persistence of modes of life from generation to generation have wrought into the very structure of the human mind a regard for old things *as old* which probably can never be wholly eliminated, and which doubtless it would not be wise to eradicate entirely. But with most men it has been so deeply ingrained and is so thoroughly dominating that an adroit appeal to it could always evoke an emotion which paralyzed reason, drowned the voice of conscience, obstructed progress, and made martyrs of the beneficent innovators of the race. It has been powerful in all spheres of life, in one perhaps as much as in another; but in no sphere certainly has it been more freely utilized than in religion as a means of converting reasonable people into mobs and hurling them in furious masses against men who dared to question the truth and sacredness of traditional dogmas and practices. By it have all the prophets been slain—and the cry which it has always inspired is, "the prophets are dead."

Now the passion for the new *as such* is not sufficiently developed in a sufficiently large number of people to make it effective as a means of crowd-fusion, except under extraordinary circumstances, if ever. It may, indeed, become a passion and render one irrationally intolerant of the old; but the new always appeals to curiosity, and awakens intelligence, in some measure at least, and for that reason is not adapted to the development of the mob-mind. But as a passion it renders one irrational in his dislike of the old, and should never be appealed to by an orator whose motives are good. On the other hand, the passion for the old *as such* is so strong in such a large proportion of the people and is so violent when inflamed that the conscientious orator—and especially the preacher—should never put the lighted torch of eloquence to that magazine of explosive emotion. Such an appeal is non-rational and should never be made. It is often easy enough to convert an audience into a mob by such an appeal skilfully made; but the use of it at once raises the suspicion either of sinister design which is not scrupulous as to method or of desperation born of conscious inability to carry one's point by the appeal to reason.

In the light of the foregoing discussion a question of very great importance demands an answer: Is the process of psychical fusion conducive to genuine religious experience? A categorical and unqualified answer cannot be given without conflict with the facts. High pressure revivals do result in the improvement of the lives of some persons; but it is quite certain that they result in an equally permanent demoralization and spiritual depreciation of other lives—just as we should expect. Not a few people have become so utterly perverted in the moral habits contracted in their individual experience, have become so abnormally subject to grossly evil impulses, that a powerful counter-stimulation of their emotional nature is necessary in order that better impulses may have any chance at all to influence their choices. But, of course, there is always danger when this counter-stimulation is applied through the collective emotion of the crowd, that the reason of the person in question, as well as that of others, will be so paralyzed that the resulting action will not represent *choice* at all; and then there is every reason to believe that the effect upon character is demoraliz-

ing and only demoralizing. The moral pervert returns to his wallowing in the mire; and his last state is worse than the first; and meanwhile others who are more normal and who are swept by the same tide of irrational emotion into false professions and relations are religiously "queered" for the rest of their lives. It is probable, however, that a moderate degree of emotional fusion is usually helpful in religious experience. It is quite possible that men in their individual experience have acquired habits or inclinations which, in part, render them inaccessible to spiritual influences. In other words, there may be wrought into the elements which differentiate them from others dispositions or tendencies which render them unresponsive to the spiritual call. It would seem, then, that the fusion process by which the differential elements of their personalities are reduced in strength might, if not carried to an excess which obliterates their reason, render them to some extent more open to divine influences. We have stated it as a possibility, but can it not be safely asserted as a universal fact that each man does acquire in individual experience some peculiar attitude of mind, or mode of thought, or point of view—a mental trait of some kind or other—which forms an obstruction to the forces of moral regeneration? If this be true—and it is entirely consonant with the teaching of psychology—the conclusion is that a moderate degree of mental fusion is normally conducive to genuine religious experience, especially in the case of adults.

3. Something should be said, in conclusion, about the *deliberative body*. Manifestly this is an assembly of a distinct psychological type. It is at the farthest possible remove from the accidental concourse; and the individuals composing it are drawn together for the distinct purpose, not of receiving some intellectual or emotional stimulation, but of taking part in discussion and contributing each his part toward a collective decision of definite issues. This gives them a special attitude of mind, which largely determines the character of the mental processes of the body. So long as this attitude is maintained the suggestibility of each is reduced to a minimum; his critical faculties are in the ascendant. But how shall this attitude be preserved?

(1) In the first place it is much easier to maintain the delibera-

tive attitude if the assembly is a small one. The reasons are obvious. The greater the number of persons between whom a common feeling is reflected back and forth, the more intense becomes the emotion. A dozen people who read in each others' faces the same impulse or sentiment will each be proportionately affected; if a thousand people see the same feeling reflected in each others' countenances, each is again proportionately affected, though one qualifying condition must be taken into account, viz., that each will be more powerfully affected by those near him than by those more distant, because he discerns more clearly the bodily expressions of their mental states and hence receives a more definite and powerful stimulation from them. After an assembly passes a certain magnitude it no longer increases in general suggestibility in proportion to its size; but up to a certain point it does approximately. Again, in a large assembly the people are more likely to be closely seated, and the effect of physical crowding, as before noted, is to facilitate the rapid spread of the common feeling in full power in all directions. Furthermore, the speaker who addresses a large gathering must use higher tones of voice and will normally make more vigorous gestures from the natural desire to be adequately heard and seen. But the more elevated tones and the freer gesticulatory movements naturally excite stronger feelings in the audience and react upon the speaker's own mind to intensify his emotion, which in turn is communicated to his hearers.

The assembly, then, when it becomes very large is almost certain to lose its deliberative character, wholly or in part, to assume the character of a mass-meeting which is subject to the spell of a few orators who have exceptional voices, and to be swept by gusts of intense, pervasive emotion. As a result it is customary for the real deliberations of such a body to take place in committee rooms; and the decisions reached in these small groups are reported to the assembly and advocated by persuasive orators, who usually secure their ratification. A very potent argument often presented in favor of such a committee report is that the committee has had ample opportunity to think the whole subject through from every point of view—a tacit confession that the psychological situation renders it impracticable for the assembly as a whole to do so. Since

the trend in recent times is toward large assemblies of the deliberative type, as of others, the tendency, as might be expected, is toward the formulation in committee rooms of the deliverances of such bodies. If, therefore, these assemblies are to be what their name indicates, if the fusing process which increases suggestibility and renders careful thought difficult or impossible is to be avoided, the bodies should be kept small; otherwise the deliberation will have to be done exclusively by committees, while the assembly is transformed into a ratification mass-meeting.

(2) But the deliberative assembly, even when small, needs special safeguards against the tendency to fusion. These special safeguards are found in the rules of parliamentary practice—rigid conventional methods of procedure especially fashioned to hold individual as well as collective impulses in check and to give free play to the rational processes. When, however, the emotions are powerfully stimulated these artificial devices for restraint snap like weak cords; and the president, together with the rest of the assembly, is swept along in the irresistible current. Or if the body degenerates into a double-headed mob or into a chaotic crowd, the gentleman who holds the gavel may “lose his head,” i.e., his intellectual processes may be inhibited, and, being caught in the cross-currents of emotion, he may be tossed about like a cork on the choppy waves.

If, however, the assembly avoids the emotional storms and maintains the calmness of dispassionate thought, the effect of rational discussion will be to modify the thinking of each individual; and so there will appear most likely a distinct tendency toward unity of thought. This is implied in the very function of such a body, which is to reach and render a collective decision. The stronger minds, while being more or less modified in their positions, will be able to lead the weaker ones and thus chiefly determine the evolution of the collective conclusion. Usually the discussion will result in the cleavage of the assembly into two or more parties around two or more leaders, or groups of leaders; in which case the two processes of unification and division go on at the same time. But unless the whole process is to end in a deadlock, the unification must proceed until a majority of the members have been brought

to substantial agreement. This intellectual unity, or unity of conviction, results from the give and take of debate and is an organization of many varied and perhaps at first conflicting opinions; and is an entirely different sort of thing from the unity which is induced by the inhibition of free rational processes and the emotional fusion of individuals.

It is true, however, that the method of reaching collective or group decisions is undergoing a profound change. That change is the result of the enormous development of intercommunication. Now-a-days the discussion of questions in which a large body of people are interested is carried on in the press, and the people reach their conclusions on the basis of their reading, supplemented by correspondence and private conversation, for which the increasingly numerous personal contacts of modern life afford a large opportunity. The result is that the deliberative assembly, so called, is coming to be less and less an organ of collective discussion and deliberation, and more and more a means of simply registering the decisions of the group. At the same time it is notable that the deliverances of such assemblies no longer impress the people with the sense of authority and finality as they did in the days in which they were, far more than they now are, the organs through which the public made up its mind. The tendency is to bring such bodies more directly under the control of public opinion, to revise, criticise, and perhaps nullify their acts more freely in the larger forum of the press, in which the people are assembled, not in person, but in mind. It is a singular paradox that along with the vast growth and complication of social organization the *direct* control by the people of their affairs is growing at the expense of the *indirect* method. Legislative and quasi-legislative bodies of every description, in all spheres of life, are compelled to act more and more as the mere registering organs of the public will and to refer their acts back to the people for their approval or disapproval.

REVIEWS

Psychology and Industrial Efficiency. By HUGO MÜNSTERBERG.

Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1913. Pp. viii+321. \$1.25.

This is not a translation of the author's recent *Psychologie und Wirtschaftsleben*, yet the essential substance of the two books is identical. In this work he has supplemented his previous applications of psychology to practical problems by an industrial psychotechnics, in which he attempts to show how the psychological experiment can be placed systematically at the service of commerce and industry. After an introduction dealing with applied psychology, the book is divided into three parts dealing with: (1) the best possible man, (2) the best possible work, and (3) the best possible effect. The problem is to assist the employer to secure such workmen, output of work, and effect on the minds of purchasers as will be best for business interests.

The method advocated for the selection of employees is scientific measurement of the "true qualities of the mind," and may be a test either of specific qualities, such as attention or memory, or of the entire complex of mental processes involved in the occupation; but it does not bring within its scope such traits as honesty or quarrelsome disposition. This method is illustrated very satisfactorily by a description of the tests used by Professor Münsterberg on motormen, ship's officers, and telephone operators. Such scientific measurements are advocated as a substitute for the inadequate examinations, tests, and certificates now used by employers, for the psychological dilettantism of vocational guidance and scientific management, and for the inadequate and ignorant personal self-direction. But it is admitted that personal inclinations and desires should remain as the principal factors in the selection of vocations, since they give much of the joy of labor.

In Part II Professor Münsterberg attempts to show how the psychological experiment can be used to secure the best possible work from the worker. This part is largely a description of the methods of scientific management, with supplementary material from previous laboratory experiments. Psychological measurements can be used to adjust the tools and determine the speed of machines; to determine the hours of work and the most suitable pauses; and to direct the movements of

workers. Such readjustment has the purpose of increased output of work. There is in this part an important chapter on monotony, in which it is maintained that the feeling of monotony depends much less on the particular kind of work than on the special disposition of the individual, and that those who recognize repetitions and uniformities readily are not the ones who are disturbed by them. The implication of this chapter is that the ordinary criticisms of the modern industrial system on the ground of increased monotony are not justified by experimental psychology.

In Part III it is proposed that the psychologist is no more competent at present than the economist to analyze psychologically the ultimate satisfactions toward which the economic processes lead. But the psychologist can study those economic processes; for that purpose Professor Münsterberg makes a statement of the psychology of advertising, display, and salesmanship, and suggests the possibility of determining by psychological experiments the point at which a trade mark becomes so similar to another as to be called illegal imitation. The purpose of this part seems to be to assist the business man in creating a favorable impression on purchasers, or in increasing sales.

There are implicit in this treatment important questions of psychological and sociological method. The psychological questions are not pertinent to the present review, but doubt may be expressed as to whether the psychologist would find much scientific satisfaction in tests of the "true qualities" of the mind of the individual, when those tests are ten minutes or thirty minutes in duration, and when the control consists in the fact that they are made by well-trained psychologists who "almost automatically" give consideration, for example in measuring memory, to secondary circumstances or indirect influences, such as attention, emotion, or intelligence (p. 114).

The question of the sociological validity of the book is much more important. This is presented as a technical study which may serve certain ends of commerce and industry without attempting to prove that those ends are desirable (pp. 17-19). The end which the author is professing both explicitly and implicitly to serve is industrial and business efficiency, increased output, and sales. He is not content, however, to keep the book within the limits of a technology, but again and again implies or asserts the social desirability of the end, and of his psychotechnical methods of securing that end; for example, after stating that increased efficiency would be for the interests of employers, employees, and the nation as a whole, he asserts: "The economic

experimental psychologist offers no more inspiring idea than this adjustment of work to psyche by which mental dissatisfaction in the work, mental depression, and discouragement, may be replaced in our social community by overflowing joy and perfect inner harmony" (pp. 308-9). Such statements lower the book from the level of a technology to propaganda; whether an increase of output and sales is socially desirable is primarily a question of the distribution of wealth, and cannot be solved on the basis of data which include only the technical appliances or methods for securing that increase.

The book does, nevertheless, present a good analysis of the technical methods and problems involved in increased efficiency, and adds considerable to the literature of scientific management, and the psychology of advertising, display, and salesmanship.

E. H. SUTHERLAND

WILLIAM JEWELL COLLEGE

The Primitive Family as an Educational Agency. By ARTHUR JAMES TODD. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913. Pp. ix+251. \$1.75 net.

Dr. Todd's monograph is a useful and thoroughly scientific piece of work. As a study of a particular function of the family, in the early stages of evolution, it marks an advance in this field of research. Already the forms and phases of the human family and of human marriage, as they have existed among various peoples, have been helpfully examined by many writers. This general analytical and constructive work is by no means complete; but the time is ripe for intensive investigation such as this book affords. It is the result of painstaking analysis of an immense mass of materials. The footnotes disclose an intimate acquaintance with the vast literature of matrimonial institutions, and with the many hard problems to which the study of those institutions has given rise. Some of these footnotes, summarizing the bibliography for particular subjects, must prove very helpful to other students and writers.

The family is looked upon by Professor Todd as purely a social product; as an institution which has been molded by human experience for the satisfaction of human needs. Of course, no other point of view could be taken by the scholar. Nevertheless, it is a decided merit that the author has frankly, courageously, and consistently maintained it throughout his discussion. Social reformers well know what a serious

obstacle to progress is the tradition that *par excellence* marriage and the family are the privileged institutions which alone are entitled to be called holy or divine. For example, this persistent notion is hindering the right solution of the divorce problem; it is thwarting efforts to provide education in sex hygiene; and in some places it has destroyed the usefulness of the juvenile court.

According to Dr. Todd, "the family is rooted in physiology, economics, and the *mores*. Its origin is to be found in the necessities of infancy and the food-quest rather than in the pleasures of marital comradeship. Love played little or no part in it." The "pairing instinct" is a "flimsy and dangerous foundation for a serious argument for marriage and the family." The pairing instinct "was only vague and more or less unformulated until eked out by a long process of education through other social forces and institutions; in other words, the pairing instinct would have come to naught had it not been aided by organic selection." In fact, the family is a "social, not a natural institution, for the primary impulses of both man and woman are against it, in the sense that their satisfactions do not require it, nay, are even repugnant to it." It results that the "family, like society, is a variable relation, not a fixed thing, and can only be defined in terms of genesis and function." Furthermore, the family precedes marriage in the order of evolution. "We concur, at least in the second part of Westermarck's conclusion, that 'it is for the benefit of the young that male and female continue to live together. Marriage is therefore rooted in the family, rather than the family in marriage.'"

For centuries, notably since the Reformation, the state as overparent has been extending its control of the domestic relations. In many ways for the good of the larger society the authority of the state has encroached upon the authority of the parent, especially in the function of education. Was the family originally the sole agency of education? or were there other agencies, such as the tribe, which shared in the important process of training the child? The present work gives the answer to that question. At all times and in all forms the family was a school for the child; but it was not the only school. The training provided by the tribe, by the "public," so to speak, might be even more important. Of this the evidence here provided is conclusive.

The foundation for the systematic discussion of primitive education is laid in the first five chapters which provide a detailed critical examination of the problems arising in primitive marital relations. After the introductory chapter, are treated in succession "Promiscuity

and Group Marriage"; "Trial Marriage, Divorce, Polygamy"; "Primitive Notions of Kinship and Relationship"; and "Primitive Parental and Filial Relations." A detailed summary of the discussion may not here be attempted. The evidence for the former universality of group-marriage and promiscuity is regarded as inconclusive. The "subordination of the individual to the group" is everywhere a "salient characteristic." The education provided in the family was inefficient, sometimes harmful. "It is obvious that with a continual shifting and disturbing of domestic relations there could have been no continuity of any policy of parental education had the times permitted or required it." Such a "slack marriage relation, instead of wholesomely educating the child, must have left him without education, or what is worse, with an education in rebellion, looseness, and egoism." Indeed, "we are rather of the opinion that even the most excellent family relations are likely to do actual educational harm if the development of the child's self and his education be restricted too closely within the family." This is not the only enlightened break with tradition. The much revered "parental instinct" is not spared. In the primitive family, the "relation of parent to child was far from stable or enduring. If there be such a thing as 'parental instinct,' it is at best only a secondary instinct; and I should go so far as to say that it is not even a thoroughly acquired characteristic."

The sixth chapter deals with the "Aims and Content of Primitive Education"; and this is followed by another on the "Methods and Organization of Primitive Education." The general conclusion is reached that the "aim, the content, the methods, and the organization of primitive instruction were predominantly public and communal in their nature" and that the family occupied only a subordinate position in education. Even the province where domestic education appeared at its best, viz., vocational instruction, is often invaded by group agencies. The training provided in the "men's house" is especially important; and the "various puberty ceremonies, initiations, and paraphernalia of moral instruction, which we found to be supremely important, are pre-eminently group activities."

This excellent study is a welcome and timely contribution to sociological literature. It will help to win for the family and the related institutions a proper place in modern education.

GEORGE ELLIOTT HOWARD

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Work and Life. A Study of the Social Problems of Today. By IRA W. HOWERTH, A.M., Ph.D., Professor of Education in the University of California. New York: Sturgis & Walton Co., 1913. Pp. 278. \$1.50 net.

This series of essays on the modern social problem deserves wide reading. They are sane and constructive, while at the same time thought-provoking. Beginning with the problem of wealth and welfare, the discussion covers a wide variety of topics, such as competition and co-operation, living and getting a living, labor and learning, the social ideal, finally ending with an excellent chapter on "Religion and the New Social Order."

In the opinion of the author the social problem of today is dominantly economic. He says (p. 23): "This, then, is the social problem of today: How are the economic institutions of society, in which so much power and privilege are concentrated, and that are essential to the well-being of all, to be effectively organized and conducted so that their benefits may be justly shared by all members of society, and thus the last refuge of the spirit of selfish domination be in the hands of the people?" The solution of our social problem is, then, in industrial democracy. But our author is under no illusions as to the practical difficulties in the way. "External changes," he tells us (p. 130), "in the industrial environment are necessary. They can do much. But no external change can be permanently effective without moral and psychological changes in men. . . . When men advocate, in a spirit of hate, an industrial and social order founded upon love, they should reflect their own unfitness for the conditions they seek to promote. . . . Industrial democracy is spirit as well as form."

Thus Professor Howerth brings in the recognition of the spiritual element in the social problem. But undoubtedly he has overemphasized the economic element, in stating the social problem so exclusively in economic terms. If the social problem, the problem of the relations of men to one another, is today primarily economic, why is it that in those circles and classes in which the economic problem most nearly approaches solution, the social problem is frequently most intense? The attainment of the most ideal economic justice in society is surely but one step, though, we may agree with Professor Howerth, the first necessary step, in the solution of our social problem. But he fails to give due prominence to the spiritual factors in the problem. Indeed, he seems quite unconscious of the mighty conflict in modern life between spiritual

forces which have little or no necessary connection with present-day economic problems.

While this is the main criticism to be made of the book, some minor criticisms may be made of his use of terms. For example, his opposition of the terms "competition" and "co-operation." Professor Howerth will not have it that competition may mean mere rivalry or emulation, but he identifies competition with the brutal struggle for existence. All competition, he tells us, is essentially selfish. Therefore he condemns even "regulated competition," and prophesies the gradual elimination of competition from industrial society and its substitution by co-operation. The goal of industry, therefore, is the complete replacement of competition by co-operation. But those writers who argue for the permanence and beneficence of competition in society usually mean by competition, not the "strifes of man against man," but comparative testing of fitness. Competition in this sense is a necessary part of the process of selection in society, and is as beneficent as selection itself. It is indeed, the basis of our whole educational system. With its grades, grading systems, degrees, and other competitive tests, it may be doubted whether competition is any less intense in the educational world than in the industrial world; only it is *regulated* competition. Whatever argument there may be for retaining regulated competition in the educational process, certainly applies equally to the industrial world. It would seem that what we should strive for is not to get rid of competition, but to replace its brutal forms by rational forms.

In spite of these strictures, which the writer of this notice feels compelled to make, the book is, nevertheless, a thoughtful one and should be read by all students of the social problem.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

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The World's Legal Philosophies. By FRITZ BEROLZHEIMER, translated from the German by RACHEL SZOLD JASTROW, with an introduction by SIR JOHN MACDONELL and by ALBERT KOCOUREK. Boston, 1912.

This is the second volume of a series of projected volumes on Modern Legal Philosophies, edited by a committee of the American Law Schools. The committee's purpose in the selection of the volumes for the series has been, "not so much to cover the whole field of modern philosophy or law, as to exhibit faithfully and fairly all the modern viewpoints of

any present importance. . . . It is believed that the complete series will represent, in compact form, a collection of materials, whose equal is not to be found at any single time, in any foreign literature" (p. vi).

No particular school of thought has dominated in the selection; and geographical representation is given only incidental consideration. "Continental thought," the committee observes, "has lines of cleavage which make it easy to represent the legal schools and the leading nations at the same time. Germany, for example, is represented in modern thought by a preponderant metaphysical influence. Italy is primarily positivist, with subordinate German and English influences. France, in its modern standpoint, is largely sociological" (p. vii). The first volume of the series, the volume preceding Berolzheimer, is a comprehensive survey of the science of law, by Karl Gareis, University of Munich.

The volume by Berolzheimer is a historical presentation of the world's legal philosophies. Berolzheimer is a neo-Hegelian in distinction from a neo-Kantian, or positivist. He postulates close relation of economics and law. While he does not posit an exclusively economic interpretation of history, he regards the economic life of each succeeding culture epoch as connected with its predecessors. Law and economics, according to Berolzheimer, are related to each other as form and content; the economic life constituting content, to which the law gives the form or constitution.

In his first two chapters, dealing respectively with the origins of oriental civilization and the ancient commonwealth or Greek civilization, Berolzheimer traverses fairly familiar ground in the usual manner. In the former field, however, his information is fuller than that of the older writers, but he offers little that is really new, unless we call it new that the recovered cuneiform literature of Assyria and Babylonia and the demotic literature of Egypt enable him to sketch the features of oriental civilization with a firmer hand than was formerly possible. His brief handling of the ancient Aryan conception of *rita*, and the Egyptian *ra* as like unto the Roman conception of *jus naturale rationis* is admirable. Of Greek civilization we have a familiar picture of the classical Greek writers from the early sophists, through Plato and Aristotle, to the post-Aristotelian period, the cynics, cyreniatics, stoics, skeptics, and neo-Platonists.

With the third chapter we enter upon ground to the cultivation of which English and American scholars have scantily contributed, although they may be said to have acquired, through the labors of

continental scholars, a fairly adequate conception of the civic empire of ancient Rome and its moralization of Roman law, through the principle of *aequitas* and *jus naturale*, of Cicero, who led his own contemporaries through a philosophic study of law. The older Roman ethics, like the Greek ethics, was aristocratic. "From the appearance of Christianity, mankind endeavored to apply a universal humanitarian ethics to the problems of life, society, and government. But the conception was limited to a Christian article of faith so long as absence of temporal power deprived it of access to law and government, and therein lies the fundamental significance of the elevation of Christianity to an established religion within the Roman Empire" (p. 90). Justinian, the final promulgator of the civil law, was a Christian emperor.

In chap. iv we have a characterization of the bondage of mediaevalism, covering some twenty pages, in which the philosophy of St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, the tenet of the "two swords," economic and social restrictions, and the liberal tendencies of the Middle Ages, represented by Dante, Occam, Marsilius, and Cusanus, are briefly sketched. This ground is covered more elaborately and from the same comprehensive point of view, by Dunning, in his *Political Theories Ancient and Medieval*.

In chap. v the first period of modern legal philosophy is comprehensively surveyed under the title, "Civic Emancipation: Rise and Decline of Natural Law." In this chapter the mercantilists, the physiocrats, the systems of Colbert, and of Quesnay, and other physiocrats, and the classical economists, Smith, Ricardo, Say, and Malthus, are considered for their contributions to legal philosophy, along with the usually cited seventeenth- and eighteenth-century politicists and philosophers like Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, Locke, Spinoza, Thomasius, Bentham, Mill, Austin, and Montesquieu. The exposition of these legal philosophies is followed by an exposition of the culminating legal philosophies of the older schools, under the leadership of Kant, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Schelling, and Hegel. Allied in spirit to this metaphysical school, Berolzheimer reviews the recent contributions of Stahl, Trendelenburg, Krause, Ahrens, Herbart, Dahn, and Lasson.

In chap. vi Berolzheimer introduces a critical review of French communism, German socialism, anarchism, and other types of socialism. He entitles the chapter, the "Emancipation of the Proletariat, Encroachment upon the Philosophy or Law by Economic Realism."

The concluding chapter of this volume is devoted to an examination of the sociological character and constructive tendencies of contem-

porary legal philosophy. An effort is made to give a critical estimate of the development of sociology, under the leadership of Comte and Spencer, and the social utilitarianism represented by Shaftesbury and Ihering. Berolzheimer finds that the sociological school, through its recent representative sociologists like Gumpłowicz, Ratzenhofer, Tönnies, Klöppel, and others, has contributed along with the realistic and historical trends in political economy to the reinstatement of Kant and Hegel, giving us the neo-Kantianism, and the neo-Hegelianism. The psychological aspects of law and economics are fully recognized. The closing section of the volume contains an introduction to recent surveys of fundamental problems in legal philosophy and the influence of the principles of evolution.

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Sociology: Its Simpler Teachings and Applications. By JAMES QUAYLE DEALEY. New York: Silver, Burdett & Co., 1909. Pp. 405.

In this book Professor Dealey is giving his own views, and not condensing Ward as in the Dealey and Ward *Text Book of Sociology*; and yet the sociology presented is the sociology of Ward and Spencer and Comte rather than the sociology of today. Some slight discussion of primitive man and early social development is followed by a good chapter on "Achievement and Civilization." The present reviewer finds the chapter on "Social Psychology" inadequate and does not consider that "The Development of Social Institutions" should constitute a half of sociological teaching. There are those who do, however, and they ought to find the six sections of this part very helpful: (1) "Economic Development," (2) "The Family," (3) "The Development of the State," (4) "The Religious Institution," (5) "The Institution of Morals," (6) "Cultural Development." Part II deals with social problems and appears to the present reviewer as a presentation that ought to appeal strongly to the instructor who desires to make much of problems and social evils in his introductory course. In the search for a good text to use in his first course the instructor certainly ought to consider this book carefully, as he may find it well adapted to his purposes.

HOWARD WOODHEAD

CHICAGO

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

The Struggle of the Labor Class against Judicial Authority in the United States.—The labor struggle in the United States may be divided into (a) the period before the Civil War, but which really confines itself to the years 1827-37, and (b) from 1867 to the present time. Both periods are characterized by united efforts against the employer; the weapon used has been the strike. The greatest strike period was in 1892-94, when, after the Pullman strike, it ceased to be regarded as the most efficient means for obtaining results. The decisions of the courts have been based upon (a) common law, (b) legal interpretation, (c) constitutionality, (d) precedent. The first issue in the struggle with the courts was "the right to strike." It was held by the courts to be conspiracy. The contention, however, was gradually gained, but the very point of its effectiveness was blunted by action concerning "violence and intimidation." Boycotts and sympathetic strikes were similarly treated. Judges unwilling to appear in opposition to strikes secured the same results by their decisions regarding boycotts. Peaceful strikes were defeated by means of "injunction" and "contempt of court." The country is controlled by the courts. Their power is above that of the legislature and the executive. In the face of legislative provisions, a judge may impose a fine for "contempt," the legality of which he alone can decide.—L. B. Boudin, "Der Kampf der Arbeiterklasse gegen das richterliche Gewalt in den Vereinigten Staaten," *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, IV, No. 1, 1913. M. C. E.

The Psychology of Socialism.—Socialism is an ideal, a goal toward which humanity strives. Other concepts are subordinate and are only means of obtaining this common goal, an ideal condition of human relationships in which political stability is inseparably united with industrial justice and harmony. All high aspirations grow out of desires, and all desires out of needs. This aspiration has grown out of the greatest need of mankind, the need of social justice. Every individual belongs to at least two groups, society in general, and a social class. The influence resulting from class-consciousness is very strong. Among the upper classes it determines that authority, not majority, shall rule. In the lower classes it determines that equality and equal justice shall reign. Where class oppression is too severe socialism means revolution, for every sane mature man demands the rights of maturity; if these are refused him he takes them. In an actual constitutional state where the lower classes realize that the root of all evil is not in the organization of the state, but in industry, property, and production, socialism means evolution.—"Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus," *Die Neue Rundschau*, September, 1913. V. W. B.

The Influence of Socialism upon Political Economy.—The influence of socialism upon political economy can be traced with reference to philosophy, aims, methods, logic, and pure economy. In treating of man's struggle for a livelihood, political economy includes more than the mere physical subsistence. Hence the study thereof will depend largely upon whether the viewpoint is materialistic, idealistic, or utilitarian. Socialism has very largely taken the philosophical viewpoint and has influenced political economy by its struggle for a more idealistic economic basis. Socialism has fostered the problems: What is a legitimate wage? and, Are the profits of the entrepreneur justified? Socialism largely established the fact that low wages signify more than merely lower prices for goods—they lessen the ability of labor and thus are an injury to society. The problem of more equal distribution must be placed in the foreground, and since man is both the producer and the consumer, he can be assured of the benefits of his products only by a close study of marginal values.—Lewis H. Haney, "Der Einfluss des Sozialismus auf die Volkswirtschaftslehre," *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, III, No. 3, 1913. M. C. E.

The Sociological Significance and Structure of the Malthusian Population Theory.—Malthus' theory was a reaction against the English and French idea of progress. Their view of society, as gained through pure abstraction, was optimistic; his view, as gained through study of actual social conditions, though rather dark, was realistic. He sought the key to all misery and the factors of progress. He found the lower classes to be the great problem. Therefore, he argues, it is very essential to raise their standard of living. To do this, he advocates teaching fundamentals of trades and social science in the public schools. Outside relief is but temporary; improvement must come from within, man himself must change. He further argues that supporting the poor gives the opportunity of an increased number of marriages, hence increased population and sharpened need among the lower classes. The only solution of overpopulation is moral restraint, delaying marriage until the man is economically prepared to support a family. He considered the natural environment as fundamental in all life, the fertility of the soil, the influence of place and climate, and the law of land productivity. From this idea he formulates his law, that the population of a country is necessarily limited by its resources.—Walther Köhler, "Die sozialwissenschaftliche Grundlage und Struktur der Malthusianischen Bevölkerungslehre," *Schmollers Jahrbuch*, XXXVII, No. 3, 1913.
H. A. J.

English Social Legislation, 1908-11.—This legislation has been along the following lines: (1) child protection, schools, and education, as compulsory education, reform schools, continuation schools, and charity education; (2) schools and vocational guidance; (3) sanitation, as tuberculosis campaigns and sanitary condition of factories; (4) industrial insurance and employers' liability; (5) old-age pensions; (6) labor conditions, as wage-scale, working-hours, and rest periods; (7) industrial arbitration; (8) problems of various industries; fixed trades, and home industry; (9) the housing and settlement conditions of laborers.—Warnack, "Der englische Sozialgesetzgebung, 1908-1911," *Jahrbücher für National Oekonomie*, June, 1913.
F. P. G.

The Influence of Superstitious Conceptions on the Economic and Social Life of Primitive Peoples, I.—Primitive man regards all inexplicable phenomena with superstitious fear and attaches sinister connection with past or future events to what seems perfectly natural to us. Upon a trivial omen, or a dream, he drops the most promising undertakings. Fruitful sources of interpretation are the passage of birds that bring either bad or good luck, and dreams. Days are set aside as lucky or unlucky, sometimes not less than sixteen of the month in the latter classification. Many exceedingly useful things are prohibited for fear of evil consequences, and on special occasions the ban is put on almost indispensable things. Injurious animals are protected through fear of vengeance from other animals. A great deal of the hostility of savage tribes to whites is due to superstition, which also limits the capacity of primitive folks for work.—H. Berkusky, "Der Einfluss abergläubischer Vorstellungen auf das wirtschaftliche und sociale Leben der Naturvölker," *Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft*, July, 1913.
F. P. G.

The Influence of Superstitious Conceptions on the Economic and Social Life of Primitive Peoples, II.—Wholly natural physiological events, as a birth, appear to primitive man fraught with peril and give rise to many harmful practices. The entire economic life, moreover, is largely shaped by sorcerers in the guise of the priest. The influence of these, often conscious deceivers, can hardly be estimated. All epidemics are regarded as the work of demons; the priests guide the people through them with fearful results. Human sacrifices are offered in an effort to further the prosperity of the tribe as a whole. The faith of these peoples in ordeals and divine tests for guilt is very firm, as witnessed by the death of thirty women, in one tribe, within twenty-four hours, for adultery proved by these means. In many cases, natural death is not believed; a murderer must be found by the ordeals. Superstitions concerning death not only are cause for bloodshed, but are peculiarly expensive. Even the poorest families must have an elaborate feast, while on the death of a chief the economic life of the tribe is prostrate for a month. It is probable that even the vague conceptions of immortality effect injuriously savage life. Superstition is one of the leading obstacles to material and spiritual development.—H. Berkusky, "Der Einfluss abergläubischer Vorstellungen auf das wirtschaftliche und sociale Leben der Naturvölker," II, *Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft*, August, 1913.
F. P. G.

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THE NEIGHBORHOOD IN SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION

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The institution of the family existed before there was any human nature. It was not humanity which created the family, but in a real sense the family created humanity.

Now the neighborhood is a still more ancient and fundamentally causative institution than the family. It seems likely that the neighborhood, in the shape of gregarious association among the animals, was the necessary matrix in which the subtle reciprocities of the family could find suggestion and protection. Such groups developed really organic quality, as each of them became a "family of families." The clan and the early village community were the dynamic source out of which the foundation principles of all the more broadly organized social forms have been developed.

It is, I believe, one of the most important and one of the most slighted considerations affecting all the social sciences, that the neighborhood relation has a function in the maintenance and progress of our vast and infinitely complicated society today which is not wholly beneath comparison with the function which it exercised in the creative evolution of that society. But there are today signs of a wholly new emphasis, both theoretical and practical, upon the function of the neighborhood as affecting the whole contemporary social process.

The peculiar disregard of the neighborhood in the theoretical and practical counsels of statesmanship, and of the non-governmental administration of society, is to be traced largely to the psychological attitude of social students and social administrators. Once three eminent geographers—Elisee Reclus, Kropotkin, and Patrick Geddes—were engaged in conversation when the question was raised, "If you go to the bottom of your mind, what is the resultant conception of the world which you find there?" They all agreed that it was the one which had been determined by the four-square Mercator's projection-maps in the little textbooks which they had first studied. Is it not true that in all social studies our minds are inevitably conventionalized by the constant dominance over them, during the whole period of education, of those particular social institutions which are in more or less crystallized form, whose sanctions are obvious and unavoidable, and which project themselves in large and somewhat distant terms? Have we in sociology really passed the stage represented in medicine by the discovery of the circulation of the blood? If so, how far have we come in the study of society to the microscopic observational analysis of ultimate cell life and of germ cultures, as contrasted with the discredited diagnosis of large-scale symptoms?

Aside from any claim of the neighborhood based on past social evolution, it presents the highest contemporary elements of value from the point of view of a developed scientific method, whether theoretical or applied. The neighborhood is large enough to include in essence all the problems of the city, the state, and the nation; and in a constantly increasing number of instances in this country it includes all the fundamental international issues. It is large enough to present these problems in a recognizable community form, with some beginnings of social sentiment and social action with regard to them. It is large enough to make some provision for the whole variety of extra-family interests and attachments, which in the fully developed community are ever more and more obscuring the boundary line that closes the family in upon itself. It is large enough so that the facts and forces of its public life, rightly considered, have significance and dramatic compulsion; so that its totality can arrest and hold a germinating public sense.

On the other hand, it is small enough to be a comprehensible and manageable community unit. It is in fact the only one that is comprehensible and manageable; the true reason why city administration breaks down is that the conception of the city breaks down. The neighborhood is concretely conceivable; the city is not, and will not be except as it is organically integrated through its neighborhoods.

Everybody knows that the battle for sound democratic government, as a battle, is still an affair of sharpshooters and raiders. The center of the army and the rear detachments are not yet engaged. But this great majority is consciously, keenly, and, up to a certain point, successfully, involved in the democratic administration of neighborhood affairs. The neighborhood is the vital public arena to the majority of men, to nearly all women and to all children; in which every one of them is a citizen, and many of them, even among the children, are statesmen—as projecting and pushing through plans for its total welfare. It is in the gradual public self-revelation of the neighborhood—in its inner public values, and in its harmony of interest with the other neighborhoods—that the reverse detachments of citizenship are to be swung into the battle of good municipal administration and good administration of cultural association in the city at large; it is this process which will turn the balance definitely and decisively in the direction of a humanized system of politics, of industrialism, and of morality.

I am inclined to think that on the whole there is a certain dignity in the sentiment of the neighborhood about itself which is not equaled in fact by any of our other forms of social self-consciousness. The family may be abject; the neighborhood is never so. The city may admit itself disgraced; the neighborhood always considers disgrace foisted upon it. The nation may have its repentant moods; the university and the church may be apologetic under attack; but the neighborhood will tolerate no criticism from without and little from within.

This strong and sometimes exaggerated sense of collective self-respect brings it about that neighborhood leadership, so far as neighborhood affairs are concerned, and if it is to be real and continuous leadership of the people, must be on a basis both of equality

and of honest dealings. The local boss, however autocratic he may be in the larger sphere of the city with the power which he gets from the neighborhood, must always be in and of the local people; and he is always very careful not to try to deceive the local people so far as their distinctively local interests are concerned. It is hard to fool a neighborhood about its own neighborhood affairs.

A neighborhood is a peculiarly spontaneous social group. It represents life at all points of human relations, not life on the basis of a few subjective ideas. Its collective sentiment is wrought out of a variety of emotions that have not been generalized and abstracted, and therefore go as directly and certainly into action as those of a normal child. It is not a smooth, cut and dried scheme, fashioned by imitation; but a drama full of initiative and adventure. Every day in a neighborhood is a new day. Here social action is discovered out in the open, under full cry. The crowd psychology, the mysterious currents in popular sentiment, which we from time to time can study telescopically in the larger horizon, are in essence constantly alert in the neighborhood.

The neighborhood is the most satisfactory and illuminating form of the social extension of personality, of the interlacing and comprehensive complex of the interplay of personalities; the social unit which can by its clear definition of outline, its inner organic completeness, its hair-trigger reactions, be fairly considered as functioning like a social mind.

Modern conditions of industrial specialization, the mobility of population, and easy intercommunication have brought a degree of disintegration to neighborhood life; but with the exception of some of the downtown sections of the great cities, this disintegration has not proceeded so far as is ordinarily thought. The time has come for a great renewal of confidence in the vitality of the neighborhood as a political and moral unit. Disorganized neighborhoods must by a great and special effort be reconstructed. These and all other neighborhoods which have lost their responsible leadership must by motives of patriotic adventure be provided with such a transfusion of civic blood as will lead to a thorough quickening of the functions of "the family of families." And all normally conditioned local communities must be inspired to the rediscovery

in modern terms and under modern standards of achievement of their latent collective energies.

It happens here as in medical science that discoveries are made under the appeal and threat of disease; but the results of experiments with untoward conditions have their great use not in the cure or even in the prevention of specific degeneracy but in the promotion and exaltation of the general, normal well-being. The new meaning of the neighborhood as developed at four hundred settlement houses which have sprung up in America during this generation, will find its fulfilment in the next in a national movement for a new synthesis of neighborhood well-being and productive power.

From the point of view of the transfer of social leadership from one local community to another, one of the most striking facts about the neighborhood is that, though it is essentially an intimate circle, it is at bottom always a hospitable one, always ready to receive new recruits. The first impact of a new arrival may be chilling, but in due time the newcomer begins almost automatically to go through the degrees of this greatest and freest of human free-masonries. As Mark Twain has suggested, when a man sits down beside you in the railroad car, your first feeling is one of intrusion; but after a little something happens to make your being in the same seat a matter of common interest, and the feeling of recoil dissolves into a continuous friendly glow.

It is surely one of the most remarkable of all social facts that, coming down from untold ages, there should be this instinctive understanding that the man who establishes his home beside yours, by that very act begins to qualify as an ally of yours and begins to have a claim upon your sense of comradeship. Surely this deeply ingrained human instinct is capable of vast and even revolutionary results. Among the unexplored and almost undiscovered assets upon which we must depend for the multiplication of wealth and well-being in the future, may it not be that here in the apparently commonplace routine of our average neighborhoods is the pitch blende out of which, by the magic of the applied social science that is to come, a new radium of economic and moral productive resource will be elicited?

From this point of view, the science of the community needs its neighborhood laboratories as one of its most essential resources. Nearly all highly educated persons are snatched out of neighborhood experience at an early age, and few of us ever really have it again. Thus our opportunity for the experimental, pragmatic study of typical human relations is lost—lost so far that in most cases we forget that we are suffering loss. Neighborhood impulse is one of the great values of life as to which we forget that we have ever forgotten. As our positive interchange is almost exclusively confined to the one-sixth of the population of our cities and towns which make the professional and commercial classes—that is the unsettled and unneighborly classes—we are inclined to think of the neighborhood as offering little more challenge to scientific inquiry than our almost faded out neighbor remembrances would suggest. It is in fact necessary that social science as now organized should have a change of heart, a real conversion, as to the endless intellectual interest and inexhaustible capacity for a better social order which lies in neighborhood life everywhere.

As has been suggested, the principal forms of effort leading to neighborhood research lie in experiments directed positively toward the better organization of more or less disintegrated neighborhoods, and conducted chiefly under initiative coming in the first instance from without. The distinguishing watchword of such effort is participation. It is in the hands of persons who live continuously in the neighborhood, and who let whatever of leadership they may have take the sporting chances of winning approval and response from the people of the neighborhood. As the force of neighborhood workers grows, it comes to represent both the line and the staff, the different grades of general administrative officers and the specialists in the different ways of service. There are two contrasted but mutually related ways of attack—first, an ascending scale of more or less formal classes and clubs, beginning with the mothers' prenatal class and reaching up into adult years; and secondly, a great variety of informal effort, principally in the way of visiting up and down the front streets, the side streets, and the back streets—going out into the highways and the hedges—beginning at the outer circumference of the neighborhood and working toward the center.

The more obvious common interests to be developed and directed fall under three main heads: health, vocation, recreation.

The fact that no modern city has yet proved its capacity to reproduce its own population; that one-half of each generation dies before it matures into productive power; that two of the greatest of all the economic wastes are found in infant mortality and child morbidity—comes home to the neighborhood worker in terms of a direct personal human challenge. The proper care and feeding of infants; the development of medical inspection and nursing in connection with the public schools; the local organization of the campaign against tuberculosis; the securing of public baths, gymnasiums, and playgrounds; the provision of country vacations for the children and young people of congested city quarters; and the insistent development of housing reform—as definite forms of action toward the enhancement of public health—had many of their inevitable beginnings in connection with this motive of neighborhood reorganization; and their progress depends largely upon its continuous, first-hand, intensive contacts. In fact it is historically true that the constructive motive as to the public health is of recent date, and until the last two or three decades nothing really substantial was done by public health authorities in our cities, except by a sort of spasm immediately after an epidemic. The raising of the banner of a human way of life in the poorest and meanest byways of our cities, by persons of intelligence and resource who are themselves actually encountering such serious sanitary evils through dwelling in the midst of them—this has had much to do with bringing about the present great movement of continuous and exhaustive public hygiene in our cities.

It must be remembered that this mighty enterprise, which has already accomplished so much for the human race, for the widest dissemination of practical knowledge as to the care and enhancement of health, cannot accomplish and hold its result unless it reach every doorstep and every fireside. Particularly since the collapse of the institutional method for the upbringing of neglected children, and the return to the problem of reconstructing rather than abolishing even the low-grade family life, it has been seen that very important new responsibilities are to be laid upon average and

under-average mothers in relatively resourceless neighborhoods; and that there must be an efficiently led neighborhood system by which those mothers shall be trained and held to their task; that a neighborhood sentiment and a neighborhood gossip must be created and steadily maintained which shall make these mothers in some degree at least mentally and morally equal to the service which civilization must lay upon them.

Another of the greatest wastes is in the loss of productive power through the lack of vocational training. Place a group of earnest young men and women who have themselves received the best and most complete training for life which their times afford, in a neighborhood where the great majority of the children end their educational experience without any sort of training for livelihood, and are thrown helpless out into the confusing currents of a great city's activities—and you soon find a group of intense and restless advocates of the vocational extension of our public-school system. The powerful tendency in this direction throughout the country is owing not a little to just such experiences; and the growing realization on the part of working-class parents of the necessity of such education—as shown in the marked change of front recently made upon this subject by organized labor—is the result in an equal degree of the activity of the local social workers.

Supposing it to be true that 15 per cent of the new generation at the most is now receiving some sort of adequate training for the intelligent productive work of life, one of the greatest of all present social tasks is to bring it about that the next 15 per cent shall have its appropriate opportunity for such training. In such effort, as Professor Marshall has pointed out, lies one of the most hopeful avenues for the rapid increase of national wealth. And the bringing it about, the proper encouragement of parents, the proper launching of these youth upon their vocational careers must come in the first instance at least through effectively organized neighborhood relationships.

The social recreation of young people is in every sort of community a problem of anxious significance; but where the home and the neighborhood have lost their coherence, it is beset continually with moral tragedy. A study of the problem of the young working

girl which the National Federation of Settlements has been conducting for the past two years,¹ whose results represent the collated evidence of 2,000 social workers, brings out very clearly the fact that as soon as the young girl wage-earner finds that she cannot have in her own neighborhood a satisfying reaction from the strain of work, she is carried by the essential forces of her being into a veritable ambush of moral danger. As President Lowell has suggested in urging the freshmen dormitories, the recreations of youth lose their danger when they are associated with one's normal conditions and relationships; they become ominous when they have to be sought apart from the normal way of life. It is precisely so with young people everywhere. Some of the best social service of today is being rendered by residents of settlements, who enter wholeheartedly with young working people into a really vital program of enjoyment within the immediate circle of neighborly acquaintance. These leaders thus acquire an authority from within which enables them, with full and free consent, to establish a better standard, and a still better, for social custom and for personal behavior. To those who know how the fundamental sexual morality of our cities often seems to be trembling in the balance, the value of such a method can hardly be stated in terms too strong or too broad; and it depends upon as close a study, and as persistent and exhaustive a practice, of neighborhood sociology as the most expert local politician can make in his way and for his purpose.²

The most significant new phase of the policy of our various semi-public and public institutions for the care of the sick and of the morally delinquent is in their system of so-called social service, or "follow-up" work, through which a patient or inmate is once more, by a marked exercise of persistence and skill on the part of special field officers, integrated into the life of his local community.

¹ *Young Working Girls*, edited by Robert A. Woods and Albert J. Kennedy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1913.

² Professor T. N. Carver, of the community organization section of the national Department of Agriculture, says that it is now clear that the economic prosperity of the farmer, instead of making him and his family satisfied to remain upon the farm, only the sooner leads them to move to a town or city. Neighborhood cultural organization in the open country thus appears to be not merely a matter of sentimental interest but of the most substantial national concern.

This means the creation of a network of local influences into which the physical or moral convalescent can be sympathetically received, through which the chance of his again falling out of a normal scheme of life may be greatly lessened.

Such effort adds point, and provides technical stimulus and suggestion, in the neighborhood, toward making such a network effective as a weir in which to catch cases on their way to physical or moral decline; and beyond that toward creating a complete and powerful system of positive up-building forces in the neighborhood, affecting every phase of life from infancy onward, which will more and more lay aside the merely preventive motive in favor of that which demands the largest and richest fulfilment of life.

It is through the emergence of such interests in their neighborhood phase that a plexus of ties is gradually created which traverses all the cleavages of racial and religious distinction. We need always to remember—and we certainly do not often remember it in the right connection—that in this country we have in an increasingly large proportion of our cities and towns a bewildering complication of all the problems of political and industrial democracy, together with all the problems of cosmopolitanism. Those issues coming out of racial instinct which other nations meet on their frontiers, or at least at arms' length, we find at the very center of our intensest community life. The continual experience of finding that efforts to unite well-meaning citizens upon programs of public welfare and progress are so easily thwarted by the crafty use of racial and religious appeals is only a single index of the absolute patriotic necessity of finding a genuine foundation upon which solid unity of interest and action can be built up. Here the neighbor instinct again demonstrates its priceless value as the cement of twentieth century democracy; but not when left to itself, for here more than ever is necessary the infusion of a type of neighborhood leadership which represents American economic, political, and moral standards. It would be only too easy for the neighbor sentiment to bring about a kind of assimilation among immigrants which would be only a foreign composite, hardly nearer to American standards than were its original constituents.

Under enlightened and patriotic American leadership, every

phase of immigrant culture is not only respected but fostered; but the different immigrant types are gradually brought together on the basis of common hygienic, vocational, and recreative interests, through multiplex forms of friendly and helpful association day after day, year after year—until such neighborhood relations begin to constitute in themselves an underlying current of conviction which no ordinary appeal to ancient prejudice can disturb, and upon which the incentives of civic and national patriotism can begin surely to rely.

Such an influence provides for the immigrant that welcome of which he has dreamed; shelters his children from the vicious allurements against which he often cannot protect them; brings forth for local public appreciation the skill of hand, the heirlooms, the training in native music or drama, which the different types of immigrants have brought with them; makes special efforts to prevent the parents, and particularly the mothers, from falling behind their children in the process of Americanization—thus holding together the fabric of all that is best in the immigrant home, while patiently integrating it into the common local relationships.

Three things may be suggested at this point with regard to the general problem of immigration.

1. All such effort as has been outlined is made extremely difficult and sometimes temporarily impossible by the flooding of neighborhoods with constant new streams of immigrants.

2. The intelligently directed neighborhood process can easily be made the most effective way in which their present and future value to the nation can be determined.

3. Whatever may be said about the restriction of immigration, there is no question but that the one policy after the immigrants have arrived is to train them in our standard of living; and that for this purpose, the wisely directed neighborhood process is an absolutely indispensable resource.

Out of such effort today is coming a real emergence of democratic communal capacity. Directly or indirectly as the result of settlement work, there are springing up in the working-class districts of some of our largest cities local improvement societies in which the vital germ of nascent democratic achievement is brought about

—a civic result which is worth more, so far as these people are concerned, than would be the universal mastery on their part of all the manuals of constitutional government.

The initial strategy in promoting these organizations is a simple one. It is found that, if no other form of general response can be secured, it is always possible to get people to grumble. They are encouraged to complain about defects in the local municipal service. The complaints are then classified, and those which are most general are made the basis of a common expression. This common expression is then drawn out into some specific piece of common action. By the time such action has accomplished the desired result, there has come about a single complete experience and achievement of citizenship which marks the dawning of a downright civic consciousness.

The repetition of such experiences—the discovery that democracy is not merely repressive but constructive in tangible terms; that it properly calls not merely for honesty but for serviceability of administration; that its tangible benefits come equally to all on the same terms—all this constitutes a vital adventure through which a group of neighbors actually taste blood in the matter of citizenship; its sting, its virus becomes a part of their life from that time on.

In political democracy we have a system of co-operation in the great total, which began with the socially microscopic neighborhood unit. The entire succession of utopian social solutions—leaving out of account the last two or three decades when crude conceptions of urban mechanism and flat nationality have dominated them—has always centered in the ideal local community. There is good ground for considering the settlement as being a scientific and more actual project than that of Fourier,¹ for instance, for ultimately, more effectively, and more conclusively accomplishing what Fourier was hitting out at. Certain phases of the organization of labor, the Knights of Labor for example, have undertaken a formation subject to the lines of the local community. Syndicalism today seems to be returning to the same emphasis. It is true, of course,

¹ Brook Farm, in which George William Curtis, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Charles A. Dana, and others were interested, was founded upon the teachings of Fourier.

that co-operation in England and on the continent has built largely upon the affiliation of local neighborhood, and in turn devotes much attention to cultivating such affiliations. These references are made particularly by way of suggesting that if, as many good observers believe, we are to see in this country a new and rapid growth of experiment toward economic co-operation, these communities in which a vital and achieving neighborhood consciousness has already been aroused, will be the most likely soil in which this seed shall germinate and bear fruit. The success of co-operation in England, and its failure thus far here, are commonly laid to the homogeneity of the one people and the lack of it in the other. The achievement of sound neighborhood assimilation among us will surely go far toward bringing such experiments within our range.

One of the most striking aspects of the presence of mental dark spots with regard to the neighborhood as the least common multiple, from the point of view of the home, and the greatest common divisor, from the point of view of the state, is the almost total lack of the compilation and publication of statistical information about it. Considering the vast effort and expense involved in the collection of statistics covering births, mortality, disease, defectiveness, crime, sanitation, housing, industries, occupation, incomes, nationality, etc., it is really a tragic form of negligence that such facts are not everywhere compiled and graphically set forth so as to point the finger of fate at actual conditions from block to block. As the constructive neighborhood sense grows, it will certainly insist that such precise specifications be laid before it, with the result that the collective power of neighborhoods will be greatly stimulated and developed.

Such a disclosure, minute on the one hand, so far as each neighborhood is concerned, but comprehensive and exhaustive for cities and states, will for the first time present the real pattern in which the municipality and the commonwealth, as total fabrics put together out of interlacing neighborhoods, will begin to work out large human projects in their true lights and shades, and in their delicate adjustments of proportion and perspective. It would be hard to overestimate the importance of such results to city planning. Sociology as an art, no less than as a science, must find its primary

essential data in the fully understood neighborhood—building organically from the neighborhood, up to the nation. Aside from political action, this same ascendant synthesis must be worked out in terms of voluntary association even more subtly and exhaustively for purposes of advancing social welfare. Here such federations as were first organized in our cities for purposes of scientific charity, and those which with an ampler and more positive program are forming among the settlement houses of some of our cities are foreshadowing something of the value of the objects, and the interest of the technique, which a properly worked out federation of the neighborhoods of a city would have. The settlement federations, gathering up in an increasing degree the indigenous interests of the tenement-house neighborhoods of the city, proceed to eliminate wasteful competition of effort, to bring different specialties of service up to the best standard reached by any of the houses, to secure experts in different forms of service and send them from neighborhood to neighborhood, to classify local needs that are common to all the neighborhoods and make them the basis of a presentation of ascertained facts to be acted upon by the city government or the state legislature, and to bring out into the broader life of the city the average citizens of the less resourceful local sections.

In one city there is a United Improvement Association with delegates from some eighteen local improvement organizations, including both the downtown and the suburban sections. This organization is gradually coming to have much of the influence of a branch of the city government, with the important qualification that membership in it is by definition restricted to men who have won their right to membership in it by neighborhood social service. The sociological type of federation goes experimentally through the actual hierarchy of the social organism, from the family, through the neighborhood, the larger district, up to the city and the state—it rediscovers what precise functions belong to each in and of itself, what functions the neighborhoods perform for the city through acting by themselves, and what functions they can render for it as for themselves only by broad forms of thoroughly organized team play covering the city or state as a whole.

There are two of our great institutions which, roused by the

results of experiment in neighborhood reorganization, are beginning to awaken to the great national possibilities of a quickened neighborhood spirit, freshened down to date. The public school in some of our states is being developed into a rendezvous for every form of local community interest; and a specialized force is beginning to be organized for the necessary and responsible leadership in such enterprise. The church social service commissions, which have now been organized in not fewer than thirty-five different divisions of the Christian church—though somewhat inclined to issue judgments upon broad economic problems which had better be left to experts in such matters—are coming to realize that the churches possess an inconceivably valuable asset for social reconstruction in that they have in every local community throughout the land a building equipment and a group of people who, as a matter of fact, are already solemnly pledged to work with everyone in the community for the well-being and progress of the community as a whole. The spread of the conception—and it is spreading rapidly—that the local church exists not for itself but for its community—that the minister must find in his congregation not his field but his force—that the best and strongest people in each local congregation must be sent freely out into the open community there to work out vows of service in full co-operation with persons coming from other congregations and with men of good will apart from any church connection—will give a new complexion to many of the most anxious problems of social democracy.

THE RISING NATIONAL INDIVIDUALISM

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It is not at all clear just where the individual merges into the social, but we have become familiar with the contrast between Individualism and Socialism, and everyone has a fairly good idea of what is meant by the two terms. We are beginning to see that men are more closely related to the groups to which they belong—family, community, and religious organization—than to any interest which could be more specifically called merely personal. The object of this paper is to show that there is a rapidly developing individualism that is distinctly social, and which promises to become a powerful factor in human affairs. The earlier conflict between Socialism and Individualism is likely to be diverted to that between Socialism and Nationalism or the struggle for national individuality.

At the present moment the world is organizing itself into two great camps—Socialism and Nationalism. Both are expressions of the group feeling; both are movements of revolt; both are struggles for freedom. They started from a common impulse about fifty years ago, but quickly found themselves arrayed against each other. One would break down political boundaries; the other would build them up. Socialism calls all the world one; Nationalism sets part against the rest. Socialism is economic; Nationalism sentimental. Both are rapidly becoming world-wide and must fundamentally modify statescraft.

Socialism is one of the world-movements accepted as an actuality. It has a program which seeks more or less clearly defined results. But National Individualism looms on the horizon as an equally extensive expression of human association which cannot fail to be a temporary check to the realization of the ideal of the socialist.

It has sprung into being in its present form so rapidly that it has been difficult to recognize it as one of the most potent forms

of social consciousness. It is akin to patriotism as generally understood, but draws its lines according to the group consciousness for a common language, common traditions, or a feeling of the unity of blood through some common ancestor. It does not correspond to present national boundaries, but rather to historic or even imaginary boundaries. At the present time this sentimental Nationalism is fraught with more significance on the continent of Europe than existing political divisions.

In the United States with its hordes of various peoples such as no other country ever knew, an understanding of the national feeling is indispensable before we can hope to assimilate our aliens into Americans.

Just as Socialism has been a revolt against the coercive control of men by wealth or arbitrary government, so this national feeling is the revolt of a people conscious of its unity, against control by a power trying to annihilate this consciousness. The phenomenal development of both Socialism and Nationalism has been in the last decade.

Labor has been oppressed since war first made slaves, and nations have been oppressed since war first made some groups conquerors and others subjects, and until recent times no one thought any other condition possible. The discovery that these conditions are not inherent in the structure of the universe resulted in Socialism for the individual and Nationalism for the group.

The policy of Europe has been the control of various areas and peoples by a few great powers. Of late years this control has been maintained by relatively much less war than formerly. Thus the German Empire was consolidated rather peaceably. Austria has established and maintained its domination over its heterogeneous aggregation of Germans, Poles, Bohemians, Slovaks, Slovenes, Croations, Bosnians, Dalmatians, and Italians. Russia has increased its control over Finland and Poland. Italy has become strong through the union of small kingdoms. But there was never a time when there was so little assimilation as at present. Bavaria and Saxony love Prussia no better than before they became integral parts of the German Empire. It seems inevitable that the time is not far distant when disintegration and realignments will change

the map of Europe. They are likely to be made peaceably—that is, if the psychologically inevitable is accepted, and the indications are so clear that he who runs may read, even if he be the Czar of all the Russias.

Austria is more nearly like the United States in the complexity of her problem, and sends us samples of all her own troubles. If we take one of her provinces, Bohemia, we may observe one of the ways in which the national movement is expressing itself.

The Bohemians are members of the great Slavic division of the human race. For many centuries the country has been part of Austria. In 1415 John Hus, a Bohemian Protestant leader, a century before Luther, was burned at the stake. From that date he has been the symbol of the Bohemian spirit, and at the five-hundredth anniversary of his death, in 1915, will be held the greatest celebration ever seen in Bohemia. Bohemians in America have been planning for years to return for it. This is very significant in light of the fact that after the Thirty Years' War, which began in 1620, Protestants were exterminated from Bohemia, and for more than a hundred and fifty years everyone within the borders of Austria except Jews had to be Catholic, and at the present time nearly all of them are officially members of that church. The language became officially and practically German. Bohemian, in fact, was hardly known except in the remote districts.

The present situation was brought out in an address given by Count Lützow in Prague in 1911, when he said:

One of the most interesting facts that in Bohemia and especially in Prague mark the period of peace at the beginning of the nineteenth century is the *revival of the National feeling and language*. . . . The greatest part of Bohemia formerly almost Germanized has now again become thoroughly Slavic. The national language, for a time used almost only by the peasantry in outlying districts, is now freely and generally used by the educated classes in most parts of the country. Prague itself, that had for a time acquired almost the appearance of a German town, has now a thoroughly Slavic character. The national literature also, which had almost ceased to exist, is in a very flourishing state, particularly since the foundation of a national university. At no period have so many and so valuable books been written in the Bohemian language.

Count Lützow himself had an English mother and a German father, but has identified himself completely with the Bohemian

nationalism. The Countess is the daughter of a German minister in Mecklenberg, but feels so strongly against the Germans, that, not knowing the Bohemian language, she speaks only English and French.

About fifty years ago several Bohemian writers were bold enough to write in their own language instead of in German, and from that time the Bohemian spirit has grown until now hostility to German has become a passion. In many of the restaurants throughout Bohemia, the headwaiter or proprietor passes a collection box regularly for "the mother of schools" which supports public schools in the Bohemian language in all parts of the country where there is a majority of Germans. In the case of a German majority the community provides only German schools.

The inevitable result of this universal spirit is the gradual elimination of the German language. One rarely hears German on the streets of Prague, whereas ten years ago one heard little else. Fathers were reared to speak German but teach their children Bohemian instead. Business men take great pride in the fact that they are succeeding without knowing any German, for it proves that Bohemian is winning. A German cannot get served in a Bohemian restaurant in Prague unless he speak Bohemian, though the waiters know both languages. All older people speak both languages equally well, but the younger very little German. At the University of Prague, where until 1882 all the work was in German, now the graduates do not know German well, and the Bohemian part of the university is more than twice as large as the German. The nationalizing process of unifying the people is going on in face of the disrupting force of eleven political parties, besides the sharp spiritual division into Catholics and anti-Catholics.

It is unquestionably a disadvantage for a people of seven million to cut itself off from the opportunities of the environing German culture, science, and commerce, but even those who see it best deliberately assume the cost in their struggle for the freedom of the spirit. When we remember that the prestige is on the side of the German, we see in this movement the same indifference to personal success that characterizes the socialist.

Socialism is strong in Bohemia. The party has nineteen newspapers including three dailies; 1,500 locals with 130,000 members;

and at the last election 400,000 votes were cast. But they were Socialists in part as a revolt against the government and the church. When they get to America most of them do not remain with the party. In Bohemia and in some other countries there are already two Socialist parties, Nationalists and Internationalists, with the Nationalists increasing the more rapidly.

The most striking form of national spirit in America is expressed by the Bohemians in their organized propaganda for free thought. Ninety-seven per cent of the Bohemians are nominal Catholics on their arrival, but at least two-thirds of those in America are militant freethinkers. Their attitude toward religion, especially toward the Catholic church, is similar to that of the Socialists, but this makes no bond of union between them. Bohemian freethinking is a story in itself, and it obviously is too general to have a real philosophical basis in the minds of a large portion of its adherents. It is rather an expression of the historical hatred for Catholic Austria, just as Polish Catholicism is an opposition to orthodox Russia and Protestant Russia, and Irish Catholicism to Protestant England. As the sight of a Russian church makes a Pole pious, so the sight of any church makes a Bohemian a freethinker. In the city of Chicago there are more than twenty-seven thousand people who make quarterly payments for the support of schools on Saturday and Sunday to teach the Bohemian language and free thought.

Not only is Nationalism a controlling force in the social institutions of our immigrants in America, but they all have organizations for the raising of money to promote the cause in the mother-countries.

A more comprehensive and fundamental expression of this movement than has been described is the rapidly developing pan-Slavic feeling. In 1912 there was an international Slavic gymnastic meet in Prague. More than twenty thousand persons took part, and at one time eleven thousand men speaking several different languages including the soon-to-be enemies, Bulgarians and Servians, were doing calisthenics exercises together. With the exception of the Poles, who would not come because the Russians were invited, there were representatives from all the Slavic divisions: Slovaks, Slovenes, Serbs, Servians, Croatians, Bulgarians, Montenegrins,

Ruthenians, Moravians, Bohemians, and Russians. The keynote of every speech was "Slavie! Slavie!" and when it was uttered the crowds would go wild.

There were a quarter of a million visitors in the city and illustrated reports of the exhibition went to the ends of the Slavic world. A few weeks afterward I saw some of them pasted on the wall of a peasant's factory in the back districts of Moscow. But the German papers completely ignored the whole thing, and no self-respecting German could attend the meet. The streets were everywhere decorated with flags, but never did one see the Austrian flag. People of conservative judgment stated that the meet indicated a great growth of pan-Slavic feeling as compared with five years before.

At the outbreak of the recent hostilities in the Balkan States it was feared that there might be a general European war, but especially between Austria and Russia, and Austria and Servia. The latter seemed very imminent at one time. We were given to understand that the modern high level of diplomacy held the war off. It was generally admitted that the great Socialist meeting in Switzerland, held to protest against making the working-men of one country fight the working-men of other countries, was influential in preventing hostilities.

There was interesting news that was not being published from Vienna which also had an influence. It did not seem possible that Austria with two-thirds of its population Slavic could make war on Servia. Inquiry disclosed that when the Bohemians were being entrained from their garrisons for mobilization on the Servian border, they sang the pan-Slavic hymn, "Hej Slovene!" sung by all the Slavic nations, but forbidden to be sung by Austrian soldiers in service. This is an enthusiastic and powerful hymn full of encouragement to the Slavs, telling them that their language shall never perish, nor shall they, "even though the number of Germans equal the number of souls in hell." There is not a shadow of a doubt that if Austria had forced these men to go against Servia at that time, Austria would have been disrupted. More than 70,000 Austrian Slavs disappeared when they were called for their military service.

The diplomats knew this feeling and now the German Empire is struggling under an unparalleled war tax which the chancellor openly stated was being raised from fear of what might happen as the result of this rapidly growing pan-Slavic feeling. Pan-Germanism is growing to keep pace with its antagonists. The military future of Europe must reckon with all this, just as it must reckon with the international brotherhood idea of Socialism. When a war does come which raises a conflict between these motives, we may expect that the emotion of Nationalism will overthrow the rationality of Socialism. In other words, there is a definite obstacle to Socialism which cannot be put aside until the spirit of national individuality shall have had an opportunity to free itself from the coercion which has attempted to crush it. The time cannot be far off when the rulers of the world will realize that the way to vitalize it is to try to kill it. When the group no longer feels any restraint on itself as a group, then the free development of the idea of brotherhood stands a good chance of encircling the earth; but in the meantime, the human soul in its common life will fight to extinction to be assured of its own common identity.

Julius Lippert, quoted in the *American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1913, said:

All the experiences which I gathered in my most diversified political activities tended to confirm my conviction that the first and indispensable precondition of the material and spiritual prosperity of two national stocks, located in the same country under such circumstances as those which existed in Bohemia, must be a fixed legal norm for their status, and their freedom of movement. How strict or liberal should be the terms of this law is a matter of secondary importance. Whenever we Germans have neglected to secure such a norm we have committed a political blunder injurious to both parties. It is no longer practical politics to demand the subordination of one of the national groups to the other.

Socialism is horizontal, aiming to unite all those of common economic interests in the common cause, that none may have unfair advantage over another. Nationalism, on the other hand, is perpendicular; forgetting class lines, it makes common cause of the symbols of unity, whether they be blood, language, or tradition. It is an evidence of the subtle fact that one's individualism is not

revealed in an isolated being, and that the nearest and dearest thing to the heart of man is the social group in which he identifies his spiritual reality. And since one's personality is more the work of the group than of himself, the loyalty which expresses itself in national feeling is a more powerful control than Socialism. As was stated above, Socialism is economic, Nationalism sentimental. The central philosophical principle of Socialism is economic determinism which Nationalism sets at naught by flying into the face of economic advantage. Both movements are conspicuously unselfish, and the devotion to them is distinctly religious in its character. Both thrive within the same people, but sooner or later come into conflict. Both thrive best where there is the most opposition to them. In America neither has been comparable to the European developments. Nationalism persists among our immigrants until they discover that we make no effort to curb it, and dies in the third generation. The widespread growth of Nationalism is illustrated further in the following:

Poland was never particularly conspicuous in art, literature, or government, but something over a hundred years ago it was a free country. Now, Germany, Austria, and Russia have divided it, and, completely ignoring sociological laws, are trying to absorb it. Never was there such another deliberate attempt on a large scale to wipe out national individuality, but if there was ever a case of imperial indigestion, Poland is causing three chronic attacks. Bismarck's policy of forbidding the Polish language, and forcing German in its place; and Russia's similar policy with Russian have made the preservation of the language a religion, and martyrdom for it a glorification. At the present time there is little doubt that Poland is best organized for the propaganda of Nationalism. Socialism has considerable strength, and in Warsaw where a Socialist paper may not be published, they are smuggled from Cracow regularly. The strong hold of the Catholic church upon the Poles makes it hard for Socialism to gain headway, and greatly complicates the situation. The Poles think that their love for the church is piety. They are really good Catholics because their religion is Poland, and Catholicism is a Polish protest against orthodox Russia

and Protestant Prussia. I was interested in observing, when walking with a Polish gentleman, whose education is such that he would have been a weak Catholic in any other country, that after passing a Russian church his zeal in crossing himself at the next Catholic church would be increased. Every sign of Russia or Germany says to the Pole, "Be a devout Catholic." In fact, any particular religious form is never so strong as the spirit of Nationalism to which it may often serve merely as a symbol. As one listens to the bated breath and sees the uplifted eye of the Pole when the ancient kingdom of Poland is mentioned, one needs no interpreter to tell where the heart is. The obsession of the Poles is to find ingenious methods for thwarting the plans of the various controlling governments. Progress as a plan has no interest. Their backward look becomes more intense every day, so that psychologically with them, if not temporarily, the day of ultimate international social co-operation is farther off the nearer we come to it.

In the midst of Poland is the Lithuanian movement. Several centuries ago a prince and princess of these two countries married, and the government and culture became Polish. There was no Lithuanian literature or education. The language was preserved by the peasants as was the case among the Finns, Hungarians, and many other peoples. Poles and Germans were the landholders, and the Lithuanians almost altogether laborers or serfs. Within the last decade the Lithuanian consciousness has burst into a conflagration. A man fully Polish in culture and associations, but possessing some Lithuanian blood, will become Lithuanian in spirit. He is learning the language from the peasants, and chooses them for associates rather than the cultured Pole with whom he associated ten years ago. After the revolution of 1905 the privilege was granted the students in the *gymnasias* to adopt the Russian, Polish, or Lithuanian language for part of their instruction, where previously only Russian had been allowed. In a *gymnasium* in Vilna, where there had been in one class thirty who had spoken Polish, only three chose Lithuanian. Now out of the same number at least twenty will take Lithuanian, and the change is an indication of the growth of the movement throughout the people. I have had two students who speak Polish as a mother-tongue, and Lithu-

anian with relative difficulty. One is half Polish in blood, and has learned to read Lithuanian since coming to America. When in the *gymnasium* in 1905 he chose Polish as his language, but his younger brother now in the *gymnasium* speaks nothing but Lithuanian when possible, though his mother does not know the language, and his father very slightly. A still older brother, a successful attorney in St. Petersburg, is now studying the language and feels fully Lithuanian. One of the students, when he came to America three years ago, allied himself with Lithuanians, although there are practically none of his class here and the Poles would have welcomed him gladly. Although an aristocrat in training, he feels closer to the Lithuanian peasant than to the Pole of his own social position with whom he has associated all his life. We see in this case—that of my other student is similar—that national consciousness has broken down class lines exactly as Socialism seeks to do, but entirely within the nation, and thus raises a barrier to one of the main purposes of Socialism. The wall is thus raised between people of the same class across the borders.

Finland is similar to Lithuania in being subject to a subject people of Russia. For six and a half centuries the Finns were ruled by Sweden, but in 1890 the country became subject to Russia, since which time the efforts at Russification have been continuous. The population is approximately 85 per cent Finnish, 12 per cent Swedish, 3 per cent Russian. The culture has been continuously Swedish. At the University of Helsingfors, where twenty-five years ago all the work was done in Swedish, now the larger portion is in Finnish, and the Finnish spirit is increasing by leaps and bounds. Seven and a half centuries of Swedish culture with no Finnish education has had no effect except to stimulate the growth of Finnish national feeling. The two peoples live amicably together. The Swedes and a few Russians conduct most of the business and have the social standing. Both Finns and Swedes are Lutheran, the services in the official church alternating between the two languages. Finland is very democratic—equal suffrage has prevailed for several years. Socialism has been very strong among them. In Chicago they have the largest proportional membership in the party of any foreigners. But in Finland the Socialist vote is beginning to

diminish, apparently because this other struggle for freedom cannot be attained through Socialism. The children in the schools must study Swedish, Finnish, and Russian. The government is increasingly Russian, but there are absolutely no signs of assimilation. Helsingfors and other Finnish cities look more like Detroit and Washington than like St. Petersburg, though Russia has been working a full century on them.

As has been suggested, both Lithuanian and Finn are revolting against the culture authority of Pole and Swede rather than the political or economic authority of Russia. This is because in both cases the nationalizing people feel that their individuality is more endangered by the spiritual than by the material power. A union between the working-classes of Poles and Lithuanians, Finns and Swedes must overcome a much greater resistance today than would have been necessary ten years ago. In Chicago the Lithuanian Nationalists and Socialists are divided into two nearly equal camps, and practically all the people belong to one or the other. Nationalists regularly resist Americanization. They do not want their young men to go to American colleges lest they come under too much American influence.

Sweden and Norway have already made a new alignment. Here were two countries with similar people, language, tradition, and geography, but Norway felt a restraint on her individuality, and in 1905, there was peaceable disunion. In America one can hardly commit a more serious offense than to confuse a Swede and a Norwegian. These two countries are very democratic and both cast a large Socialist vote, but a Swede is a Swede, and a Norwegian is a Norwegian before he is class-conscious across the border. The Norwegians have revived and modified the language which was spoken by the people before Norway was conquered by the Danes, and in the coming year a formal popular movement is to be launched to make it the language of the people instead of the one which has been used for centuries. In America the Scandinavians have made no effort until recently to teach their children the language of the fatherland. Now many schools have been established for teaching the language, and in Sweden, as in Bohemia, many towns have museums with collections representing the peculiar local history;

and costumes that had yielded to the common European dress are now being worn on gala occasions.

Human nature is the same in all peoples. It is, nevertheless, a remarkable fact that this movement should occur so contemporaneously among such diverse peoples in such various degrees of civilization, but it is unquestionably a world-movement. Japan, India, and Egypt are teeming with it. Korea, after being satisfied with Chinese literature for centuries, now that Japan is exercising authority over her is religiously developing her own language and literature. In Hungary, Slovak hates Magyar, and both hate the Germans. In France, where Syndicalism, the most unpatriotic and radical form of class-consciousness, calls for class war, in the last three or four years the spirit of nationalism has risen to a level never before realized in its history.

In any particular nation there seem to be peculiar reasons justifying and promoting its development, but they are the occasion rather than the cause. There can be nothing mystical about it, but the rapidity of communication must have enabled a suggestion to find ready fields. Thus Ireland in the fifties was a stimulus to Bohemia, though the history of Bohemia seems to contain quite enough stimulus of its own.

Ireland has been the best-known expression of Nationalism because of the recurrence and continuance of the home rule discussion. The present conflict between the home rulers and the people of Ulster who are opposing them is due to the fact that the question is nationalistic rather than geographical. The Scotch Irish of the north are not only Protestants, but feel their relationship to England, and home rule for Ireland will mean foreign rule for them. For all the noise of their struggle, the Irish have made far less success than many of the others, for Gaelic has succumbed to English.

As we become more familiar with the soul of our newer immigrants we shall hear stories about home rule that will make the activities of the Irish seem relatively unimportant.

Canada is coming into a national feeling. The reciprocity treaty with the United States was rejected as soon as the import of Champ Clark's annexation speech was understood, and the

government of Canada was forced into a complete change, while Canada's self-consciousness has increased beyond all expectation.

Every sane person realizes that interference with the affairs of Mexico would arouse a nationalism which would make ineffective any ideas we might try to impose upon the country. Domination by superior force is no longer accepted as a matter of course, and this is a new fact in the world's development.

From these examples of intense feeling it becomes clear why representatives of the subject nations of Austria should visit the director of census, and Congress, to demand that they be counted by mother-tongue rather than by country of birth. There is far less community of feeling between Bohemian, Magyar, and German in Austria, than between England, France, and Germany, and from the point of view of assimilation in this country, the latter group might much better be grouped as one than the former.

Whether Nationalism be rational or irrational, it is a fact. The political science of the nations of the earth must be revised in the face of it, and in America our practical treatment of our alien peoples needs to take cognizance of the fact that human nature expresses itself more strongly in the struggle for sentiment than in the struggle for bread. But when full freedom for the development of group-consciousness shall have been attained, the fearsome elements of the antithetical movements of Socialism, Syndicalism, and Anarchy will have disappeared.

In America the popular idea prevails that it is our business to assimilate our aliens by making them over according to some fixed standard. The only true prophet seems to be crass Americanism. This is a pathetic and impractical mistake. The nationalities have as definite cultures as individuals. Why should our Bohemian children be made into Americans by singing "Land where our Fathers died," when their fathers died in just as noble a fight for freedom in the Hussite wars? At least they ought also to sing their own national song. Our problem is to make our immigrants co-operating members of our civilization, and we cannot do this by repressing the peculiar social impulses each group brings with it. Probably there is no other nationality in which the com-

mon use of the language persists so long as with the Bohemians. Often the third generation use nothing else in the family circle. Since so many of them have passed beyond any religious influence, I think there can be no better method of moral control and assimilation into American life, than offering the Bohemian language in the elementary schools. They would thus develop a respect for their language and a respect for the ideals which have actuated their national heroes. We need have no fear that they will not learn English. Our problem is not at present at all parallel to that of Europe. With us Nationalism is an emotional force that can be used to control the second generation, whereas if we attempt to suppress it we shall be laying up for ourselves increasing trouble.

RACIAL ASSIMILATION IN SECONDARY GROUPS¹

WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE NEGRO

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I

The race problem has sometimes been described as a problem in assimilation. It is not always clear, however, what assimilation means. Historically the word has had two distinct significations. According to earlier usage it meant "to compare" or "to make like." According to later usage it signifies "to take up and incorporate."

There is a process that goes on in society by which individuals spontaneously acquire one another's language, characteristic attitudes, habits, and modes of behavior. There is also a process by which individuals and groups of individuals are taken over and incorporated into larger groups. Both processes have been concerned in the formation of modern nationalities. The modern Italian, Frenchman, and German is a composite of the broken fragments of several different racial groups. Interbreeding has broken up the ancient stocks, and interaction and imitation have created new national types which exhibit definite uniformities in language, manners, and formal behavior.

It has sometimes been assumed that the creation of a national type is the specific function of assimilation and that national solidarity is based upon national homogeneity and "like-mindedness." The extent and importance of the kind of homogeneity that individuals of the same nationality exhibit have been greatly exaggerated. Neither interbreeding nor interaction has created, in what the French term "nationals," a more than superficial likeness or like-mindedness. Racial differences have, to be sure, disappeared or been obscured, but individual differences remain. Individual differences, again, have been intensified by education,

¹ The distinction between primary and secondary groups used in this paper is that made by Charles H. Cooley.

personal competition, and the division of labor, until individual members of cosmopolitan groups probably represent greater variations in disposition, temperament, and mental capacity than those which distinguished the more homogeneous races and peoples of an earlier civilization.¹

What then, precisely, is the nature of the homogeneity which characterizes cosmopolitan groups?

The growth of modern states exhibits the progressive merging of smaller, mutually exclusive, into larger and more inclusive social groups. This result has been achieved in various ways, but it has usually been followed, or accompanied, by a more or less complete adoption, by the members of the smaller groups, of the language, technique, and mores of the larger and more inclusive ones. The immigrant readily takes over the language, manners, the social ritual, and outward forms of his adopted country. In America it has become proverbial that a Pole, Lithuanian, or Norwegian cannot be distinguished, in the second generation, from an American born of native parents.

There is no reason to assume that this assimilation of alien groups to native standards has modified to any great extent fundamental racial characteristics. It has, however, erased the external signs which formerly distinguished the members of one race from those of another.

On the other hand, the breaking-up of the isolation of smaller groups has had the effect of emancipating the individual man, giving him room and freedom for the expansion and development of his individual aptitudes.

— What one actually finds in cosmopolitan groups, then, is a superficial uniformity, a homogeneity in manners and fashion, associated with relatively profound differences in individual opinions, sentiments, and beliefs. This is just the reverse of what one meets among primitive peoples, where diversity in external forms, as between different groups, is accompanied with a monotonous sameness in the mental attitudes of individuals. There is a striking similarity in the sentiments and mental attitudes of peasant peoples in all parts of the world, although the external differences

¹ F. Boas, *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, quoted by W. I. Thomas, in *Source Book for Social Origins*, p. 155.

are often great. In the Black Forest, in Baden, Germany, almost every valley shows a different style of costume, a different type of architecture, although in each separate valley every house is like every other and the costume, as well as the religion, is for every member of each separate community absolutely after the same pattern. On the other hand, a German, Russian, or Negro peasant of the southern states, different as each is in some respects, are all very much alike in certain habitual attitudes and sentiments.

What, then, is the rôle of homogeneity and like-mindedness, such as we find them to be, in cosmopolitan states?

So far as it makes each individual look like every other—no matter how different under the skin—homogeneity mobilizes the individual man. It removes the social taboo, permits the individual to move into strange groups, and thus facilitates new and adventurous contacts. In obliterating the external signs, which in secondary groups seem to be the sole basis of caste and class distinctions, it realizes, for the individual, the principle of *laissez-faire, laissez-aller*. Its ultimate economic effect is to substitute personal for racial competition, and to give free play to forces that tend to relegate every individual, irrespective of race or status, to the position he or she is best fitted to fill.

As a matter of fact, the ease and rapidity with which aliens, under existing conditions in the United States, have been able to assimilate themselves to the customs and manners of American life have enabled this country to swallow and digest every sort of normal human difference, except the purely external ones, like the color of the skin.

It is probably true, also, that like-mindedness of the kind that expresses itself in national types, contributes, indirectly, by facilitating the intermingling of the different elements of the population, to the national solidarity. This is due to the fact that the solidarity of modern states depends less on the homogeneity of population than, as James Bryce has suggested, upon the thoroughgoing mixture of heterogeneous elements.¹ Like-mindedness, so far

¹ "Racial differences and animosities, which have played a large part in threatening the unity of States, are usually dangerous when unfriendly races occupy different parts of the country. If they live intermixed, in tolerably equal numbers, and if in

as that term signifies a standard grade of intelligence, contributes little or nothing to national solidarity. Likeness is, after all, a purely formal concept which of itself cannot hold anything together.

In the last analysis social solidarity is based on sentiment and habit. It is the sentiment of loyalty and the habit of what Sumner calls "concurrent action," that gives substance and insures unity to the state, as to every other type of social group. This sentiment of loyalty has its basis in a *modus vivendi*, a working relation and mutual understanding, of the members of the group. Social institutions are not founded in similarities any more than they are founded in differences, but in relations, and in the mutual interdependence of parts. When these relations have the sanction of custom and are fixed in individual habit, so that the activities of the group are running smoothly, personal attitudes and sentiments, which are the only forms in which individual minds collide and clash with one another, easily accommodate themselves to the existing situation.

→ It may, perhaps, be said that loyalty itself is a form of like-mindedness, or that it is dependent in some way upon the like-mindedness of the individuals whom it binds together. This, however, cannot be true, for there is no greater loyalty than that which binds the dog to his master, and this is a sentiment which that faithful animal usually extends to other members of the household to which he belongs. A dog without a master is a dangerous animal, but the dog that has been domesticated is a member of society. He is not, of course, a citizen, although he is not entirely without rights. But he has got into some sort of practical working relations with the group to which he belongs.

It is this practical working arrangement, into which individuals with widely different mental capacities enter as co-ordinate parts, that gives the corporate character to social groups and insures their solidarity.

addition they are not of different religions, and speak the same tongue, the antagonism will disappear in a generation or two and especially by intermarriage. . . . But in one set of cases no fusion is possible; and this set of cases forms the despair of statesmen. It presents a problem which no constitution can solve. It is the juxtaposition on the same soil of races of different color."—James Bryce, *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, pp. 245-46.

It is the process of assimilation by which groups of individuals, originally indifferent or perhaps hostile, achieve this corporate character, rather than the process by which they acquire a formal like-mindedness, with which this paper is mainly concerned.

The difficulty with the conception of assimilation which one ordinarily meets in discussions of the race problem, is that it is based on observations confined to individualistic groups where the characteristic relations are indirect and secondary. It takes no account of the kind of assimilation that takes place in primary groups where relations are direct and personal—in the tribe, for example, and in the family.

Thus Charles Francis Adams, referring to the race problem in an address at Richmond, Va., in November, 1908, said:

The American system, as we know, was founded on the assumed basis of a common humanity, that is, absence of absolutely fundamental racial characteristics was accepted as an established truth. Those of all races were welcomed to our shores. They came, aliens; they and their descendants would become citizens first, natives afterward. It was a process first of assimilation and then of absorption. On this all depended. There could be no permanent divisional lines. That theory is now plainly broken down. We are confronted by the obvious fact, as undeniable as it is hard, that the African will only partially assimilate and that he cannot be absorbed. He remains an alien element in the body politic. A foreign substance, he can neither be assimilated nor thrown out.

More recently an editorial in the *Outlook*, discussing the Japanese situation in California, made this statement:

The hundred millions of people now inhabiting the United States must be a united people, not merely a collection of groups of different peoples, different in racial cultures and ideals, agreeing to live together in peace and amity. These hundred millions must have common ideals, common aims, a common custom, a common culture, a common language, and common characteristics if the nation is to endure.¹

All this is quite true and interesting, but it does not clearly recognize the fact that the chief obstacle to the assimilation of the Negro and the Oriental are not mental but physical traits. It is not because the Negro and the Japanese are so differently constituted that they do not assimilate. If they were given an oppor-

¹ *Outlook*, August 2, 1913.

tunity the Japanese are quite as capable as the Italians, the Armenians, or the Slavs of acquiring our culture, and sharing our national ideals. The trouble is not with the Japanese mind but with the Japanese skin. The Jap is not the right color.

The fact that the Japanese bears in his features a distinctive racial hallmark, that he wears, so to speak, a racial uniform, classifies him. He cannot become a mere individual, indistinguishable in the cosmopolitan mass of the population, as is true, for example, of the Irish and, to a lesser extent, of some of the other immigrant races. The Japanese, like the Negro, is condemned to remain among us an abstraction, a symbol, and a symbol not merely of his own race, but of the Orient and of that vague, ill-defined menace we sometimes refer to as the "yellow peril." This not only determines, to a very large extent, the attitude of the white world toward the yellow man, but it determines the attitude of the yellow man to the white. It puts between the races the invisible but very real gulf of self-consciousness.

There is another consideration. Peoples we know intimately we respect and esteem. In our casual contact with aliens, however, it is the offensive rather than the pleasing traits that impress us. These impressions accumulate and reinforce natural prejudices. Where races are distinguished by certain external marks these furnish a permanent physical substratum upon which and around which the irritations and animosities, incidental to all human intercourse, tend to accumulate and so gain strength and volume.

II

Assimilation, as the word is here used, brings with it a certain borrowed significance which it carried over from physiology where it is employed to describe the process of nutrition. By a process of nutrition, somewhat similar to the physiological one, we may conceive alien peoples to be incorporated with, and made part of, the community or state. Ordinarily assimilation goes on silently and unconsciously, and only forces itself into popular conscience when there is some interruption or disturbance of the process.

At the outset it may be said, then, that assimilation rarely becomes a problem except in secondary groups. Admission to the

primary group, that is to say, the group in which relationships are direct and personal, as, for example, in the family and in the tribe, makes assimilation comparatively easy, and almost inevitable.

The most striking illustration of this is the fact of domestic slavery. Slavery has been, historically, the usual method by which peoples have been incorporated into alien groups. When a member of an alien race is adopted into the family as a servant, or as a slave, and particularly when that status is made hereditary, as it was in the case of the Negro after his importation to America, assimilation followed rapidly and as a matter of course.

It is difficult to conceive two races farther removed from each other in temperament and tradition than the Anglo-Saxon and the Negro, and yet the Negro in the southern states, particularly where he was adopted into the household as a family servant, learned in a comparatively short time the manners and customs of his master's family. He very soon possessed himself of so much of the language, religion, and the technique of the civilization of his master as, in his station, he was fitted or permitted to acquire. Eventually, also, Negro slaves transferred their allegiance to the state, of which they were only indirectly members, or at least to their masters' families, with whom they felt themselves in most things one in sentiment and interest.

The assimilation of the Negro field hand, where the contact of the slave with his master and his master's family was less intimate, was naturally less complete. On the large plantations, where an overseer stood between the master and the majority of his slaves, and especially on the Sea Island plantations off the coast of South Carolina, where the master and his family were likely to be merely winter visitors, this distance between master and slave was greatly increased. The consequence is that the Negroes in these regions are less touched today by the white man's influence and civilization than elsewhere in the southern states. The size of the plantation, the density of the slave population, and the extent and character of the isolation in which the master and his slave lived are factors to be reckoned with in estimating the influence which the plantation exerted on the Negro. In Virginia the average slave population on the plantation has been estimated at about ten. On the Sea

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Islands and farther south it was thirty; and in Jamaica it was two hundred.¹

As might be expected there were class distinctions among the slaves as among the whites, and these class distinctions were more rigidly enforced on the large plantations than on the smaller ones. In Jamaica, for example, it was customary to employ the mulattoes in the lighter and the more desirable occupations about the master's house. The mulattoes in that part of the country, more definitely than was true in the United States, constituted a separate caste midway between the white man and black. Under these conditions the assimilation of the masses of the Negro people took place more slowly and less completely in Jamaica than in the United States.

In Virginia and the border states, and in what was known as the Back Country, where the plantations were smaller and the relation of the races more intimate, slaves gained relatively more of the white man's civilization. The kindly relations of master and slave in Virginia are indicated by the number of free Negroes in that state. In 1860 one Negro in every eight was free and in one county in the Tidewater Region, the county of Nansemond, there were 2,473 Negroes and only 581 slaves. The differences in the Negro population which existed before the Civil War are still clearly marked today. They are so clearly marked, in fact, that an outline of the areas in which the different types of plantation existed before the War would furnish the basis for a map showing distinct cultural levels in the Negro population in the South today.

The first Negroes were imported into the United States in 1619. At the beginning of the nineteenth century there were 900,000 slaves in the United States. By 1860 that number had increased to nearly 4,000,000. At that time, it is safe to say, the great mass of the Negroes were no longer, in any true sense, an alien people. They were, of course, not citizens. They lived in the smaller world of the particular plantation to which they belonged. It might, perhaps, be more correct to say that they were less assimilated than domesticated.

In this respect, however, the situation of the Negro was not

¹ *Documentary History of American and Industrial Society*, Vol. I, "Plantation and Frontier": Introduction, pp. 80-81.

different from that of the Russian peasant, at least as late as 1860. The Russian noble and the Russian peasant were likely to be of the same ethnic stock, but mentally they were probably not much more alike than the Negro slave and his master. The noble and the peasant did not intermarry. The peasant lived in the little world of the *mir* or commune. He had his own customs and traditions. His life and thought moved in a smaller orbit and he knew nothing about the larger world which belonged exclusively to the noble. The relations between the serf and the proprietor of the estate to which he was attached were, perhaps, less familiar and less frank than those which existed between the Negro slave and his master. The attitude of the serf in the presence of the noble was more abject. Still, one could hardly say that the Russian peasant had not been assimilated, at least in the sense in which it has been decided to use that term in this paper.

A right understanding of conditions in the South before the War will make clear that the southern plantation was founded in the different temperaments, habits, and sentiments of the white man and the black. The discipline of the plantation put its own impress upon, and largely formed the character of, both races. In the life of the plantation white and black were different but complementary, the one bred to the rôle of a slave and the other to that of master. This, of course, takes no account of the poor white man who was also formed by slavery, but rather as a by-product.

Where the conditions of slavery brought the two races, as it frequently did, into close and intimate contact, there grew up a mutual sympathy and understanding which frequently withstood not only the shock of the Civil War, but the political agitation and chicane which followed it in the southern states.

Speaking of the difference between the North and the South in its attitude toward the Negro, Booker T. Washington says: "It is the individual touch which holds the races together in the South, and it is this individual touch which is lacking to a large degree in the North."

No doubt kindly relations between individual members of the two races do exist in the South to an extent not known in the North. As a rule, it will be found that these kindly relations had their

origin in slavery. The men who have given the tone to political discussion in southern states in recent years are men who did not own slaves. The men from the mountain districts of the South, whose sentiments found expression in a great antislavery document, like Hinton Helper's *Impending Crisis*, hated slavery with an intensity that was only equaled by their hatred for the Negro. It is the raucous note of the Hill Billy and the Red Neck that one hears in the public utterances of men like Senator Vardaman, of Mississippi, and Governor Blease, of South Carolina.

III

The Civil War weakened but did not fully destroy the *modus vivendi* which slavery had established between the slave and his master. With emancipation the authority which had formerly been exercised by the master was transferred to the state, and Washington, D.C., began to assume in the mind of the freedman the position that formerly had been occupied by the "big house" on the plantation. The masses of the Negro people still maintained their habit of dependence, however, and after the first confusion of the change had passed, life went on, for most of them, much as it had before the War. As one old farmer explained, the only difference he could see was that in slavery he "was working for old Marster and now he was working for himself."

There was one difference between slavery and freedom, nevertheless, which was very real to the freedman. And this was the liberty to move. To move from one plantation to another in case he was discontented was one of the ways in which a freedman was able to realize his freedom and to make sure that he possessed it. This liberty to move meant a good deal more to the plantation Negro than one not acquainted with the situation in the South is likely to understand.

If there had been an abundance of labor in the South; if the situation had been such that the Negro laborer was seeking the opportunity to work, or such that the Negro tenant farmers were competing for the opportunity to get a place on the land, as is so frequently the case in Europe, the situation would have been fundamentally different from what it actually was. But the South

was, and is today, what Nieboer called a country of "open," in contradistinction to a country of "closed" resources. In other words there is more land in the South than there is labor to till it. Land owners are driven to competing for laborers and tenants to work their plantations.

Owing to his ignorance of business matters and to a long-established habit of submission the Negro after emancipation was placed at a great disadvantage in his dealings with the white man. His right to move from one plantation to another became, therefore, the Negro tenant's method of enforcing consideration from the planter. He might not dispute the planter's accounts, because he was not capable of doing so, and it was unprofitable to attempt it, but if he felt aggrieved he could move.

This was the significance of the exodus in some of the southern states which took place about 1879, when 40,000 people left the plantations in the Black Belts of Louisiana and Mississippi and went to Kansas. The masses of the colored people were dissatisfied with the treatment they were receiving from the planters and made up their minds to move to "a free country," as they described it. At the same time it was the attempt of the planter to bind the Negro tenant who was in debt to him, to his place on the plantation, that gave rise to the system of peonage that still exists in a mitigated form in the South today.

When the Negro moved off the plantation upon which he was reared he severed the personal relations which bound him to his master's people. It was just at this point that the two races began to lose touch with each other. From this time on the relations of the black man and white, which in slavery had been direct and personal, became every year, as the old associations were broken, more and more indirect and secondary. There lingers still the disposition on the part of the white man to treat every Negro familiarly, and the disposition on the part of every Negro to treat every white man respectfully. But these are habits which are gradually disappearing. The breaking-down of the instincts and habits of servitude, and the acquisition, by the masses of the Negro people, of the instincts and habits of freedom have proceeded slowly but steadily. The reason the change seems to have gone on more

rapidly in some cases than others is explained by the fact that at the time of emancipation 10 per cent of the Negroes in the United States were already free, and others, those who had worked in trades, many of whom had hired their own time from their masters, had become more or less adapted to the competitive conditions of free society.

One of the effects of the mobilization of the Negro has been to bring him into closer and more intimate contact with his own people. Common interests have drawn the blacks together, and caste sentiment has kept the black and white apart. The segregation of the races, which began as a spontaneous movement on the part of both, has been fostered by the policy of the dominant race. The agitation of the Reconstruction Period made the division between the races in politics absolute. Segregation and separation in other matters have gone on steadily ever since. The Negro at the present time has separate churches, schools, libraries, hospitals, Y.M.C.A. associations, and even separate towns. There are, perhaps, a half-dozen communities in the United States, every inhabitant of which is a Negro. Most of these so-called Negro towns are suburban villages; two of them, at any rate, are the centers of a considerable Negro farming population. In general it may be said that where the Negro schools, churches, and Y.M.C.A. associations are not separate they do not exist.

It is hard to estimate the ultimate effect of this isolation of the black man. One of the most important effects has been to establish a common interest among all the different colors and classes of the race. This sense of solidarity has grown up gradually with the organization of the Negro people. It is stronger in the South, where segregation is more complete, than it is in the North where, twenty years ago, it would have been safe to say it did not exist. Gradually, imperceptibly, within the larger world of the white man, a smaller world, the world of the black man, is silently taking form and shape.

Every advance in education and intelligence puts the Negro in possession of the technique of communication and organization of the white man, and so contributes to the extension and consolidation of the Negro world within the white.

The motive for this increasing solidarity is furnished by the increasing pressure, or perhaps I should say, by the increasing sensibility of Negroes to the pressure and the prejudice without. The sentiment of racial loyalty, which is a comparatively recent manifestation of the growing self-consciousness of the race, must be regarded as a response and "accommodation" to changing internal and external relations of the race. The sentiment which Negroes are beginning to call "race pride" does not exist to the same extent in the North as in the South, but an increasing disposition to enforce racial distinctions in the North, as in the South, is bringing it into existence.

One or two incidents in this connection are significant. A few years ago a man who is the head of the largest Negro publishing business in this country sent to Germany and had a number of Negro dolls manufactured according to specifications of his own. At the time this company was started Negro children were in the habit of playing with white dolls. There were already Negro dolls on the market, but they were for white children and represented the white man's conception of the Negro and not the Negro's ideal of himself. The new Negro doll was a mulatto with regular features slightly modified in favor of the conventional Negro type. It was a neat, prim, well-dressed, well-behaved, self-respecting doll. Later on, as I understand, there were other dolls, equally tidy and respectable in appearance, but in darker shades with Negro features a little more pronounced. The man who designed these dolls was perfectly clear in regard to the significance of the substitution that he was making. He said that he thought it was a good thing to let Negro girls become accustomed to dolls of their own color. He thought it important, as long as the races were to be segregated, that the dolls, which like other forms of art, are patterns and represent ideals, should be segregated also.

This substitution of the Negro model for the white is a very interesting and a very significant fact. It means that the Negro has begun to fashion his own ideals and in his own image rather than in that of the white man. It is also interesting to know that the Negro doll company has been a success and that these dolls are now widely sold in every part of the United States. Nothing exhibits

more clearly the extent to which the Negro had become assimilated in slavery or the extent to which he has broken with the past in recent years than this episode of the Negro doll.

The incident is typical. It is an indication of the nature of tendencies and of forces that are stirring in the background of the Negro's mind, although they have not succeeded in forcing themselves, except in special instances, into clear consciousness.

In this same category must be reckoned the poetry of Paul Lawrence Dunbar, in whom, as William Dean Howells has said, the Negro "attained civilization." Before Paul Lawrence Dunbar, Negro literature had been either apologetic or self-assertive, but Dunbar "studied the Negro objectively." He represented him as he found him, not only without apology, but with an affectionate understanding and sympathy which one can have only for what is one's own. In Dunbar, Negro literature attained an ethnocentric point of view. Through the medium of his verses the ordinary shapes and forms of the Negro's life have taken on the color of his affections and sentiments and we see the black man, not as he looks, but as he feels and is.

It is a significant fact that a certain number of educated—or rather the so-called educated—Negroes were not at first disposed to accept at their full value either Dunbar's dialect verse or the familiar pictures of Negro life which are the symbols in which his poetry usually found expression. The explanation sometimes offered for the dialect poems was that "they were made to please white folk." The assumption seems to have been that if they had been written for Negroes it would have been impossible in his poetry to distinguish black people from white. This was a sentiment which was never shared by the masses of the people, who, upon the occasions when Dunbar recited to them, were fairly bowled over with amusement and delight because of the authenticity of the portraits he offered them. At the present time Dunbar is so far accepted as to have hundreds of imitators.

Literature and art have played a similar and perhaps more important rôle in the racial struggles of Europe than of America. One reason seems to be that racial conflicts, as they occur in secondary groups, are primarily sentimental and secondarily economic.

Literature and art, when they are employed to give expression to racial sentiment and form to racial ideals, serve, along with other agencies, to mobilize the group and put the masses *en rapport* with their leaders and with each other. In such case art and literature are like silent drummers which summon into action the latent instincts and energies of the race.

These struggles, I might add, in which a submerged people seek to rise and make for themselves a place in a world occupied by superior and privileged races, are not less vital or less important because they are bloodless. They serve to stimulate ambitions and inspire ideals which years, perhaps, of subjection and subordination have suppressed. In fact, it seems as if it were through conflicts of this kind, rather than through war, that the minor peoples were destined to gain the moral concentration and discipline that fit them to share, on anything like equal terms, in the conscious life of the civilized world.

IV

The progress of race adjustment in the southern states since the emancipation has, on the whole, run parallel with the nationalist movement in Europe. The so-called "nationalities" are, for the most part, Slavic peoples, fragments of the great Slavic race, that have attained national self-consciousness as a result of their struggle for freedom and air against their German conquerors. It is a significant fact that the nationalist movement, as well as the "nationalities" that it has brought into existence, had its rise in that twilight zone, upon the eastern border of Germany and the western border of Russia, and is part of the century-long conflict, partly racial, partly cultural, of which this meeting-place of the East and West has been the scene.

Until the beginning of the last century the European peasant, like the Negro slave, bound as he was to the soil, lived in the little world of direct and personal relations, under what we may call a domestic régime. It was military necessity that first turned the attention of statesmen like Frederick the Great of Prussia to the welfare of the peasant. It was the overthrow of Prussia by Napoleon in 1807 that brought about his final emancipation in that

country. In recent years it has been the international struggle for economic efficiency which has contributed most to mobilize the peasant and laboring classes in Europe.

As the peasant slowly emerged from serfdom he found himself a member of a depressed class, without education, political privileges, or capital. It was the struggle of this class for wider opportunity and better conditions of life that made most of the history of the previous century. Among the peoples in the racial borderland the effect of this struggle has been, on the whole, to substitute for a horizontal organization of society—in which the upper strata, that is to say the wealthy or privileged class, was mainly of one race and the poorer and subject class was mainly of another—a vertical organization in which all classes of each racial group were united under the title of their respective nationalities. Thus organized, the nationalities represent, on the one hand, intractable minorities engaged in a ruthless partisan struggle for political privilege or economic advantage and, on the other, they represent cultural groups, each struggling to maintain a sentiment of loyalty to the distinctive traditions, language, and institutions of the race they represent.

This sketch of the racial situation in Europe is, of course, the barest abstraction and should not be accepted realistically. It is intended merely as an indication of similarities, in the broader outlines, of the motives that have produced nationalities in Europe and are making the Negro in America, as Booker Washington says, "a nation within a nation."

It may be said that there is one profound difference between the Negro and the European nationalities, namely, that the Negro has had his separateness and consequent race consciousness thrust upon him, because of his exclusion and forcible isolation from white society. The Slavic nationalities, on the contrary, have segregated themselves in order to escape assimilation and escape racial extinction in the larger cosmopolitan states.

The difference is, however, not so great as it seems. With the exception of the Poles, nationalistic sentiment may be said hardly to have existed fifty years ago. Forty years ago when German was the language of the educated classes, educated Bohemians

were a little ashamed to speak their own language in public. Now nationalist sentiment is so strong that, where the Czech nationality has gained control, it has sought to wipe out every vestige of the German language. It has changed the names of streets, buildings, and public places. In the city of Praag, for example, all that formerly held German associations now fairly reeks with the sentiment of Bohemian nationality.

On the other hand, the masses of the Polish people cherished very little nationalist sentiment until after the Franco-Prussian War. The fact is that nationalist sentiment among the Slavs, like racial sentiment among the Negroes, has sprung up as the result of a struggle against privilege and discrimination based upon racial distinctions. The movement is not so far advanced among Negroes; sentiment is not so intense, and for several reasons probably never will be. One reason is that Negroes, in their struggle for equal opportunities, have the democratic sentiment of the country on their side.

From what has been said it seems fair to draw one conclusion, namely: under conditions of secondary contact, that is to say, conditions of individual liberty and individual competition, characteristic of modern civilization, depressed racial groups tend to assume the form of nationalities. A nationality, in this narrower sense, may be defined as the racial group which has attained self-consciousness, no matter whether it has at the same time gained political independence or not.

In societies organized along horizontal lines the disposition of individuals in the lower strata is to seek their models in the strata above them. Loyalty attaches to individuals, particularly to the upper classes, who furnish, in their persons and in their lives, the models for the masses of the people below them. Long after the nobility has lost every other social function connected with its vocation the ideals of the nobility have survived in our conception of the gentleman, genteel manners and bearing—gentility.

The sentiment of the Negro slave was, in a certain sense, not merely loyalty to his master, but to the white race. Negroes of the older generations speak very frequently, with a sense of proprietorship, of "our white folks." This sentiment was not always con-

fined to the ignorant masses. An educated colored man once explained to me "that we colored people always want our white folks to be superior." He was shocked when I showed no particular enthusiasm for that form of sentiment.

The fundamental significance of the nationalist movement must be sought in the effort of subject races, sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, to substitute, for those supplied them by aliens, models based on their own racial individuality and embodying sentiments and ideals which spring naturally out of their own lives.

After a race has achieved in this way its moral independence, assimilation, in the sense of copying, will still continue. Nations and races borrow from those whom they fear as well as from those whom they admire. Materials taken over in this way, however, are inevitably stamped with the individuality of the nationalities that appropriate them. These materials will contribute to the dignity, to the prestige, and to the solidarity of the nationality which borrows them, but they will no longer inspire loyalty to the race from which they are borrowed. A race which has attained the character of a nationality may still retain its loyalty to the state of which it is a part, but only in so far as that state incorporates, as an integral part of its organization, the practical interests, the aspirations and ideals of that nationality.

The aim of the contending nationalities in Austria-Hungary at the present time seems to be a federation, like that of Switzerland, based upon the autonomy of the different races composing the empire.¹ In the South, similarly, the races seem to be tending in the direction of a bi-racial organization of society, in which the Negro is gradually gaining a limited autonomy. What the ultimate outcome of this movement may be it is not safe to predict.

¹ Aurel C. Popovici, *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Gross-Oestreich, Politische Studien zur Losung der nationalen Fragen u. statsrechtlichen Krisen in Oestreich*, Leipzig, 1906.

THE PRUSSIAN-POLISH SITUATION: AN EXPERIMENT IN ASSIMILATION

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There is a stage of social organization where solidarity of sentiment and action are more essential to the welfare of the group than ideas. This principle holds in the kinship group of primitive times, in the peasant house-community, and has its more absolute expression in animal colonies and gregarious groups.

Now these are the laws of the Jungle,
and many and mighty are they;
But the head and the hoof of the Law
and the haunch and the hump is—Obey!

The principle of primary or face-to-face relations, which Professor Cooley has made so useful to all of us, is one on which a society may best preserve its life so long as it can preserve a degree of isolation. Moreover, it is a type of relationship which, with its more immediate contacts, its loves and hates, its gossip and hospitality, its costumes, vanities, and self-sacrifices, lies nearer to the primal instincts and contains consequently more sentiment and warmth than is secured through the more abstract relations of the secondary group. In Southeastern and Slavic Europe I was more than once struck by the tendency of the individual of the higher cultural group to drop back into the lower. I am told that there is no case on record of a Magyarized Rumanian, but in Transylvania I met case after case of Rumanized Magyars. I remember particularly one village where an old Magyar woman, who spoke Rumanian very badly, insisted with vehemence, almost with tears, that she was a Rumanian, while the villagers winked and laughed. The Rumanian of this region stands only just above the Gipsy. Another striking fact in this eastern and southeastern fringe of Europe is that the lower cultural groups are, at least temporarily, pushing back those of the higher cultural levels. The Pole of Posen

is pushing back the Prussian, the Ruthenian is pushing back the Pole in Galicia, the Lithuanian is beginning to make headway against the Pole also at another point, and the Italian in Austria is pushing back the German. Naturally the isolated individual tends to be absorbed by the larger group, and the question of the expansion of the populations of the lower cultural levels is largely a matter of the birth rate and of the standard of living, but the question of the solidarity of sentiment in the more primary group and the force of this sentiment when organized toward certain ends, and inflamed through leadership, is an important factor in the struggle for nationality in Eastern Europe, and one which we must consider in connection with racial assimilation in general.

Now, I believe we all recognize that there are no races in Europe, properly speaking. There are only language-groups. But these groups have certain marks, of language, religion, custom, and sentiments, and feel themselves as races; and they struggle as bitterly for the preservation of these marks as if they were true races.

I think it is clear also that the smaller alien language-group, incorporated against its will in the larger state, behaves essentially as a primary group. That the state also behaves somewhat as a primary group in this connection is true, but the state is nevertheless a secondary organization acting through legislation and bureaucracy in its efforts to coerce the sentiments of the alien group and to assimilate it.

Among these efforts to assimilate an incorporated group, I have found those of Prussia in connection with the Poles of its eastern provinces perhaps the most interesting, because the policy was formulated by the man who formed the German Empire, and has been carried on with resourcefulness, system, and ferocity, and because, on the other hand, it discloses in a more complete way than I have found elsewhere the varieties of reaction which the coerced group may develop under this external pressure.

It is estimated by the German that during the nineteenth century 100,000 Germans in the eastern provinces of Prussia were Polonized, that is, they adopted the language, religion, and sentiments of the Poles. During this time the Poles were making no systematic effort in this direction. It seems to me that the main

force in operation was the attractive qualities of the Poles—and their more intimate, personal, face-to-face relations.

On the other hand it seems that the Polish population was at one time on the road to Germanization. In the period of serfdom the peasant had been so mercilessly exploited that he acquired a profound suspicion of the upper classes, and this remains a prominent trait in his character today. It has been hard to convince a peasant that anybody will do anything for him or for his community in a disinterested way. A leading Galician economist, himself peasant-born, informed me that when he returned to his native village and interested himself in its sanitation the peasants speculated on what he was going to get out of it for himself. But in the back of the peasant's head there lingered a tradition that he fared badly because the emperor was deceived by the nobility and did not know how the peasant was treated. And under the German government he began to be loyal (for Germany understands how to care for her people) and for a long time—until after the war with France—she treated the Poles without discrimination—protected them and let them alone. And they in turn began to be patriotic, to speak German and drink beer, and to be proud of the Prussian uniform. A Polish nobleman has recently admitted that if you should put a Prussian Pole into a press, German culture would pour in streams from every opening and pore in his body. Prussian Poles are much sought in Russian Poland and Galicia as agricultural overseers, but they become homesick and long for the time when they may end their banishment and return to Posen. And the aristocratic Poles were coming even more under German influence and unconsciously imitating German institutions and speech. I do not know how far this process of assimilation would have progressed, for there was arising a noticeable nationalistic movement—a movement dating back to the '30's.

At any rate, so long as the peasant felt that the government was friendly to him he paid little attention to agitators. But in 1873 he was attacked by the government. At this point Bismarck took a hand and decided to force the process of Germanization. He said he was not afraid of the Polish man, but of the Polish woman. She produced so many children. He undertook the task

with apparent confidence, but he was profoundly deceived in his judgment of the peasant. He said that the peasant who had shed his blood so generously for Germany was at heart a true German. The fact is, the peasant had been gradually losing sight of the fact that he was a Pole and the policy of Bismarck restored to him that consciousness.

It was a saying in Germany that the Prussian schoolmaster had won the battle of Sadowa, and it was Bismarck's policy to use the same schoolmaster in the Germanization of Posen. The German language was substituted for the Polish in the schools, and German teachers, preferably without a knowledge of Polish, were introduced into the schools. Now speech is one of the signs by which a people recognizes itself, and fear of the effacement of the signs of self-consciousness is somewhat like the fear of death. And this effacement of speech implied also the effacement of religion, for in the mind of the peasant speech and religion were identified. Ask a Pole his nationality and he will not improbably reply: "Catholic." He felt also, and the priest taught, that the good Lord did not understand German. At this point the peasant knew that the government was his enemy. He had heard it before from the priest and the nobility, but he did not believe it.

There is not the slightest doubt that the Prussian government at this point raised a devil which it has not been able to lay. This action, indeed, marked the beginning of what is now known as the Polish Peasant Republic in Posen. The direct consequences of this school policy were riots and school strikes. At Wreschen a number of women who entered a schoolhouse and rescued their children from a teacher were tried for violation of domicile and sentenced to two, three, and five years' imprisonment. In 1906 there followed a systematically organized school strike involving about 150,000 children. The children at the instigation of their parents, the priests, and the press, refused to answer in German. It seems that the behavior of the school officials was on the whole patient. But the strike had the effect of developing in the Polish children a hatred of the Germans. Indeed, this was probably the main object of the organizers of the strike. It may be that the Poles had planned precisely this, and expected no further results.

The next important move of the Prussian government was the establishment of a colonization commission, with the object of purchasing Polish land and settling it with German peasants. This commission has been in operation for 27 years, has expended about \$140,000,000 in the purchase of land, and the result is that the Poles have more land than they had at the beginning.

The next important move was a law prohibiting the construction of any buildings without a permit. This virtually meant that the Poles could not build on land newly acquired, nor build further on land already possessed; not even old buildings could be repaired nor chimneys renewed. It may be said at once that the Poles have almost completely nullified the force of this law by buying large estates and parceling them. The peasants then live in the manorial house, in the carriage house, the stable, the barns, the tenant houses, and by packing themselves in like sardines they have found that they save money.

And finally, in 1907 the government passed the expropriation act authorizing the legal seizure of any land which the colonization commission desired but could not purchase. This meant Polish land, and the action was forced by the fact that the Poles had developed so perfect a morale that practically no land was offered to the commission by Poles. This action aroused intense indignation, and was condemned by many Germans, notably by Professor Delbrück, who took the ground that a modern state could not resort to such methods and remain a modern state. It was thought and hoped by many members of the government voting for this measure that it would never be enforced—that it was to be used as a threat—but in 1912 the government began to carry out the policy of expropriation.

These are the main steps taken by the Prussian government in its experiment with the assimilation of the Poles, and the Poles claim that the government is making war on 4,000,000 of its people.

Before outlining the results of this policy I wish to point out that the peasant has been the main factor in the struggle on the Polish side. He was aroused (1) by the Prussian state, (2) by a small middle class of agitators and patriots, (3) by the press, (4) by the clergy, (5) by Polish business men, who developed in him an

immense land hunger and ministered to it. It is noticeable also that the nobility and revolutionary agitators made no headway and secured no effective organization until the national consciousness of the peasant had been aroused. Indeed, I have the impression that, generally speaking, the nobility and the priest were, so to speak, shamed into co-operation with this aroused consciousness of the peasant.

Coming then to the types of organization which the Poles have developed in their struggle with the Prussian, the Marcinkowski Association deserves, perhaps, the first mention, because it is the one important and successful organization antedating the period of Bismarck. Marcinkowski was a physician who after the revolution of 1831 had retired to Paris. But about 1836 a report reached him that the poor people in Posen were complaining of his absence, and he returned. In 1840 he formed a society for the education of Polish youth. His immediate purpose was the formation of a middle class. This society, with its central organization in the city of Posen, has about forty branch associations and gives what we call fellowships to about six hundred Polish young men who are studying in high schools and universities. Wherever these stipendiaries are located not only their studies but their habits are closely watched and reported on by resident Poles. They are also expected to pay back in course of time the money advanced to them, and to make in addition contributions to the funds of the society. An annual list of old stipendiaries making repayments and contributions, with the amounts, is published and commented on. Here, indeed, as everywhere, the Poles make use of comment and criticism very freely. If, for instance, the branch association in Gnesen has been very active and that in Mowgliño apathetic, the one is commended and the other rebuked in the annual report. Furthermore, the central association receives all funds collected by the branches, but returns to the branches the amount sent in, with an addition from the funds of the central association. But in this redistribution each branch is treated according to the zeal it has shown. For instance, in one year the district of Scrimm sent in about M. 1,500 and received back M. 5,000, while the district of Znín sent in about M. 400 and received back only M. 500.

Marcinkowski was also very successful in his insistence on what he called the "moral principle," that the nobility and well-to-do Poles who chose not to live in Posen were not released from their obligation to contribute to the Polish cause, but that they were rather under the greater obligation to do so—a sort of penalizing of the non-residents for their absence. This society is also the beneficiary of the courts of honor to which I may barely allude. The Poles are a litigious people, an attitude growing perhaps out of their previous communal system and the troubles arising from the periodical distribution of land. At any rate, going to law may be regarded as their national sport. From the adjudication of these cases the Prussian government was profiting in the way of fines, and the Poles have understood how to form an organization to which litigants voluntarily submit their grievances and to which they pay their fines. These fines are turned over to the Marcinkowski Association. The association has also been more instrumental than any other organization, with the exception perhaps of the press, in drawing the priests into the nationalistic movement. As early as 1841 the archbishop of Posen and Gnesen addressed a circular letter to the clergy of his diocese in which he said: "I urge the priests and chaplains and lay it upon them particularly forthwith to co-operate with this society, which will be a blessing to mankind, and appropriately to assist its noble and useful purpose." From the American standpoint the association is not rich. Its capital is about M. 1,400,000, and about half of its expenses are defrayed from the interest on its capital. Associated with the Marcinkowski Association are four other associations: (1) the West Prussian Educational Association, (2) the Association for Girl Students, (3) the Association for Girl Students of West Prussia, and (4) the Public Library Association.

In 1873 Maximilian Jackowski began to organize the peasants into associations, and in the first year founded 11 such associations; in 1880 he had personally founded 120 associations; at present there are more than 300 associations. During his life Jackowski traveled, wrote, and spoke unceasingly. His two main objects were the improvement of the economic condition of the peasant and the

preservation of the national spirit through a national organization. This organization was to be based on the peasant.

The peasant associations, each under a president, are divided into 26 districts, each under a vice-patron, and all are united in a central association under a patron. The monthly meetings of the associations are devoted to a discussion of matters of agriculture, though they serve also to foster the feeling of nationality. The annual district meetings under the vice-patrons bring out 350 members, and the annual general assembly of the associations in Posen has an attendance of about 1,000. And as the same date of meeting is selected by the Polish Association of Large Land Owners, Trades Unions and other societies, the meeting in Posen in the middle of March assumes the aspect of a national demonstration. Nevertheless politics and sentiment are strenuously disallowed in the meetings of the associations. This is not only essential to the existence of the associations under the Prussian government, but is regarded as intrinsically important. For the Poles thoroughly realize that their success and the realization of their emotional aims lie in business enterprise. They were at one time the most emotional people in the world, or bore that reputation—indeed the Pole has been called the *Slavus saltans*—but there is a legend that a deputation of Poles asked the historian Thierry in Paris what was a good program, and he said: "Get rich." And they have since followed that policy. It is by no means true that they have lost their sentiment; it is the force behind all, but they carry it in a different compartment.

The peasant associations have an official paper, the *Poradnik Gospodarski* ("Agricultural Messenger") which is perfectly adapted to the peasant's needs, and, I may say, to his psychology. The paper is indeed dull reading to the outsider, with its description of drainage, soils, manures, etc.; but we must remember that the peasant has an affection for the soil greater than that for all else; the soil is a part of his being. In the greatest of the novels based on the Slavic peasant, Reymont's *Cłopi* ("Peasants"), an old peasant who had received an injury to his head in a fight over some timber, and who had lain in a comatose condition for months, rises from

his bed one night and walks out over his land, and in the morning he is found dead in the fields. He had fallen face foremost, and the earth stopped his mouth and was clasped tightly in both of his hands. By an appropriate automatism he had in death embraced and kissed what was supremely dear to him. A people so disposed responds eagerly to suggestions about the soil. Formerly *Polnische Wirtschaft* was a synonym among the Germans for all that was sluttish. Now it is amusingly inappropriate as applied to Polish agriculture in Posen.

If the primary group is distinguished by face-to-face and sentimental relations I think it is correct to say that the land of the peasant was included in his group. And this land sentiment is the most important factor in the failure up to date of the plans of the colonization commission. It was not, indeed, the plan of the commission to buy peasant land, but to buy large Polish estates and partition them among German settlers. This plan worked very well for some years, because a sufficient morale was not immediately developed among the landed Poles to prevent the sale of some estates. But at the very beginning something occurred which the commission had not counted on—namely the German large land owners in West Prussia were much more eager to sell than the Poles. When it became known that the government was spending about M. 40,000,000 annually for land, there was a stampede of German owners to get in on the money. It was in vain that the commission pointed out that it did not wish German land, only Polish. The German land owner protested that he was obliged to sell, and that if the government did not purchase he would be compelled, in order to avoid ruin, to sell to Polish speculators. In fact, the commission was compelled to buy German land. As late as 1903 the commission bought from German owners land for about M. 40,000,000; in 1904 for M. 30,000,000; and in 1905 for M. 35,000,000. On the other hand the amount of land offered by Polish owners was always small in comparison with that of German owners, and at present practically no Polish land is offered. For instance, in 1903, 210,000 hectares of German land were offered to the commission, as against 35,000 hectares of Polish land; in 1904, 200,000 hectares, as against 20,000; and in 1905 the Germans offered 135,000 hectares,

and the Poles offered almost none. In this connection land speculation became rife and the price of land has doubled. Polish speculators began to purchase large Polish estates and parcel them out to Polish peasants, and to take over and parcel in the same way German estates refused by the colonization commission. They also began to outbid the government for German land, and to organize parceling banks and other associations to enable the Polish peasant to acquire land. It is here that the land-hunger of the Polish peasant became an important factor. On the Polish side the most daring and inventive land speculator was a certain Martin Biedermann. Among his inventions, two are most notable. The first is known as the "Biedermann clause." A German estate owner offered his estate to the commission. If this was declined he went to Biedermann and sold him the estate, with the reservation that he might have the privilege of withdrawing from the transaction within a month. The deed drawn with Biedermann's firm, say for M. 500,000, contained the following paragraph: "But if a third party [the colonization commission] enters into the transaction before [a given date] said party shall pay M. 30,000 more. But this sum shall be divided equally between the firm of Drweski & Langner [Biedermann's firm] and the estate owner X." At this point the commission might yield and buy the estate, in which case Biedermann's firm had a profit of M. 15,000. Otherwise the estate was parceled among Polish peasants. In the second place, Biedermann understood how to make out of land-buying a patriotic sport for rich Poles. The Pole is socially ambitious and lives very much for the approbation of his circle. Many of the attractive careers are closed to him; he has no place in the army, the government, or the university. If, then, a young man comes into an estate of some millions, and presently a large estate comes onto the market, it is suggested to him that it would be a fine thing to outbid the government and secure this for the Poles. He will have to pay dear, perhaps very dear, for his whistle, but to have his name on every Polish tongue and to be mentioned in many of the 600 newspapers and periodicals in the three parts of Poland is worth the M. 50,000 which he pays in excess of its value.

The heart of the peasant has been won to the Polish cause quite

as much through a system of small parceling banks as through the peasant associations. The peasant is usually in debt. Under the Polish custom the oldest son usually takes over the estate from the father and pensions him, and assumes the obligation of paying to the younger children the worth of their portions. On a small farm there may be ten or fifteen mortgages outstanding. Formerly, at any rate, this was so, and the mortgages were in the hands of money lenders, some of whom would welcome an opportunity to foreclose. So the peasant led an unhappy and harassed life. The Catholic clergy under the leadership of Wawrzyniak, a truly remarkable man, whom the Poles called the "King of Action," have been active in the organization of the parceling banks. At present, when a peasant is in difficulties, he speaks to his priest or to an officer of the local bank. His affairs are looked into, the small mortgages are taken up, and the bank lends him the necessary money. If the peasant is in trouble through bad management, drink, or other fault of his own, every influence is brought to bear on him to reform him and save his land. If it is necessary to sell a part or the whole of it, it at least does not fall into the hands of the Germans. These banks also furnish the peasant with the means to acquire new land.

Another device developed by the Poles in the land struggle may be called the "great family council," and is based on a peculiar trait of aristocratic Polish society. The noble Polish families are closely related by blood and marriage and show a minute personal interest in the private affairs of one another—a sort of friendly inquisitiveness which we should regard as offensive, but which among themselves is felt to be not only good form but a welcome expression of affection. It is in fact family life extended to a larger circle. This larger family circle is formally represented by a club in the city of Posen called the "Bazar," and not to be a member of this club is not to be in the better Polish world. When now it becomes known that a young land owner is not living properly, and that he is in danger of coming to ruin, a friend speaks to him and advises him to have a conference with the president of the club. This advice is practically mandatory. If he does not follow it he will receive a note from the president of the club requesting him to call and have a talk. If he ignores this he will be expelled

from the club. One of the by-laws of the club is that a member may be expelled for unbecoming conduct. If he is dropped from his club he is dropped from all the connections in life that mean most to him. So he goes. He is then asked how his affairs stand, what debts he has—everything. If he lies on this point, he is also expelled. He is then informed that a committee will take charge of his estate and place him on an annuity until his affairs are re-established. The most skilled men in Posen will then administer his estate at a nominal charge of say M. 500. He signs an agreement to this effect. A paid overseer may also be engaged for say M. 1,500. In this way the land is not lost to his creditors, above all it does not fall into German hands, and the young man may be reformed. It will be seen that the occasion presents a very favorable opportunity for conversion.

In the course of time the press has become the most violent if not the most influential force in the struggle for the development of Polish national spirit. Every small town has its newspaper, and it cannot be denied that some of the newspapers make a business of working on the emotions of the people in a way that not even the more responsible Polish leaders approve. A few editors in fact make it a part of their business to go to jail, and some papers are said to keep two editors, one to go to jail when the term of the other expires. A Mr. Kulerski, editor of the *Gazeta Grudzińska*, published at Graudenz, when sentenced for "exciting to violence," writes something like this: "Dear brothers and fellow-strugglers: When these words reach you, I shall be no longer a free man, but in prison. Therefore it is my wish to address a few final words to you from the threshold of the prison. My sentence has excited great joy among the Pole baiters, but the incident may be made to recoil on their heads if you will rally to the support of the *Gazeta Grudzińska*: 500 new subscribers for every day of imprisonment! That must now be your solution of the matter. If in this way 15,000 new subscribers are secured, our Polish cause will thereby secure a powerful impetus." I must repeat that this "business patriotism" has had a wide condemnation, but the *Gazeta Grudzińska* has a subscription list of 100,000.

Frequently recurring themes in the more sensational of the

newspapers are: Poland must become again an independent power; the Poles are neither true nor loyal Prussian subjects; the Prussians are unwelcome guests in the Polish land; no loyal Pole will illuminate his house or otherwise participate in any Prussian demonstration, such as the celebration of the emperor's birthday; the suppression of the Polish language is a device for killing the intelligence of Polish youth, because the mind cannot be developed normally in a foreign speech; no true Polish girl will marry a German; every true Pole will read the Polish newspapers; the German Catholic is the most dangerous and detestable form of Prussian.

Many of the papers have children's supplements, in which they print and answer letters from children, and praise their expressions of patriotism. Commenting on the report that a schoolboy had said: "William II is only a German king; our Polish king is named Ladislaus and is no longer alive," the paper *Praca* said: "This boy is a proof that nature itself rebels with violence and protests against the doctrine that we are or can be true and loyal German-speaking Poles." The development of the boycott of German and Jewish shops and manufactures has been a particular work of the press, and on this point it has been truly ferocious. Some papers have made it a policy to name or give the initials of Poles who buy from "Strangers," or "Hares," that is Germans, or from "Jerusalemites" or "Hook-noses." "The newly wed Mrs. A., a born Pole, and one who should feel herself particularly identified with Poles because she was recently a saleswoman in a Polish shop, was seen entering a German shop." "The Misses B. are patronizing the Jews. Is this a proper way to show respect for their recently deceased mother?" "And from whom has Mr. Anton bought the pretty necktie? It has indeed the national colors, but was bought from 'Strangers.'" "Swó! do swoich"—each to his own—that is, Buy only from your own people, has become a slogan. "God will punish those who buy from 'Strangers.'" Lists of Polish shops are printed, and lists of the "friends of our enemies" also. Against those selling land to the Germans the press is particularly violent. The following paragraph is from *Lech* (published in Gnesen), May 4, 1906: "Our community has taken steps,

and properly, too, to enrol in a special book the names of those who for a Judas penny have sold their land into the hands of the colonization commission, and in this book will be indicated also the name of the estate and its size, in order that our posterity may know of the infamous deeds of these betrayers of their country and at the same time of the indignation and contempt expressed by the community for the traitors, and may beware of staining its Polish name and heart by similar actions. It is only to be regretted that the pictures of these vendors are not to be contained in the 'black book.' If we only had their pictures before our eyes and could thus impress their features on our memories then we could easily know from whose path we should step aside, before whom we should spit, and whose hand we should decline to shake; for these infamous rascals who have so shamed our dear fatherland deserve nothing better."

It must be understood that the boycott is very real and that it extends to everything "made in Germany." The organization of the peasants has been used in the attempt to exclude all German agricultural implements and machinery. There was developed a plan to import from England and France everything which could not be supplied in Poland. In this respect the boycott has had only a limited success, for Polish firms have long-established relations with German manufacturers, and buy on long credit, and it has been found impossible to break off with them. In some cases Polish firms have been driven to an arrangement with German manufacturers whereby the latter supply the products, but stamped with the name of a Polish firm. But in general the boycott is very bitter, and this is especially so since the inauguration of the policy of expropriation in the fall of 1912.

There are some special psychological features which have tended to make this a losing fight for the Germans. The old German residents of Posen, as we have seen, were only too eager to sell their land to the government. It is not pleasant to be surrounded by and dependent on Poles. The new settlers also have not been altogether happy in their new home. Posen is not an attractive country in comparison with the Rhine region from which many of the settlers came. It is said that the soldiers of Napoleon exclaimed:

"Et voilà ce que les Polonais appellent une patrie!" But most of all, the old residents and the new have felt that they have a powerful patron in the government—that the government must stand by them, that what the individual does is not important, that the government will live and see to it that they live. School teachers receive extra pay for serving in Posen, and sluggish and boycotted German merchants send in an appeal to the Ostmark Verein and receive subsidies. This is the weakness of a secondary group. It is the principle of making something out of the government which we are familiar with among ourselves.

There has been also a growing feeling of discontent with the government policy among the large German land owners who otherwise have remained loyal. They have seen themselves gradually surrounded by small German settlers who take the place of the nobility whose estates have passed into the hands of the commission. Their social circle has been broken up and they find themselves isolated. They also feel that German prestige and the leadership of the nobility in politics is threatened by the influx of settlers, whom they call "the coddled children of the state." So in January, 1909, the Association of German Land Owners held a session in which a demand was made that the commission pay less attention to the settling of peasants and more to the development of large and medium-sized estates. "The peasant," they said, "is indeed politically enfranchised and sits in the community assemblies but without the leadership of the large estates and medium-sized estates he would be powerless." This precipitated a counter-movement among the German settlers. In March, 1909, 1,000 German peasants assembled in Gnesen and the settler Reinecke spoke on the theme: "Have we a vote or not?" and said: "We demand an advisory voice in the managing body of the colonization commission. We demand more part than heretofore in the provincial government, and we will guard ourselves against the establishment by new settlements of so-called permanent estates whose owners might serve as our leaders politically and economically. For the peasant is very well fitted to look out for his own interests and to choose leaders out of his own number. The Poles are our enemies. Against them we will protect ourselves, but

against our friends may God protect us." And shortly afterward a German Peasant Association was formed. There is then at present a dangerous split in the German forces in the Ostmark, and the Poles have not hesitated to enlarge it. A Pole, Morawski by name, issued a very plausible pamphlet, which was taken seriously and echoed by a part of the German press, in which he sought to show that the nobility, both Polish and German, should combine against the rising peasant democracy, and he pointed out that a German song was already current in the provinces:

Michel sagt zu seinem Sohne:
Hol' der Teufel die Barone,
Ob sie deutsch sind oder Polen,
Alle soll der Teufel holen.

Finally, the labor situation at present has an ominous outlook for the Germans. Of the laborers on the German estates 80 per cent are Poles, and these are now thoroughly saturated with the Polish spirit. Lately labor has been organized, and is in a position to strike effectively. But between the Association of Polish Laborers and the Association of Polish Estate Owners an agreement has been reached for the arbitration of all differences through committees. It is apparent that the Poles are therefore in a position to call a general labor strike on the German estates, and no greater calamity can be imagined than a general agrarian strike at harvest time. The Poles threatened to call such a strike if the Prussians carried out the expropriation policy. Why they did not do so I do not know, but I think it is because they did not want to disturb business. For, thanks to the land struggle and the train of events which I have indicated, Polish business has expanded enormously. Last year the president of the largest bank in Posen showed me a report of the condition of the bank. During the past twelve months it had done almost exactly the same amount of business that it had done in the whole of the preceding 24 years of its existence. And then there is the Polish woman who is still reproducing her kind in a generous way, and the question of nationality is after all largely a question of the birth-rate. At any rate, the Poles are quoting an old proverb that "the abbey lasts longer than the abbot."

"SOCIAL ASSIMILATION": AMERICA AND CHINA

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The phrase "social assimilation" has hardly come to have a precise and commonly accepted meaning; but it is sufficiently exact to indicate a field of observation and of critical interpretation of intercourse between members of groups, races, or nations. It is proposed in this paper to discuss a few of the phenomena of relations between Americans and persons in China; but no claim of completeness, adequacy, or authority is suggested. A statement of certain facts of common knowledge may furnish the starting-point of this brief study or hungry interrogation:

1. Since about 1840 trade enterprises, driven by powerful commercial interests, have been pushed in China, with Great Britain in the lead. Many British authors deny that there ever was an aggressive war to force the opium traffic on the Chinese, and that question need not be discussed here. But certain it is, and a matter of boast in our mother-country, that English gunpowder has opened ports and made commerce relatively secure in the Celestial Empire; and that Hongkong remains in the possession of the British government. The French and the Germans have planted their flags on the Continent and occupy fortified centers by force of arms and dread of using them. Under their protection, or in occasional alliance with these powers, the United States have helped to secure an "open door," through which very few of our traders have yet cared to pass with their wares. The statistics of trade between China and the various countries give us a more exact notion of the result up to this time.¹

2. The political relations between China and the United States have steadily become closer. China does not yet belong fully in the group of nations which recognize and respect international law. China still submits to the decisions of foreign courts on her own soil

¹ Given in the *China Year Book*, 1913.

and accepts foreign tax-gatherers at the receipt of customs. The United States embassy at Peking lives in a fort protected by American soldiers, even in time of peace. This must be regarded as a transient situation. Certain it is that many Chinese public men secretly resent and detest the arrangement, and bide the time when a self-respecting treaty may be secured, and the position maintained by Japan. It is one source of friction and ill-concealed grudge. As the United States government was not so prominent as Great Britain in the aggressive military operations which placed China in this position, we do not suffer so much in their esteem and confidence.

3. Certain districts of China feel the painful pressure of population on the means of subsistence, even with a high rate of mortality; and they are seeking an outlet for the surplus in Burmah, the Malayan colonies, and elsewhere. They are energetic, industrious, shrewd, masterful, and successful. They are prosperous, even in Hongkong, under the British flag. Many are looking with longing toward California; some of them know of the efforts of Japan to secure a foothold on this continent; and millions would be ready to come over if there was any hope of having a two-acre farm. The treatment received by their pathfinders on the Pacific Coast has not helped us in our relations with the Chinese, whatever justification it may have had in the supposed necessity for self-defense. The problem of regulation, limitation, or prohibition of Chinese labor is not discussed here on its merits; it is alluded to as a factor in explanation of the difficulties in the way of assimilation of American culture.

4. On the other hand, the American people have done certain acts which are recorded to our credit, and which at banquets, where Chinese orators wish to toss us bouquets, serve for material in flattering addresses. They remind us that when in settlement of claims we were awarded indemnity for wrongs done our countrymen, we told them to keep the money; and they chose to invest its income in education; the "Indemnity College" near Peking is now sending us scores of young fellows, keen, bright, and brotherly. They do not altogether forget that in the last awful famine, when about two million people faced starvation, the Americans led in

organization of relief and contributed about 90 per cent of the foreign funds for mitigating the terrible misery. Yuan Shih-Kai has voiced the sentiment of millions of Chinese people when, before the visiting medical missionaries assembled in the wonderful capital, he manfully acknowledged the debt of his people to our own.

I do not propose to discuss that form of assimilation which springs from intermarriage, important as that subject is. Some day it may come to ask for practical action of some kind; but not now. No doubt we shall hear occasionally of instances of intermarriage, and in certain localities the number may be considerable. Some Chinese students and others have already expressed impatience on the subject. It does not seem worth while to indulge in speculation at present, for many reasons, and partly because the biological basis for the speculations are not yet sufficiently solid for valid conclusions on the racial effects of such unions.

The facts and consequences of exchange of ideas and sentiments seem to be most urgently in need of study for the present. We have here to do chiefly with deeper and more interior, personal phenomena than those of trade, conquest, politics, and international law: (1) What are some of the significant facts and tendencies in the interchange of ideals, sentiments, valuations, standards of character between Chinese and Americans? (2) What are some of the consequences of social intercourse in trade, institutions of education, medical service, and missionary contacts on the inner and intimate life and soul of the Chinese? (3) Does our study of these facts and their consequences throw any light on the probable future of this intercourse? (4) Can we derive from this study any light on the subject of our duty in the situation; whether we have any duty; what it is; how we may best meet the obligations involved? Is it desirable to make any effort to promote or hinder "assimilation," and if so, of what kind?

I

It is common to hear from well-informed writers that the Chinese are a "mystery" to Americans; that they are so peculiar that we can never understand them; so sly and deceptive that we

can never learn the real facts about them. Unquestionably there are both physical and psychical differences; for there are considerable tracts and caverns of our own being of which we have only dim and confused notions. Just as certainly there are shades and refinements of motive and taste, of belief and reverence in the Chinese, which must remain to us *terra incognita*; not to dwell upon the fact that in a population of 400,000,000 people, some children do not know their own fathers, and some misunderstandings may arise about contracts and land marks. At the same time certain chance personal observations and readings have convinced me that there are a few things in the Chinese that we can read off without a dictionary. For example: it is not difficult to see that the Chinese like to eat, and are willing to work hard for food. There is no mystery about the contents of the open fish tanks which the messengers of Canton carry around for their customers. The people shiver with cold, as we do. They occasionally die of typhoid, though Professor Ross finds them somewhat immune, as we are if we survive an attack. They will give a good deal to live; and some of them are ready to die if they must.

Readers of our newspapers should not find it too hard to understand Chinese politics. There is "squeeze" in Peking; "graft" in New York and in the administration of big railways. In China they do many things to "save their face"; while our looters of municipal funds grow indignant when accused and fill the air with the dust of counter-recriminations, meanwhile wearing, somewhat awkwardly, the assumed halo of sainthood and accepting from their partners a double coat of whitewash.

When the governor of Hangchow told me he lived on a salary of \$300 a year and did not mention fees and perquisites, I knew from our experience with county sheriffs and treasurers what must follow. The fee system is rich soil for the roots of rascality in the state of Alabama and in Kwangtung Province. In Chicago our bosses tell us virtue is more robust!

But we may go deeper. In the ethical and poetical literature of China there are gems of purest ray serene. We need not be ashamed to welcome them into world-literature. Someone must have felt the inspiration of those noble sentiments; and there must

have been something which responded to them in a people who have cherished and revered these writings for many generations.

II

What are some of the consequences of contact between the Chinese and Americans? There are so few Americans in China, and they have been there so short a time, that their influence as yet touches comparatively few points; a few soldiers and marines; a few consuls in the most important cities; a few teachers in colleges and schools, private and public; a few medical and evangelizing missionaries; some traders of various grades of integrity and character. It would be impossible to describe all the consequences which have come from the occasional and limited contacts of our citizens with those of China; much less to give any numerical or true measure of the extent of these influences. Who can tell what the crop will be from seed buried temporarily under the sheet of winter snow? No one has yet set forth in more fascinating and picturesque phrase some of the manifest fruits of these relations than our own Professor Ross, of whose book on the *Changing Chinese* a high authority told me in Peking: "I have found some errors in little things; but in all the big things he is right."

One consequence is that China is seeking Western science and art; not all China, but the most prescient and influential persons. The example of Japan and the humiliating defeat which the big nation suffered at her hands have compelled a study of the causes. Recently the flood of Chinese students to Japan has been diminished and the number sent to Europe and America is increasing; while in government schools teachers from the West are installed in considerable numbers.

It may be easy to exaggerate the importance of these facts. The people of China are numerous and self-satisfied; proud of their ancient culture and achievements; and the means of communication are imperfect. The movement of ideas is obstructed by prejudice, ignorance, and custom. Corrupt politicians, there, as here, are suspicious of any change which threatens to curtail their power to loot and spoil. Reactions and revolutions must be expected; splendid promises and pitiful performances; delays and intrigue;

treacherous diplomacy and open defiance. All these obstacles will give the critics of China abundant food for gossip, and to aggressive powers excuses for armed intervention, especially when commercial interests, not always clean, appeal to the honor of their country's flag whenever railway or mining stocks decline and interest on bonds is difficult to collect.

In spite of these reactionary movements and these pessimistic prophecies, one does not need to draw from the spring of national optimism to justify a sober hope of the gradual transformation of Chinese ideals, ethics, education, diplomacy, commerce. There is a sound root and trunk to Chinese character; amazing industry; wonderful capacity; a persistence and solidarity of national life which has held together the peoples of many widely extended provinces for aeons. Already in particular instances we see what a Chinese man may become when, though still Chinese, he enriches his mind with the scientific and ethical ideas won by the Western world. What has happened in a few cases may become general—even universal.

III

What is the probable future of these relations? Enough has been said to indicate that some kind of contact is inevitable. It does not seem possible to tear down the wonderful Chinese wall and use the stones for a barrier along our Pacific Coast.

1. The American manufacturers have already begun to study the Chinese markets with keener interest. If British, German, and French traders are eager to have a share in the enterprises of mining, building railways and bridges, selling coal oil, textile machinery, electric light and power companies, cotton and silk mills, etc., then our Americans of energy and vision are certain to seek a share, whenever the demands of the home market are not adequate. China has many articles of export which we want.

For economic reasons it does not seem probable that we can avoid closer contact.

2. Our methods of dealing with immigration are a constant insult to the pride of all Orientals. They seem willing to accept laws of exclusion based on economic grounds, but feel keenly that

discrimination in favor of European laborers must be protested against with all the force of their national feeling. This sentiment is sure to grow and must be reckoned with. The discrimination against the Chinese on grounds of race will continue to rankle in the oriental soul and the hatred it induces will wait only the moment of our weakness to find expression.

3. As a member of the group of nations which recognize the ethical principles of international law we cannot avoid our share of responsibility for steadily insisting on those principles in the East. This means that our diplomacy must penetrate the sentiments, customs, administration, and legislation of China; for China cannot be fully admitted to the privileges of the international law group of nations while its revenue system remains mediaeval, its criminal law and procedure archaic, its central government despotic and feeble, its local administration corrupt and oppressive.

4. We have gone too far in our voluntary efforts to promote science and education in the East to retreat unless compelled by insurmountable obstacles.

5. Without discussing the dogmas or beliefs of missionaries, or the wisdom and sanity of some of their purposes, no interpretation of the situation is complete without taking missionary efforts into account. Science and education are mediated chiefly by missionaries, including the Y.M.C.A. Recent history shows that the capacity for martyrdom has not been exhausted. The beliefs which actuate missionaries are of the stuff which robs death, not of its terrors, but of its inhibiting power. The governments might remove their protection from these enthusiasts and enough of them would remain to keep the bond between the peoples alive. Furthermore, there are thousands of Chinese who also are ready to die for this faith; and thousands of them who are not converts who have seen enough of our missions and schools to desire their continuance.

IV

Have Americans any obligations of duty to China? We may remind ourselves of the hard-won achievement of social science, the discovery that the ascent of man is no longer left to the control of natural selection and blind instinct. Even in the ethics and politics

of Plato and Aristotle the aims of general welfare became motives to concerted volition. The negative policy of *laissez faire* is yielding to the positive and constructive policy of scientific investigation and co-operative effort to promote the common good. Nations are determined to have something to say about their own future to fate and to despots.

The word "ought" in social science begins to make conquest of the word "must," which is the last word of nature sciences. And the conduct which ought to be is no longer determined by some vague appeal to "justice," "natural law," "law of nations," but by the largest and most exact possible array of facts in the relations of conditions and consequences to welfare. In this vast and complex calculation of consequences, certain or probable, economic and physical welfare must take no more than a fair and reasonable place at the banquet of life; the higher ends of personality, to which wealth and health are, in the phrase of Carlyle, mere "preliminary items," are coming to be counted in social science as realities. Furthermore, we are surely passing beyond the political ethics of Machiavelli, which helped temporarily to build nations, and which, having achieved its end, should be laid away in the historical museum with other dried and dead specimens. Even Bismarck is becoming obsolete. That calculation of social science which omits the highest form of welfare of the 400,000,000 people of China deserves scant notice. The facts are too vast to ignore. The exploitation theory of colonization may sometimes still be followed by private greed, but it is solemnly disowned in politics and diplomacy. The Belgian infamies on the Congo, and the treatment of Indian laborers in South Africa, only serve to evoke cries of horror and reprobation among civilized peoples; they would not be tolerated in China.

The argument of this brief and inadequate statement has for its issue these demands of social morality:

Contact with China is inevitable. Intercourse with the Chinese people through trade, education, travel, missions, and diplomacy must grow. The consequences of this increasing intercourse must be felt in all the interests of our nation and of mankind. The movement, which is irresistible, requires for its rational direction

all the resources of social science to master and present the entire causal series of phenomena, and so present them that the federation of the world can be guided on the way of justice, culture, fair dealing, elevation of the whole human race.

It is just the distinction of true science that it makes common knowledge more systematic and complete; that it ignores the selfish considerations, prejudices, and national pride which conceal the merits and rights of strangers and exaggerate the importance of the interests which are near; that it takes into account all elements which may help to visualize and comprehend the entire problem; and thus it brings to law, diplomacy, commerce, education, philanthropy, and religion that mastery of knowledge which illuminates the progress of mankind on its royal highway to ever-increasing wisdom, beauty, justice, brotherhood, and intimations of endless hope and striving.

TEKNONYMY

ELSIE CLEWS PARSONS

New York City

Four hypotheses have been put forward in explanation of the practice of naming parents after their children. It has been suggested that (1) teknonymy marks a transition from matronymy to patronymy,¹ that (2) it recognizes the right of the father in the home of the maternal grandparents,² that (3) it is a survival from the original familyless group in which first the mother and then the father wished to show that she or he was actually the parent of the child.³ The fourth hypothesis is one of parental contact and protection. By taking their child's name, by identifying themselves with him, parents put themselves into touch with the child and are thereby enabled to shield him.⁴

The first two hypotheses are untenable, as Steinmetz has pointed out,⁵ because in many cases both parents take the name of the child, and in Fiji the mother only takes it. Steinmetz' own hypothesis, the third, presupposes not only an original promiscuity between the sexes, a supposition far from verified; it presupposes also ignorance of maternity as well as of paternity, considering the duration of human infancy an incredible condition. The fourth hypothesis, the identification or union hypothesis, is also untenable. It is proved untenable by the very cases of teknonymy its author cites. Why should the parents desire to protect only their firstborn child? (In most cases they take his name only.) Then how explain the less common practice of parents taking a child's name only when he reaches puberty or only when he becomes distinguished, making a name for himself? It is the young child who

¹ By Wilken. See S. R. Steinmetz, *Ethnologische Studien zur ersten Entwicklung der Strafe*, II, 236 (Leiden and Leipzig, 1894).

² Tylor, *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, XVIII (1888-89), 248-50.

³ Steinmetz, II, 240.

⁴ E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, p. 428.

⁵ *Ethnologische Studien zur ersten Entwicklung der Strafe*, II, 239-40.

stands most in need of protection against supernatural as well as natural foes, and a son grown famous is *a priori* better able to look after himself than a son socially obscure.

Against these descent and protection theories of teknonymy I should like to advance what may be called a theory of family shyness. On this hypothesis teknonymy is merely one case of the widespread practice of avoiding the use of a personal name by substituting a status name, a title, or a nickname. Calling a woman Mother of So-and-So, a man, Father of So-and-So lets you out just as do other kinship names from the embarrassing use of her or his personal name. Teknonymy is a means of concentrating attention upon kinship or status, diverting it, to the comfort of the family, from the individual to his or her position. The child serves as a barrier between his parents and the rest of the family group. The parent loses himself or herself in the child. Through the child the personality of the parent may be the better ignored. Children are a kind of armor, armor of one parent against the other, of parent against grandparent, of parent against outsider. The child becomes the center of attention, as we say, protecting one adult personality from another. Can we not see this performance going on among ourselves any day in almost any group of children and adults? Conversation is not possible with children present, we say. Why? They distract your attention. Why? But conversation of a kind does go on with children present, and when we notice the highly conventionalized character of it—particularly between unsophisticated mothers or nurses—it is quite apparent to what use the child is being put. The child serves as a buffer. To look at the child instead of at one another, to “make conversation” about the child instead of getting into touch with one another, is a comfort to those who are disquieted by a direct personal relationship and who are yet “sociably inclined.” And so we have here in their manner and talk an expression of what in other cultures is more formally expressed in teknonymy.

EDITORIAL

SHALL SCIENCE BE STERILIZED?

The esoteric group which produces the *ex cathedra* deliverances of the *New York Evening Post* is made up of gentlemen conventionalized into imposing facility in giving plausibly Pickwickian utterance to fatuous prepossessions.

A recent instance is a laboriously sophistical editorial, which ingeniously darkens counsel by solemnly chiding a sociologist for "mistaking his mission," when he exhorts his fellow social scientists not to be content with card-indexing the past or the present, but to subordinate that process to constructive work upon the future.

There is a pedantry which convinces itself that adding a decimal place to the precision of the location of the boundary line between the science and the art of medicine is a more worthy pursuit than finding out how to adapt medical knowledge to practice. There is a smugness which classifies an application of ascertained facts to a patentable invention as a discovery "of the head," while it treats endeavor to use ascertained facts for the betterment of human relations as an impotent impudence "of the heart." There is a journalistic prudery which regards itself as licensed, not to say divinely appointed, to read into the words of anyone who ventures an unconventional opinion whatever glosses are necessary in order to convict the innovator of folly. By some mysterious law of association, these platitudes are suggested by the essay in question.

Much of the recurrent discussion as to whether a given activity is "scientific" or not is a mere matter of the use of terms. Much of it merely raises questions of boundaries between different phases of mental activities, which must pass through the whole circuit from stimulus, through knowledge, and feeling, and volition and the technique of execution, or sink into the rank of abortions. Much of it is merely dogmatic disguise for the amiable conceit that systematic effort toward ends which the dogmatizers approve is scientific, while equally systematic effort toward ends which the dogmatizers disapprove is unscientific. Let us relax our features in the appropriate smiles!

Pathetic solicitude about the sanctity of science is one of the most convenient finding-marks of *laissez-faire* philosophy. If knowledge

can only be so sterilized that it is in no danger of fertilizing action which might disturb the equilibrium of things-as-they-are, your *laissez-passez* theorist will furnish forth all its natal anniversaries with verbal nose-gays, and enjoy his full quota of sleep in peace. But there is a cry of abomination in the traditionalist camp whenever knowledge of things as they are, and as they need not be, except by grace of general consent, moves a scientist to be true to himself as more-than-scientist, by investigating how facts as they are known may be controlled, by appeal from general consent to better instructed general consent, in the interest of situations more worthy to be. This is solemn trifling; and judicially minded men who have been trained in scientific methods and who know both the limitations and the uses of science, know that it is either a conscious pose, or it is pompous ignorance. In either case it is worth noticing simply for the sake of reaffirming the proposition that scholars stultify themselves if they adopt a conception of science which bars or exempts them from sharing in constructive work.

To be sure, there are areas of scientific inquiry which do not now and may never yield results which can appreciably affect the conduct of life. The men who devote themselves to research in these fields cannot of course be expected to make first-hand contributions from their specialty to problems of human action. On the other hand, it really amounts to a demand that life shall be rated as an irrational procedure at best, and that it be accepted as such, if we call thinking and other activities unscientific in the degree that, so far as our knowledge goes, they are contingent. Compared with the whole content of human activities, our total of science conclusive enough to furnish demonstrative authorization even of our routine programs is woefully small. Nevertheless, we neither doom ourselves to inaction till science becomes inerrantly prophetic, nor do we brand ourselves as unscientific, when we eat our breakfast without possessing indubitable proof that it will not poison us; or when we go to our daily work without sure knowledge that our next footfall will not close the chain of causation that will stop the action of brain or heart; or when we put the telephone receiver to our ear without infallible assurance that it will not end our lives with a shock. In our contacts with our fellow-men, we should mark time till we dropped lifeless, if we waited for unquestionable evidence that their actions would correspond to our expectations.

Life in society is experimental at best, so far as human powers of prognostication are concerned. Deliberate experimentation of society, by society, for society, may be just as scientific as individual or group

experimentation in the laboratory. The constructive spirit among social scientists is not a disposition to act, regardless of the state of knowledge. That would surely be unscientific. It is rather a purpose to use all the extant or obtainable knowledge pertinent to the situation in question, first, in forming conclusions as to the degree in which the situation utilizes all the resources in sight for human advantage; second, in visualizing conditions indicated by knowledge not yet fully applied in the programs of life; and third, in stimulating experimental effort to work out programs which will turn the unutilized resources into realizing the vision.

In form and in spirit all this is as loyal to the laws of science as the efforts of Darwin and Wallace to solve the mysteries of organic variation, or of the Curies to learn the properties of radium. It is, furthermore, that better thing than science—that more-than-science, which loyalty to life demands, viz., application of such science as there is to inquisitive experience that may at once enlarge the range of living, or that in any event will increase our knowledge of the difficulties of enlarging the range of living.

When the do-nothingists warn scholars not to enter the field of social experiment, because it is not science, they are as silly as if they should exhort farmers not to send their children to school on the ground that education is not farming.

THE "SOCIAL CONCEPT" BUGBEAR

In the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* for November, 1913, Professor L. H. Haney has the first of two papers on "The Social Point of View in Economics." The discussion is a highly technical critique of four different types of interpretation of the "social" reality: viz., (1) the *social-contract* theory, (2) the *social organism* theory, (3) the *common-consciousness* theory, and (4) the *conscious-commonness* theory.

It would rouse suspicions of insincerity or of jealousy if a sociologist should object to such a discussion in itself. If it stood alone, as a contribution to pure sociological theory, we should refer to it with great appreciation, although we should take issue with some of its positions. Our present point is that Professor Haney starts with an entirely indefensible and confusing assumption about that in "a social point of view" which need be taken into account by economics, or anything else outside the confines of pure sociology.

Interest in running down remote implications of the concept "social"

has occupied the writer of this paragraph a large part of his time for more than twenty-five years, and he hopes to do further work in the same line. He is happy to confess, however, that not least among the things that he values, as the upshot of all this study, is his ability to testify, with a clear mind and a clean conscience, that nobody, except the professional sociologist or the student who is getting a part of his education from pure sociology, need bother his head a moment about the range of conceptional subtlety to which Professor Haney refers. This is not a concession that the higher sociology—to coin a convenient phrase—is of no further use. On the contrary, the relations of “the higher sociology” to men’s affairs are closely analogous with the relation of “the higher mathematics” to everyday reckonings. On the one hand, the most abstruse mathematical reasonings have bearings and values beyond the immediate interests of mathematicians. On the other hand, it is not necessary to have taken sides on mooted questions in the logic of mathematics, in order to be a good bookkeeper.

The elements of everything that the most penetrating search can find from “a social point of view” are on exhibition in every family, or schoolroom, or workshop, or playground, or other everyday meeting-place of two or more persons. It is these literal elements that are important in all judgments of conduct, not the elaborations and refinements and generalizations through which these elements become material for philosophical systems. The latter, as we have said, have their uses, but they are not uses that justify dragging them into connections where they embarrass more immediate concerns.

Professor Haney is quite within the truth in hinting that the adjective “social” covers a multitude of squints. Some of these may be clearer, and in a straighter line, than others. At all events, it is hard to know what the term means in the mouth of a given person. Attempts to show what it ought to mean have been more or less responsible for wide variations in sociological theory.

On the other hand, we repeat that, except in details which need not concern anyone but the sociological specialist, there is no important difference among sociologists about the substantial matter referred to by the word “social.” Moreover, everything essential in the concept “social” may be fully taken into account for all practical purposes, outside of technical sociology, without bothering in the least about the types of philosophical construction to which Professor Haney refers as the leading social conceptions.

The plain matter of fact with which all our sociologizings start is

that no person exists in a moral vacuum. Contradiction of everything like a moral vacuum conception of the lot of persons is the sum and substance predicated in all accurate sociological uses of the term "social." That is, every person's life touches other persons' lives. These contacts with others receive or transmit influences, and usually they do some quantity of both. Any "social point of view" is merely a way of trying to visualize this rudimentary fact on some large scale intended to insure distinctness and proportion in all surveys of that give-and-take relationship in actual life. Whatever their preferences among the types of general exhibit that have been proposed, the sociologists regard each and all of these efforts at symbolization as so many algebraic formulas, so to speak, for the terms of which we must find the quantitative and qualitative values whenever we are dealing with an actual situation. In other words, whether we have in the backs of our heads one of the technical schemes of sociological analysis or not, if we are trying to understand the factors involved in a real human experience, say the break-up of a family, the strike in the Calumet district, or our relations with Mexico, we face the fact that the crisis as it stands is the result of a combination of gives and takes between people, and any resolution of the crisis whatever will be another combination of gives and takes between people. If our purpose is merely to understand how the crisis came about, or how a given settlement works, our task is to ferret out, on the one hand, as many as possible of the influences which culminated in the crisis, with as much as we can learn about the relative force of each, or to discover the different lines of influence set in operation by the settlement. If we are personally concerned with either situation, and if our problem is what to do under the circumstances, then "a social point of view" means consideration of the whole problem as an affair of the effect upon all the persons concerned of each possible alternative, and choice of action in accordance with the estimated balance of interests. In other words, taking problems of conduct as the illustrations, "a social point of view" means keeping the questions always open: What specific lines of influence will spring from the possible alternatives? and What do these prospective effects of action indicate as to obligation, in view of all the interests depending on the decision? In a nutshell, this is all there is in any "social point of view," no matter how ambitious the amplifications to which it leads.

Otherwise expressed, "a social point of view," as related to present problems, is an outlook upon life which, in every situation, keeps the question to the fore: Just what different human interests are concerned

here; how will each of them be affected by the different lines of action that are possible in the situation; and what does the weighing of all these influences with one another show about what is just and reasonable, considering all the circumstances?

"A social point of view" does not turn out then to be anything mystical or metaphysical or schematic or even novel. In its essence it is merely paying due attention to the most obvious commonplace in human life.

THE FORD MOTOR COMPANY INCIDENT

Out of all the publicity given to the plan of the Ford Motor Company for distributing its profits, only one clearly demonstrated proposition emerges, viz., the scheme illustrates on a large scale the much-disputed commonplace that, even in business, men act from mixed motives, not solely from desire for gain.

We might put the most cynical interpretation upon the facts. We might assume that in Mr. Ford's calculation, a voluntary contribution of ten million dollars to the annual wage of the help in his concern will in the end buy more than its equivalent, in advertising, and in the loyalty and efficiency of his employees. Even if that were the whole story, the case would remain a spectacular exhibition of the play of consideration for fellow-workmen, as a factor in the pursuit of profits in a single instance.

We are far, however, from accepting this ungenerous interpretation. We believe that Mr. Ford's motives are as unselfish as they appear. We are heartily in sympathy with his apparent purpose. We believe it is a move in a direction which corporate management will ultimately take. At the same time it is prudent for academic theorists to reflect that such a variation from custom must for a long time rate as on trial before an incredulous world. There is certainly room for candid doubt whether Mr. Ford's method of carrying out praiseworthy intentions was the wisest which further consideration might have suggested. Although the parallel is by no means close, the accounts of the Detroit program thus far published have actually reminded us of those early philanthropic orgies in which Tolstoi scattered coins indiscriminately among street crowds.

The social problem which Mr. Ford confronted reduces to this: Under the present workings of our technical equipment, together with the legal, economic, and moral institutions within which the equipment operates, a yearly dividend is credited to our stock which makes the

wages of our help look small. Is the contrast something that is caused wholly by the unalterable nature of things or partly by something in the legal, economic, or moral system under which we are working? If the latter factors have any share in the result, what is there about them that might be changed if we only thought so, and that we should agree upon the necessity of changing if we got a more correct view of industrial relations? Assuming that these questions have received specific answers, to the effect that the actual contrasts in distribution are to a certain extent real anomalies, and that these anomalies would be reduced or removed if certain changes were made in our fundamental business assumptions and practices, what is the wisest method on the whole of readjusting ourselves to our own convictions about the situation?

Taking the Ford program at face value then, in contrast with the supposition which we have dismissed, the alternative chosen amounts to this: Without waiting to convince anybody else, without being halted by the bogey of possible disturbing effects of our action upon market conditions in general, without allowing ourselves to be held up by thought of conceivable evil consequences, for a large body of workmen, of a sudden change of fortune, which will make them exceptional in their several divisions of labor, we will at once, in our own business, put into effect the conclusions which we have reached about a proper scheme of distribution. We think our stock has a legal claim to at least ten million dollars a year which belongs morally to our help. We will accordingly relinquish our legal claim to that sum, and divide it among the employees as justly as possible.

If Mr. Ford had waited for preliminary demonstrations of the effects of all thinkable alternatives, upon all the interests affected, neither he nor his children nor his children's children would have had the proofs at hand which would have justified any innovation at all. Nobody knows, and nobody can know until experience has presented the facts as something already in the past, all the effects of a modification such as Mr. Ford has adopted. In the same way no one could be sure in advance of the detailed and total effects of a Wilson tariff or currency bill. The moral from this fact is that men of affairs have incessantly to choose between letting things alone and running a measure of risk in attempting improvement.

It is an old and frequent saying that there can be no such thing as social science, because there can be no social experimentation in the scientific sense. This is a mere fraction of a truth. The social scientist cannot put persons into a test tube, as chemists can manipulate matter.

On the other hand, human life is incessant experimentation, conscious or unconscious, intended or unintended. Whenever a man and a woman mate, whenever two men form a partnership, whenever a legislature enacts a law, whenever voters elect an official, an experiment is performed which may have precisely the same degree of value as a scientific datum as any experiment in the laboratory. The detail that the scientific observer in the former instances may have no control over the experiments does not signify, so far as their evidential value is concerned, provided only that the observer admits no mistakes into his calculations of the conditions under which the experiments were performed. The social observer simply has a different kind of task, and a more difficult one, from that of the laboratory observer. The extra difficulty is principally connected with this more complicated task of checking up the conditions.

On the other hand, the experimentation which it is the social scientist's task to generalize is of a much less artificial sort than the experiments of the laboratory. When men try to run a political machine, or a religious sect, or an academic organization, they are trying to make means serve ends in the actual medium in which their purposes must succeed, if they succeed at all. Such experiments are consequently the most searching and instructive tests of the means, or of the ends, or both. If they succeed, or if they fail, the success or the failure at the same time does more to indicate the reasons for success or failure, and to demonstrate conditions in which success or failure is probable, than is the rule with laboratory experiments.

Regardless of its philanthropic phase then, and from the purely scientific standpoint, the Ford experiment is as commendable in its way as an attempt to discover an antitoxin for a baffling disease. From this same standpoint, too, the experiment can hardly be worthless. It will surely lead to results that will change, in one way or another, the state of the evidence about a good many industrial relations. Even if it should turn out to be a disappointment to some or all of the parties directly concerned, they and the rest of the world should be wiser for the experience. It is certainly to be hoped that a program with so much in its favor, on the side of human fellowship, will yield a large surplus of good over bad results.

REVIEWS

Glimpses of the Cosmos: A Mental Autobiography. Vol. I, "Adolescence to Manhood." Pp. lxxxix+244. Vol. II, "Scientific Career Inaugurated." Pp. xiii+464. Vol. III, "Dynamic Sociology." Pp. 11+434. By LESTER F. WARD. New York: Putnam, 1913.

These first three of the twelve volumes of which the series is to consist will be received with delight by all careful students of the author's major works. The advertisement says:

The volumes comprised in the series contain the collected essays of Dr. Ward, representing contributions minor in compass, but in most cases of first importance in character, which have been brought into print during a series of years, and which are here accompanied by sketches at once biographical and historical. The volumes present not merely the writings of this distinguished thinker and author, but may be described as recording, so to speak, the evolution of his brain.

Those who not only knew Dr. Ward's works but were also within his circle of acquaintance will find in these volumes invaluable means of understanding him more intimately. They reveal him more distinctly as a great man—not merely as a great craftsman in two broad scientific fields—greater even than those of us who rated him highest had estimated. To students of the development of knowledge and theory about social relations who have never discovered Ward, these books will furnish a key to a body of literature, with a stimulus to study it, without knowledge of which one of the most significant and creditable developments during the last thirty years of American life could be but superficially understood.

Until the present contents of sociology are absorbed and redistributed into systems that will arise in the future, no one can be thoroughly informed about sociology unless he is familiar with Ward's thinking, and unless he has arrived at precise agreements or disagreements with him, and knows the reasons why. Readers of this *Journal* do not get their judgments on such matters from reviewers. It is necessary, therefore, to confine this notice to certain reactions which may be recorded as the latest of a long series of individual impressions about phases of Dr. Ward's character and work.

I have known for twenty-five years that Ward was exceptionally methodical. His command of the literature of his subjects, down to brief and fugitive observations, has challenged my wonder; yet I have often queried whether the labor necessary to control such auxiliaries was worth while. The section entitled, "History of the Present Work" (I, pp. xxiii-lvi), throws much light upon his methods, and indicates that it was the habit of making entries in time, in accordance with a thorough system, which accumulated an apparatus of references by the use of interstitial moments which men without such a system would have wasted. The same results would be bought too dear by men who had to gain them without his economies. Even with this explanation, added to the statements in the text and the internal evidences as to the assistance rendered by Mrs. Cape, Mrs. Comstock, and Miss Simons, I am amazed that while the regular work of a professor was in progress, the mass of minute and difficult editing involved in the plan of this work could have been accomplished between October, 1909, and April, 1913.

In my editorial relations with Ward, which extended from his contribution to the first number of this *Journal* (July, 1895) to our correspondence about the last two manuscripts which he prepared for publication (see this *Journal*, May, 1913, pp. 737 and 814), I came to have something closely approaching awe for his terrific mental drive. It was the more impressive because it was utterly without fuss or fluster. He never for a moment seemed to be trying to get his bearings in a fog. He always knew where he was, and the direction in which he wanted to move, and the means at his command for holding his course. When he could not undertake a piece of work he stated the reasons, and they were almost mathematically convincing. He accepted an engagement with equal promptness. He seemed to have no accumulated hindrances to remove. He was as ready as an express locomotive watered and coaled and fired for its run. He was exactly punctual in keeping his promises; and of all the writers whose copy I have handled he made the fewest corrections in the proof. His papers always came to me in his own handwriting, which was of rugged size and form, and compositors told me that it was better for their purpose than typewriting. The volumes at hand reflect all these characteristics; and it seems to me that graduate students who have never seen the author will find it a liberal training in precision, not to speak of sociology and botany, to become acquainted with his method.

In one respect I am seriously disappointed in these volumes. I had

hoped that they would do something toward clearing up what has always been to me the mystery of his attitude toward religion. I have wanted to know what his early contacts with religious opinions could have been, to have left him in such a naïve state of mind toward religious ideas and religious people. There is practically nothing in these volumes to satisfy this desire. Just as Ward's prevailing interests as a botanist were in histology and morphology, rather than in ecology, so in sociology and biography he seemed to feel that there was a self-sufficient structure of his thinking, and that any reference to the surroundings in which the structure took shape was irrelevant, or at least superfluous.

Accordingly, in his "Personal Remark" (I, pp. lvii-lxxxix), there are only two items from which inferences bearing on this subject might be drawn, and they merely serve to emphasize the unanswered questions. In the first place, Dr. Ward refers to his maternal grandfather with the casual remark, "who I believe was a clergyman" (*op. cit.*, p. lxviii). In the second place, he calls the place where his parents lived during his eleventh and twelfth years, ". . . only headquarters . . . a place . . . for my parents to have social and religious society" (*ibid.*, p. lxxi). Beyond this I have discovered not a syllable which might be taken as a guide to his religious associations. Whatever we might suppose about the religious atmosphere of the home as thus vaguely indicated, the boy was not in that home after he was fourteen, and there is not the slightest indication of further religious contacts until recoils from them begin to appear in his writings, starting for example with the editorial written at the age of twenty-seven, on "The Present Age" (*ibid.*, p. 48).

From the viewpoint of Ward's own aims in editing these volumes, viz., to exhibit the histological development of his own mind (*ibid.*, p. xiv), this hiatus is deplorable. No one is scientifically interested today in studying the evolution of anything, if it must be considered in isolation from its environment. That detachment leaves us merely the result of the evolution minus the principal factors of its process. We can find out what Ward thought, but in this connection, at any rate, we cannot find out what is much more worth finding out, viz., why he thought it.

Ward's attitude toward religious beliefs and those who professed them was very much like that of a model housewife toward a slattern. In either case the monster in question would rate as inexplicable and intolerable and inexcusable. To Ward's mind, until long after the publication of *Dynamic Sociology*, what religious people understood as

reverence for truth was merely benighted and stubborn refusal to be taught the truth. While I think his religious philosophy was in substance nearer right than wrong, his manner of treating religious opinion was unfortunately lacking in what the Germans call *Schliff*; and his utterances on religious subjects were often in a tone which tended to confirm religious people in the impression that the sort of science for which he spoke was itself defiance of truth.

My acquaintance with Ward began in correspondence over this feature in *Dynamic Sociology*. I asked him why he felt called upon to say things in the book which were immaterial to its argument, and which would gratuitously wound the feelings of religious people. His reply was: "I was not writing for the weak minded." He had no working measure of the strength of mind it has always cost individuals who were in and of resolute religious groups merely to begin tentative criticism of the *mores* of those groups.

In fact, Ward was tilting at certain types of theology, not at religion; and so far as I could discover he never successfully differentiated the two. His feelings softened, however, notably in later years. In New Orleans a decade ago, he said to me, while we were chatting over the lunch-table: "I've changed my views about religion. I see now that it has a function in society." Some of the papers which will appear in later volumes of the present series will illuminate this remark.

From my earliest acquaintance with Ward, I have had no doubt that he was a genuinely religious man; and as a moral matter I have never had a more serious reaction than amusement at his inability to recognize himself in that character. He was a prophet of righteousness as uncompromising as Amos or Hosea, but what he regarded as truth was so clear to him that he could not see how people who had not reached his outlook could be honest.

Among all the other subjects which a glance through these volumes tempts one to discuss, I mention but two more. The first is the paper entitled, "Mind as a Social Factor" (III, 361). It was completed and published in 1884. I do not remember that I had seen it until these volumes reached me. So far as I am aware, it is the most compact and forcible formulation that Ward ever made of the radical conception, developed in *Dynamic Sociology* in 1883, which displaced the Spencerian type of fatalistic evolutionism in American social theory. The main thesis of the essay is contained in these paragraphs (III, 367):

. . . modern scientific philosophers fail to recognize the true value of the *psychic factor*. Just as the metaphysicians lost their bearings by an empty

worship of mind, and made philosophy a plaything, so the modern evolutionists have missed their mark by degrading mind to the level of mechanical force. They seem thus about to fling away the grand results that the doctrine of evolution cannot otherwise fail to achieve. Far be it from me to appeal to the prejudices of the enemies of science by casting opprobrium upon scientific deductions, but when I consider the tendencies which are now so unmistakable, and which are so certainly the consequence of the protracted study, on the part of leading scientists, of the unquestionable methods of nature, I think I can, though holding precisely opposite opinions, fully sympathize with Carlyle in characterizing the philosophy of evolution as a "Gospel of dirt."

But I need not longer dwell upon the blighting influence of this construction of the known laws of nature. Let us approach the kernel of the problem.

The *laissez-faire* doctrine fails to recognize that, in the development of mind, a virtually *new power* was introduced into the world. To say that this has been done is no startling announcement. It is no more than has taken place many times in the course of the evolution of living and feeling beings out of the tenuous nebulae of space. For, while it is true that nature makes no leaps, while, so long as we consider their beginnings, all the great steps in evolution are due to minute increments repeated through vast periods, still, when we survey the whole field, as we must do to comprehend the scheme, and contrast the extremes, we find that nature has been making a series of enormous strides and reaching from one plane of development to another. It is these independent achievements of evolution that the true philosopher must study.

Not to mention the great steps in the cosmical history of the solar system and of the earth, we must regard the evolution of protoplasm, the physical basis of life, as one of those gigantic strides which thenceforth completely revolutionized the surface of our planet. The development of the cell as the unit of organization was another such stride. The origin of vertebrate life introduced a new element, and the birth of man wrought still another transformation. These are only a few of nature's revolutions. Many more will suggest themselves. And although in no single one of these cases can it be said at what exact point the new essence commenced to exist, although the development of all these several expressions of nature's method of concentrating her hitherto diffused forces was accomplished through an unbroken series of minute transitional increments continued through eons of time, still, it is not a whit less true that each of these grand products of evolution, when at length fully formed, constituted a new cosmic energy and proceeded to stamp the future products and processes with a character hitherto wholly unknown upon the globe. . . .

It has always been a marvel to my comprehension that wise men and philosophers, when smitten with the specious logic of the *laissez-faire* school, can close their eyes to the most obtrusive fact that civilization presents. In spite of the influence of philosophy, all forms of which have thus far been negative and nihilistic, the human animal with his growing intellect has still ever

realized the power that is vouchsafed through mind, and has ever exercised that power. Philosophy would have long since robbed him of it, and caused his early extermination from the earth, but for the persistence, through heredity, of the impulse to exercise in self-preservation every power in his possession; by which practice alone he first gained his ascendancy ages before philosophy began.

The great fact, then, to which I allude is that, in spite of all philosophy, whether mythological, metaphysical, or naturalistic, declaring that man must and can do nothing, he *has*, from the very dawn of his intelligence, been transforming the entire surface of the planet he inhabits. No other animal performs anything comparable to what man performs. This is solely because no other possesses the developed psychic faculty.

The paper from which these extracts are made should have a place in the double-starred literature of sociological instruction.

Only a word need be said about the second of these minor subjects. Have any of the sociologists joined the Bergson cult? I do not know how persistent the affection is, but those of us who have not suffered from it will probably be more interested than those who have at finding a diagnosis of the disease in Ward's best vein, in the first volume at the close of the "Personal Remark" (pp. lxxxiii-lxxxviii). Ward never pricked a bubble more neatly.

We shall report the other volumes in the series as fast as they appear.

ALBION W. SMALL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Unpopular Review. Vol. I, No. 1 (January, 1914), pp. 226.

Published quarterly by Henry Holt & Co. Single copies 75c, \$2.50 a year.

Since *Puck* and *Judge* passed into the category of class organs, and *Life* is no longer as unexpected as at first, the United States of America has become a vast stomach gnawing with hunger for a steady diet of strictly high-grade humor. With a single regret we greet this first evidence that an inexhaustible source of supply for the demand has been tapped. The title chosen for this gurgling spring of revivification will retard discovery of its soul-refreshing properties by the multitude, until philanthropists like ourselves have spread abroad the news that, barring its whimsical taboo of a catchy label, it has all the requisites of a potential best-seller. Since the soul of humor is dramatic juxtaposition of things out of their places and proportions, and since the folk-soul is a garbage heap of things whose displacements and disproportions miss being humor-

ous merely from lack of the dramatic motif, there is an evident chemical affinity between this beatification of bathos and the average mind, which will not long be denied. *Unpopular* indeed! It cannot be many days before the greedy public will be storming the bargain counters for fresh loaves of this bread of life. If the title had only been *Everybody's Foolishnesses Solemnly Parodied*, or *Mediocrity Magnified*, no one would have had the slightest hesitation in jumping at the just appraisal that here at last is humorous literature which gets its effects by that touch of nature which makes all men kin—unflinching conviction that the evils of things as they are must vanish before dogmatic asseveration of things as they ought not to be.

This leads us to remark that the greatness of the project and performance embodied in this *Review* must be recognized from another coign of vantage. We must remember that humor is spurious unless in its deepest impulses it is evangelistic. If it is not a preacher of glad tidings to sorrowful, or sordid, or saturated souls, it is sounding brass or a clattering cymbal. In this respect this latest reinforcement of inspiration is instantaneously impressive. Its cue is the unpopularized discovery that fatigue is the arch-fiend; that mental fatigue in particular is both cause and effect of toxic secretions that play the devil with all conventional prearrangements; and that a permanent *dolce far niente* for the human race will have been inaugurated whenever the precise date in the past when sound thinking ceased can be agreed upon, and whenever, abandoning vain strivings after solutions of impertinently alleged "problems," we enter into our inheritance of a petrified working-pattern for the world, from which there may henceforth be no variation nor shadow of turning. Words would ignominiously fail adequately to eulogize this splendid conception.

Fondly as we find ourselves lingering over these and similar outstanding qualities of this precious volume, we must not rob its fore-ordained multitudinous readers of the delight of discovering the remainder for themselves; and we reluctantly restrict ourselves to one or two minor observations.

The contents of this initial number are grouped under fourteen titles. The indiscriminating would incontinently assume that, besides the editor, at least twelve or thirteen dredgers in the ocean of wisdom had been engaged in bringing together these pearls of purest ray serene. Instead of weakening this hypothesis, the device of anonymity artfully intensifies the illusion. The critically minded will not be long, however, in concluding that not more than one genius could have occurred in a

generation, equal to the order of intellectual achievement deposited under each of these titles. Even if twelve or thirteen of such penetrating searchlights of superiority were thinkable, it would too much tax our credulity to suppose that their several luminosities could be blended in a single beam of flawless white light. To change the figure, as the luxuriance of the subject-matter miscellaneously provokes us to do, from cover to cover the book is a symphonic crescendo of harmony. Doubtless the architect of this monument of merriment had more or less vaguely in mind that rhythm of the spirit counted upon when relieving gargoyles complete otherwise oppressively beautiful cathedrals. He has called the finial of his creation, *The Stewpan (En Casserole)*. Critical appraisal of the whole structure, however, in plan and execution, forces us most earnestly to protest against this invidious reservation.

We must admit that at times the humor is rather broad. But just as Bret Harte and Finley Peter Dunne succeeded in effacing the local coloring of their provincialism, and flattened the picturesqueness of Roaring Camp and Archey Road into decent conventionality, after they had mingled with a bigger world, so, after he has enlarged his experience, this stimulator of the gaiety of nations will hardly be able to remain uniformly as funny as he has been throughout his maiden attempt. For instance everybody knows that Miss Jane Addams is the most dangerous perverter of morals since Socrates; but what a scintillation of inimitable originality it was to caricature her premises and her conclusions, and to label dismembered and mutilated fragments of her message, "The New Morality"! If this unique and unprecedented device had been thought of soon enough, what a convenience it would have been to the world's great traducers!

We propose to keep this treasure on our desk as a recourse against over-seriousness in our graduate classes. It will be an invaluable deposit of material for stimulation by the "case method." So far as we are informed, no such closely up-to-the-minute jokebook has been produced since Aristophanes.

Puck will pardon us for stealing its stolen superscription—"What fools these mortals be!"

A. W. S.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Uncle and Nephew in the Old French Chansons de geste. A Study in the Survival of Matriarchy. By WILLIAM OLIVER FARNSWORTH. New York: Columbia University Press, 1913. Pp. xii+267.

Es erben sich Gesetz' und Rechte
Wie eine ew'ge Krankheit fort;¹

and more than one indication of our remote past survives in the customs and traditions of a later day. So it is with matriarchy. Originally built up on the principle of exogamy, which forbade intermarriage in the same group and traced family descent in the female line, it long outlived its practical usefulness, in order to be handed down in the legendary material of various peoples of the earth. Thus traces of matriarchy are to be found in the Bible, in oriental literature, in the legends of Ireland and Germany, and among the so-called savage races of the present day. Its most enduring feature is the intimate bond between maternal uncles and sisters' sons. The present work, a Columbia Doctor's dissertation, is a consideration of this question in the field of the Old French epic.

It may be said at once that Dr. Farnsworth has collated the large body of the *Chansons de geste* with great care. Apparently no effort was spared to unearth every vestige of his theme that might prove interesting. Indeed, if there is a particular criticism we should make, it is that the material tends to crowd the discussion. For instance, a fuller account of the two most prominent theories of the origin of the Old French epic would have been of service, especially to scholars in other fields, and would, we believe, have further clarified the author's own thought. But too much evidence is certainly better than too little, and the book has the advantage of resting on a firm foundation.

The treatise has an introduction—outlining the problem and establishing the linguistic usage of “uncle” and “nephew”—six chapters, which treat respectively, “the attitude of father compared with that of uncle,” “points of contact between uncle and nephew,” “stylistic treatment in the poems”—by which is meant the emotional manifestations due to the relationship—“the sister's son,” “the prevalence of mother-right” (*Mütterrecht*), and “the conclusion” or summary.

There are two appendices, the one on formulas for identifying the sister's son, the other listing the bibliography. Quotations from the Old French are translated in the footnotes. While the treatment of matriarchy in general offers nothing new, the use of authorities on the subject

¹ Goethe's *Faust*, I, vss. 1972 ff.

is both complete and discriminating. An index would have facilitated reference; but we must not ask too much of a dissertation, and this one is certainly above the average.

As the introduction points out: "Even the more or less casual reader of the Old French epic poems cannot have failed to be impressed by their constant, pervading, and almost obtrusive glorification of the relations between uncle and nephew" (p. 3). The interesting problem, then, is not so much the occurrence of the maternal relationship (and Dr. Farnsworth shows how widespread the idea is in the epic), as its significance. Does the relationship reflect an actual social condition? Or is it merely a memory of such a condition, surviving in the epic as a tradition? And if this alternative be true, what bearing has the tradition on the origin of the epic itself?

The first question is easily answered. The *Chansons de geste* contain "no specific indications that the son is ever dispossessed in favor of the nephew," and instances of a nephew inheriting in the maternal line are "not many" (p. 88). Sentimentally Charlemagne may favor his nephew, Roland; legally he is bound to Louis, who succeeds him in the Empire: "Il est mes filz, e si tendrat mes marches."¹ Doubtless the tendency is "to minimize the intimacy between father and son, while exalting that between uncle and nephew," still we question whether the affection of father for son is as perfunctory as Dr. Farnsworth thinks (cf. *Girard de Roussillon*,² § 618: "il vit venir son filz qu'il aimait tendrement"), and the epic is so far historical in that it does not violate the obvious political or legal practices of the time, and these were paternal and not matriarchal, as Dr. Farnsworth makes clear. Indeed, as he remarks in speaking³ of the *Entrée en Espagne*, "the whole question of legal inheritance is disregarded by the poet, while he emphasizes the sentimental bestowal of property." In other words, wherever found in the epic, the emphasis on the maternal relation seems traditional (we should say "poetic") and is not traceable to legal or social⁴ conditions of the time.

As for the bearing of the matriarchal tradition on the origin of the epic, this question is much harder to answer. Here Dr. Farn-

¹ *Roland*, vs. 3716.

² In the translation of Paul Meyer; for other cases see Farnsworth, pp. 32 ff. The *Girard* is relatively early.

³ P. 89.

⁴ Except, of course, in the sanction that must have been given the claims of a nephew on an uncle. But this sanction would be "sentimental."

worth shows praiseworthy caution. Nevertheless, he tells us in closing (p. 244): "The foundation of family life . . . is plainly the most ancient part of the [epic] poems, and the inference is that *all else was of gradual growth*," the stories developing and expanding, while the primitive core remains until the period when paternity becomes actually of such authority that the mediaeval mind no longer appreciated the glorification of the relation between the maternal uncle and nephew, and the theme dropped out of literature."

But is not a *Chanson de geste* primarily the elaboration of a dramatic situation, founded, if not in history (the *Roland*²), at least in local legend (*Girard de Roussillon*³)? This situation the poet interprets or "humanizes" for his audience by every means possible. To the folk of the eleventh and twelfth centuries the sister's son was still a familiar figure. There are other popular themes in the epic, and it would be impossible to affirm that they were not derived from the people at the period of epic florescence in the twelfth century.⁴

To illustrate our point concretely. Roland is described in the *Vita Caroli* (about 800) as "Roland, the prefect of the march of Brittany." In the *Chanson* (about 1100) he is still associated with Brittany, but not specifically, Brittany being one of the countries he conquered for Charles; and he is called "count" (*li cuenz Rollanz*, vs. 175). What is most striking, however, is that Roland is now Charles's "nephew" and Ganelon's "stepson," personal ties which explain the motives of the action. Thus has the poet justified history through the imagination.

But could we affirm then that nephew-right "is plainly the most ancient part of the poem"? And that "all else was of gradual growth"? We think not. In other words, the mere presence of the matriarchal relation would not prove an earlier form of the epic. It would, in our opinion, prove only that when the first epics were written it was still possible to express an intimate relationship in terms of uncle and nephew.

That the relationship survived as a *poetic motif*,⁵ capable of swaying

¹ The italics are ours.

² See Bédier, *Légendes épiques*, III, 374: "pour expliquer la légende de Roland, il faut supposer, et il suffit de supposer que quelqu'un au XI^e siècle a pu lire la *Vita Caroli* d'Einhart."

³ Bédier, II, 92.

⁴ See Bédier in *Studies in Honor of A. M. Elliott* (Baltimore), I, 93.

⁵ Cf. what is practically a formula in the *Pèlerinage de Charlemagne*, vs. 306: "Jo sui de France chies, Jo ai nom Charlemagne, Rollanz si est mis nies." "I am the head of France, My name is Charlemagne, Rolland is my nephew."

the audiences the *jongleurs* addressed, and that in time it was replaced in the epic itself by the bond between father and son, these facts Dr. Farnsworth's study sets in a new and interesting light.

WILLIAM A. NITZE

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Family among the Australian Aborigines. A Sociological Study. By B. MALINOWSKI, PH.D. (Cracow). London: University of London Press, 1913. Pp. xv+326.

At last a ray of clear light is cast upon the matrimonial and related institutions of the native races of Australia. Dr. Malinowski's monograph is a fine example of critical and constructive research. He has successfully grappled with a very hard problem. Perhaps no literature has presented more dark puzzles, more confusion and contradiction, than the great mass of writings dealing with the kinship, family, and tribal relations of these peoples. Even the specialist has been inclined to turn in dismay from the task of threading its forbidding mazes. The existence of individual relationship, individual marriage, and the individual family among the Australian aborigines—a fact more or less dimly perceived by several preceding writers—is set beyond reasonable doubt in this book.

An "exposition of the problem and method" constitutes the first of the nine chapters. The author declares his purpose "to give in outline the social morphology of the Australian family"; to describe in terms taken from the evidence the actual, aboriginal individual family "with all its peculiarities and characteristic features"; and to seek "for the connection between the facts of family life and the general structure of society and forms of native life." In the outset the reader's confidence is won by the clear exposition of the method employed in sifting the evidence and in handling the available source materials.

The author finds evidence of the larger social control. The tribal society appears as a rudimentary state exercising a central governmental authority. Among these peoples, as among all so-called primitive peoples, "norms" which have the sanction of laws are distinguishable, though not always clearly, from religious or mere customary rules. A trespass or "crime" punishable by the "decision of the community acting as a whole, or by its central organs, or certain groups of it," as contrasted with a "sin" or with "improper conduct," is "quite well marked in different features of aboriginal life."

The "modes of obtaining wives" in Australia, treated in the second chapter, are (1) normal or pacific; and (2) violent. The typical pacific form, more or less prevalent in every tribe, is the custom of betrothing females in infancy. Usually this is combined with the exchange of sisters or relatives, and "with a series of obligations and mutual duties which both contracting parties undertake." This exchange of females and the various duties of the husband toward his actual or future wife's family are in fact but a form of wife purchase. The violent modes of obtaining wives are "elopement, when both sides are consenting," and capture, "where the woman is secured by a mere act of brutal force." Actual wife-capture exists, but it is not frequent; while the practice of elopement is found "in nearly all tribes." In all "cases it is considered as an encroachment on the rights of the family or of the husband over the girl, and it is punished." Under certain conditions, such as belonging to the right class, the union is legalized and acknowledged. In general, the source of authority in marriage is the family, usually the father; and in fact the prevalence of law, of social sanctions, as well as of betrothal or marriage ceremonies, may surprise one who has not learned to what extent codes of unwritten law exist among the most backward peoples on the globe. Without doubt, individual legal wedlock exists among the Australian tribes.

The authority of the husband over the wife is discussed in the third chapter. Marriage in either of its forms makes the woman the property of the man. Legally therefore the husband has almost unlimited power; but he may not kill his wife. In that case, he has to reckon with the blood-vengeance of the wife's kindred who appear to have legal rights as her protector. But how does the husband make use of his power? "How does he usually treat his wife?" Summarizing the evidence, Dr. Malinowski finds that "ill-treatment is—in the primitive state of the aboriginal society—in most cases probably a form of regulated intra-family justice; and that although the methods of treatment in general are very harsh, still they are applied to much more resistant natures and should not be measured by the standard of our ideas and our nerves." Moreover, apparently, "the more tender feelings of love, affection, and attachment" are not entirely absent from the Australian household.

The chapters on the "sexual aspects of marriage," "mode of living," "discussion of kinship," "parents and children," and "economics" are all full of fresh interest and attest the efficiency of the author's critical method. There is space here for the notice of but two points. The parents are fond and proud of their children. Dr. Todd's recent con-

clusion as to the respective shares of the family and of the larger social unit of the tribe or some division of it in the education of the child gain support from this investigation. The father trains the boy before puberty. Thereafter in the "bachelors' camp" and elsewhere his education is continued.

There is a marked sexual division of labor. The economic activities of the man and the woman are deeply differentiated. In general, the man hunts and fights; while the woman develops and practices the arts of peace. The hardest work is her portion. She organizes and socializes primitive industry. "The more regular and systematic kind of labor" falls to her share; and this share is of "much more *vital importance to the maintenance* of the household than man's work." Even the "food supply, contributed by the woman, was far more important than the man's share." Not "only does the kind of food supplied by the man appear on the whole to be less important than that contributed by the woman, but it seems as if the man's contribution, which in the main was reduced to his hunting products, was devoted much less exclusively to his family's benefits." In short, the Australian woman, like the woman of other peoples in the earlier stages of social progress, is not only the chief worker, the chief inventor, the chief maker of social laws; but she is likewise the chief provider for the family.

This original and fruitful study advances our knowledge regarding the rôle of woman and the household in social progress.

GEORGE ELLIOTT HOWARD

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

Religion in Social Action. By GRAHAM TAYLOR, D.D. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1913. \$1.85 net.

In recent years there has been much written, some wisely some otherwise, about practical religion; that is, religion that gets outside the walls of churches and the Sunday life of individuals and into the week-day life of men and helps them in their business of making a living; a type of religion that will help men to be civic churchmen and religious business men and workmen. Doctor Taylor's book, *Religion in Social Action*, is a masterpiece in the development of such a religion. It is a book which ministers, social workers, and all others interested in the welfare and well-being of themselves and society—and this should not leave a rest—should read and study. The book recommends itself all the more when we remember that Dr. Taylor possesses the rare talent of being able to put academic wisdom in a popular and simple

style. Written in such a style the book is well adapted to the general reader, but at the same time the scholar will not fail to be profited by its message. It has a message for the largest employer of labor as well as for the most unskilled laborer.

Dr. Taylor's thesis is that *life and religion are one and the same*, as is indicated by the opening sentences of chap. i: "Life and religion are alike. They are meant and made to be one and the same." In reading over the pages the practical man, the man of affairs in this world, cannot help but feel that here is a religion that is intended for men in this life. And it is of course just this kind of religion that men feel any real need of—a religion that will not only make their work more pleasant but will help them to be better, more efficient workmen, in their trade. Men have long since learned to believe that if they can but live the right kind of life here and among their fellows, they are taking no chances on their welfare in the world to come. Thus the religion wanted today is the religion that will help men to live right in this life. Just such a religion Dr. Taylor brings to all men from his rich experience of having lived for over a decade with his family among the families in our second largest city with whom life often seems to go hard.

That the author appreciates the true extent to which men live between Sundays differently from the way they live on Sundays is brought out by repeatedly striking sentences, such as: "This awful dualism is the ethical tragedy of the age. In the vain attempt to live our lives on two levels we lose both. Our relationships to God, our Father, are not 'saved' if the relations in which we are living with his children, our fellow-men, are 'lost.' No more is our social life sound if it is lived only manward and not Godward. Each of us lives one life, not two."

The chapters on "The Religion of Human Relationships"; "Industry and Religion, Their Common Ground and Interdependence"; "City and Church Reapproaching Each Other"; and "Church and Community—Their Interrelation and Common Aim" are especially rich in the message they bring the reader.

Probably one of the most striking emphases that has ever been put on the part religion should play in the everyday affairs of life is the following, taken from the last chapter: "All human interests need nothing so much as to have the ordinary things of life invested with extraordinary importance, common experiences with special interest, the natural relationships with exceptional significance, routine with zest, the most human with the divinest meaning. It is the genius of religion to do just this thing."

In her long Introduction to the book Miss Jane Addams speaks very highly, and properly so, of the work of Dr. Taylor as well as of his book. The closing paragraph of her Introduction may not be out of place here: "This book will doubtless be of value to men and women of all faiths who are eager that the current of their religion should pour itself into broader channels of social purpose."

GEORGE H. VON TUNGELN

IOWA STATE COLLEGE

Social Programmes in the West. The Barrows Lectures. By CHARLES RICHMOND HENDERSON. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1913. Pp. xxviii+184. \$1.38 postpaid.

This work consists of the text of six lectures delivered in India on the Barrows Foundation for 1912-13, prefaced with a copy of the letter commissioning the author to represent the International Associations on Social Legislation and a statement of the aims of these associations by Professor E. Fuster. An extensive syllabus precedes the body of the work.

The author seeks to present "that system of measures which is designed to promote the welfare of the common people" (p. 1), with due regard for the cardinal principle of social improvement that "only that which expresses the character of a community will endure" (p. 17). The survey consists of description of philanthropic and co-operative undertakings, and an interpretation of occidental developments in relation to common ideals. In Lecture I the relation between economic facts and social ideals is established. The main descriptive portion is contained in Lectures II to V, inclusive, being devoted to the treatment of "Public and Private Relief of Dependents and Abnormals," "Policy of the Western World in Relation to the Anti-Social," "Public Health and Morality," and "Movements to Improve the Economic and Cultural Situation of Wage-Earners." Lecture VI traces the relationships between these western measures and policies and social progress.

The size of the work—a small volume in large type—precludes the possibility of extensive, well-rounded description of familiar social conditions and movements on the scale to which we are accustomed in treatises in applied sociology, including some of Professor Henderson's own works. On the other hand, this very limitation has made possible a well-used freedom in selecting the features of social work in America and Western Europe which are most significant for students of India. Even the fact of their having been prepared for oriental audiences adds

a unique quality to the production. This may well prove to be another instance in which the necessity of interpreting the manner of social organization of one's own nation to a foreign people serves to clarify common understanding of the subject in the home land. Of no minor importance in explaining the satisfactoriness of the present work is Professor Henderson's trustworthiness as a representative of practical social movements in the West.

The book contains several minor typographical errors such as undoubtedly would have been eliminated through proofreading by the author, which was prevented by his absence in the East at the time of publication. Moreover, for most practical uses, the value of the fourteen-page syllabus is questioned.

Only occasionally has new material been introduced, as in the description of the sanitary policy of the United States government (p. 117), but, notwithstanding, the modern aspect of social questions is presented throughout. The absence of statistics and of detailed description, the failure to treat extensively international problems or attempt to any degree an application of Western principles directly to Indian life, serves but to throw into relief the unique function of the work, of delicate emphasis and interpretation. The book abounds in poetic quotations. To be sure, any summary statement of social reforms in progress, even in very limited areas, is necessarily imperfect, and every authority would make a different selection. But Professor Henderson's well-rounded, practical outline will doubtless prove among American students as pleasing as the effect of the lectures is reported to have been profound upon his Indian audiences.

One of the most interesting features of the work is its underlying purpose. It is remarkable from the sociological standpoint because the lectures were delivered on a foundation whose purpose is the presentation of "the truths of Christianity." *Social Programmes in the West* follows in the series subjects such as *Christianity, the World Religion* (Barrows), and *Christ and the Eastern Soul* (Hall). Just as unique is it from the religious standpoint. "My interest," said Dr. Hall in referring to his first lectures on the same foundation, "lay in separating the essence of the Christian religion from those accretions and accessories occurring in the West."¹ The author frequently emphasizes the religious relations of social reform. Students of practical sociology are fortunate in the circumstances which have brought forth this avowed presentation

¹ Charles Cuthbert Hall, *Christ and the Eastern Soul*, p. 2. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.)

of current movements for social welfare from the frequently echoed standpoint: "A common life must realize its religion or confess itself a sham" (p. 26).

WILLIAM T. CROSS

CHICAGO

Social and Economic Survey of a Rural Township in Southern Minnesota. By CARL W. THOMPSON and G. P. WARBER. University of Minnesota Studies in Economics, No. 1. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota, 1913. Pp. vii+75.

A good example of what ought to be done in all sections of the country and over much wider areas is this survey of 36 square miles of rural Minnesota. The method is one of intensive observation by a person who has become thoroughly familiar with the individuals and conditions studied and who has won the confidence of the people. Budgets and farm accounting were not resorted to, though there are considerable specific data regarding various economic matters available in the pages of the study. The authors do not give us much insight into the actual methods of gathering their facts, which may be due to the apparent fact that the investigation was made by one of the signed authors and written by the other. If there was such division of labor, as the internal evidence seems to indicate, it is rather unfortunate, for the reader would welcome a little more description of method.

The subjects investigated were nationality, work, business relations, farmers' organizations, civic relations, roads, education, religious activities, and social (including recreational) activities. Only 11 per cent of the population was native American. The other elements were German 30.8, Norwegian 24.2, mixed 21.3, English 5.8, Irish, 3.7, Swedish 2.9; 35 per cent of the territory is in the hands of renters, 12 of the renters' families being German, 12 mixed, 9 Norwegian, 7 American, 2 Swedish. The ownership of the rented farms is divided among 22 Americans, 16 Germans, and 4 Norwegians; 25 per cent of the owners of rented farms have never lived on them. The hours of work are excessive at all seasons of the year—13.3 hours in summer and 11.5 in winter. The women have even longer hours than the men, a fact which makes it very difficult to secure domestic service when needed, though 10 per cent of the families kept hired girls when the study was made. In 32 per cent of the families the women helped with the outside chores and in 16 per cent they helped in field work in rush times. There is perhaps no better

index to the thrift of rural people than the kinds of gardens they keep; 79 per cent had good gardens, 13 per cent poor, and 8 per cent had no gardens at all.

Co-operation was a doubtful success, thriving best in the marketing of dairy products, but meeting some difficulties even here. In this community as elsewhere the farmer is suspicious, somewhat tricky, and has suffered from poorly managed organizations. The farmer is a model in most concrete, near-at-hand business dealings, but his scrupulousness diminishes as the distance or unfamiliarity of the transaction increases. He does not understand complex business relations very well and is under the impression that he is being "done" by the city dealers; 37 per cent buy from peddlers and 38 per cent from catalogue houses, though the purchases from both are not extensive.

In this community lack of church organization and consolidation is painfully evident. Church going appears to be a sort of rural recreation for some and for others a painful duty; 65 per cent of the men and 75 per cent of the women are members of some church, but only 34 per cent of the men and 36 per cent of the women attend services regularly. The women find it difficult to go without the men and their home duties are exacting. Country women are also very sensitive about their clothes. The Catholics and Norwegian Lutherans hang together best as organizations. Dancing and card playing were the chief recreations, the devotees of these two forms of pleasure constituting 62 per cent and 66 per cent respectively of the population; 55 per cent of the population both dance and play cards, while "in only 14 per cent of the places where men and boys played cards did they read magazines or farm papers." "Although reading is a form of recreation in 66 per cent of the homes, only 45 per cent of the young people 'do any reading worth mentioning.' The boys who read generally interest themselves in farm papers, or some scientific article in a magazine. The girls 'read little else than the current fiction and the fashion publications'" (p. 61). There is less social intercourse now than formerly because of the growth of social classes based on wealth, custom, and formalities. Baseball is losing ground as an athletic recreation because the young men have become more interested in Sunday driving with the girls. The girls prefer the young men of the nearby towns who are "such dandy fellows," and consider it quite a social distinction to be invited to the low-class dances in the city engineered by the "low brows" and semi-disreputables. There are apparently signs of a lowered moral tone in the community. The girls prefer to marry city young men, even of a lower social grade, because the housework is

lighter and the opportunities for pleasure are greater; 29 per cent of the girls go to the cities while 22 per cent of the young men seek their fortunes in the same place. On the average the girls go earlier.

This study adds its share of evidence to the now well-established fact that our educational system is anachronistic, inefficient, and more or less insincere. In this community the schools trained neither for the ordinary business relations of the farmer nor for his wider duties of citizenship. The farmers did not feel any identity with the government except when they paid their taxes or served on juries. One of them said, "Yes, I know that we are the government when it comes to paying for it all, but you don't want to stand there and tell me that anyone is going to pay any attention to what we farmers want" (p. 38). Another declared that "schools run by the government certainly should do more to acquaint the growing generations with practical knowledge about government. The younger generations of farmers ought to know more about affairs of government than the old, but they don't learn anything about such things in our country schools now" (p. 39). One farmer's insight into the situation would put to shame that of many university presidents. He protested, "What good is a lot of the grammar they get going to do them; or what use is a farmer going to make of such stuff as learning to bound British South Africa, or to give the height of Mt. Kilimanjaro? Why not teach something that a farmer can make use of?" Another sees that "the things they take up in school all tend to direct the thought toward what man has done and is doing in the cities" (p. 51). But this insight into the difficulty was probably somewhat exceptional, since only 26 per cent of the farmers desire consolidation of schools—a fact which is in part to be explained by their perception that high-school education is no more effective than that of the graded schools.

This study is filled with concrete facts and discerning observations. It ought to act as a stimulus to more study of our rural situation and to its betterment. Questions which have constantly recurred to the reviewer's mind are: If the farmers understand the inefficiency of their schools, why are they so inefficient and why can't the farmers get them changed? Perhaps it is not the function of a "survey" to raise and answer such questions in connection with its particular community. The study contains no recommendations.

L. L. BERNARD

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

Co-operation in Agriculture. By G. HAROLD POWELL. New York: Macmillan, 1913. Pp. xvi+327. \$1.50 net.

This book is one of the more practical indications of the awakening of public and educational interest in rural affairs. It deals primarily with economic problems, but the opening chapter on changes in industrial methods in agriculture is quite as sociological as economic in its bearing, as indeed is the discussion of the problems of the organization and successful administration of co-operative societies. The remainder of the volume is taken up with the technical features of law and economics in organizing and financing local and general societies. Methods are illustrated graphically by quotations of complete constitutions and by-laws and shippers' agreements from various sections and industries. The co-operative methods here discussed in considerable detail embrace such varied types as breeders' and growers' associations; the marketing of grain, dairy products, eggs and fruits; the purchase of supplies; co-operative irrigation; rural credits and banking; rural community ownership (telephone), and mutual insurance. This book is fuller and more practical than Coulter's earlier work and is more suited to American conditions than the works of Fay, Aves, or Wolff. Only once does the author stray from his constructive work with a controversial remark, attacking socialism as an evil which he believes only co-operation can forestall.

L. L. BERNARD

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

Immigration. A World Movement and Its American Significance.

By HENRY PRATT FAIRCHILD. New York: Macmillan, 1913. Pp. ix+455. \$1.75.

This book is equally satisfactory as a textbook and as a book for the general or popular reader. As a basis for classroom discussion and investigation it probably has no equal at the present time. Despite, however, the author's defense of the omission of extensive statistics, the reviewer believes the book would gain in value for most users by at least a few more tables and especially by some such charts as Frank Julian Warne has employed in his *Immigrant Invasion*.

The declaration in the preface that the problem of immigration would be treated as one of world-wide significance wins the instant attention and approval of the reader. Bigness of view is much less common and much more appreciated than perhaps we always recognize. A "conservation program for all humanity" must ultimately furnish the touch-

stone of policy for any world-nation. We must turn ever more and more to the scientific study of general principles.

It is the point of view which gives significance to the whole volume. Perhaps it is the art of the author, but we lose sight of the point of view during a considerable part of the discussion. A quarter of the book is devoted to a history of immigration and to a digest of federal legislation down to 1907. In the chapter on "Volume and Racial Composition," as in some others, we feel a sense of meagerness of fact and inadequacy of treatment. Its explanations for the decline of immigration from northwestern Europe seem to ignore entirely the improved industrial opportunities at home to keep the people there. It would not have been illogical to transfer a part of this chapter to the following one on the causes of immigration, and so to have left space for consideration of the significance of both problems, the problem of numbers and the problem of racial composition.

The more important part of the book begins with chapter xi, on the "Conditions of the Immigrants in the United States," wherein the author turns at once to a consideration of the question whether or not immigration has reduced the native growth of population, and then to statements of the distribution of the immigrants and of the problems of congestion involved. The continuation chapters on the "Standard of Living" utilize the reports of the Immigration Commission and give depressing figures and facts on housing, the keeping of boarders, food, clothing, wages, literacy, and school attendance.

A chapter on the common methods of exploiting the immigrant, on religion and the partial failure of the churches, and on the statistics of marriages, births, and deaths is followed by a more significant chapter on the effects of immigration on wages, pauperism, crime, and insanity in this country. Professor Fairchild attempts to show how immigration retards the rise of wages through its neutralization of the potential advantage of the native laborer in times of special demand in the labor market. A later chapter brings out the author's belief that the inexhaustible supply of European labor constitutes a source of profits to employers in times of rising prices, thus intensifying the speculative tendencies which result in financial and industrial crises.

The twofold problem of welfare and assimilation is the one upon which the author has fixed his attention. His conception of assimilation is that of "Americanization," dependent upon intimate relations between immigrant and native in the daily routine of existence, producing similarities which make intermarriage natural and normal. Can this rela-

tion obtain and can the present American type continue? The ratio of the foreign-born to the native-born in 1910 was larger than at any previous year except 1890. The immigration between 1900 and 1910 was more than twice as large as in any decennial period except 1880-90, and 3,500,000 larger than in that second largest period. There is grave danger that we shall become an aggregation of heterogeneous units rather than a homogeneous nation.

When we strike a balance, we find that the average advantage to the immigrant, to the United States, or to the foreign country, as conditions now are, is offset by large and serious evils. So far as we have grappled with these evils, we have applied specific remedies to each. We ought to formulate "some far-reaching, inclusive plan of regulation, based on the broadest and soundest principles." Immigration under a *laissez-faire* policy will not lessen in volume so long as we are more prosperous than other nations. We cannot long set high standards for the world unless new controls are established.

The reader closes the volume with a sense of great responsibility in the face of a problem which scarcely as yet has been stated. One thing seems certain, namely, that neither conscience nor intelligence can longer let this great movement go undirected. A policy of *laissez-faire* is a policy of sin. Some authority, public or private, should choose a body of men of the type of Professor Fairchild, men who have the sociologic foundation, and enable them to spend sufficient time to analyze the data at hand, to frame a national and international policy, and to carry on an educational campaign which will make that policy a concrete reality. The fate of tens of millions of people and the welfare of the world can no longer be ignored.

FAYETTE AVERY MCKENZIE

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

Organized Democracy. An Introduction to the Study of American Politics. By FREDERICK A. CLEVELAND. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. Pp. xxxvi+479. \$2.50.

The purpose of this volume is to trace and analyze the various means by which the citizenship of organized society has sought to make itself effective. In approaching this vital problem of democracy the author is singularly free from the preconceptions of the subject. He takes the investigator's point of view and reaches the conclusion that the problems of democracy are to be solved in terms of citizen efficiency. All the old and modern suggestions and devices for popular control are

briefly treated in their historical perspective. Dr. Cleveland does not evaluate them by the maxims of speculative philosophy but rather in terms of political and social efficiency. He finds that government is the product of the unceasing struggle for existence, conditioned and shaped "by processes of human selection and invention, operating under 'the law of advantage' or greatest economy" (p. 4). Recognizing the predatory ideal of early government, he traces its evolution to the modern conception of public service, which he accepts as the one purpose of organized society.

In a democracy, where the citizenship is sovereign, the political organization becomes a trusteeship, in which the citizen is a beneficiary, the government is the trustee, and the public welfare and public funds are the intrusted interest and estate (p. 73). Reasoning from this the American people have before them three fundamental questions: (1) How may the citizen become more effective in his double capacity as sovereign and beneficiary? (2) How may the electorate more effectively express the sovereign will? (3) How may the officers be made more efficient? (p. 79). The first question is considered in Part II, which deals with the citizen's rights against the government, his duties and responsibilities as a citizen, and his direct participation in the acts of government. Parts III and IV are devoted to the second question, and include the discussion of suffrage, elections, political parties and their legal control, direct legislation, and popular participation in constitutional amendments. The third question is mainly discussed in Part V. Here are described the various methods for the popular election and recall of officers, and the legal restraints and constitutional limitations of official action.

The most original work of the volume is left to the last two chapters, to which the rest of the volume is a most excellent approach. There is no time-serving flattery of the people, with wholesale denunciations of the political boss. The author convincingly traces our political ills to the social and intellectual inefficiency of our citizenship. While favoring many institutional changes, he does not attribute all our failures to an effete legal and constitutional system, nor does he cling to the hope of constitutional changes as a panacea for social ills. He finds the political boss to be an inevitable product of citizen inefficiency.

An American political "boss" is commonly one of the most intelligent and efficient citizens that we have. His guiding motive may not be the public welfare, but he has had a clearer conception of the essential factors of democracy than has the reformer who dreams of higher statesmanship in terms of abstract

morality, but who lacks the touch and balance of facts about the everyday life of the people. The "boss" is the only one who makes it his business to know what is necessary to supply the community needs which are brought home to him. He has been the only one who has had a comprehensive citizen program. To the Tweed and other "graft" organizations New York owes much that is best in the development of municipal life. It has been under the rule of "the organization" that Philadelphia has developed practically all that may be considered the product of a well-considered constructive program. . . . "The boss" has made citizenship his business. With the reformer, citizenship has been only an emotion [pp. 443-44].

But the author is optimistic. He sees an awakening of the civic body, and his plea for political innovations is confined largely to the budget, balance sheet, operation accounting, efficiency reports, and similar reforms, with which the actual value of public service may be accurately determined. He wants to place these into the hands of an aroused citizenship to the end that their efforts be both intelligent and effective.

The volume is remarkable for its historical perspective, its keen analysis, its utter freedom from cant and dogma, and the sanity and common-sense which characterize it throughout. It is the work neither of a "standpatter" nor of an emotional reformer, but of a thinker. While the statements of fact contain occasional errors, there are few conclusions which one can oppose with scientific evidence. It is unfortunate, however, that the bibliography, which is given considerable prominence in the volume, is several years out of date. For instance, in the list of select constitutional treatises (p. xxviii) is to be found the second edition of Black's *Constitutional Law* instead of the third edition, and the three most recent treatises on this subject, those by Willoughby, Watson, and Hall, are not even mentioned. Similar omissions are to be found in other sections of the bibliography.

ARNOLD BENNETT HALL

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Rights and Immunities of Citizens of the United States. By
OLD JOHNSON LIEN. New York: Longmans, Green &
1913. Pp. 94. \$0.75.
This monograph tracing the development and meaning
of the rights and immunities of citizens of the United States from the
primitive to its more definite meaning as determined
by the federal courts. The first part deals with

the salient features of our constitutional system, with special emphasis upon the dual aspects of our government which make possible both a state and national citizenship. The second part deals with judicial decisions before the Fourteenth Amendment, the debates in Congress over the meaning of that amendment, and the judicial decisions following it, with a chapter devoted to the minority view of the federal courts. Apparently all the decisions of the federal Supreme Court touching on the subject have been examined by the author, and the discussion is developed in an effective manner. The writer finds that the development of this subject by the Supreme Court has been consistent and logical and that the principle of the original decisions of the court, which was refined and enunciated in the dictum of the Slaughter-House Cases, has received definite form in the case of *Twining v. New Jersey*. He states the principle as follows:

The court has concluded that the privileges and immunities which are peculiar to citizens of the United States are those which arise from the powers conferred upon the national government, which are completely protected by that government, and which are enjoyed by the individual because he is a citizen. No final enumeration of these privileges and immunities has ever been made, nor can one ever be made under a living constitution like that of the United States [p. 80].

It is difficult, however, to reconcile the writer's position with the distinct approval which he gives to the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in the Civil Rights Case (p. 71). The appendix contains several tables of cases on subjects pertinent to the monograph and a few select references.

ARNOLD BENNETT HALL

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Indian Slavery in Colonial Times Within the Present Limits of the United States. By ALMON WHEELER LAUBER. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. Pp. 352. \$3.00 net.

This volume contains the results of what appears to be a thorough investigation of Indian slavery as practiced by the English, although the first three chapters describe Indian slavery among the Indians themselves, the Spaniards, and the French. The ^{most intelligent} work-^{ers} of the processes of enslavement, the methods of employ-^{ment} may not be the ^{most intelligent} of the slaves, and the final decline of the ^{most intelligent} insensational factors of democne is interesting, not only as dealing with a nesmanship in terms of abstrady

history, but as affording some additional information regarding the interplay of social and economic forces in the beginnings of American society.

ARNOLD BENNETT HALL

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Comparative Legal Philosophy. By LUIGI MIRAGLIA. Translated from the Italian by JOHN LISLE; with an introduction by ALBERT KOCOUREK. Boston, 1912.

Kocourek, in his introduction to this volume by Miraglia, tells us that it also, like Berolzheimer, is a historical presentation of legal philosophy. But one has to read Miraglia before he can realize that his treatment of comparative legal philosophy is historical. The historical character of Miraglia's treatise would not be inferred from its table of contents. That Berolzheimer is historical we see by merely glancing at its table of contents; the epochs of history stand out in his chapter headings. But when we first look at Miraglia, we think of his introduction only as historical, which is a brief, rapid sketch of the great writers on law, from Greek speculation to the modern sociological conception of law.

The body of Miraglia's treatise is analytical, more accurately, historico-analytical. That is, it combines, as the reviewer would say, logic and history, but Miraglia, as a follower of Vico, says comparative legal philosophy must be a combination of the true (metaphysics), and the certain (history) (cf. p. 94). Miraglia clearly does not belong to the same school as Vanni, who presents the problem of the philosophy of law as a science of the first principles of the genetico-evolutionary theory. Comparative legal philosophy, according to Miraglia, becomes a causal explanation of legal institutions; he rests his explanation in the domain of empirical knowledge, in the domain of biology, psychology, and economics. But from this modern sociological standpoint, Miraglia brings comparative legal philosophy beyond the mere political and historical interpretation of law.

Law is represented as an evolutionary growth adapting itself from age to age with variations in social conditions and responding to the ideals of the time. This, as Kocourek observes in his introduction, does not rest on a conception of causality which involves "blind, unconscious, or mechanical enfoldment of social institutions implied in a Darwinistic institution. An element of hazard is present, but the voluntary element persistently overrides the spontaneous factor or

growth. This view of legal institutions is one which may confidently be expected to find among us an approving reception when it is better understood" (p. xvii). The result of Miraglia's method is a scientific metaphysics. But of such a metaphysics, we can say that it "does not lead too far into the dark, and yet holds something up to our aspirations toward knowledge." Such a metaphysics need not frighten anyone away from the philosophy of law.

Miraglia's treatise is divided into two parts. Book I is a general part, occupied with an analysis of the idea of the philosophy of law; the theoretical presuppositions of the deductive idea of law; and corollaries of these theoretical presuppositions.

Succeeding chapters investigate the practical foundations of the deductive idea of law, and exhibit a critical analysis of the principle definitions of law by writers like Hobbes, Spinoza, Spencer, Kant, and others. The concluding chapters of Book I are occupied with pointing out the relations of law, morals, and social science; and law, social economy, and politics; the distinction between rational and positive law; and the sources and application of positive law.

Book II is entitled, "Private Law." It is an elementary treatise on law from the historico-sociological standpoint, grounded in a well-defined and clearly reasoned system of thought, which consciously correlates philosophy with the legal, social, and political sciences. "The second part of this book," Miraglia tells us in his preface, "has no other object than to extend philosophical thought over various subjects that for a long time have been considered apart from any such relation."

The general purpose of the series, of which Miraglia forms the third volume, was sufficiently stated in the review of Berolzheimer in this *Journal*, January, 1914, p. 562. Sociologists, economists, and political theorists, as well as advanced students of law and jurisprudence, should hail the appearance of this series with an appreciation that will express itself in the actual reading of some of these volumes.

For the economist, as for the case lawyer, Berolzheimer and Miraglia, the two historical volumes of the series, will furnish a wider outlook than the "ocean of cases" in which the latter is likely to be drowned, or the merely mechanical details of industry and commerce by which the former is likely to be submerged.

ISAAC A. LOOS

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

European Cities at Work. By FREDERIC C. HOWE. New York: Scribner, 1913. Pp. xvi+370. \$1.75.

This is a book of much value to the specialist as well as the citizen. It comes from Doctor Howe's fund of information on cities and his broad experience in municipal affairs. The first fifteen chapters describe the many social activities of German cities in planning, housing, transit, encouragement of art, protecting health, levying taxes, controlling buildings, location of factories, etc. Having described very ably, he proceeds to *interpret* the psychology of the citizens and of the officers. Some of the points emphasized in these fifteen chapters are: the freedom of the cities from outside interference; the success of the unearned increment tax; the farsighted vision of city officials; the profession of experts who devote themselves to city problems; the socialization of the city services; and the ideals of the German business men who control the city. The psychological interpretation is found in chap. ii, "Impressions of European Cities," and chap. xv, "The Explanation of the German City."

The next five chapters are on the British cities; they do not, however, describe the British cities as fully as the chapters on Germany described the German cities. The psychological *interpretation* of the British city-dweller is welcomed. The ugliness of the British cities is not described, its ugliness is interpreted in psychological terms. The merits of the English system are acknowledged, viz., (1) simplicity of the machinery, (2) high character of the citizens in public life; but the lack of home rule and national exploitation for the landed classes are emphasized as the demerits. No argument is presented on municipal ownership, the cause is asserted to be won; some material proving its success is given.

The last chapter best shows the spirit of the book. It is a comparison of the European and American cities in their different activities. The book has two main merits, viz.: (1) the psychological explanation for the model German cities and for the ugly British cities; (2) the frequent comparisons of the European and American cities; these Doctor Howe is excellently prepared to make. To clarify the thought the chapters should have been divided into two parts; one dealing with the German city, the other with the English city. Most of chap. vii deals with the German state, not the city "at work," and should have been omitted.

SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Family in Its Sociological Aspects. By JAMES QUAYLE DEALEY.
New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1912. Pp. 137. \$0.75.

This is an excellent little volume for the general reader and will also prove valuable for special work by classes in sociology. It is to be hoped that other special studies as good as this may be given us, as a single chapter is hardly enough for many of the topics we wish to study, and yet the younger student and the general reader do not always need to refer to compendious works. The process of development is most clearly brought out. The first chapter, "The Family as a Social Institution," is a good introduction, indicating, among other things, the possibility of human control of social change and the synthesizing function of sociology, as well as the composite character of the family and its great importance for study, since it is the fundamental social institution. Chapters on "The Family of Early Civilization," "The Patriarchal or Patronymic Family," and "The Rise of the Modern Family" attempt to compress into thirty-five pages an idea of the pre-historic and historic development of marriage. There are many good points in this section, and many suggestions that should aid the reader in attaining a scientific point of view. It is in the following chapters, however, "The Family and Religion" and "The Family Influenced by the Reformation and the State," that the present reviewer finds the greatest satisfaction. The sexual impulse, its developments and perversions; and more particularly ideas concerning these, and attitudes of mind and social ideals based hereon that have been taking shape through the centuries—these are most excellently presented. The reader will surely find many difficult points cleared up because he will find facts correlated and presented as phases of the general process of development. The present period which appears as transitional is influenced by democratic ideals and by urban conditions, as the next two chapters indicate. "The Marriage Tie and Divorce" is much like other chapters on this subject except that it is shorter and so contains fewer bare statistics. This topic is seldom well treated, being either sterile or over fervid. The concluding chapters on "Democracy in The Marriage Tie" and "The Family under Reorganization" round out this study with some positive suggestions and with an attitude of sane optimism which the reader ought to be able to share. All in all this book is to be strongly commended.

HOWARD WOODHEAD

CHICAGO

The Church and the Labor Conflict. By PARLEY PAUL WOMER.
New York: Macmillan, 1913. Pp. 302. \$1.50.

This book is a sincere and intelligent attempt to accomplish the impossible task of continuing a system of ethical theology and a technical program of social politics in one small volume. It has been frequently undertaken with the same disappointing result. This author has made good use of well-known treatises, but one must go to the more thorough discussions for a full mastery of any one of the many subjects. One point requires critical examination: the exact task of the church. The author says that the church has no equipment for deciding controversies on economic, political, or legal matters, and this is evidently true. And yet this principle is not consistently carried out, and appeal is made more than once to a summary dogmatic mental process, as: "The church should be slow to pass criticism on the courts," but it should, apparently, attack the judicial use of the injunction in certain situations (p. 224). So the church should have something to declare about the open shop (pp. 196-97). This statement is open to criticism: "It is certain that the church cannot afford to withhold its sanction of needed social changes and reforms until the economic and political problems have been worked out." Would it not be better once for all to say that the church may well continue to inspire conscience and afford all possible opportunity for studying the scientific presentations of facts, without accepting responsibility for formulation of legislation which must be left to specialists? Policies and their results may be judged by an enlightened people; the church can help men to learn, but it has no competent organs for direct interference with government or business, and any claim to authority will be quickly and vigorously resented by the parties against whom the church decides, whether trade unions or corporations.

C. R. HENDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Workmen's Compensation and Industrial Insurance. By JAMES HARRINGTON BOYD, A.M., Sc.D., Chairman of the Ohio Employers' Liability Commission and Member of the Toledo Bar. 2 vols. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1913.

This work of patient compilation, legal analysis and economic criticism will be found indispensable for the student of social insurance in this country. The progress of public opinion is so rapid, and the

legislatures are so busy with the subject that the present laws will soon be out of date; but the discussion of history and principles will remain useful, and the book will be a milestone for future students.

One deplorable fact in the situation is brought out by the analysis of the laws thus far passed: they lack a unifying principle. There is no national and scientific investigation at the foundation of our laws; there is no agreement among legislators; there is only a hasty reflex response to the stimulus of a discovery of intolerable injustice in all past statutes and judicial decisions. We cannot hope for a really scientific system until the nation finds a way to control a movement in which state lines have not the slightest significance except as artificial barriers. Up to this time we must regard all laws yet passed as experiments in vivisection, inspired by the pious hope that out of this welter some order may at last be evolved, no one knows how. As evidence of a fine humanitarianism these acts are valuable; but the time is not distant when this entire contradictory mass of makeshifts must be cast aside for an adequate, consistent, scientific, national system. Such a system will include not only accident insurance but also sickness insurance which is vastly more important; and insurance of widows and orphans; unemployment, invalidism, and old-age insurance. No one has ever yet attempted to measure the annual loss from needless and preventable worry.

C. R. HENDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Crime and Its Repression. By GUSTAV ASCHAFFENBURG; translated by A. ALBRECHT. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1913.

The translation of this very significant German book will make it accessible to a wider public in the English-speaking world and enlarge its wholesome influence. In the realm of the abnormal the psychiatrist has a right to be heard, and the jurist ought to listen. The fundamental conception of this work is that criminality, anti-social conduct, is the effect of discoverable and already known causes; that the obvious duty and interest of society is to remove those causes or diminish their activity as rapidly as possible; that it is futile to attempt measured retribution according to the degree of ill-desert; that all our energy should be devoted to effective means for protecting society.

Crime is not a disease transmitted by inheritance or inoculated by contact; it is an acquired habit into which people with weak character

most easily fall under trying conditions. Alcohol and poverty are the chief incentives to harmful conduct; so that control of the liquor traffic and improved economic conditions are among the most hopeful methods of social defense. Imprisonment has little deterrent effect on those who are once or twice incarcerated, and it does not often reform. The reformatory effect would be increased by the indeterminate sentence which makes freedom depend on improved conduct. At this point ideas long since familiar and accepted in the United States are strongly defended.

The statistics used in the study of crime causes are generally taken from the excellent German tables, with which, unfortunately, we have in this country nothing comparable. The author's treatment makes us eager to have similar figures for our own scientific studies of criminality. Taken altogether, this work is a notable contribution and the translation is a distinct public service.

C. R. HENDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Le divorce des aliénés. By DOCTOR LUCIEN-GRAUX. Paris: Grand Librairie Médicale A. Maloine, 1912.

In connection with drafts of law submitted to the French legislature, Doctor Lucien-Graux has brought together a large amount of important materials for a consideration of the complex question of divorce in case of insanity. The letters published represent all views of the subject of divorce in general and of this problem in particular. There is an evident desire to be impartial and to make a substantial contribution to the discussion.

C. R. HENDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Sixth Annual Report of the State Probation Commission of New York. New York, 1912.

This is an important document, including the report and statistics of the Commission of New York, the proceedings of the State Conference of Magistrates, and of the Probation Officers, and with a directory of officials and tables of statistics. It is one of the important contributions to the subject of probation.

C. R. HENDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Die Berufsvereine. Von W. KULEMAN. Berlin: Leonard Simion, 1913.

This work is described as the second and completely revised edition of the author's *Gewerkschaftsbewegung*. It contains descriptions and historical accounts of the organizations of employers and employees in all countries. In Vols. IV-VI, there are articles on these organizations in England, France, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Austria, Hungary, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Russia, Finland, Servia, Bulgaria, Roumania, the United States of America, Canada, Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and international organizations. The article on the United States is given ninety-eight pages. The difficulty of keeping up to date in such publications is seen in the treatment of social insurance which has advanced so rapidly with us since the author's materials were gathered. The work must prove to be exceedingly useful and convenient; it has been prepared with great care and enormous industry.

C. R. HENDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Bulletin of the Department of Factory Inspection, State of Illinois.
Vol. I, No. 1. October, 1913.

The chief Factory Inspector of Illinois, Mr. O. F. Nelson, has begun to publish a very interesting and helpful bulletin dealing largely with occupational diseases and other risks of working-men. It is a great improvement on the ordinary reports which few people read with profit. The illustrations are telling and the information is good material for popular education.

C. R. HENDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

1^{er} Congr s International des Tribunaux pour Enfants, Paris, July, 1911. Edited by MARCEL KLEINE. Paris: A. Dary, 1912.

The literature of juvenile courts is enriched by the publication of papers, discussions, and resolutions of the first international conference on the subject. This document is the most convenient comparative exhibit of the legal doctrines and primitive experiments of an American invention which has been imitated, with adaptations, in many countries.

C. R. HENDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Industrial Poisoning from Fumes, Gases, and Poisons of Manufacturing Processes. By DR. J. RAMBOUSEK; translated and edited by THOMAS M. LEGGE, M.D., D.P.H. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913.

Physicians in industrial establishments, factory inspectors, and students of the hygiene of industry will find in the volume of Ramboousek a convenient summary of the subject treated. The work is divided into three parts: descriptions of the industries and processes attended with the risk of poisoning, pathology and treatment, and preventive measures against industrial poisoning.

C. R. HENDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Religious Chastity. An Ethnological Study. By ELSIE CLEWS PARSONS. New York: privately published under the nom-de-plume of John Main, 1913. Pp. xii+365; Appendix, Bibliography, Index.

The spirit in which this work is evidently undertaken is explained by the statement, "similarities in culture point, not to the existence of set cultural stages through which all societies must pass, but to the homogeneity of human mind and its tendency to express itself, given like circumstances, in like ways." The author has taken considerable pains to get together a great mass of material from diverse primary sources which deals with human belief and practice centering around supposed relations of the living with the recently dead. From the comparison of different customs and ceremonies she educes additional evidence to substantiate the modern ethnological principle above enunciated.

Fear of the recently dead leads primitive man to the invention of various schemes to trick or frighten away the importunate ghost. The widow, being especially liable to death infection, must be scrupulously disinfected by show of bereavement. The "haunted" widow has to undergo cleanings, else remarriage will be dangerous for her and her man. The exaggerated observance of mourning customs is usually incumbent upon the widow. Where ghost fear yields to ghost love, care for the comfort of the dead is paramount in funeral and mourning customs. The widow is the one who has special responsibility to cater to his daily need of food and drink, to be the custodian of his corpse or

bones. When women have begun to figure primarily as chattels, they must be buried with the dead as are his other belongings. Under these circumstances wives may be clubbed to death with great ceremony, buried alive, or set adrift bound to a boat. When there is a change in ideas about destroying property in general at death, the widow's fate is milder. Now she becomes the widow of service rather than of immolation. Widow chastity and service were more widespread customs than widow immolation, for the latter is a luxury of the great. Chastity has a sort of magical potency and medicine-women often observe chastity. Anthropomorphic gods need female service, and special classes of women are god-devoted: old widows, and again "vowed virgins." It appears that the amorously adventuresome deities of mythology are sun-gods, and since sun-gods are gods of fertility, the god's powers of reproduction are multiplied on earth by the representation of them by mortals. Hence the fertility cults believe that the human bride of the god husband imparts his potencies to her community. Thus concepts of sympathetic magic appear to explain the wife-priestess and the priestess-wife. But this divine type of sexual hospitality was uncertain because it interfered with domesticity. When the phallic character of the god is insignificant and the woman's promiscuity is no longer thought of as a means of magical communication between him and his worshiper, chastity is required of god-given women; this is strongly emphasized when the proprietary rights in women are strict. Unchastity becomes a grievous offense. To preserve the purity of god-dedicated women there is an ever-increasing tendency to seclude her. She may become a nun. Although the drift toward chastity for magic or worship is in early culture periods held in check by the powerful tendency to give exceptional privileges to the medicine-man and the king-god, experience showed that chastity became an entertainable and tolerable idea for other than religious ends.

The work abounds in a great variety of ethnological illustration which serves to show the primitive mind's undeveloped powers of differentiating separate modes of human activity as well as to exemplify its subordination to the principle of association of ideas. The reader is often conscious of repetition and is impelled to wish that more care had been taken in classifying the material after some definite generalization in order that light might be thrown upon its truth or falsity. There is a common fault in much modern ethnological writing of avoiding generalizations of any sort. The inevitable consequence of this is seen

in absence of purpose and loss of coherence. The work would have been given greater clarity and definiteness if the relation of the material presented to the principle of association of ideas or to the principle enunciated in the preface had been more consistently pointed out. The tone of the work is judicial. A most complete bibliography is appended.

F. STUART CHAPIN

SMITH COLLEGE
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The Color Line in Ohio. A History of Race Prejudice in a Typical Northern State. By FRANK U. QUILLIN, PH.D. "University of Michigan Historical Studies," III. Ann Arbor: The Ann Arbor Press, 1913. Pp. xvi+178.

This monograph is of a type that is needed to gain more local and more exact knowledge of the Negro problem. It is a study, from source material and personal interview, of the historical development and present-day conditions of race antagonism in Ohio, "a typical northern state." The chief conclusion of the research is that prejudice against the Negro has never been absent from Ohio and that it has waxed rather than waned in the past hundred years in accordance with the principle of increasing numerical proportion. In the introduction the writer states that working independently he has arrived at the same general conclusion of Alfred H. Stone in his book *Studies of the American Race Problem*.

The first part of the book, treating of the historical development of the Negro problem, discusses the rise and persistence of the feeling against the Negro. In the first constitutional convention in 1802 a motion embodying the 1787 ordinance prohibition of slavery in the Northwest Territory carried by but one vote. The Black Laws which indicated the real attitude of the majority of the people to slavery were repealed, not by a revulsion of public opinion, but by a political trade of the Free Soil party, which held the balance of power in the state legislature. Since the Civil War the writer shows that "equal rights in Ohio for blacks and whites is a myth," and he believes that the feeling against the Negro is "increasing rapidly, especially during the last twenty years."

The second part of the book, which deals with present-day conditions in the largest cities and certain selected towns, is less valuable as a study,

though of greater general interest. It is a somewhat impressionistic account derived from personal interviews with persons of both races of the existing state of race antagonism. Even if the author has here presented a qualitative rather than a quantitative statement of northern feeling against the Negro, he has abundantly indicated that discrimination against the Negro is not southern alone but national.

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

ERNEST W. BURGESS

The Government of American Cities. By WILLIAM B. MUNRO.
New York: Macmillan. Pp. viii+401. \$2.25.

The author of *The Government of European Cities* here presents a companion volume dealing with the government of American cities. The first book discussed both the structure and the function of European municipal organization and administration; the present work is confined to a description of the forms, past, present, and proposed, of city government in America. A second complementary volume is promised which will treat of the administration and actual functioning of municipal government.

Throughout the book the author emphasizes the importance of a knowledge of historical development as prerequisite for the understanding of the present forms of city government. A central idea running through many chapters is that federal and state forms of government and the national system of political parties have exerted an influence out of all proportion to reason upon the structure and activities of city government. The present protests against the "federal analogy" with its principle of divided powers, against political parties in municipal elections, and against state interference in city affairs are signs of a reaction toward a functional form of organization. The author gives a cautious approval to city government by commission and to direct legislation and the recall after a decidedly fair consideration of the arguments for and against.

To the sociologist the chapters entitled "American Municipal Development," "The Social Structure of the City," and "Municipal Reform and Reformers" should prove especially helpful. The particular value of the book to social workers and reformers is thus succinctly stated by the author: "In an age when men appear far too ready to proceed with a diagnosis and to prescribe remedies without much pre-

liminary study of the anatomy and physiology of city government, too much stress upon the importance of the latter branches of the subject can scarcely be laid."

ERNEST W. BURGESS

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

Housing Problems in America. Proceedings of the Second National Conference on Housing. Cambridge: The University Press, 1913.

The second volume on the subject of housing problems in this country, while presenting the most recent consensus of expert opinion upon the general housing situation, is designed to be of especial help to the medium-sized cities. Particularly valuable for practical use is the fact that the papers with their statement of general principles given by our leading experts in housing and municipal problems were supplemented by discussions and round-table talks which threw light upon the concrete conditions and actual methods in use. The live interest shown in the questions of the desirable type of working-men's houses, the adoption of the zone system in city-planning, and the promotion of associations for co-operating with the wage-earner in financing the small home manifest the strong tendency to emphasize the preventive as well as the remedial methods in meeting housing problems.

ERNEST W. BURGESS

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

Ehe und Ehereform. By VON ROMUNDT CHASTÉ. Berlin, 1913.

The first forty-two of his eighty-two pages the writer devotes to telling you how down he is on certain types prominent in modern life, principally on the greedy and brutal capitalist, exploiter of art and science, patron of prostitution, corrupter of all he meets, and on the women of his harimlik, wives pampered, "spoiled," unwilling to bear children, daughters educated merely to catch suitors, sensationalists, immoderate "sports." For such unpleasant characters the traditional attitude toward marriage, the writer claims, is responsible. Marriage is celebrated today with meaningless forms. It is a mere purchase, negotiated by those of unlike tastes and interests, bent on fooling each other beforehand, and afterward, at best content in getting used to each other and growing fat and soulless together. Now as all social

and physiological problems culminate in marriage, according to the writer, as marriage is the fundamental calling of man, to reform society, marriage must obviously be reformed. Therefore let us organize a marriage Society. This society will be open to all independent and high-minded souls, anxious to marry for only the noblest reasons, for no ulterior considerations, male candidates not to be under twenty-eight, female, under twenty-two, each to declare himself or herself fit physically and psychically for reproduction. If after due probation the marriage is a failure, let it be dissolved, the children, of course, if there are children, to be properly provided for. "I know that generalization is often a mistake" writes the author of this program. Of its being still more often a bore, he is, however, apparently unaware, just as he is unaware that panaceas are convincing only to their makers.

ELSIE CLEWS PARSONS

NEW YORK, N.Y.

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

The Analysis of Anthropometric Series, with Remarks on the Significance of the Instability of Human Types.—The criticisms of my paper on the body-forms of descendants of immigrants in America in comparison with those of the parents born in Europe rest, in general, upon the common method of dividing anthropometric series into a small number of arbitrarily chosen groups and indicating the percentage of all the individuals in each of these groups. This method can furnish merely descriptive numerical information of facts and gives no clue as to the causes of the facts. It sets up a "constant something" as a measure for an exhaustively defined group. The measures should be the "variables" of all individuals of an inexhaustively defined class. Only if we knew all the influences of the conditions of life upon the "body-forms," and only if we made those conditions the same for every individual, could we expect to have a constant measure. Variability is therefore no biological problem, but only an expression of this—that the forms of all the individuals constituting a class are determined by unknown influences. The class cannot be cut up into arbitrary groups and studied, but it must be treated as a whole, and any attempt at analysis must consider the influence of any factors upon the whole series. Recent studies seem to indicate that nourishment and state of health in youth have marked influences on the instability of human types.—Franz Boaz, "Die Analyse anthropometrischer Serien, nebst Bemerkungen über die Deutung der Instabilität menschlicher Typen," *Archiv für Rassen- u. Gesellschafts-Biologie*, December, 1913. V. W. B.

Our Poles.—Unbiased study convinces one that the propaganda against the Poles within our borders is not political wisdom. Guaranteed their rights of speech and nationality, they have proved their loyalty by refraining from European revolutions and fighting against even fellow-Poles for the sake of Prussia. But this propaganda calls for their immediate Germanization. This would necessitate a remodeling of the psychical and physical natures and even the government has no agency for that. Infringement upon speech rights has been followed by infringement upon land rights and the whole policy has effectually halted the steady assimilation that was going on. The government's excuse is that the Polish provinces must be Germanized for the protection of the eastern border; but the safety of a nation's borders depends not on the border provinces but on the tone of the whole populace.—K. Jentsch, "Unsere Polen," *Zukunft*, October, 1913. F. P. G.

The Second Austrian Convention for Child-Protection.—The convention of 1907 gave a stimulus to reform in the treatment of children, but the second convention, in 1913, was notable for the advanced thought presented. The twofold deliberation was along practical lines: first, for the suppression of child labor, and second, for the establishment of trustee-education, especially for the children of the needy. The country child was represented in the discussions as forming a problem different from the urban. It was agreed to urge that child labor be sufficiently restricted to give the child opportunity for education and that the trustee-system should guarantee the possibility of his making use of this allowance of time.—H. Goldbaum, "Der II. österreichische Kinderschutzkongress," *Zeitschrift für Kinderforschung*, November, 1913. F. P. G.

Proceedings of the Third Convention for Child-Study and Child-Development.—This convention, held in Breslau, October 4-6, considered psychological investigation in sexual differentiation and its pedagogic significance. Reports and discussions brought forth fruits of much research. Lipman found from experiments that boys

show a greater intra-variation and that more boys are supernormal, while more girls are subnormal. Frau Hirsch advanced data indicating that among both boys and girls of the school ages the ideal of the mother predominates overwhelmingly. Stern showed the very dissimilarity in speech and play habits to be suggestive of essential differences; boys are usually more positive, girls more imitative. Cohn's data, gathered concerning children actually in school, prove that the feminine spirit, normally, is more interested in the intuitive and emotional than in logical processes or abstract reasoning. Feeling was not unanimous as to the pedagogic application. Wychgram favored separate schools of domestic vocations for girls, corresponding to professional schools for boys; others were for coeducational throughout. Three mistakes were made in the nature of the discussions: (1) the physical differences were insufficiently accented; (2) disproportionate emphasis was laid on the psychic composition of the female; (3) the folk-school was kept too much in the background while attention was riveted on the higher branches.—O. Scheibner, "Die Verhandlungen des III. Kongresses für Jugendbildung und Jugendkunde," *Zeitschrift für päd. psychology*, November, 1913. F. P. G.

The Minimum-Wage Law in England.—The trade boards, which set the minimum wage law in action, were created by an act of Parliament in 1909. They are composed of: (1) representatives of the employers, (2) an equal number of representatives from the working class, (3) and appointed members, the number of whom must be less than half of all representative members. The representative members may be chosen by the parties or named by the board of trade upon the suggestion of the parties. The authority of a particular board of trade is limited to a certain industry, which its members represent. Its duties are to establish the minimum wage and to insure its enforcement. Further, it is the duty of boards of trade to specify a minimum wage for part-time workers and piecework, for a given district or for the whole industry. Seven inspectors are employed to detect violations of the law. An employer paying less than the minimum wage is liable to a fine of not more than twenty pounds sterling and is obliged to pay the employee the full wage deficiency. The Anti-Sweating League works to educate all employees to know their rights and powers.—Dr. Werner Picht, "Das gesetzliche Lohnminimum in England," *Zeitschrift für Volksw. Sozialpol. u. Verw.* H. A. J.

Punishment in the Curriculum of Charitable Institutions.—Spencer's theory was that a child in being punished should be brought to realize as vividly as possible that the punishment was a natural result of bad conduct. With the majority of children and especially the psychopathic children, this theory would prove confusing and impracticable. It is quite difficult to draw a line between the normal and psychopathic children that are received in charitable institutions. Bad conduct, opposition, cruelty, deceit, and sexual offenses are symptoms of mental ailment. This class of children are incapable of judging and following right modes of conduct. They are continually violating the rules of good discipline. The first and most important step is to study the mental attitude and ability of the child, before any punishment is administered.—Dr. Monkermöller, "Die Strafe in der Fürsorgeerziehung," *Zeitschrift für Kinderforschung*, November-December, 1913. H. A. J.

Child Labor in Austria.—Investigations made in 1911 for the Juvenile Protective League found the following facts to be true. Out of 418,391 children in Austria, 148,368 have to work. Twenty per cent of these are from six to eight years old. Forty-five per cent have not reached their eleventh year. Seventy-four per cent began work before the age of nine. Forty per cent began work between the ages of six and seven. Seventy-seven per cent work more than six hours per day, 54 per cent more than eight hours per day, and 24 per cent more than ten hours per day. In 22 per cent of the boys and 23.5 per cent of the girls, health was already found to be undermined; and that children in factories as a whole have poor blood, hollow chests, curvature of the spine, tendency to tuberculosis, and in life come to early invalidity.—Popp Adelheid, "Die Kinderarbeit in Oesterreich," *Die Neue Zeit*, XXXI, No. 52. H. A. J.

A New Presentation of the History of Economic Doctrine.—A fruitful history of national economic theory can be written only when viewed from a definite theoretical aspect; and this history must be interpreted and reviewed in terms of this aspect found in its earlier presentations. In order to secure such a history of economic doctrine we must, as in the case of economic theory and economic sociology, make a distinction between economic politics and economic science. Although the history of a science contains the records of false theories as well as the true, only the facts which tally with experience become a living part of its own age. Therefore, to understand economic doctrine it must be interpreted in terms of the history of its contemporary life.—L. Pohle, "Neue Darstellungen der Geschichte der Volkswirtschaftslehre," *Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft*, January, 1914. J. E. E.

Sociology and Psychology.—The fundamental notion in religion, according to Durkheim, is not divinity but sacredness. Sacred objects are those resulting from tradition and are social, in contrast to profane things which are individual. Religious phenomena are those consisting of obligatory beliefs connected with definite practices about certain sacred objects. Magic consists of rites that exercise a direct or automatic action; religion has rites that possess ideas, sentiments, and volitions. Magic is individual, while religion, the use of gods, is social, of the tribe. Conscience and the actions of the individual are modified by those of the group. All ideas, desires, and habits appear first in the individual conscience. In studying society it is necessary to study the physical environment; then the mental activities of the group, the psychological environment; then the reaction of the individual toward that environment. In the last analysis, social phenomena must be studied psychologically as well as objectively.—J. Leuba, "Sociologie et psychologie," *Revue philosophique*, October, 1913. P. E. C.

Sexuality and Prostitution.—In the writings of Dr. Iwan Bloch on the subject of sexuality we have a valuable contribution to the literature of the subject. The author traces the evolution of sexual attraction through the periods of civilization, showing its development until it has become the noblest emotion of the human spirit. He defines a prostitute as "the individual who abases self, apart from the bonds of marriage, to any sexual act whatever, without discrimination, in a manner, continuous and notorious, with an indefinite number of persons, generally in exchange for a price, usually in a commercial manner." Some defects may be found in this definition, in fact he does not refer at all to the matter of enticement, which is an essential characteristic of prostitution; but in many respects it is excellent. On the whole, Dr. Bloch has carried into a vast and little-explored field a true critical spirit, and has endeavored to direct a systematic investigation.—P. E. Morhardt, "Sexualité et prostitution," *Revue anth.*, October, 1913. E. E. E.

The English Social Insurance Law of 1911; Payment of Premiums.—For insurance against loss of health the English law requires the employer to pay both his own and his employee's assessment. The former is then authorized to deduct from the worker's wages an amount equal to the latter's assessment. Although the employer is forbidden to make the laborer pay the employer's assessment, there is nothing to keep the latter from discharging the worker and hiring in his stead another worker at a wage reduced by the amount of that assessment. The assured is not required to pay his own assessment when out of work or when his employer fails to pay his. The sole obligation of the worker is to reimburse the employer for having paid the worker's assessment.—Maurice Bellom, "La loi anglaise d'assurance sociale de 1911; paiement des cotisations," *Journal des économistes*, March, 1913. R. H. L.

The First Results of the New Social Insurance Law of England.—Tables for mortality, morbidity, invalidism, and maternity had to be worked out anew, because the tables in use by private insurance societies had been rendered obsolete by the advance in sanitary engineering recently, or because these tables were not in the precise form necessary for administering the law. The new mortality tables are based on the total population by age groups on June 30, 1909, and on the number of deaths at each age during 1908-10. The new tables of morbidity and invalidism are based on

the experience of the best private companies as furnishing data for the necessary mathematical calculations. These were checked also by the experience of such companies.—Maurice Bellom, "Les premiers résultats de la nouvelle loi anglaise d'assurance sociale," *Journal des économistes*, August, 1913. R. H. L.

The English Social Insurance Law of 1911; Payment of Premiums.—For insurance against unemployment, the English law provides that each laborer in the occupations covered by it is made equally responsible with the employer for the payment of assessments. Default in payment by either is punishable by the same amount of fine, viz., not over fifty pounds and not more than three times the unpaid assessment. In fact, however, the employer is held for the payment of the worker's assessment at the same time with his own. In this the law resembles the corresponding provision under sickness insurance.—Maurice Bellom, "La loi anglaise d'assurance sociale de 1911; paiement des cotisations," *Journal des économistes*, June, 1913. R. H. L.

The First Results of the New Social Insurance Law of England; Unemployment Insurance.—Insurance against unemployment is administered by the minister of commerce through a special division that serves also as an employment bureau. As a result of agreements with working-men's associations the number of those insured against unemployment has greatly increased since the passage of the act. Voluntary insurance is not paid out of the unemployment insurance funds, but by the state. Those obtaining this form of insurance are not limited to workers in the insured occupations. Associations may get the benefit of this arrangement by complying with certain conditions. And by July, 1913, over six hundred had either been admitted or had applied for the privilege.—Maurice Bellom, "Les premiers résultats de la nouvelle loi anglaise d'assurance sociale: assurance contre le chômage," *Journal des économistes*, September, 1913. R. H. L.

The Evolution of Work-Accident Laws in Europe and America.—Today the greater number of nations have adopted the principle of risk as inherent in the industry and consequently the principle that indemnity for accident should be an item of general expense borne by the industry. Compulsory insurance goes hand in hand with the adoption of these principles. Even yet, however, certain countries and states require proof of neglect by the employer in order to establish his liability. These are Bulgaria, Greece, Portugal, Japan, the republics of Central and South America, and some thirty states in the American Union. Within the recent past, eighteen other states have passed work-accident laws. These have gone through an evolution from the first, limited chiefly to definition of employers' liability and the correction of obvious defects in judicial procedure, to the New York law of 1910 concerning accidents in dangerous occupations. This law recognizes the principle of risk inherent in the industry; and the employer cannot escape liability, unless inexcusable negligence of the victim can be shown. American public opinion strongly favors the rapid spread of similar legislation in other states.—P. L. Pic, "L'évolution des lois européennes en matière d'accidents du travail," *Revue économiste internationale*, August, 1913. R. H. L.

Scientific Choice of Vocations.—A rational study in the choice of occupations is absolutely imperative. No longer can the young man or woman just out of school rely on a personal inclination or an artificial environment to determine one's vocation. A scientific understanding of the market for various kinds of labor together with constant co-operation between public, industrial, and professional schools on the one hand and the industries and the professions on the other, can make it possible for every person to find his highest efficiency.—A. Høyer, "Organiseret Valg af Livsstilling," *Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift*, September-October, 1913. J. E. E.

Rural Land Reforms.—An urgent need in Denmark is a scientific redistribution of agricultural lands. The economic independence of the proletariat is less than it was twenty years ago. Though manufactures have increased, the production of agriculture for home consumption is not sufficient to keep the growing population. The landowners are reaping large unearned increments while a poor peasantry and

the high cost of living are direct results. The ever-expanding political power of an increasing proletariat is inconsistent with a delimitation of its economic independence. As a consequence the modern laws of social amelioration which are superficial and make unjust demands upon an already over-burdened state will foster a continuous emigration.—H. Waage, "Landboreformer," *Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift*, May-June, 1913. J. E. E.

The Lowering Birth-Rate.—There is no dispute as to a conscious limiting of the number of births in all civilized countries, but the interpretations of the underlying motives differ widely. One fundamental motive has its simultaneous growth with the economic considerations for an improved standard of life for the coming children. This lowering birth-rate is not peculiar to the upper classes, but affects the laboring classes as well. Even educational regulation restricting the remunerative power of child labor has its specific influence. Apart from economic motives the general emancipation of woman, politically and socially, has undoubtedly complicated the interpretation of this problem, which is at present resting on hypothetical grounds.—Adolph Jensen, "Den af Sagende Fødselshyppighed," *Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift*, September-October, 1913. J. E. E.

The Negro and Labor Unions.—Negroes in industry generally come from the country where laborers are scarce. They have never had to look for work, hence they do not feel the need for unions. Black laborers are prejudiced against unions because these have sometimes excluded Negroes. For these reasons Negroes act as strike-breakers. This increases unionists' prejudice against the Blacks. But competition generally forces the unions to admit the Negroes, who usually become good union men.—Booker T. Washington, *Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1913. V. W. B.

The Development of Syndicalism in America.—Syndicalist ideas appeared simultaneously in America and in France. But these tendencies in America can be understood only by examining them in the light of economic and political developments. In fact, the term syndicalism can be applied to American industrial unionists only with the understanding that it is generic and includes variant species. It is therefore both logical and convenient to consider its development in connection with the evolution of the I.W.W. In 1905, the industrial unionists of America met in Chicago and laid the foundations of the now famous Industrial Workers of the World. In the western states, where the field had already been ploughed by the American Labor Union, it succeeded in maintaining a considerable influence over the more or less migratory laborers engaged in railroad construction and in the lumber and fruit industries, while in the East the I.W.W. had to break ground for itself. The Lawrence strike in 1912 revealed two things: (1) That what has come to be known as "direct action" is especially effective in the case of unorganized and unskilled workers, and (2) that the needs of these workers are best subserved by a new type of labor leader, who is inspired by revolutionary ideals.—Louis Levine, *Political Science Quarterly*, September, 1913. J. E. E.

Survival in Sociology.—Psychology stands in a relation to sociology almost exactly as physics and chemistry stand in relation to geology; and just as nothing but confusion could have resulted if the early geologists had endeavored to find physical and chemical explanations of conditions which they had not yet arranged in their proper sequence, so does confusion reign in the sociology of social phenomena before we have determined the course of the historical development of the phenomena with which we have to do. If this be so, it will be evident on how misleading a path have those entered who reject the social process of survival on the ground that it does not seem to them to provide an adequate psychological explanation of social phenomena. There must, of course, be psychological processes of some kind underlying the continuity of human activity shown in survivals; and chief among these is that mental disposition which we call conservatism. However, in the present condition of the science of sociology we only confuse the issue by trying to explain social facts and processes in psychological terms.—W. H. R. Rivers, *Sociological Review*, October, 1913. J. E. E.

Malthus and Some Recent Census Returns.—The rate of population increase during the last intercensal period in Scotland dropped from 11.1 per cent to 6.4 per cent. This is considered by many as deplorable. Since Malthus, many have deemed a regular increase of population a sign of prosperity. Malthus held that, in general, the population increased geometrically, while the food supply increased arithmetically. Further, he says the yearly increase of food depends on the melioration of land already possessed, which is gradually diminishing. Barriers to population increase are vice, misery, and moral restraint. Increase of population in Germany and Scotland during the nineteenth century fluctuated from period to period, chiefly owing to moral restraint. Since Malthus, the innovation of railroads and steamships have indirectly increased food supply and also population. Population increase in the long run depends on the extent of food supply somewhere, and in civilized countries upon the standard of living. If this is maintained by the decrease in the rate of increase of population, it is not regrettable that moral restraint has been used. One problem is how to provide for those in want and prevent increase of their number.—G. G. Chisholm, *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, September, 1913. P. E. C.

The Economic Factors in Eugenics.—The basic principles underlying the social conditions which prevent us from furthering the cause of eugenics are chiefly economic. These economic factors are: (1) the increased uncertainty of a livelihood among the working people; (2) the great rise in the cost of living without a corresponding rise in wages and salaries; (3) the general ambition of the people to give their children better food, better clothing, and especially better education than they had themselves; (4) the general entrance of women into all occupations and professions; (5) the demand for luxuries for children. This granted, we must admit that the remedial measures must also be economic.—William L. Holt, *Popular Science Monthly*, November, 1913. B. D. BH.

The Antagonism of City and Country.—The antagonism between country and city began when the human race was yet young and has persisted ever since. Careful philological analysis of terms and words like *Roma est orbis caput*, "pagan," "gentile," "gentle," "heathen," "fence," "hedge," "foreigner," "hamlet," "village," and "state" illustrates the development of human thought along the lines of city and country. Even the very recent writers contribute to this antagonism. But the city is slowly coming into its evolutionary rights and before long the "mark of Cain" upon it will be completely obliterated.—Alexander F. Chamberlain, *Journal of Religious Psychology*, July, 1913. B. D. BH.

The Genesis of Personal Traits.—In the light of the new psychology, mental traits could be reduced to (1) mechanisms for "expression" which are organic; and (2) mechanisms for "repression" which are social and due to the association of ideas. This being understood, it becomes quite obvious that mental defects are due to the violation of this fundamental psychological law, conditioned, mostly, no doubt, by social environments.—S. N. Patten, *Popular Science Monthly*, August, 1913. B. D. BH.

Report of Committee of the Massachusetts Association of Boards of Health on Uniform Health Reports.—Any attempt to study any phase of public health work in the reports of local health officers meets with these difficulties: (1) reports are prepared without any apparent plan; (2) they not only vary in different cities but are very unlike in the same city for different years—hence no basis of comparison of different years or different cities; (3) unsatisfactory statistical tables; (4) lack of intelligible and significant financial statements. Scientific uniform health reports should be adopted so that (1) students and officials may make comparative studies; (2) the public may know what its health officials are doing—cost of each phase of work, prevalence of different diseases—and comparison with the work of other years. It would greatly aid investigation if, in these reports, the work of other agencies along these lines were referred to briefly. Of course uniformity must not be applied so rigidly as to stifle initiative and experiment.—Charles V. Chapin and others, *American Journal of Public Health*, June, 1913. F. S. C.

Negro Race Philosophy.—With all his racial peculiarities the Negro is subject to the same laws of development as other races. The forces which have lifted the Anglo-Saxon race are needed to uplift and civilize the Negro. The old irresponsible, superstitious type is passing and the Negro with whom we will have to deal is the aspiring black man who protests against the spirit of caste. The Negro has had a different race history from the Anglo-Saxon. He lived where Nature made the struggle for survival less keen, allowing a greater proportion of the less fit to survive and developing a happy and irresponsible character. Slavery still kept him from shouldering individual responsibility, and did not furnish a very good training in morals. The Negro race must lift itself by its achievements; recognition will follow. The question before the country is: How can the black man develop his powers and unfold his possibilities without bringing on friction between the races or precipitating an inter-racial warfare?—William H. Ferris, *School Journal*, October, 1913. F. S. C.

Man Power, Organization, and Rewards.—Physiological and engineering experiments are discovering laws regulating maximum human efficiency. One of these is that in heavy labor a man should be under load for only a certain percentage of the day and must be left entirely free from load at frequent intervals; rest must balance exertion. Men, like machines, will refuse to work efficiently unless every law is lived up to. Scientific management in organization aims to secure (1) greatest degree of prosperity for both employers and employees; (2) high wages for workman, low labor cost for employer; (3) development of the science of work, standardizing both equipment and working conditions; (4) scientific selection of workers; (5) elimination of waste, material, time, and human energy; (6) spirit of co-operation; (7) definite task and definite bonus for all who by special skill, perseverance, and intelligent following of instructions accomplish more than the average result. To reward the more efficient, (1) profit sharing has proved unsuccessful, capital and labor disagree on estimate of profits; (2) piece wages are a premium on quantity, lead to greater exertion instead of relief, and require careful inspection; (3) the bonus or individual effort system is based on the idea of buying labor on specification, there being a basic price with a premium for results superior to the specifications. It shares the result of increased efficiency among employer, employee, and consumer. The day-wage system is doomed.—Annie Dewey, *Journal of Home Economics*, December, 1913. F. S. C.

The Metamorphism of a Nationality through a Change in Language.—Not to ignore its peculiar political constitution, habitat, religious and economic interests, a nation's most potent distinguishing characteristic is its language. Hence real assimilation of a foreign nationality cannot be secured merely by leading the nation into the new political order and the new religious and economic processes but some way must be found to lead it to give up its language with all its peculiar idioms. Conquest or invasion may result in (1) a double language, (2) a hybrid language, or (3) a substitution of one for the other. Only the last is real metamorphism. The Roman conquest, the history of Russia and Poland, Austria and its dependencies illustrate the importance of language substitution in the assimilation of a nationality. Bohemia's struggle with Austria illustrates the power of language when maintained in preserving the autonomy of a people. Language taught in schools, preserved in literature, and recognized by government insures national individuality.—Raul de la Grasserie, "Du métamorphisme d'une nationalité par le langage," *Revue philosophique*, September, 1913. F. S. C.

Opinions from Different Countries on the Railroad Problem.—The Royal Economic Society has issued seven treatises on the governmental relation to railways. The English situation is presented by three authorities, Ackworth, Stevens, and Stephenson, who seem agreed that while free competition is a desirable economic principle, its modern application is questionable. The Frenchman, Leroy-Beaulieu, defends the rather arbitrary control of his government over private companies; Professor Dewsnup explains the attempts of the United States to meet the problem with the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and strenuous legislation by Congress. In striking contrast to these papers, stand out the discussions by Professors

Schumacher and Mahain, of the state railroads of Germany. Public welfare is of prime importance, while profit is secondary. The unprejudiced mind will perceive the advantage of this plan. The chief arguments against it in the other countries deal with political considerations. But if it has worked such material aid to financial and industrial evolution in two countries, why should it not prove helpful in the other three?—Wehrmann, "Stimmen aus verschiedenen Ländern über die Verstaatlichung der Eisenbahnen," *Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen*, July and August, 1913. F. P. G.

The Social Significance of the Teachings of Karl Marx.—He accepted with Kant the idea of universal legislation for the soul. The only attitude that will permit one to find the truth is that there is a common unity of man with man. All the mystery of society finds its rational explanation in human experience. Human society has no other form of existence than the struggle of various group interests. This struggle is a historical process which is bound to continue. The class struggle which seems to threaten to divide society really strengthens the bonds. The natural sciences furnish the basis for determining the technique of social life. History has come to be a record of all human endeavor. By properly controlling human endeavor society will secure for itself the advantages for which it has been striving.—Max Adler, "Der soziale Sinn der Lehre von Karl Marx," *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, IV, No. 1, 1913. J. B. A.

The New Workmen's Insurance Laws in Russia.—Diversity of races and customs, varying density of population, and the great number of petty trades necessitated undesirable restrictions at the start. The law applies only to European Russia and Caucasia, not to Siberia and Turkestan. Only the following come under the law: factories, foundries, mines, railways, tramways, and navigation companies on inland waters. The cost of sickness insurance is derived from both employers and employees. The cost of free medical treatment is borne by the employer. A board of directors chosen by the general assembly of the members of the trades administers the sick relief funds. The general assembly determines what the maximum amount paid to members shall be and the amount of the contributions. Support is given in case of (1) sickness or accident depriving the worker of earning capacity, (2) pregnancy and child-birth, (3) death, funeral expenses, and an income to the family. The general administration of the workmen's insurance is concentrated in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in which an imperial office has been established. The local oversight is in the hands of government officials for workmen's insurance, who have the following functions: (1) to establish the statutes for the sick funds, (2) to interest the individual entrepreneur in the sick fund, (3) to make rules for employers for collection of statistical data important for the insurance administration, (4) to settle differences in the general assembly on particular cases, and (5) to establish standards.—Dr. Staatsrat Alexandrow, "Die neuen Arbeiterversicherungsgesetze in Russland," *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft*, July, 1913. F. S. C.

Infant Mortality in the First Four Weeks of Life.—The greatest infant mortality occurs in the first year, and by far the greatest proportion of that in the first four weeks, the first week averaging much the highest, when one-third to one-half of the monthly total die. The obstetrical causes are premature birth and traumatism; the medical causes, gastro-intestinal inflammation; the social causes, early separation of the mother and the child. Existing remedies are obstetrical therapeutics, e.g., caesareotomy and symphysiotomy; care of the mother at birth and confinement stations, and asylums for children. Future remedies should be general social and educational campaigns for greater care during the last month of pregnancy and the first month of the child's life.—Dr. Wallech, "La mortalité infantile dans les quatre premières semaines de vie," *Revue d'hygiène*, September, 1913. F. E. C.

From Classic Liberalism to Social Individualism.—The place of John Stuart Mill in the history of economic doctrine. John Stuart Mill reacted against the economic materialism reigning at the beginning of the nineteenth century. To him complete economic equality was not the final end of the social movement. He desired a social condition which would permit everyone to develop his own individuality—

not for the sake of an egoistic interest, but because he believed that in that way the greatest good would accrue to the entire human species. He was not, in the strict sense, a materialist. He believed in the power of ideas as a factor of progress, but he regarded those ideas as issuing from concrete realities. He did not consider the individual as such, but looking beyond him saw all humanity, the entire human race. In his own words: "The supreme goal toward which we should direct all our efforts is not the multiplication of the human race, but the guaranty of continuously elevating it."—E. Krumme, "Du libéralisme classique à l'individualisme social," *Revue internationale de sociologie*, October, 1913. E. E. E.

Zionism.—The Jewish colonization of Palestine as a patriotic instead of a religious movement began in the nineteenth century. Théodore Herzl, the first great apostle, convened the first Jewish congress in 1897 which formulated a definite plan for restoration through the guaranty of public law. Since then many local societies and federations have been formed in European cities. Those Jews will emigrate who are not able or willing to remain in their present home. The arguments in favor of Palestine as a colony preference are: (1) the neutral occupation by the Jews would remove the cause of much national strife over the Holy Land; (2) Palestine is the only place on earth where pretension for possession is legitimate; (3) because of inherited traditions, Palestine will offer a great moral reconstructive basis. The sympathetic support of many of the crowns of Europe has been secured, though overtures with the Porte have failed. Besides a political policy, a practical one is being promoted. At present one hundred thousand Jews are in Palestine, ten thousand of whom are in the colonies. The total population is seven hundred thousand, while the country could support seven millions. The various agricultural pursuits are being developed, a Jewish colonial bank has been established, and schools after European methods are making rapid progress.—Alfred Valensi, "Le Sionisme," *La vie internationale*, May, 1913. P. E. C.

The Sociological Conception of Punishment.—A reprehensible action causes the whole social organization to tremble. Repetitions or imitations of the act will cause the structure to fall, unless the equilibrium is in some way established. The function of suffering is to re-establish this equilibrium by affixing a penalty to every act that threatens the structure, in order that the future may be safeguarded. From this it appears that punishment is a correlative of social organization. Since the mechanism of society is designed to give protection to life and property, the justification of punishment lies in its being employed as a means of conserving these ends, the gravity of the offense determining the degree of punishment. No idea of vengeance or expiation can have a place in its administration. Mieczyslaw Szerer, "La conception sociologique de la peine," *Revue internationale de sociologie*, October, 1913. E. E. E.

Infant Mortality and Child Welfare. Address before the National Association for the Prevention of Child Mortality.—Statistics show that city life is, in general, inimical to child welfare. But the most significant fact is that child mortality is high wherever industrial life is made necessary for the mother near child-birth or during the infancy of her children, in city or country. Care, both prenatal and after birth, proper food, and cleanliness are the most important items in reducing infant mortality. Within the existence of this association the general death-rate has decreased 13 per cent, death by tuberculosis 18 per cent, infant mortality over 30 per cent. Means instrumental in this decrease are the "notification of birth" act, notification of ophthalmia of the newly born, and all forms of tuberculosis, thus bringing the doctor and other agencies into the home. Other agencies in the improvement are medical inspection in schools, children's act, maternity grant under insurance act, act of 1909 improving housing conditions, appointment of "public health visitors," two hundred voluntary health societies recently organized, and the distribution of literature. A pure-food bill and a milk bill are hoped for. In all efforts of the association beware of taking the initiative from the mother. Teach her to do more wisely by the child but to do it *herself*. Venereal diseases should be more closely studied and their effects on infant welfare considered.—Rt. Hon. John Burns, *The Child* (London), October, 1913. F. S. C.

The Evolution of the Social Consciousness toward Crime and Industrialism.—Until recently society has been of the opinion that the struggle between capital and labor must be settled right if conflict were allowed. But both sides are so efficiently organized that future clashes mean social danger, and demands for positive legislation come from all sides. It is not the incompetents or the undesirables of either side who are mainly involved. It is a struggle between honest, hard-working laborers and equally honest, hard-working capitalists. It is no longer a struggle for a living mainly—not even for personal greed—but for justice, for class rights. Social programs for the elimination of the unfit, unemployment insurances, garden cities, labor bureaus, etc., will not settle the question. They aim mainly at increase of production. But in the productive process the interests of capital and labor are identical. It is in distribution where the clash of interests arises, and until the ratio between the wages of capital and labor is altered or the present ratio is conclusively proven to be just, the discontent will remain. Just as society gradually came to realize that personal vengeance was a social wrong and the state gradually assumed the power of dealing out justice in criminal matters, so we now find the public demanding industrial laws and courts to settle the differences between labor and capital. Recent employment and labor laws are not disconnected legal enactments but evidences of a new code of industrial morality. It may be crude, but it is young and exhibits the fact that working-men, capitalists, and the public at large share in a keen desire to find the most rational way out of present industrial troubles.—E. H. Jones, *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1913. F. S. C.

The Relation between and Control of Manual Arts and Vocational Education.—The school has only partially adjusted itself to the demand for vocational preparation by introducing manual arts, agriculture, and domestic science. Both manufacturers and trade unions have established schools for preparation in special lines. Each has met the accusation of exploiting youth for special interests. It then becomes a problem of the public school. The older manual arts is a form of general education, while vocational education is a form of special education. Believing some good remains in the old and that there is subject-matter, and method too perhaps, in the new, we should use them both to meet the new demands in an ever-changing system. Let present studies be vocationalized without losing general educational value to train boys not only for a vocation but for manhood. To this end let the control of vocational education be in the hands of the board of education, representative of community interests. This method of administration already seems to be more successful than one in which general and vocational education are under separate control. The man in charge should be not only a skilled workman but a teacher. The opportunity is again presented to the school to vitalize, motivate vocational work and make it real.—F. D. Crawshaw, *Elementary School Teacher*, November, 1913. F. S. C.

The Economic Necessity of Trade Unionism.—In its fundamental principle, trade unionism is a recognition of the fact that under modern industrial conditions the individual unorganized workman cannot bargain advantageously with the employer for the sale of his labor. It must be clear that associations formed for the sole purpose of protecting and promoting the welfare of the men, women, and children who labor should not be placed by the law in the same category with monopolies or combinations organized for profit, and be condemned as unlawful conspiracies in restraint of trade.—John Mitchell, *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1914. J. E. E.

Control of Venereal Disease in England.—No truly effective steps have ever been taken by Local Government Board of England to stamp out syphilis and other dangerous types of venereal diseases. However, in March, 1912, the Eugenics Education Society approached the Royal Society of Medicine which urged all large hospitals to keep good record of the incoming cases. This was done, and it was found out that the prevalence and intensity of syphilis are decreasing. Suggestions have been made to emphasize (a) special instruction of the surgeons, (b) systematic instruction of the children by their parents, (c) opening of a special department in every hospital for the treatment of and research work in these diseases, and (d) gratuitous application of the Wassermann blood test.—J. Ernest Lane, *Bedrock*, October, 1913. B. D. BH.

Socialism and Economics.—Socialism, as distinct from the Socialist movement, and as defined by people like August Bebel, Belfort Bax, and Karl Marx, has somewhat asserted that "Socialism has been well described as a new conception of the world, presenting itself in industry as co-operative Communism, in politics as international Republicanism, in religion as atheistic Humanism; and that as soon as we are rid of the desire of one section of the society to enslave another the dogmas of effete creeds will lose their interest." There is another point of view—that of social science—which, for want of a better word, may be called "economics." It begs to point out that the most of the so-called evils that Socialism wants to stamp out are merely expressions of human nature. They always existed, and will exist in all times to come.—Richard Dana Skinner, *Forum*, February, 1914. B. D. BH.

The Labor Movement.—The labor movement at its best is the revolt of the human order against the economic order. It depends for its success on the moral intelligence of the people; it draws its support from the steady, careful, sober, and thinking sections of the working class. If the nurture of that class be neglected, social stagnation follows and the working-class ideals are lowered. As a matter of historical fact, this Labor party in England has been the most potent influence in revising spiritual aspirations among their people. Therefore, if the church cannot retain the confidence of the active spirits in the Labor and Socialist movement, it will cut itself off more and more from the spiritual life of the people.—J. Ramsay MacDonald, *Constructive Quarterly*, December, 1913. J. E. E.

The Modern Man's Religion.—As a matter of fact, a consideration of the "state of religion" in our present day is no longer a mere courtesy to constituted religion, but is a necessary logical preliminary to sociological reconstruction as such. The negative aspects of the religion of today are: (1) indifference to the idea of immortality; (2) impatience of authority of every kind; and (3) neglect of religion in its ecclesiastical forms. The positive and virile attitudes in modern religion are: (1) the doing of that which is practically possible for the increase of order and happiness in the world; (2) the pity for the needy and fellow-feeling for the one who has fallen by the wayside; (3) the supreme optimism which can scarcely be called anything but typical of these times; and finally (4) the modern man's religion is social in its ways of expressing itself.—John E. LeBosquet, *Harvard Theological Review*, January, 1914. J. E. E.

Conservatism and Morality.—Conflict between progressive and conservative thought arises largely through a difference in viewpoint, although it is to be regretted that in numerous instances the conflicting opinions are due to sentiment, prejudice, bad logic, or a false, unwarranted conservatism, as also immoderate radicalism. These facts lead many thinkers to adopt a dualistic world-conception. True conservatism at all times is commendable, but when it approaches the extremity of denying the future competence to achieve what the past has achieved, then it approaches prejudiced intolerance. But the important point here sought is the unimpeachable fact that moral conduct is a question of adaptability to dominating conditions. In no other realm, than in the domain of morals and precepts, can science do greater service for man; and if permitted it becomes the defender of true ethics and religion.—T. T. Blaise, *Open Court*, February, 1914. J. E. E.

Present-Day Aims and Methods in Studying the Offender.—The offender is out of line with social requirements. Adjustment must come through self-directed or external control. Present legal processes, supposed to aid in this adjustment, are unscientific; they do not use contributions of other sciences explaining criminal phenomena. Their attempt toward adjustment ceases when the offender leaves the prison and he is left worse off than before. The new methods of studying the offender aim to work out a science of causes and results that will deal with predictabilities as any other science of dynamics, and thus solve the problem of individual adjustment and throw light on situations provocative of crime. These methods are intensive, inductive, seeking facts about the whole individual and avoiding metaphysical theorizing about free will and determinism. The field of study includes sociological, medical, and psychological facts. The predictabilities achievable by careful

study are: (1) necessity for segregation of mental defectives; (2) discovery of physical defects as causes; (3) discovery of specialized mental defects and peculiarities; (4) discovery of mental habits leading to delinquency; (5) discovery of unsuspected vocational aptitudes, i.e., that certain individuals must have certain types of work in order to have healthy mental life; (6) discovery of mental conflicts and repressions, so little understood; (7) knowledge of environmental conditions. These can furnish the only sound basis for social predictability and treatment.—William Healy, M.D., *Journal of American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology*, July, 1913.

F. S. C.

The Evolution of the Social Conscience toward Crime and Industrialism.—Danger to society does not lie in the weaklings of the extreme poor or of the extreme rich but in the conflict of capable men against capable men. A complete victory for either side would spell its own defeat as well as the paralysis of the whole state. Both sides are fighting for the same principle: a just division of the spoils of industry. Some have considered the present condition as static; but evolution still operates. Under a policy of *laissez faire* no public check was put upon acts of violence. But in a highly organized society tyranny and oppression necessitate interference. So we are building up our industrial law today, as is shown by the history of acts for the regulation of the economic conflict. But the greatest danger of the solution of the problem along this line lies in holding too low a conception of the ideals of industry. The new industrialism may now lack the finer qualities of the older institution whose place it has taken, but our industrialism is new and the moral consciousness will soon develop.—E. H. Jones, *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1913.

J. B. A.

The Doctrine of Evolution and Anthropology.—The historical as opposed to the evolutionary view of anthropology is quite justified in its assertion that the science of anthropology is primarily a science of culture, by which is meant something objective, that is, distinct from the individual. Anthropology, thus defined, attempts to establish the hypothesis that all races of men belong to one species; the race-differences being variations within the species. All men are organically equal. Besides, there are no grades of human progress.—Clark Wissler, *Journal of Religious Psychology*, July, 1913.

V. W. B.

Heredity, Environment, and Social Reform.—To what extent either heredity or environment is responsible for the efficiency or non-efficiency of society is yet an unsettled problem. Yet nobody will deny that the individual's size, stature, and many other physical characteristics are due to heredity. The study of the family histories shows that children of defective parents are susceptible to certain diseases and insanity. Social reform must consider the problem of heredity seriously and proceed to make the environment such as will not permit defective heredity to influence the life of the future generations.—A. F. Tredgold, *Quarterly Review*, October, 1913.

B. D. BH.

Is Religion an Element in the Social Settlement?—The settlement disavows being in any sense a substitute or rival of the church or mission. The settlement stops short of where the church begins its distinctive work. While the functions of the settlement and of the church are so distinct that neither can fulfil the purpose of the other, yet each supplements the other. The religion of relationship to God as Father and to fellow-men as brothers is seen in (1) the respect for each one's religious convictions and preferences; (2) a common though always voluntary expression of religious fellowship is offered by silent or oral "grace" at the table and at "vespers"; (3) the active co-operation with all the churches and clergy of the community.—Graham Taylor, *Religious Education*, October, 1913.

J. B. A.

The Churches and Social Sentiment.—Prompted by the newly developed social sentiment, the evangelical churches in the United States have lately manifested some desire to unite in good work. This disposition finds expression in the principles adopted by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. Sixteen separate propositions are set forth concerning current social problems. Some of the

principles are axiomatic but vague; some are lacking in precision and suggest no specific action; some are grossly exaggerated though of good tendency; and some, mischievous because they suggest forms of collective action which are distinctly demoralizing to individual workers. "Proper" social conditions must be defined before recommendations for improvement can be of use. In addition to the traditional training of the minister, has come a professional study of subjects adapted to prepare him for social service so that he may lead his church in acquiring new truth about human society through a thorough study of existing conditions and of the most promising remedies.—Charles William Eliot, *Harvard Theological Review*, October, 1913.

J. B. A.

A Study of Still-Births in the Cities of France, 1896 to 1905.—In making a study of the causes of national depopulation in France a factor which must be considered is that of the still-born. The figures given here have been taken from the official registers of the cities investigated, being reported in two ways: (1) in actual numbers of still-births during the decade under consideration; and (2) in the proportion of these, year by year, to the number of recorded births. Under the first classification, we find the number of still-births per 10,000 of population to vary from 1896 to 1905, in Paris, from 218 to 173; in cities above 100,000, from 170 to 143 during the same interval; in cities of 30,000 to 100,000, from 147 to 123; in cities of 5,000 to 30,000, from 129 to 109. Under the second, we find the number of births reported for each still-birth, in the same decade, to vary in Paris from 97 to 89; in the second group of cities, from 71 to 61; in the third class, 93 to 58; in the fourth class, from 56 to 52. The interpretation of the significance of these figures shall be left to another occasion.—Dr. Chambrelent, "Étude sur la morti-natalité dans les villes de France, pendant la période décennale, de 1896 à 1905," *La revue phil.*, December 15, 1913.

E. E. E.

The Weaknesses of International and Social Arbitration.—Hyper-legality is a great obstacle to the accomplishment of arbitration between individuals. Civil procedure, with its interminable delays and minutiae of complexities, dominates the process entirely too much. The same is true of international arbitration. The problem is complicated by the confusion of juridical affairs with those of other sorts. Public attention is diverted from the actual issue at hand by the intricacies of legal exactions. And as regards arbitration applied to social conflicts, it is yet in a chaotic state.—M. T. Baty, "Les insuffisances de l'arbitrage international et social," *La paix par le droit*, October 10, 1913.

E. E. E.

The Responsibility of the Parents of Delinquent or Criminal Children.—One cause of much juvenile delinquency is bad parents; another is "incomplete families." Thus out of one hundred children committed for correction only thirty-six had both parents living together. Again, many children of fourteen or fifteen years live away from home. Many others are allowed to loaf in the streets instead of being required to go to school. In still other families the parents rid themselves of the economic burden of their children as soon as possible. This is a cause of the rural exodus of the young to the cities, where the girls are led into prostitution. Parents are less careful than formerly of their children in the conversations they hold before them. Among the working classes labor absorbs the whole day of the parents; among the leisure classes luxury and the acquisition of means for luxurious living keep the parents from caring properly for their children. Love between parent and child is declining. Some parents even make use of judicial correction of children to get rid of them.—P. Kahn, "La responsabilité des parents des enfants délinquants ou criminels?" *Bulletin de l'institut général psychologique*, July-October, 1913.

R. H. L.

On Allaying Labor Conflicts.—As a result of evolution the labor contract itself has become an object of legislation, indeed one of the most important. Groups of employers and of laborers constitute elements that the legislator must take into account. The law about labor contracts becomes inadequate and must give place to a law of collective contract of labor. It is difficult, however, to enact legislation providing guaranties for the execution of this contract by both the parties to it. Collective contracts are not an absolute remedy for labor conflicts, but tend to diminish them.

As a step toward a general law of conciliation and arbitration, conciliation and arbitration in case of conflict should be imposed upon all who shall make collective contracts. In the Hubert bill provision is made for the establishment of commissions on labor troubles and for regulation by the intervention of a third party. Under present conditions, compulsory arbitration cannot be realized; the law limits itself, therefore, to facilitating conciliation. Other countries have laws of collective contract, conciliation, and arbitration which are effective. The United States and the English colonies furnish striking instances of laws on arbitration and conciliation, and European countries furnish instances of collective contracts. In Denmark, however, arbitration has proved successful. European public opinion, generally, is not favorable to official intervention in labor conflicts.—Arth. Oliviers, "Vers l'apaisement des conflits du travail," *Revue sociale catholique*, October, 1913. R. H. L.

On Allaying Labor Conflicts.—In Denmark there has been a spontaneous development of arbitration and conciliation in response to social needs. No serious criticism has been brought against their operation. It is significant that here arbitration is not compulsory. Since social justice is an adaptation to social needs, and since arbitration in practice proves to be an effective device for this purpose, the writer believes that it constitutes a real step in social progress.—Arth. Oliviers, "Vers l'apaisement des conflits du travail," *Revue sociale catholique*, November, 1913. R. H. L.

Some Unforeseen Obstacles to the Peace Movement: Its Actual Limits in Europe.—Two great obstacles to the thoroughgoing adoption of arbitration for all national differences are: first, the fact that national boundaries do not coincide with ethnic lines leads to difficulties which are called international by some countries but are as insistently declared national problems by others. Those countries declaring them to be national problems naturally oppose international interference through arbitration. The second obstacle is the great reluctance of countries having colonies to submit differences between themselves and their colonies or differences between the colonies of different nations to arbitration courts in which other nations than those involved are represented. Closely allied with this is the great difference in the political power of the greater and smaller nations which brings about a great inequality in treatment even though it is given the semblance of justice.—Raoul de la Grassiere, "Des obstacles imprévus au pacifisme: ses limites actuelles devant la carte de l'Europe," *Revue internationale de sociologie*, January, 1914. F. S. C.

The Segregation of the White and Negro Races in Cities.—The latest development of legalized race distinctions is the segregation of the white and black races as to residence in cities. There are four types of segregation ordinances now in use: (1) the Baltimore type applies only to all-white and all-negro blocks and does not legislate for blocks where both whites and blacks live. (2) The Virginia type permits the town to divide its territory into "segregation districts" and to designate which is for white and which is for black. It is then unlawful to mix the races in a district. (3) The Richmond type legislates for the whole city. The block is white where the majority are white and black where the majority are black. (4) The Norfolk type also applies to mixed as well as to all-white and all-black blocks, but the color of the block is determined by the ownership as well as by the occupancy of the property thereon.—Gilbert T. Stephenson, *South Atlantic Quarterly*, January, 1914. V. W. B.

Woman and Morality.—Woman's maternal functions, which have demanded so much self-denial of her from the very primary stage of her organism, have deprived her of many of the qualities which have gained for her the subordinate place in the state organizations. In the modern conflicts of woman the protagonists of "equality" find enough reasons to believe that she would, in the near future, occupy a better position than she ever did in the past. However, they should not fail to notice that this change in the social order is bringing a certain amount of moral retrogression. The "woman's movement" is a one-sided attempt to elevate woman.—Mrs. Archibald Colquhoun, *Nineteenth Century and After*, January, 1914. B. D. BH.

Continuation Schools in England and Germany.—Any contrast between Germanic progress and the present-day conditions of England becomes very vivid and real when we study the educational systems of these countries. The continuation schools of Germany have more influence than the few scattered night schools of England. It is high time for the people of the mother-country to think of empowering the government to make the attendance in these schools compulsory. The employers should co-operate with the government in the carrying-out of these measures.—J. Saxon Mills, *Fortnightly Review*, February, 1914. B. D. BH.

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THE SOCIAL GRADATIONS OF CAPITAL

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The social transition is advancing by leaps and bounds, if not by literal "mutations." People whose lot in life is on the shady side of easy street have hard work to see that anything is doing toward letting the sun into the rear, if it cannot reach the front of their dwellings. On the other hand, people who are watching the human process from the conning towers almost literally catch their breath sometimes, when they glimpse, at a new angle, some of the signs that the old order is changing.

This does not mean that wise observers think visionary promises will ever be fulfilled. It does not mean that they think the world will ever be made over in a day. It does mean that life is still vital. Life is creative. Life reconstructs its agencies. Life energizes its processes. Life eliminates its burned-out tissues, and substitutes structures capable of further service. Life outgrows its immaturities, and advances in the scope of its powers.

All these things are as true of the life of society as of the individual. There is no mysticism about this. It is plain, everyday fact. We know it in detail, but when we try to take a broad survey of it we often obscure our own vision, by selecting some aid that turns out to be more like a smoked glass than a moving-picture apparatus. The real thing which it is up to modern men to realize, by some means or other, is that in the last hundred and fifty

years, and especially in the last fifty years, civilized people have changed their ways of doing their work. The kinds of work that they do have changed. Meanwhile our thoughts about the work to be done and about ways of doing it have also changed. Many of us see that the ways of thinking about the work of the world, which were fairly satisfactory a century and a half or even a half-century ago, have to a considerable extent lost their plausibility. They do not seem to us now to cover the facts with which we are familiar, as they seemed to our predecessors to cover the facts with which they were familiar. Every day new people are passing through a mental conversion which they report in some equivalent of the confession: "For a long time I've had a sort of feeling that something is out of whack in our economic institutions; but I kept still, because I couldn't make out just what is the matter. I've come to the idea now that this very keeping still is a good deal of the matter. We know our present economic system doesn't convince us any longer, but we keep still, instead of speaking out that much, and then comparing notes about why it isn't convincing. The longer we keep still, the more different kinds of twinges it will cost us to make the changes which we shall find to be necessary. The moral is that it is time to take stock of our fundamental social ideas, and to find out how much must be written off for depreciation."

Another fact about the present phase of social transition is that social unrest can no longer be sneered out of court by the plea that it is merely the envy of the unsuccessful toward the successful. Since the present economic traditions began to take shape, there have always been leaders of protest against the system of whom this charge surely would not hold. The number of such who have no private complaint against the present economic order, who admit that it has treated them better than they deserve, if measured by the average of men of similar merit, is daily gaining recruits. They do not join the ranks of destroyers. They have no bombs hidden in their clothes. They are not subsidizing dynamiters. They have waked up, however, to the fact that as a sheer matter of clear thinking, it is necessary for them to find out whether the economic ideas which are supposed to be here to stay are truths or myths.

The inhabitants of the tropics might conduct their affairs without serious error if they took it for granted that water is always either vapor or liquid. If they moved to the north temperate zone, however, before the first winter was over they would find that they could not do business any longer on that assumption.

In a parallel sense, it is fairly accurate to assert that success or failure in life is merely the natural consequence of using or not using the opportunities freely and equally open to all—*provided*, that the assertion is made with reference to conditions in which all are within walking distance of unclaimed land, and all the success there is for anybody is limited by the uses that ordinary manual labor can make of virgin soil. It is extravagant fiction to repeat that assertion where all the land there is has been appropriated by someone, in parcels varying from a city lot which could not be bought for as many gold coins as it would take to pave its surface, to patches of soil barely capable of feeding pigs and chickens enough to support a family.

A society may be near enough for all practical purposes to the truth, if that society depends upon "free competition" to insure economic justice—*provided*, that the members of that society are all alike in depending solely upon their individual labor of hand, or brain, or both, to obtain the results which they will have to exchange with their neighbors. Our present society is assuming the impossible, however, when it dallies with the illusion that there can be "free competition" in a society containing, on the one hand, millions of persons with no assets but their individual powers, and on the other hand thousands of corporations with wealth and credit and legal resources. When the interests of these two types of competitors clash, "free competition" between them is like a boy with a pea-blower besieging the Rock of Gibraltar.

A society may boast that it offers to all alike a fair field for an equal start in life—*provided*, it gives no privileges, nor perquisites, nor preferments, except as a fair equivalent for services rendered, or as a challenging responsibility in view of demonstrated competence. It is stupid or hypocritical to allege equity in a society which suffers the many to start with nothing, but which foreordains that some shall start with endowments of millions.

Men whose interests in the matter are as impersonal as any human interests can be are becoming aware that our social order rests in part upon presumptions like the foregoing, viz., that things are as they should be because other things are so, which are not so. It is a mere matter of time when every man with a conscience, who can also think, will discover that, if he does not join in the demand for reconsideration of the premature hypotheses beneath our social system, he belongs in the same mental limbo with those religious freaks that taboo the telephone because it is not authorized by the Bible.

In other words, we may well go back nearly a century to that still timely saying of Comte, "The trouble with our society is its anarchy of fundamental ideas." After all, what we think, or what we think that we think, about antecedent matters, that may seem far away from practical applications, does much, well or ill, to shape our everyday courses. The miners in Colorado, and Michigan, and Pennsylvania, and West Virginia; the textile workers in Massachusetts, and the South Atlantic states; the railroad employees and owners all over the country; the socialists in every country are raising questions of detail that may be patched up temporarily as questions of detail only. The problems will sooner or later come back to trouble everyone, unless they are treated with reference to underlying questions of principle affecting all the interests touched by the health or unhealth of social relations. That is, as the German economists have been declaring since 1870, *there are no economic questions which are not at last moral questions*. If this fundamental morality in a primarily economic situation is not set right, to that extent the whole social order is unstable.

Expressed in another way, capitalistic civilization has created a capitalistic theory which virtually presupposes that there can be a capitalistic world, insulated from the moral world. In truth, capitalistic phenomena are phases of the conduct of man toward man, just as literally as the same is the case with the phenomena of politics, or religion, or vice, or crime. This truth seems to have the relation of the camel to the needle's eye in the minds of traditional thinkers. Its penetration into common-sense philosophy is illustrated in a back-handed way by the dialogue:

"D'ye think a man can make money an' be kind?" asked Mr. Hennessy.

"Sure, he can," said Mr. Dooley. "But he'll have to have two sets iv office hours."

In so far as human beings enter into economic processes, the final word about those processes, whether they are production, or distribution, or consumption, must be said from the standpoint of the relation of those processes to all the human beings concerned. In short, the processes must be considered as only provisionally impersonal, and as always ultimately personal.

The most evident consequence is that many familiar economic presumptions must be further generalized. Their approximate truth for strictly capitalistic purposes at once appears to be gross untruth when subjected to the social, that is to say, to the human or moral test.

This paper has to do with a single illustration of these propositions. The particular thesis to be developed is that *a large part of the confusion in the present stage of transition is due to our acquiescence in conceptions of capital as an exclusively economic phenomenon, and in corollaries from those conceptions which act as automatic adjusters of conduct to those unmoral conceptions. Conflicts centering around capital press for convincing analysis of capital as a social phenomenon.*

From Adam Smith down, economic theorists and practical business men alike have betrayed little doubt that they have covered the whole ground when they have contented themselves with the commonplace division of capital into "fixed" and "circulating."¹ We have no quarrel with this classification, except as it crowds out another and more significant one. For all purposes which do not go beyond analysis of the technique of industry, the old distinction is ample. Unless we observe, however, that this classification is strictly technical, and that it leaves the moral problems connected with capital entirely unrecognized, this division palsies the social analysis necessary to illuminate the human relations involved. One might sift orthodox English and American economic literature since 1776 without finding unequivocal evidence that a woe-is-me had been felt over the lack of a moral

¹ *Wealth of Nations*, Book II, chap. i.

differentiation of capital. Even the socialists have not followed up their own demand for a reconsideration of capitalism with an adequate analysis of capital in its moral aspects. The familiar distinction between "individual capital" and "social capital" is a coy debutante that has never figured very effectively in the serious work of scrutinizing capital.

The clue to a primary analysis of capital from the social standpoint may be found in the question: *To what extent is the effectiveness of capital in the economic process due to unaided acts of the owner; and to what extent is its effectiveness conferred by acts of others than the owner?*

When the answer to this question is partially made out, it shows that there are three distinct types of capital, considered as a social phenomenon, viz., first, capital which is used solely by the owner; second, capital which is used by the owner in some sort of dependence upon the acts of others; third, capital which is employed, as such, wholly by others than the owner, and under conditions which he does not and could not maintain by his individual power.

For convenience, we will call these types of capital respectively, *tool-capital*, *management-capital*, and *finance-capital*. We proceed to examine some of the comparative moral antecedents, and consequents, and implications of these three types.

For our first illustration, let us take the case of a frontiersman who has cleared a piece of land, and with the rude tools which he has brought from the settlement has added to his equipment a hoe. Of course, this pioneer and his tools are social products. If the demand were made, we might assume for the sake of argument that Friday was potentially in all respects Crusoe's equal. The hard fact remains that Friday could not actually bring to pass what Crusoe could, because Crusoe had been trained in a more advanced school, and had brought from this school tools that Friday did not possess and could not use. Our settler could not have made the hoe if he had not been an heir of civilization. Granting that, and allowing it to stand on the debit side of his account, he used his inheritance without further aid in making his hoe. With the strength of his own arms he uses the hoe in breaking up the soil he has cleared, and he gets a somewhat larger crop than the land would

have yielded if it had not been prepared at all for the seed, or if it had merely been scratched with a stick. The hoe is virtually a part of the man himself. He has given more strength and skill to his hands, more executive power to his brain, more control over nature to his will, by making and wielding the hoe. By his own exertion, not by any gift or privilege from other men, not by taking advantage of other men, nor by sharing the benefits of other men's efforts (with the qualifications already indicated), he has increased his own capacity to produce wealth. As nearly as anything within sight, the hoe itself, in the first place, then the crop raised from cultivation by means of it, belong to the worker by the best right that can be imagined. When a settlement gathers within co-operating distance of this pioneer, and when the neighbors tacitly agree that any stranger who might try to separate the hoe from its maker and user, without his consent, would have to reckon with the whole group, they are merely recognizing elementary moral facts. They are doing nothing that contains an appreciable artificial element. They are resolving to ratify that to which common sense responds. They are saying that the thing which evidently ought to be shall be, so far as their united power can decide.

The relations between capital and labor, as represented by the farmer and his hoe, are thus settled on a basis that is as little open to question as the propriety of leaving his hand free to convey food to his mouth. If all capital were literally a tool in the hands of its owner, and if there were no questions about accidental shiftings of the products of one tool-capitalist's work into the hands of another, it is hard to see how there could be any dubious questions of moral principle in the field of industry.

Let us now suppose a neighboring claim, through which a stream flows. Let us suppose that it has a fall sufficient to develop a considerable amount of power. Let us suppose that the settler has saved enough to build and equip a small grist mill, and that he presently becomes a miller as well as a farmer. As owner and operator of the mill, are his relations to the community in any way different in kind from his neighbor's social relations as owner and operator of the hoe? The customary economic presumption is that they are not, and this presumption may be taken as marking the

beginnings of all the differences of opinion about the ethics of capitalistic society.

If we confine attention simply to the fact that the miller is still working, let us say just as industriously as the farmer, if we think of the mill as his tool, just as literally as the hoe is the farmer's tool, the capitalistic presumption is apparently in strict accordance with the facts. But if we press our analysis a little farther, we find that another factor must now be taken into the account. As we have seen, this new factor is not absolutely new. It was present, as an accessory before the fact, and as indorser and potential co-operator parallel with the fact, in the case of the man with the hoe. It played such a relatively minute part, however, in the work of the man with the hoe, that we found it to be negligible. That factor is the *co-operation of others beside the owner* in making the capital efficient. On the technical side, this has of course been one of the commonplaces of economics, since Adam Smith's masterly exposition of division of labor. In the aspect here emphasized, it has been almost totally ignored. Under normal circumstances, the maker of the hoe might use it until it is worn out, and not be affected, well or ill, so far as his productivity with the hoe is concerned, by the existence or the non-existence of other human beings. If he is able to produce more of a particular kind of crop than he needs to consume, and if he would like to consume something else instead of that surplus, other people then become significant as a possible market; but they have nothing directly to do with the farmer's productive efficiency. The miller, on the contrary, is not thinkable as a miller without much dependence upon his fellow-men, without much assistance from them, and without much potential or actual control of social conditions by them, so that his labor may proceed without interruption and loss.

An argument is possible to the effect that the difference between the man with the hoe and the man with the mill, in the matter of social co-operation, is merely a difference of degree rather than of kind. If anyone derives satisfaction from that way of putting it, we will concede the point; but the force of the admission at once disappears when we take notice that, in its social significance, this difference of degree acquires the importance of a difference in kind,

as the quantity and complexity of the management-capital, typified in the first instance by the small mill, increase.

The crucial matter about this class of capital is that it cannot be a part of the personality of the owner, in the same intimate and literal and complete sense as in the case of the hoe. If we try to express the facts about the mill in terms of a tool, we are confronted by the fact that no very large part of that tool has ever been actually in the owner's hands at once. If he took a personal part in building the dam, he was not at the same time building the water wheel. Supposing that his own hands alone constructed both, it is difficult to imagine that he also alone quarried and installed the millstones, or that he fashioned the rest of the machinery. Given the mill in running order, the owner cannot be in all parts of it at once. He must have one or more helpers. One of them may be needed to keep the gearings in repair, while another tends the hoppers, and the owner deals with the customers. At times the owner must leave the premises for food, or sleep, or bargaining with his neighbors. At those times the mill has to be left in charge of others. That is, the owner is forced to rely upon actual co-operation with others, in order to make his management-capital effective; and the ratio between his own literal operation of the capital and that of the other co-operators varies with the volume and form of this sort of capital. Moreover, another kind of co-operation is involved, both as condition and consequence of the existence and efficiency of this sort of capital. This is the co-operation of the surrounding community in maintaining the conditions without which this type of capital would be impossible.

The moment a worker is in any degree dependent upon another person for the success of his work, the stage is set for a moral conflict. Actual conflict may not occur in a given case. The co-operation may proceed without friction. Each may perform his part to the entire satisfaction of the other. On the contrary, there may be friction from the beginning. Each party may suspect the other party of getting or trying to get too much advantage out of their common labors. Each party may take measures accordingly to embarrass the supposed unjust purposes of the other. Neither

party could prosper if left exclusively to its own resources in adjusting these differences. Appeal must lie at last to customs and laws enforceable and enforced by the community. In the degree of the bulk of management-capital, and of the complexity of its operations, this social co-operation must develop. It comes about at last that the literal tool element in many cases of management-capital shrinks till it includes nothing but an office chair and desk, with pieces of paper which the management-capitalist may hold in his hand while dictating to his stenographers or using the telephone. At the same time, the actual wealth controlled by this tool-capitalist may be distributed among buildings in which thousands of helpers work, over the transportation lines of the world, upon which raw material or finished products are in transit, and in warehouses where marketable stock is stored.

We cannot state too strongly that we are neither asserting nor implying that this phenomenon of management-capital is wrong. We are pointing out in the first place that it is artificial, as compared with tool-capital. The control of the management-capitalist over this large and dispersed wealth is not principally by virtue of his own power. It is principally by virtue of the organized action of society, which gives power not his own to his volitions. This being the case, the terms of this relationship between society and the men whom it empowers to be management-capitalists will always demand closer scrutiny, as to their justice and wisdom, than the simple and obvious resolution of the neighbors to protect the farmer in possession of his hoe. Compared with the group opinion about the hoe, group opinion which results in the development of management-capital must necessarily always be in a high degree contingent. The community, in which the owner of the management-capital may be only a millionth or a hundred-millionth part, must have guaranteed certain elements of social uniformity and stability; it must have put at his disposal certain physical and moral resources reinforcing his own energies; it must have created and supported legislatures, and courts, and civil and military forces available to sustain the legal institutions. Thus the management-capitalist is not, like the man with the hoe, chiefly a self-sufficient individual. On the contrary, the management-

capitalist is chiefly a social product. Measured by the ratio of his powers as a literal tool-wielder, and the influence which he actually exerts as a wielder of other men who actually use the bulk of the tools, he is in a very small fractional degree himself, and he is in a very large degree what his community has enabled him to be. The community has gone before him, and stood behind him and around him, and has potentially or actually exercised a collective power for his benefit, in comparison with which the most capable man is puny.

We must go out of our way to guard against possible suspicion that we are actually or by implication denying or belittling the importance of managerial functions. In fact, no capitalistic fallacy is planted more directly in the path of concrete economic progress, and of clear moral thinking, than the fallacy of some socialists and some labor leaders not socialists, that managerial functions are fictions. Not long ago, within ten days of each other, three organizers of three different types of labor movement told me, in the most deliberate way, that in their opinion there is no such thing as a special kind of work for managers that could not be done just as well by anyone drawn by lot from employees; that the notion of a managerial function is merely a blind to cover up exploitation. We do not question the fact of exploitation in many cases. We do not doubt that the idea of a managerial function is made to go as far as it can in many cases to conceal the fact of exploitation. The laborer will be his own worst enemy, however, until he educates himself out of the notion that there is "no such thing as a managerial function." The laborer has really a larger stake than anybody else in competent discharge of the managerial function. If it is not well performed, it may mean the loss of his job and indirectly of his life and the life of his family. At the same time, it might mean to the capitalist only the loss of a fraction of his property.

There ought to be enough "baseball sense" scattered among American laborers to retire the dangerous fallacy that the managerial function is merely an alias for fraud. Every baseball fan knows better. The "Giants" won a pennant last year and the "Athletics" two, not merely because each was a bunch of capable

players, but also because John J. McGraw and "Connie Mack" handled the players. If either of those managers should announce his retirement, the betting fraternity would change the odds on the prospects of the team before the news was fairly off the wire. What is true of baseball is equally or more true of every complicated business. The difference between competent and incompetent management may quickly mean the difference between life and death for the business. Competent managers can no more be chosen by lot than competent bricklayers, or plumbers, or electricians, or train dispatchers could be selected by lot from the names in the Chicago telephone book. In any system of industry that could ever succeed, the managerial function would have to be insured by some method of selecting competence, not by reliance on chance.

It should be said at the same time, that our present capitalistic system does not insure competent management, although in that respect present methods are far more effective than chance would be. Hereditary management is no more certainly efficient in economics than it used to be in politics. The fact that man is a lazy animal, and that management-capitalists by grace of accident are inclined to hire men more competent than themselves for the strict managerial work guards the technical side of management-capital, but does not remove its social anomalies.

Our analysis of the social relations of management-capital, therefore, in no way implies doubt about the necessity of management as a distinct economic factor, our discussion takes that for granted, but it aims straight at these two facts: *first, the function of economic management would be relatively impotent without the support of social co-operation; second, this social co-operation morally entitles the co-operating laborers and the co-operating society to a share in controlling the terms under which the management-capitalist shall work, and a larger and more influential share than our present economic system has either realized in practice or admitted in theory.*

We return then from this side issue to the main argument.

It is a curious fact that English-speaking economists have almost wholly ignored the necessity of analyzing the relationships which differentiate the management-capitalist morally from the

tool-capitalist. The whole range of the "labor question" has been befogged by employers and employees and theorists alike, through failure to throw on it the light of this simple perception, viz.: *It begs the question at the outset to assume that the management-capitalist is simply an individual, like the man with the hoe; to regard him as exercising solely his own personal faculties; as acting merely in the enjoyment of indubitable natural rights; as possessing and using only those things and those powers which belong to him strictly as a person, which are to all intents and purposes his own proper self, just as the hoe is the extended arms of the man who uses it.* On the contrary, the management-capitalist is a highly artificialized social contrivance. A large part of the efficiency which is credited to him is in fact merely symbolized by him. It is really the working of other men, first in the immediate economic organization of which he is the head, second, in the entire legal and social community whose institutions make the industrial operations possible. Just at this moment it is timely to illustrate by asking the question, Why are capitalistic operations at a standstill in Mexico (March 1, 1914)? Several of the most efficiently managed concerns in the world are anxious to operate there, but they are powerless until the social conditions prerequisite to their efficiency are restored.

An important factor will be introduced among the forces that are making the present social transition, by working out the omitted passage in social theory to which this perception points. The problem is: *What neglected elements are brought into the social question by attention to the fact that the management-capitalist is not merely an individual exercising his unaided powers, but that he is an individual with powers increased tens, hundreds, or thousands of times by virtue of artificial arrangements, which make him the repository of social powers incomparably greater than his own?*

It is a part of the instinct or the strategy of obscurity to represent all formulations of questions like this as attacks upon persons or upon the foundations of morals. No one can deal judicially with a social problem unless he is able to keep the involved questions of principles distinct in thought from the individuals or interests that may be immediately affected by the principles. The problem here in question is no more an attack upon individuals,

or upon wealth acquired by operating in good faith under our capitalistic system, than the problem of *coal v. oil* as fuel for our battleships and locomotives is an attack upon the personal character or property rights of our naval officers or railway presidents.

Still further, it is a part of the inbred sophistry of traditionalism to practice sabotage on inquiries of this sort by challenging the inquirers to propose "remedies" for institutions under investigation. Of course anyone capable of scientific reasoning, and willing to pursue it, knows that such opposition is on a par with demands that the meteorologists and the oceanographers shall either stop their studies or present "remedies" for the arctic currents and the Gulf Stream. The immediate capitalistic problem is not a question of approval or disapproval. It is not a question of retention or substitution. It would be an urgent scientific problem, even if there could be no more thought of turning its results into a program than the astronomers have of rearranging the solar system. In the first instance, the capitalistic question, on its moral side, is a pure problem of analysis, viz.: *What are the facts about the social relations involved in the phenomena of management-capital, as compared with tool-capital?* After we have become generally acquainted with these facts it will be in order to consider what may, can, or must be done about them.

This is not the place for an attempt to trace in detail the evolution of the customs and the laws which give to management-capital its present status. We can here merely point out certain significant features in its development and in its results up to the present time.

Most obviously then, the arrangements, by virtue of which the management-capitalist of today has his radius of action, are in part the accumulation of habits, or the "crystallization of custom." Under pressure of circumstances which no individual could control, which, however, in the course of time some individuals became better able to accommodate themselves to than others, certain standards grew up in accordance with which the management-capitalist was able to secure the assistance of other people not capitalists. At the same time, and through a series of

generations, legislation accumulated, defining the scope of action which the management-capitalist might perform with the approval, and to a certain extent with the assistance, of the government. This accretion of custom, and particularly this body of laws, is by no means in the interest of the management-capitalist alone. It has developed, and it operates, to some degree, in the interest of the helpers who come most directly to the assistance of the management-capitalist, and of all the other persons in the community, both as individuals and as an organized society.

It is not necessary, for our present purpose, to inquire whether anyone took undue advantage of anyone else, in building up this body of customs and laws; or whether the circumstances were such that the customs and laws would inevitably be shaped more by certain interests than by others; or whether the opinions that prevailed in promoting this, that, or the other piece of legislation were thoroughly impartial. The essential thing about these enabling acts, whether of custom or of law, is that they are, each and all, both specifically and as an institutional system, reflections of *opinions* about what was just and fair, or at least expedient, under the circumstances in which the judgments went into effect. As a matter of fact, these opinions may have been held by a considerable majority of the community that gave sanction to a given provision, or by a smaller number, dwindling down to a bare majority of some legislative committee with pull enough to "put through" a piece of special legislation which attracted little attention. They may have been opinions which reflected the moral sense of all concerned, or they may simply have registered the terms which a few had the physical power to force on the many. In so far as previous acquiescences continue to be the custom and law for people succeeding those by whom the arrangements were made, the only moral justification for that continuance must be found in good and sufficient reasons for the persistent opinion that the arrangements still represent that which is just and fair, or at least expedient; the welfare, not of special interests, but of all interests concerned being taken as the criterion.

Now the first consideration to be emphasized, in view of all these things, is that, in consequence of the very fact that the

institutions which do so much to make the management-capitalist are not, as in the case of the man with the hoe, plain recognitions and ratifications of indubitable facts, inasmuch as they are so largely registrations of opinions, and often of minority and interested opinions, about the meanings of facts, *the room for error in those opinions increases with the complexity and variability of the facts concerned.*

That is, as we have seen, there is practically no room whatever for any doubt more serious than a quibble, as to whether the man who has made the hoe should be supported by his neighbors in having and using the hoe. There is a great deal of room for doubt as to whether the ownership of a steel plant, with thousands of operatives, should permanently involve the precise balance of power, which our present institutions sanction, between management-capitalist, operatives, and public. The reason for this is not that, whereas justice was once obligatory, it is obligatory no longer. The reason is rather that the human arrangements, which may have been as nearly just as possible in an embryonic social condition, may turn out to be variously unjust in a more complex social condition. The judgments which the people immediately concerned passed upon the relations involved in the earlier condition may prove to have only the value of naïve guesses, when carried over to later relations. As such premature suppositions, the judgments have no sacredness as standards of justice, after the workings of the institutions, which the judgments support, have proved to be different from those anticipated.

Suppose the particular type of management-capital in question is the fixed and circulating capital of a manufacturing corporation. The president of the corporation holds a majority of the stock, and is the actual manager. It may be that, in many respects, he exercises his powers to the advantage of all concerned. That was true of some of the "benevolent despots" of the eighteenth century. In spite of the amiable and efficient qualities of some of these princes, however, civilization presently decided that "benevolent despotism" was an obsolete political principle. *The significant matter is that an uncomputed portion of the power which this corporation-president-management-capitalist wields is not his own*

inherent power. It is the power of society transferred to him by the artificial process of law-making, together with the gravitation of industrial custom. In connection with such a recent contrivance as a corporation, it is needless to enlarge on the proposition that the lawmaking process which created corporations, and defined their powers, was at least as much a matter of guesswork as the process of making a schedule of railway freight rates. It is notorious that the more our American traffic men have known about the rate situation, the more frankly they have admitted in private that nobody has found out how a rate scale should be made. Under the circumstances, it is not wonderful that there is no very widespread belief in the unimpeachable sacredness of a freight tariff. For precisely parallel reasons, it is impossible for judicially minded men to believe that there can be anything approaching permanency in the assumptions which experimenting legislators have woven into ~~the~~ laws of corporations. When the community agreed that what a man produced with his hoe should be regarded as rightfully his own, it had in view a fairly close conception of the utmost which that particular assurance might involve; and the agreement was accordingly unimpeachable. When, after 1800, legislation began to create joint stock companies, it was impossible that anyone could have had a very adequate conception of what that creation would involve. It proves to involve, under certain circumstances, such outcomes as this, among others. The corporation supposed at the beginning of this paragraph may cover all the cost of production for a year at market rates—that is, rent, wages, interest, salaries, cost of material, taxes, insurance, depreciation, etc. There may remain to the credit of the company on the year's operations values aggregating a million, two million, five million, ten million, twenty million dollars. It appears that the legislation which has made this species of management-capital possible authorizes the management-capitalist, with very slight limitations, to act as though this residuary product were his own creation, as literally as the increased yield of the soil was the product of the man with the hoe. Reserving for consideration under the next title the qualifications necessary in the case of minority stockholders, this management-capitalist is under no legal obligations whatsoever,

so far as the surplus is concerned, to recognize the partnership of any of the other persons who co-operated in producing that surplus. The law assumes, and until recently business theory has taken it as self-evident, that whatever remains, after settling with market supply and demand on the year's transactions, represents the personal contribution of the management-capitalist to the operations. Absurdly enough, minority stockholders have the legal status, at this point, of management-capitalists. On the contrary *that surplus really represents the amateurish provisionality of our distributive system.*

Nothing could be more self-evident to a discriminating mind than that this surplus *does not* represent the merit of the management-capitalist alone, but that it is due to a number of concurrent factors. Our present economic system helplessly confesses judgment when it dodges the problem of ascertaining the equities between these different factors, and stupidly leaves the whole questionable surplus to a single one of them. Not even the state has begun to use its taxing power so as to assert a respectable fraction of its probably just claim as an indispensable copartner at every stage of the capitalistic enterprise. By virtue of the stupendous gift of power which civil society has bestowed, the individual management-capitalist may vote to himself, and to fellow-stockholders less entitled than himself (as we shall see under the next head), pro rata shares of this whole surplus, and the other chief partners in producing it—civic society and the operators of the plant—have thus far no recourse. Indeed, if the management-capitalist wanted to, and time contracts were not in force, no legal provision could prevent his discharging every one of the operating partners at the close of the last working day of the year, and starting up with a totally new force the next day.

And we see no difference between capital with such prerogatives and tool-capital!

We now turn to the third grade of capital in the social scale. We have seen that there is a sort of capital which is literally a tool in the owner's hands, or by a slight stretch of the imagination it is the owner's extended self at work. It gets all its productive efficiency from the owner's direct effort. With a certain important

reservation covering the work of previous generations up to the time when the record of the given individual begins to stand for itself, nothing which this kind of owner brings to pass with his capital depends upon any other human being but the owner himself.

We have seen that there is another grade of capital which is possible, and which is productive, because other people consent to become partners with the owner in holding and using the capital, and because they consent to allow the owner to become a partner with them. We have called this type *management-capital*. Its peculiarity is that its economic efficiency is conferred only in part by the labor which its owner performs. Both in bulk and in importance the owner's work may be only a small fraction of the energy and skill by virtue of which the capital becomes an instrument of production. The other persons whose activities combine with those of the owner—the civic society and the operatives in the immediate enterprise—may represent by far the major portion of the actual motor power and direction which give to the capital its productive virtue.

But there is now a third grade of capital. It is still further removed from the literal productive activity of the owner. It is capital which might be just as productive as it is, if the owner had never lived. It is capital to which the owner has no functional relation at all, so far as the process of economic production is concerned. It is capital the owner's possession of which is a purely conventional arrangement. He does not hold it literally. He could not retain it by the utmost exertion of his individual power. It might be sterile in his hands if he could. All his competence in connection with it is conferred by the agreement of civic society to sustain him as owner, and to sanction his exercise of those property rights which the morals of that society associate with ownership. We have called this grade finance-capital.

Our analysis of the intermediate grade of capital has gone far toward showing that *private property is progressively social endowment*. With these preliminaries before us, and with the added observation that what is true of the increment of social endowment, as we pass from the simplest tool-capital to the most complex management-capital, is still more true of finance-capital, we may abbreviate the present section of the discussion.

Every person who has opened a savings-bank account by depositing a dollar is a finance-capitalist. The three, four, or five cents payable on that deposit at the end of the year have not been produced by any effort of the depositor. They would have accrued just the same if he had dropped dead before he passed out of the bank door. Year after year the interest would be credited to that account, whether or not an heir put in an appearance to collect it. The dollar goes on "earning," utterly irrespective of the further actions of the finance-capitalist, but by virtue of two co-operating organizations; the business organization on the one hand, which forwards the dollar to some point where workers convert it into more than a dollar, and the legal organization on the other hand, which puts every man in the business organization under liability to punishment—from the bank window, out through the business system, and back again to another bank window—if he fails to do what the law requires of him in the process which makes that deposit safe and profitable.

Possibly the means of social endowment which have stimulated the development of management-capital include in principle all those that permit creation and expansion of the subsequent grade of capital. So far as the outcome itself is concerned, in the shape of capitalistic phenomena which have a distinct social character, it is immaterial whether the particular variants that result in the phenomena are new in principle or only in detail.

A more advanced type of the finance-capitalist is the money-lender by vocation. He employs his time finding borrowers who will pay for the use of his money while furnishing good security. He may by courtesy be said to work. As we shall say in a moment of the more dignified work done by the banker, the time so spent satisfies real human needs, and in a particular case it may very well be that the lender actually deserves all that he collects for his loans. (Whether he does or not is a question by itself. Its answer either way will not affect the matter in hand.) The immediate point is that the kind of work which the loaner performs does not itself make his capital productive. If A. in good faith loans a thousand dollars to Z., it depends not only upon Z., but also upon the industrial and civic society in which both live, whether any

interest at all, or even the whole or a part of the principal, is returned to A. If Z. proves to be, as A. supposed, a successful farmer, then Z.'s work on the soil will be the actual means of producing the new wealth to pay the loan with interest. If Z. turns out to be a gambler, and such an amateur one that he actually takes chances, A.'s good intentions may not prevent his capital from taking wings "without recourse." A. does not produce in the one case more than in the other. I repeat that what he does may be quite as worthy of reward as though it were actual production. It is not, however, a part of the productive process in the strict sense. He has a legal claim to something which others may use as a means of production, and by virtue of further legal support he is able to collect from the producer a plus in excess of his loan. Whether or not he is morally entitled to that plus, or any part of it, is in either event entirely aside from the fact that the particular work which makes payment possible is done not by himself, but by somebody else; and the ability to hold Z. responsible for that payment is not A.'s own ability, but the ability of organized society put at his disposal.

It is a long step in social development to the type of finance-capitalist represented by the bank of deposit and issue. It is needless for our present purpose to become involved in details of financial technique. Speaking in general, the bank as medium between depositor and borrower is of course performing functions quite distinct from those that primarily touch the circulating medium. Our point is simply, as before, that neither of these activities can reach relatively high development unless the practices of business and the agreements of civic society go hand in hand in creating a social medium favorable to these operations. As the dubious history of so-called "private banks" in Illinois shows, there is a certain scope for credulity on the one hand and for irresponsibility on the other in carrying on banking operations. The rule is, however, that fiduciary transactions cannot reach relatively high development unless civic society furnishes the legal apparatus which makes all types of trustees responsible. On the side of the banks themselves, the truth is essentially as stated in the case of the private lender of his own funds. There could be no banks, the

men engaged in banking would have to consume their own capital in order to live, if production proper were not carried on by other people, so as to create the means for remunerating both bankers and their depositors.

Our leading proposition is still that the system which regulates the relations between these parties is a system of agreements, a conventional system, a construction of opinions as to what is right and wrong in the balance of power between the types of persons concerned at every step of the operations. In the concrete, the bank president is worthy of his hire just as distinctly as the man with the hoe. In the case of the bank president, however, there are a hundred points in the series of conclusions implicitly leading up to the fixing of his salary, where there is room for debate about the validity of the findings, so far as the scope of his powers and the rate of his remuneration are concerned; while there is only the one plain issue in the case of the man with the hoe.

We must keep calling attention to the fact that we are not arguing that finance-capital is wrong. We are pointing out that it is artificial. The simple fact that it is artificial keeps the question eternally open whether the artificial elements in the arrangement correspond with a relatively belated or a relatively advanced stage of social intelligence. The legal system which supports the artificial adjustments is the expression of a complicated body of *opinions*, one resting upon another in the most involved fashion, about what ought to be, in the relationships of all concerned with this type of property. It should go without saying that the banking functions must be performed by someone, somehow, in any society that continues the process of civilization. No one capable of conducting an analysis like this could have any doubts about that point. On the other hand, finance-capital when aggregated, and held in large masses by a few owners or their agents, is such a different social factor from anything that could be imagined from the standpoint of the depositor of a dollar, that the theory and practice of finance-capital present perhaps the central sociological problem of our time. The whole hierarchy of opinions, upon which our present system of finance-capital rests, must be re-examined from premise to premise, and from conclusion to conclusion, in the

light of the enormous visible anomalies that have developed in the operation of the system.

One more type of finance-capitalist may be referred to for purposes of further illustration. It is the man, woman, or child who has come into possession of wealth by the operation of social factors of which the owner is the passive beneficiary. The owner enjoys revenues from that wealth without the slightest contribution of his own to the processes which make any revenue whatever possible. A. B. has inherited, for example, one thousand shares of the X. Y. Z. Manufacturing Company's stock. A. B. has never seen the plant of the X. Y. Z. Manufacturing Company. He knows nothing whatever about the processes which men in that organization are carrying on. They are creating wealth without the least assistance from the fact that he is in the world. Yet social co-operations guarantee to him a regular share in all the wealth that these actually functioning persons create. It may be that, instead of a thousand shares, he has been presented by society with a majority of the stock of the concern. Besides collecting the larger part of all the surplus wealth produced by the plant, he may now influence the welfare of all the operators in the concern to an extent that for a long time has not been within the power of political rulers in civilized states. That is, by following a path whose leadings no one could see in advance, capitalism has brought large sections of industrial human beings back into social relations as dependent upon the will of other human beings as the subjects of princes "by divine right" were to the decrees of those rulers. This is not rhetoric. It is not fiction. It is the bald and literal fact in the case of many inheritors on the one hand and operatives on the other. This relation of superiority and subordination is given only in part by the nature of the case. In its other parts it is decreed by the opinions of society. It is not confined to inheritors alone among capitalists by any means; but we refer to it in connection with them in particular, in order to call attention as sharply as possible to the anomaly.

Now the present social transition is a partly instinctive, partly reasoned reaction to the partially recognized artificiality in our social relations. Nothing can stop this reaction, because it is

reality asserting itself against partial unreality. Constructive social action must necessarily proceed by means of more precise detection of the artificial elements of our institutions, and by means of revision of judgments about their value.

To start at the beginning, in the case of finance-capital, it is a debatable question whether we are not turning morals upside down by supposing that the depositor of a dollar in the savings bank deserves any payment at all for his deposit; and whether we are not turning economics into a chimera by supposing that we can permanently act on the assumption that he deserves a payment and that other people can permanently afford to pay it. Capitalistic society has taken for granted, without proof, that the depositor is entitled to 3, 4, or 5 per cent annually, simply because he can get it; but it is an open question whether he ought not rather to pay 3, 4, or 5 per cent annually for the security which the business and the legal system together afford. At all events, the depositor of a dollar has no right to rail at "Wall Street," as the heavy villain in the plot, unless he is willing to treat these matters as debatable. If "Wall Street" is in any way wrong, it will turn out to be, in part at least, because of confusion of ideas which begins with the dollar deposited in the savings bank.

One of the most familiar, and at the same time most fatuous ways of arresting perception that this whole question of principle, in the matter of justifying income to finance-capital, is debatable, is school-masterish assertion that people would never have saved and loaned wealth if they had not received a bonus for it. As a pure historical generalization the proposition is probably nine-tenths true. It nevertheless does not contain the insinuated conclusion. It by no means follows that saving will always have to depend upon that motive, nor that a society convinced that the privilege and premium factors in the incomes of finance-capitalists are fallacious will have no other recourse for insuring a continuance of the necessary supply of capital.

Ethnologists are pretty well agreed that we should not yet have had the capability of sustained industry which civilized peoples exhibit, if slavery had not supplied the intermediate training which disciplined men for persistent effort. Americans know that we

should not have had our western railroads as soon as we did, if enormous land grants and other gifts had not stimulated individual enterprise to go far ahead of public demand. We know too that our mineral resources would not have been developed to the present extent, if public endowments had not been turned over to individuals with a prodigality which we should now be too wise to repeat. Our present policy in Alaska proves so much. That is, the historical process through which we have arrived at our present wealth, and knowledge, and character is not necessarily in detail the process which we shall perpetuate in our further use of what we have acquired. If we find that we have offered unnecessarily large premiums for certain kinds of activities, we can lower or abolish the gratuities, as we have lately done in the case of some of our tariff schedules.

Returning then to the proposition that finance-capital is an artificial phenomenon, the fabrication of an involved system of opinions, it is obvious that the degree of validity of finance-capital, as a permanent device, depends entirely upon the degree of artificiality and generality of the judgments which have produced the device.

First, as to the artificiality. What happens when X. deposits his dollar in the savings bank? An officer of the bank holds repeated conversations with Y. who, let us say, owns an undeveloped water power. These conversations are followed up by further investigations into Y.'s credit and business ability. Another representative of the bank examines Y.'s title to the site. Still another agent makes estimates of the cost of developing the power, and perhaps a fourth reports on the probability that the power can be profitably leased or that the owner can himself make it pay. Finally the directors of the bank decide to put X.'s dollar with the dollars of many more depositors, and turn them over to Y. for use in developing the power. Y. agrees to pay 6 per cent for the loan. At the end of the year 3, or 4, or 5 of the 6 cents which Y. has paid for X.'s dollar are credited to his account. Meanwhile X. has known nothing whatever of all these transactions, beyond the mere fact that the bank has given him a little book, with credit for a dollar written into it, and the fact that, if he calls at the end of the

year, he is offered his choice between receiving the 3, 4, or 5 cents in cash and having another credit for the amount written into the book. What is the actual efficiency which makes that choice possible? Not X.'s, certainly, for after he left his dollar in the bank it would have been the last he would ever have seen of it or its equivalent, if he had been left by his fellow-citizens to do his best to recover it. He does recover it, with an addition, simply because one combination of men worked in the business system to make the dollar productive, and another combination of men worked in the legal system to make the dollar plus secure; in brief, through assurance of the inviolability of contracts. Now as a mere matter of hypothetical illustration, it is easily conceivable that, as we study the workings of financial contracts, our opinions may undergo very radical modifications. It is highly probable that we shall greatly mature our opinions as to the conditions to be observed in order that contracts should receive public sanction; that is, in order that the community as a whole should accept the rôle of indorser and sustainer to which it is committed in connection with contracts. For instance, it is conceivable that we may sometime refuse to give legal effect to any contract involving finance-capital, unless a judicial representative of the community has passed favorably in advance upon the equity of the terms, especially as between either or both of the contracting parties and the now inadequately represented contractor, the civic community.

For another illustration, suppose we go back to A. B. and his inheritance of a controlling interest in the big factory. A. B. may still be in the cradle. So far as the operation of the plant is concerned, his presence in the world, or absence from it, makes no more difference than the presence or absence of one drop more or less in the Atlantic Ocean. If natural processes only were in operation, the chances are millions to one against A. B. and the X. Y. Z. Manufacturing Company ever being introduced to each other as owner and owned. Whence then this fateful linking-up of their destinies? The explanation is, of course, that the community has followed certain traditional rules, and it has installed certain machineries for securing their application. A. B. falls under the workings of those rules. By the will of society, not by his now

might nor power, he is put into a position in the social order which it is inconceivable that he could ever have reached strictly by his individual efforts. He is, let us suppose, next of kin to the man who owned a controlling interest in the company. His consanguinity may have been very remote. The owner may have left neither near relatives nor a will. The civic community long before decided what course property should take under those circumstances, or rather, probably those precise circumstances were anticipated by nobody when the civic agreement was adopted, but these circumstances are covered by the letter of the agreement or of precedents accepted as interpretations of the agreement.¹ The community has in waiting probate courts, and guardians, and trustees, and executors, with rules for their procedure. These agencies are directed by the community to do their several parts in conserving the estate and in coaching the heir, until twenty-one years later he is informed by society that he is now entitled to "rights," which make him arbiter over the destinies of many of his fellow-men!

Centuries ago, if Piers the Plowman died possessed of a hoe, it was the common sense of his fellow-citizens that justice would be done if that hoe passed to his son, who would be the most natural successor of his father in tilling the momentarily tenantless patch of ground. Generation after generation since, we have been enlarging on that habit of standing by the transfer of the ownerless hoe to the person most likely to put the hoe to its proper use. Meanwhile the things left ownerless have grown from hoes to factories that are virtually cities, or to transportation systems that might make or mar the prosperity of a nation. And our habit of standing by old rules of inheritance, and old permissions of bequest, leaves us unaware that in applying our habit to the giant factory or the railroad system we are doing anything morally different from standing by Piers the Plowman's son in succession to the hoe!

By generations of stultifying habit we have deadened our minds to the anomaly of a system, professedly democratic, which permits individuals, through the sheer irrelevancy of blood relationship to other individuals, to take over and exercise the ownership of

¹This form of expression does not imply a harking back to the "social contract theory." It merely exhibits the literal force of legislation.

millions of capital, without even counterbalancing conditions requiring a corresponding return to the community. We gratuitously present to some men the privilege for life of levying on the earnings of other men, and of passing along the same gratuitous privilege to someone in the next generation, without the slightest assurance, beyond a paltry inheritance tax, that an effort will be made by the grantee to compensate either the persons directly under tribute or the general public. Not only this, but by placing the powers of finance-capital at the disposal of these privileged persons we give them large scope to influence the social conditions which affect the lives and fortunes of their fellow-citizens.

But suppose our ideas about the rationality and morality of ownership had progressed as much as methods of agriculture have since Piers the Plowman's time. Suppose we had meanwhile become as wise to cause and effect in human relations as we have about the technique of acquiring wealth. Suppose, in particular, civilized communities had decided that they would not be parties to the creation or perpetuation of preferential wealth or opportunity. Suppose it had become a part of common sense that dead men's capital must pass to those living men who are most likely to make the capital productive. Suppose the civic community in which the X. Y. Z. plant is located had provided that, under the circumstances assumed, the plant should become the property of the whole body of its operatives, with charter control of their relations among themselves, and of their liabilities to the community. We should then have a relatively natural order, developing with the actual development of industrial society, instead of an antiquated artificiality.

Second, as to the generality. As I have shown in another connection,¹ as the example of Piers the Plowman and the contrasted artificial cases have already illustrated, and as I pointed out more generally in early paragraphs of this paper,² the present vagueness in our conceptions of the morals of capitalism is due in part to crude credulity that a relation which is morally wholesome in a relatively simple social situation is necessarily wholesome in a highly complex social situation. On the contrary, suppose we

¹ *American Journal of Sociology*, XIX, 441.

² P. 723.

have, instead of two individuals bargaining over small quantities of visible goods, one party that is a highly specialized, and informed, and equipped promoter, and the other party that is an unconscious, uninformed, and inadequately represented public. The contrast between the circumstances in the two types of cases can hardly be brought to the attention of any judicial person without arousing wonder that intelligent people could ever have acquiesced in permitting the rules that seem to fit the former type of case to apply, without radical restrictions, to the latter.

Again, suppose I am a small farmer, and the general store supplies me with the necessities of life, at fair prices, through the summer, on my promise to pay as soon as I have collected on my cotton in the autumn. It is rather evidently in the interest of public policy that my contract shall be held inviolable. If, on the other hand, I succeed in getting careless or corrupt representatives of the public to give me a franchise which I capitalize so that it yields me two, four, five, or ten times a fair equivalent for interest on the actual investment plus a fair wage for the service, it is obvious to anyone capable of analysis that somewhere in the course of transition from direct and simple relations between man and man to indirect and complicated transactions between artificial legal persons, the balance of even-handed justice has been destroyed, and that it is subornation of the wrong to insist that the disarrangement must be accepted as eternal, and that it "strikes at the foundations of society" to study means of returning nearer to equity.

Again, waiving all questions which have been suggested above about interest as a source of income, suppose I am a farmer and need a thousand dollars to build a barn. Suppose my neighbor has a thousand dollars which he is willing to lend for a consideration. It might be the nearest approach to wisdom and justice which the community could achieve, if my neighbor and I were left to settle the terms between ourselves, with no more interference by the community than would be implied in our mutual knowledge that, whatever the terms agreed upon, the community would hold us to the agreement. Suppose, on the contrary, my neighbor has moved to the city, and has made use of the particular species of modern improvements which enable him to transform himself into

a trust company. Suppose he has acquired all the facilities for obtaining market information, and for co-operating with other finance-capitalists, which give him a decided advantage in bargaining with amateur borrowers. Suppose the region in which I live has grown into a town, and needs a water system. Suppose the representatives of the town bond the water plant to the trust company on terms which yield a profit to the latter institution far in excess of the rate which a competent third party would estimate as fair. The point which we are now illustrating is that it is preposterous for the civic community to proceed on the same assumptions toward the town and the trust company which were wise in the case of myself and my neighbor. The differences between us, in all the elements of our situation, when we were ordinary farmers, were not great enough to justify interference with any bargains we might make, or to make it public policy to offer either of us any recourse in case of dissatisfaction with the agreement once made. Because it is wise for the community to give to private bargains the sanctions of law, when the bargainers are on equal terms, it by no means follows that public policy will permanently permit treatment of amateur and specialized bargainers as presumably equal, and it by no means follows that in advanced society the machinery for realizing the community interest in finance-capitalistic operations should not be greatly modified, with a view to securing a more balanced type of bargaining as a condition of community sanction.

Once more, if I buy a stagecoach and pass the word along between the points A and D that I intend to make regular trips, and to carry passengers and parcels at fair rates between those localities, it would be difficult to imagine that any serious variations from social balance could result from a community policy to allow traffic and the rates to develop on the obvious supply-and-demand basis. If I charge what I think I ought to have, and the dwellers along my route use my service or not, according to their convenience, it will not be long before facts will attend to the permanence or the transience of my enterprise. But suppose I am a finance-capitalist with a fancy for manipulating the railroad business. Suppose I have no interest whatever in developing the technique of transportation. Suppose the convenience and prosperity of the

public do not concern me in the least, except as they affect the volume of business on the lines that I control. Suppose it is within my power under the law so to reorganize roads which other men have built, and which use of the sovereign right of eminent domain, among other things, has made into virtual monopolies, that the "earnings" of the roads are scandalously disproportioned to the actual cost of the service rendered, measured by any system comparable with adjustment of prices between parties fairly free to take or leave each other's offerings on their merits. Suppose those "earnings" pass, by legal sanction, so largely to my private credit that my wealth increases as if by magic, while no dispassionate person can discover that I have added anything to public welfare which is remotely comparable with the size of my income. It is an irresistible certainty that my status in the community will not be allowed to go long unchallenged. The myth that as a manipulator of railroad properties I am merely an evolved stage-driver is certain to be stared out of countenance. I am possible as a manipulator of railroad securities, and as a sequestrator of railroad revenues, simply because the community, which gives me the possibility of existence at all in my financial relations, has not yet intelligently taken in hand the problem of auditing my account as a purveyor of public service. It has not yet begun to take seriously its function of revising its requirements for a reasonable balance between obligations assumed, and powers conferred, and services performed on the one hand, and influence upon the public, aside from direct performance of the service, and the rate of reward on the other. That is, to adopt a related figure, the community has not yet discovered that I am not a mere farm-bred horse, drawing a stagecoach, but a Trojan horse capturing the city.

This paper began with a reference to the current social transition. The change may be described on its subjective side as an unorganized and largely instinctive effort of adjustment to a new attitude toward life. From the men whose adjustments are of the most particular and concrete sorts to those who attempt to philosophize the universe, the modern temper is no longer conformity to models, but inclination to understand and obey or control laws of cause and effect. The farmer no longer figures on a harvest because he has performed the prescribed ritual to the gods of the

fields. He counts on a harvest because he has used information that came from his own experience, supplemented perhaps by the agricultural experiment station. The citizen will not always believe that the best civic conditions possible are those given up to date by the spontaneous historical processes, and sanctified by conventional social doctrine. He is already beginning to believe that the best possible civic conditions will be the result of men's desire and will to find out whether they are co-operating toward the most intelligent ends, and with the highest attainable degree of efficiency. That is, our thinking and our feeling are no longer merely historical, or merely syllogistic; they are finally and chiefly functional. We believe in a thing, or disbelieve in it, because it works or does not work up to a standard set by our growing sense of what ought to be. Theories pro or con may hold what they will about criticism and reconstruction of capitalistic institutions. Those institutions are merely provisionally adopted means toward certain incidental ends. So sure as humanity remains virile, transition after transition will follow, in experiment with modified institutions, until our economic machinery gets into stable equilibrium with the implications of human needs.

The capitalistic ultimatum is that property is property, whether it is a hoe or a house or a railroad, a dollar or a thousand dollars or a thousand million dollars. The dictum belongs in the "important-if-true" class. With only the rudiments of objective social analysis, one may discover that it is not true. On the contrary, it would seem to be axiomatic that in the degree in which the partnership of other men besides the proprietor is necessary to make a type of capital possible and efficient, corresponding partnership of those other men in control of that capital is indicated. This logic is making the social transition. Men are applying this analysis and making this discovery. The result appears in gathering momentum of the movement to retire those accidents of our social order which make large sections of capital chiefly pretexts for privilege, and to substitute control which shall tend to make capital, from least to greatest, a consistent means of human service.¹

¹ Discussion of the ways in which the three types of capital—tool, management, and finance—overlap and interlock in particular properties, was excluded from this paper by lack of space.

FUNCTIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND THE WAGE RATE

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Social theory is the outgrowth of the attempt on the part of man to discover rules of action in his social environment which will aid him in his efforts to direct the course of social progress. In his search for these rules he has available two sources, the record of past experience and the analysis of the present social organization. During the past two centuries social conditions have changed so rapidly that the experience of the past loses much of its significance and the interpretation of the present is scarcely completed before new conditions invalidate the conclusions reached. But social theory once accepted by the popular mind persists as a basis of social control and thus becomes a source of maladjustment in social relations. For this reason in many cases the attempts of men consciously to direct the course of human progress have defeated their own ends.

One theory, widely accepted among modern economists, which must be classed among the results of an earlier environment, is the productivity theory of wages. This theory in brief is that in the industrial system the tendency is for each producing agent to receive from society the equivalent of what it has produced. In some standard texts the tendency is manifest to relate productivity to the efficiency of the wage earner, and thus to fix upon the individual producer the ultimate responsibility for wages received. An excellent statement of this point of view is to be found in Professor Seligman's text on economics:

Since the ultimate factor of the relation between labor and cost is productive efficiency, the problem of increasing the efficiency of labor is of paramount importance" (*Principles of Economics*, p. 289).

Again, in comparing the efficiency of different men and the value of their labor, the statement is made:

A modern railway president of an industrial trust often receives a salary equal to that of several hundred of his workmen, and larger than that of the President of the United States. The work may not be as irksome as that of the day-laborer, but it may be worth far more to society, because its contribution to the product is so much greater. The real value of labor depends not upon condition of employment, but upon the results of activity" (*ibid.*, p. 286).

In another place the author states:

Labor, therefore, has a value because its services or products have value. Labor secures a remuneration because it produces something for which people are willing to pay; in other words, wages depend on productivity" (*ibid.*, p. 417).

In the first quotation we are told that "efficiency of labor is of paramount importance." In the last two, that value of labor or wages depend on productivity or results of activity. The thought underlying current economic theory, then, is that the workman tends to receive the amount he produces and that he is accordingly under normal conditions personally responsible for the amount he receives.

This principle became the controlling one at a time when mediaeval institutions were being broken by the growth of industry; when economic opportunities offered much greater hope to the ambitious workman of becoming an independent producer; when Adam Smith and the Physiocrats, seeing the advantages of individual initiative, taught freedom of industry and external trade; and when later, Ricardo, in full harmony with the industrial conditions of his time, conceived the "economic man" with the one motive of wealth acquisition in an environment of free competition and acting under the impulse of enlightened self-interest. A theory of personal responsibility for economic success was the logical outgrowth of that transitional period when old bonds were breaking and when new standards of social and economic control had not yet been formed. It has been developed and perfected by later writers in the very midst of movements destined to undermine its utility as a safe principle for the guidance of statesmen.

The theoretical statement of this idea has its concomitant in popular thought well expressed in the following quotation from a journal devoted to the advancement of commercial education:

Do not be discouraged, young man, because you are poor and unknown today. That is no reason why you must always remain so. Many men who have obtained positions of the greatest prominence, and who have acquired the greatest fortunes, and achieved the greatest victories, began poorer and more obscure than you are. Columbus was the son of a weaver and a weaver himself; Homer was a farmer's son; Demosthenes was the son of a cutler; Oliver Cromwell was the son of a London brewer; Daniel Defoe was a hostler and the son of a butcher; Whitfield was the son of an inn-keeper; Virgil was the son of a porter; Horace was the son of a shopkeeper; Robert Burns was a plowman in Ayrshire; Napoleon was the son of a poor Corsican; John Jacob Astor once sold apples on the streets of New York; Cincinnatus was plowing in his vineyards when the dictatorship of Rome was offered him; Elihu Burritt was a blacksmith; Abraham Lincoln was a rail splitter; Ulysses S. Grant was a tanner.

Such are the sentiments that once prevailed and that are still passing without question among many. Both the popular thought and the scientific statement result from looking at life from the point of view of individual advancement and individual responsibility. That "man is the architect of his own fortunes" is the popular belief; and the tendency is to hold the individual personally responsible for economic failure, and to give credit exclusively to the one who achieves success in the accumulation of a fortune. Popular thought, as well as economic theory, has lagged behind the transition from primitive individual or family economy to modern social economy, and the result is that necessary readjustments are delayed.

The above quotations fail to take into account the functional nature of the modern social process. The co-ordination represented by the industrial system is a co-ordination of services to be rendered rather than a co-ordination of persons. The individual, of course, must render the service, but it is the perfect correlation of given services in the system that is sought rather than a correlation of persons. In this functional relationship there are positions of large responsibility offering large opportunities for the production of social values. These positions are dependent upon positions requiring less effort and offering less opportunity for production. Persons are to some extent interchangeable; functions are not. The president of an organization may for several days do the work of a day-laborer. But if he continues in the latter position he will

not long draw the salary of a president. In the lower and in many of the higher positions in industrial life functions do not remain long unfilled. The person is soon forgotten as the industrial organization runs smoothly along, but the function remains and someone steps quickly into the vacancy.

A few illustrations will make clearer the point in mind. The United States Census for 1900¹ shows that in the combined textile industries of the United States, there were 44,502 salaried officials, clerks, etc., and 1,029,910 wage earners. This represents a total of over 23 times as many in the second group as in the first. The average annual income of the smaller group per person was \$1,123.00, while the average income of the larger group was only \$332.00, or less than one-ninth of the larger. These averages show further that many low-paid clerks were employed whose wages balanced the high pay of the few managers in the first group, and that the wage-earning group must have had a similar differentiation of productive employment. The figures for 1890 show a similar disparity in productive possibilities in the same industrial group. Other industries reported show like results. In 1900 the flour-milling industry had 5,790 of the first class and 37,073 of the second; slaughtering and meat packing wholesale, 9,658 of the first class and 64,783 of the second; boot and shoe manufactures, 7,843 of the first and 142,922 of the second. These figures indicate that the proportion of positions of low possible relative productivity in the industrial system is very much larger than the positions of high productive possibility.

This principle of necessary proportion or functional relation between positions of low-grade and high-grade productive possibility may be still further illustrated. During the last few years the country has witnessed a period of growing business activity. New factories have been built, new railways have been projected, new mines opened, new farming projects considered. Each of these projects has resulted in the creation of a few positions of large responsibility and of large possibilities of production. But the creation of these few positions was possible only because they were accompanied by many positions involving less demand upon those

¹ Vol. VII, 470.

filling them, and consequently requiring a lower grade of efficiency. In a period of industrial expansion many productive enterprises are delayed because it is impossible to secure men to fill the large number of positions of low productivity created. According to investigations of the United States Bureau of Labor (*Bulletin 72*, p. 424), during the seven months ending October, 1906, employers of labor made application to one New York agency for 37,058 men, 32,749 of whom were needed for railroad construction. In response to this demand only 3,705 could be sent out. Other agencies reported similar difficulty in supplying the demand. For the same year one railway reported 41 per cent increase in construction and truck gangs, and could have employed 53 per cent more, had the laborers been available. Another railway reported 44 per cent increase and desired 56 per cent more. This demand did not, however, result in a corresponding increase in the wage rate. The nature of the work required, when considered in relation to the social utility of the product, was such that any large increase in the rate would have been impossible. These illustrations may be considered too well known to be worth taking account of, but the fact remains that the functional relationship which makes these differences in wage rates possible has not been adequately considered by economists.

The functional point of view requires a different attitude toward many matters of public interest. The significance of vocational training and the basis for it are indicated by the understanding of functional relationships. Miss Sumner, in her discussion of industrial education (Adams and Sumner, *Labor Problems*, p. 458), closes with these words:

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that the need of the day is for greater skill instead of less, and this need will inevitably increase in the future. As industry becomes more and more highly specialized and systematically organized, the laboring classes must more and more follow the example of the professional classes and learn to work before they apply for employment. The day of mere muscle in industry has passed and the day of mind, with skill of eye and hand, has dawned.

In this quotation there is a failure to recognize that specialization has in many parts of the industrial system brought simplification of the process and a consequent lessening of need for long

term apprenticeship. The skilled man, trained to do well all the parts of the constructive process, gives way to the semi-skilled and the unskilled, the machine feeders and the performers of operations that require a minimum of skill of eye and hand. It is true that in some places greater skill is required, but this requirement affects the initiator and the positions of directive responsibility. Scientific management is accused of taking from the wage earner the little need of personal initiative that he once had and used, though imperfectly, to some extent.

Moreover, the functional nature of the productive process precludes the hope of ever equalizing returns of men through the education of the masses, unless the productivity theory of wages is radically modified. Neither does it offer hope of increasing the returns of any particular class without increasing in proportional manner the returns of every other group. Four years of college research in the history and technique of handling a spade would not materially increase the efficiency of the section hand. Productive efficiency can be increased only up to the functional possibilities of the occupation at which the person is engaged, and from the point of view of that particular occupation, any education for efficiency greater than this is wasted. The hope of increasing the returns of any occupation, beyond the limited amount which might result from bringing personal efficiency into harmony with functional standards, lies in such an increase in social production as will result in a larger return to every agent in the industrial system. This would prevent any equalization of return by means of universal vocational training.

This view of the situation also indicates that the social justification for popular industrial education lies not in the possibility of raising every workman to the more remunerative positions, such as foreman, superintendent, or the skilled positions, but in the right of every citizen to be given the opportunity to prepare to compete for these positions, and in the value to the state of giving potential ability the opportunity of finding its proper place in the positions of larger productive possibilities.

The tendency in many parts of the industrial system toward the displacement of the function demanding skilled labor by semi-

skilled indicates that common-school education must continue to emphasize to a large degree "cultural" training. Curricula should be modified to include more of those disciplines which give the prospective citizen an appreciation of the civic and social life of which he is to be a part, and for whose control he is to be responsible. While industrial training has large possibilities of development at the present time, the most fundamental and permanent educational progress will be in other directions.

The individual point of view of the productivity theory, and the social point of view of functional relationships in industry, lead to different conclusions as to responsibility for success in the acquisition of wealth. The productivity theory holds the individual responsible for his income. The only solution of the problem of low wages is to increase efficiency through education. It fails to recognize that this method can never eliminate those differences in productive possibilities resulting from functional relationships, and hence that this method can never do away with those differences in income for which the individual is not responsible. Further it brings the economists who have been trained in the individualistic theory of an earlier period into opposition to any attempt to control the wage system in the interest of those who may be in positions of low productivity, or who may be unable to protect themselves. To them economic law, as they interpret it, is supreme and any policy of statesmen that runs counter to these laws is worse than useless. We have the repetition of the experience of finding men who should be in the advance of social progress, bravely defending the existing or a passing order.

The functional point of view places the responsibility for differences in income where it belongs, upon the division of labor resulting from the development of the modern industrial system. Social production in which there is a definite relation of parts is a fact. If a few places of high productive possibilities depend upon the existence of many places of low productive possibility, it is a matter for group and not individual responsibility. Human beings that must occupy the places of low productivity deserve consideration as human beings, and an adjustment of wages to meet their reasonable needs is one of the duties devolving upon the

group. It is not right to hold the individual responsible for productivity made necessary by conditions inherent in the life of the group. Here is to be found a theoretical justification for the minimum wage, and for any group control which fixes responsibility upon the group for any disabilities or inequalities resulting from social production.

Many of the economists have not learned to approach their problems from the social point of view, the point of view which is in harmony with present conditions. They still spend a large part of their time explaining the phenomena of competition, when competition in many parts of the industrial system has given way to monopoly and co-operation. They still continue to interpret their material in terms of individual psychology when group life is the logical starting point. When a point of view in harmony with present conditions is attained, popular ideas of success will be materially modified; the inadequacy of the productivity theory as a basis for state action will be recognized; group responsibility for conditions resulting from functional relationships will be substituted for ideals of individual responsibility inherited from an earlier period; and the needs of human beings as members of a group will be provided for, instead of making them suffer as individuals because they happen to draw the smaller occupation prizes in a system of social production.

THE ASSIMILATION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN

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To the descriptive scientist who paints his way through the series of race conflicts—through the history-long tragedy of the contacts of conqueror and conquered—there comes a certain artistic glow as he contemplates the relations of the white man and the red man in the United States. If such a scientist were here he might delude his academic soul into the belief or hope that learned phrase and happy illustration would lull him today into the elysium of gentle but pleasing uselessness. But such is not the desire or intent of the writer of this paper. The topic in his mind is concrete and involves action. It is summed up in two phrases: (1) the obligation of the nation to the Indian, and (2) the obligation of the universities in general, and of the sociologists in particular, to furnish the scientific basis for the Indian policies of the nation.

The first thesis scarcely needs comment; we have forced upon the Indians the status of wards, and therefore cannot divest ourselves of the responsibilities which devolve upon trustees and guardians. The second thesis must remain in abeyance until we have assurance that there are sociological principles which are applicable and of imperative importance. This paper therefore rests upon the first thesis of national obligation as one conceded, and leads to the second thesis of university obligation as a corollary of the general contents of the paper itself. But it cannot be understood except in relation to these two dominant ideas.

My topic really is the topic of the Indian problem of today. As a nation we are at least ostensibly engaged in the process of assimilating the Indian. This is fundamentally a sociological problem, but what interest have the sociologists taken in it? It may be that limited knowledge or permanent introspection has given me a false notion, but you will allow me to say that my voice seems to me like the voice of one crying in the wilderness, with

almost no response from the ranks of those who should long ago have done the great work which would have made my humble endeavors unnecessary.

I want if I can to sum a situation, and to place upon my hearers something of the great sense of responsibility and duty which has been with me almost constantly for the last ten years. Perhaps any one of you could have solved the problem alone in that space of time, but I warn you that my weakness or little success will be no excuse for your inaction in the future. I trust that the imperative in my tone may not seem offensive. No one more than I realizes the killing pace that is set for the sociologist. But he that hath eyes let him see, and he that hath ears let him hear. The possibility of salvation for the Indian races lies in the hands of those who have vision and hearing. If there be any imperative resting upon the sociologist it will not be because I presume to pronounce it, but because he both sees and hears and is a sociologist.

In passing let me say my views are largely wrought out of my own experience. My theory has been hammered out on the slow anvil of some actual endeavor and of some direct association with the people I would serve. Incidentally it might not be amiss to suggest that one of the great reasons for direct service on our part in the social movements of the world is that we may rectify, if not actually create, the splendid body of theory which we are to transmit to our students. It is very questionable whether theory uncontaminated by endeavor remains good theory. It takes years of patience before you can begin to know an Indian and therefore before you can begin to get first-hand knowledge of the human unit of your problem.

A well-worn formula tells us that when two races come together the fate of the weaker is summed up as extermination, subordination, or amalgamation. As a matter of fact history would suggest a judicious mixture of all three. Nevertheless a fourth object has been evident on the part of the conquering Caucasian from the days of the first discovery of America. Missionary objects have ever been to the front. The missionary believes in assimilation—either in time or in eternity. But the efforts of the missionaries for three hundred years—shall I say four hundred years?—have

seemed to be the efforts of those who write upon the sands of the shore of the sea. The disappearance of the tribes from the days of Eliott in Massachusetts to those of Zeisberger in Ohio has constituted a tragedy which has almost no acknowledged explanation. The optimism of Eliott shines today against a background of almost complete failure, so far as bringing his Indians into the permanent life of the United States is concerned. Zeisberger's personal experience sums up the point I wish to make. On Christmas Day, 1788, he wrote in his diary: "The chief thing which gives us joy and courage is this, that the Gospel . . . is not preached in vain. . . . It opens the hearts and ears of the dead and blind heathen and brings them life and feeling." His biographer tells us, however, in the end that Zeisberger's life "seems a sad one. It was his fate to labor among a hopeless race. In his last years he could see no lasting monument of his long labor. Even the Indian converts immediately about him were a cause of sorrow to him." Zeisberger's permanent Indian villages in Ohio have long been forgotten. From the point of view of incorporation into the life of the nation Zeisberger's efforts must be acknowledged a failure.

We have no time at this point to state or to discuss the reasons for this fact; we do not affirm or deny that the fault lay with the missionary. It is sufficient to say that, in accordance with the general rule, despite the white men's religion, the red men died away in the presence of the white man's civilization. And yet we may say that gradually or rapidly policies of extermination and subjugation overrode the efforts of religion. Missionary endeavor did not have a free field to prove itself. The soldier and the merchant rode with the missionary and made themselves not less evident to the Indians than did he.

The ever-growing friction between the races reached its climax in the middle of the nineteenth century. The cost in money and lives was enormous. Down to 1866 our government had spent half a billion of dollars on Indian wars. We killed off Indians at a cost of a million dollars apiece. The relative futility of war strengthened the hands of the believers in assimilation as opposed to extermination, and so we have in Grant's administration the beginning of the "peace policy."

The first Board of Indian Commissioners intrusted with the inauguration of this new policy struck the first clear note of governmental philosophy which we find. Their altruistic devotion and their business capacity have long been recognized. Their scientific insight, however, will constitute their greatest claim to a place in history, when history is correctly written. They believed that assimilation was possible, but that it would come about only through the living together of the two races. The initial step in the upward movement lay in the bestowal of a common language. Education then was the keynote, and today it remains the keynote of any scientific policy. The salvation of the race and the efficiency of any Indian policy are equally dependent upon it. Doubtless the board relied a little too strongly upon the power of language, but yet it remains substantially true that difference in language bars intercourse and mutual understanding, and so preserves both the differences in customs and the artificial antipathies which hold the races apart.

The "peace policy" in most of its practical details was built up out of many bits of endeavor made during colonial and later days, and it was defended and utilized for very utilitarian objects. The Secretary of the Interior on this latter point filed his belief that it would be "cheaper to feed every adult Indian now living, even to sleepy surfeiting—than it would be to carry on a general Indian war for a single year." Thus as a matter of fact a policy of stimulation has all too frequently become a policy of pauperization. Assimilation has been replaced or supplemented by slow extermination. Peace became an object in itself rather than the instrument of progress.

Francis Walker in 1874 declared that the "peace policy," at least in its actual working, was not a policy, but a mere expediency. No great constructive advance had been made. He maintained, on the contrary, that the act of 1834 which provided for segregation of Indians and for Indian self-government was the outcome of a sound and far-reaching statesmanship." The "peace policy" as supplemented by the congressional resolution ending the recognition of Indian tribes as nations "struck the severest blow that remained to be given to the policy of 1834, in that it weakened the

already waning power of the chiefs, while yet failing to furnish any substitute for their authority."

Possibly we may say today that the two great results that accrued from the "peace policy" were the ending of Indian wars and the new impetus given to Indian education. The next period began about 1887. Not until 1876 had the appropriation for education reached \$20,000, but in 1886 it passed one million. In 1887 the Dawes Act marked the new era in its provisions for bringing about individual allotments of Indian land and for the admission of Indian allottees into citizenship. Along with these movements there came a demand for the "vanishing policy," a phrase which was intended to mean that discriminations and privileges peculiar to the Indian should as rapidly as possible be done away, and he should at the same rate be admitted to full citizenship and equal opportunity to share in the economic, legal, and political life of the country. Carried to its logical limits the "vanishing policy" goes a long ways along the path of assimilation.

Today with the churches increasingly active, with the government appropriation for education running close to \$4,000,000, with individualized holdings of land, and with citizenship an accompaniment of such holdings, you will tell me that assimilation is surely provided for, if not already achieved. I recite these things, however, that you may discriminate between the form and substance of things.

Consider with me, if you will, three groups of facts, those of blood mixture, of legal status, and of education. We shall then have a suggestion, if not a measurement, of the extent to which assimilation has gone.

With regard to blood we shall follow the facts as analyzed by Roland B. Dixon, of the Census Bureau. Since 1890 the Indian population has increased from 248,000 to 265,000, or about 7 per cent. Of the present population Dr. Dixon reports 58.4 per cent as full-bloods and 35.2 per cent as mixed bloods, 8.4 per cent being unknown as to blood. Doubtless the mixed bloods are more numerous than they will acknowledge, but in any event we may say they constitute at least two-fifths of the total Indian population. Moreover, mixed marriages are more often fertile, result in a larger

number of children per family, and a larger proportion of these children survive. Dr. Dixon believes that "unless the tendencies now at work undergo a decided change the full-bloods are destined to form a decreasing proportion of the total Indian population and ultimately to disappear altogether."

It is probably safe to say that so far as the blood of the race is to survive it will survive through amalgamation. But amalgamation is not assimilation. An Indian in the eyes of the law continues to be an Indian until the proportion of Indian blood is very slight indeed, and his own insistence upon his Indian blood continues still longer. From the social point of view the mixture of bloods has little significance. The blood that determines the legal status and social environment is the blood that tells. Ofttimes the mixed blood is farther from, not nearer to, social assimilation than is the full-blood. Even the adopted white man is cut off from white civilization to a greater or less extent. Law and custom are stronger than blood. Complexion, real or imputed, is for the Indian a barrier which he scarcely may surmount so long as law and custom remain unchanged. But when law and custom are satisfactorily changed, the fact of physical amalgamation will greatly accelerate the process of real assimilation.

The legal and political status of the Indian is particularly unfortunate. Tens of thousands of Indians have been allotted. Most, but not all, of these are nominally citizens. Custom and congressional action have given citizenship to tens of thousands of others. For purposes of congressional representation 73 per cent of all our Indians are accredited as "taxed" Indians. In all the United States there are only 71,872 not so taxed. This certainly looks like rapid if not complete assimilation. But I beg you to look again past the form to the substance. Let me quote my own analysis of the situation as given in the *Journal of Race Development* a year ago:

There is no necessary connection between taxation and citizenship. The Indian may swell the population for the congressional district, he may be counted a taxable, and yet be substantially and, apparently, legally, debarred from citizenship. No one knows today what the status of the Indian is.

Even such facts as we do know present such a diversity of situation in the different states that no general statement can be made for like classes in different parts of the country. But this might be condoned if the status of the Indian in each state was understood either by him or by the general public. Doubtless even congressional enumeration as "taxed" carries an Indian (if only he knows he is one of the number so classed) far along the road to citizenship; he becomes relatively at least a "potential" citizen. . . .

So long, however, as we have taxed Indians and non-taxed Indians, citizen Indians and non-citizen Indians, independent Indians and Indian wards, and so long as we have every sort of combination of these classes, and further, so long as we have neither certainty as to classification nor definiteness as to the status when named, just so long we shall continue to have a condition of confusion in Indian affairs intolerable alike to government and Indian. Indians of like capability and situation are citizens in Oklahoma and non-citizens in New York. Allottees are citizens in Nebraska and non-citizens in Wyoming. In many cases in the same state some of the allottees are citizens while others are not.

I know an Indian admitted to practice law before the Supreme Court of the United States who was compelled to appear before an agent for examination as to his competence to manage his own property. That agent later went to the penitentiary for graft. Do you wonder that the Indians resent the impossible situation and the perpetual humiliation in which they are involved? Do you call this assimilation?

The situation with regard to education is very similar. The expenditures for Indian schools as compared with the general Indian budget has increased from one-half of 1 per cent in 1877 to 26.9 per cent. I believe that this proportion should continue to increase. Of the 88,000 Indian youth, 50,000 or 56.3 per cent are today found in some school. Of the children between ten and fourteen years of age, 71.4 per cent are in school; 71.2 per cent of all Indians can speak some English, and 45.4 per cent can read and write to some extent. The ability of the youth to speak English rises to 84.2 per cent and ability to read and write rises to 77.2 per cent.

I consider it a great achievement to have effected so complete an introduction to the educational system of our civilization. But we must in all honesty recognize that it is for the great mass of

Indians merely an introduction. An Indian attorney, now well known and prosperous, last year in a public address in Columbus gave us a most interesting bit of personal experience when he told us what an amazing impression he had of the English language and of our civilization after years of attendance upon our government schools. It is our rule to require the youth to go to school until they are eighteen, and not infrequently they continue in school until they are twenty-five or more, and yet the most advanced government school is a grammar school. The great mass of the children get very much less. No attempt is here made to appraise the industrial training given in the Indian schools. My object is simply to reveal the inadequacy of the schooling to prepare the Indian for successful competition in the world of business affairs and for a genuine participation in the thought and aspirations of our civilization. Is it any wonder we are afraid to trust an Indian with full control of his land and property?

Let us stop a moment and summarize. The Indian race is fast reducing the purity of its blood, but the Indian blood predominates and holds the succeeding generations out of the national thought and out of Caucasian social control. No one is free until he shares in the thought which controls his social life. The mixed blood in custom and tradition is Indian, or raceless, which is worse. The Indian has no defined status. Taxed, he may or may not be a citizen. If taxed, or even if a citizen, he may have few or none of the privileges and immunities of a citizen; he may not—ordinarily he does not—have the control of his own property. If he is not a citizen, he is incompetent to sue or be sued, and is not even a competent witness in court. Even whole tribes of Indians, every individual of which may be nominally a citizen, have no standing in court, and have no right to sue for their claims, even in the United States Court of Claims. And in the third place, though we spend on an average about \$100 per year on every Indian child in the government schools, and demand from them not less than twelve years, and sometimes hold them far beyond their majority, yet the limited few who get an advanced education do not by government policy go beyond the eighth grade of our public schools.

Now may I state my thesis? The Indians are *not* assimilated. The assimilation of one race into another and surrounding race means bringing them into a full share in the life and thought of the latter. They must become constituent parts of the nation. They must be units of the new society. John S. Mackenzie, in his *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, has stated the point I wish to make in these words:

When a people is conquered and subject to another, it ceases to be a society, except in so far as it retains a spiritual life of its own apart from that of its conquerors. Yet it does not become an integral part of the victorious people's life until it is able to appropriate to itself the spirit of that life. So long as the citizens of the conquered state are merely in the condition of atoms externally fitted into a system to which they do not naturally belong, they cannot be regarded as parts of the society at all. They are slaves: they are instruments of a civilization of which they do not partake. Certainly no more melancholy fate can befall a nation than that it should be subjected to another whose life is not large enough to absorb its own. But such a subjection cannot be regarded as a form of social growth. It is only one of those catastrophes by which a society may be destroyed. In so far as there is growth in such a case, it is still a growth from within. The conquering society must be able to extend its own life outward, so as gradually to absorb the conquered one into itself; otherwise the latter cannot be regarded as forming a real part of it at all, but at most as an instrument of its life, like cattle and trees.

I maintain that the Indian has not been incorporated into our national life, and cannot be until we radically change a number of fundamental things. We must give him a defined status, early citizenship and control of his property, adequate education, efficient government and schools, broad and deep religious training, and genuine social recognition. We must give him full rights in our society and demand from him complete responsibility. There is not time today to put these principles into a concrete program. The important thing is to recognize and publish the principles.

The Indians today, the great mass of them, are still a broken and beaten people, scattered and isolated, cowed and disheartened, confined and restricted, pauperized and tending to degeneracy. They are a people without a country, strangers at home, and with no place to which to flee. I know that there are thousands of exceptions to these statements, but yet they remain true for the

great majority. The greatest injustice we do them is to consider them inferior and incapable. The greatest barrier to their restoration to normality and efficiency lies in their passivity and discouragement. We have broken the spring of hope and ambition. Can it ever be repaired?

It is readily to be seen that success will depend upon the accurate utilization or release both of external forces and of internal forces. The white race through government, industry, and religion must do its full part, and the red race through initiative and race leadership must also do its full part. I cannot make too clear, definite, or positive my belief that this problem is an exceedingly delicate one, and my belief that *failure is inevitable unless just the right policies are initiated* very soon and carried on *and carried through on the basis of maximum efficiency*.

The simple test of efficiency for us is, are we giving the Indian identical or equal opportunity with ourselves to share in and to control the social consciousness, as well as to share in the privileges, immunities, duties, and obligations of the members of our national social body? This is the only goal worth while in assimilation. I grant you that public opinion is very far from this point of view and belief. The question for us is, do sociologists agree with it?

How shall Congress and the nation believe except they be taught? And who shall teach except those who have set themselves apart to study these things? If the body of sociologists could agree upon the theory and would express themselves individually and collectively, they could exert an immense influence at this particular critical moment. The hour is ripe and conditions are propitious for a considerable forward step—if only those who can speak with authority will speak. They must secure a consistent governmental practice, and guide public policy through the formulation of sound theory and the organization of a wise public opinion.

Long ago I became convinced that the Indian problem could not be solved without the initiative and co-operation of the Indian himself. When the government has done all that it can, there still remains the stimulation and development of internal forces to be effected. Race leadership must be found or the race will fail to see the new and better opportunities and will sink to rapid ruin.

It used to be said that it would be impossible for Indians to organize and to hold together. Personal jealousies would wreck every endeavor. But the impossible has been done. For three years in succession the Indians have met in national conference, twice at the Ohio State University, and this year in the city of Denver. The conference has grown to a membership of nearly a thousand people, half of them Indians, half of them whites. Indians only are active members and do all the voting. They are publishing a remarkable quarterly journal, and if properly supported bid fair to do a work of great significance. Their Denver platform is of a quality which will compel national attention. Out of great sacrifice and labor this new force emerges. Shall we not welcome it and give it every possible support?

For us, duties divide into those imperative for the moment and those which relate to the future. We have our obligations toward pending legislation and in the support of the splendid efforts of the society of American Indians.

For the future we must set ourselves the task of continuous education of the public that every correct endeavor shall be protected and aided to the point where it achieves its proper and logical results. All of us can share in this task. But should not some of our great universities go farther? Ought there not to be one or more endowments created to establish chairs of race development with particular reference to the native race of the American continent? We have eminent professors who as anthropologists, ethnologists, and historians study the Indian of the past. Should we not have men who can devote themselves to the problem of the Indian as he now is, and to the problem of the means by which he may realize his highest possibilities as a citizen and fellow-worker? Such studies should mean vast things, not only for the United States, but for the uncounted millions of native Americans in the countries to the south of us. The nation and the continent call for this great new chair in sociology. Do we not owe this to the people we have so largely dispossessed?

I close with an appeal for your help in the cause of the Indian. However great or small you may think that help will be, it may be the force which will determine whether the scales shall turn in the

direction of wisdom or unwisdom, of salvation or ruin, for the race that once ruled the domain from whence comes the wealth and resources with which we build, through our universities, the civilization of the future. With you rests the decision.

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ASSIMILATION IN THE PHILIPPINES, AS INTERPRETED IN TERMS OF ASSIMILATION IN AMERICA

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Assimilation is psychic, as distinguished from amalgamation which is physical and founded on the biological fact resulting in miscegenation. So assimilation is intellectual and emotional; fundamentally it is emotional. Van Dyke suggests that, as assimilation progresses, it produces certain resemblances between individuals or ethnic groups, followed by developing likenesses. The likenesses become increasingly persistent until at last identity results; then and only then is assimilation complete. Only when the individuals or ethnic groups are emotionally dead to all their varied past, and are all responsive solely to the conditions of the present are they an assimilated people.

On the occasion of the recent Balkan War many thousand Greeks from America poured into the Grecian army, while scarcely one entered our volunteer army in the recent Spanish-American War; the Greeks in America are not yet assimilated. A few years ago during the threatening rupture between Norway and Sweden, foreign-born Minnesota Swedes sent word to the king of Sweden that they would gladly bear arms in defense of their Motherland—but they hastened to add that they would as quickly bear arms for America, their mother by adoption. The foreign-born Scandinavians in Minnesota are rapidly assimilated.

Probably the power of assimilation is the most outstanding and distinguishing characteristic of American social life of today. So accustomed to it are we that at first thought we might take it for granted as occurring everywhere and at all times. To do so is to proclaim our nearsighted vision. Hon. James Bryce wrote from the city of Tiflis, Caucasus, in 1875, Tiflis is

a human melting-pot, a city of contrasts and mixtures, into which elements have been poured from half Europe and Asia, and in which they as yet show no

signs of combining. The most interesting thing about it is the city itself, the strange mixture of so many races, tongues, religions, customs. Its character lies in the fact that it has no character, but ever so many different ones. Here all these people live side by side, buying and selling and working for hire, yet never coming into any closer union, remaining indifferent to one another, with neither love nor hate nor ambition, peaceably obeying a government of strangers who conquered them without resistance and retain them without effort, and held together by no bond but its existence. Of national life or numerical life there is not the first faint glimmer.

Thirty-five years later Mr. William E. Curtis wrote from Tiflis that

what Mr. Bryce said of Tiflis is equally true today. Perhaps it is even more true today than it was then because of the increase of population.

It is now substantially 850 years since the last extensive ethnic flood deluged Great Britain. Yet it is only within the confines of England that assimilation has anywhere nearly completed its process. Assimilation operates more rapidly than amalgamation in England, but outside England, as in Ireland and Scotland, assimilation with the English lags far behind its goal.

In America assimilation did not always characterize our people. In the Atlantic coast-wise colonies it was practically unknown. When the peoples of the diverse coast-wise groups filtered through the mountains westward the earlier individualistic ideas and ideals which had repeatedly caused splits in those groups along the coast gave way before the dominant interests of the new westward movement. Americanisms then began to form the American character.

America possesses an unprecedented ability of assimilation. To what condition or conditions is it due? In speaking of assimilation Münsterberg says:

America's whole success in that direction is determined by its geographical and economic situation, but not by its form of government (*American Traits*, p. 187).

In 1908 Hon. Joaquim Nabuco, ambassador of Brazil to the United States, said:

It is not patriotism that conquers immigration. Through our intercourse with you we see what it is that conquers it. You owe your unparalleled success, as an immigration country, first of all to your political spirit. . . .

The American political spirit is a combination of the spirit of individual liberty with the spirit of equality. Liberty alone would not convert the immigrant into a new citizen. . . . Equality is a more powerful agent. . . . It is the progress of your country, the place it has made for itself in the world, that helps with national pride the spirit of liberty and equality in winning over to you the millions of immigrants who try life in America (*The Approach of the Two Americas*, p. 7).

The two authors quoted are typical of the many; they disagree completely and diametrically as to the cause of American assimilation. Let us say that each in his positive statement, but not in his negative one, is partially correct. Assimilation in America is a complex of conditions, among which are the following—numbered for the sake of convenience and not to indicate relativity:

1. *Volition on the part of the person to be assimilated.*—Practically all immigrant aliens who have come to America, except the Chinese and Japanese, and some of the southeastern Europeans, especially Slavs and Italians, have come to America determined to become Americans. They deliberately “burned their bridges [of historic and hereditary emotions] behind them.” Assimilation of a person against his will is probably impossible; assimilation is immeasurably rapid when one’s chiefest desire is to be considered, at the earliest possible moment, a typical citizen of the country of his adoption.

2. *The English language as the common means of intercommunication.*—Probably the rapidity with which our spoken language is learned by immigrants is, next to assimilation itself, the most striking fact of American social life.

The English spoken language is memorable. Its sledge-hammer blows delivered as short Anglo-Saxon words or as longer words with stressed syllables of harsh consonantal sounds seem to have an advantage all over the world today. One can trade in the markets on navigable waters today more easily in the English language than in any other. The harsh brutality of the English spoken language makes it easy to remember—actually difficult to forget. Such a hold does its vigor get on the young, even foreign-born, children of our immigrants that their mother-tongue becomes a thing despised and to be forgotten. Alexander Francis, the Britisher, favorably contrasts the vitality and freshness of the

English spoken in America with "the anaemic refinement of speech in which Englishmen are apt to take pride."

The immigrants who learn in the streets or the school the use and meaning of such phrases as "play the game," "buck up," "a square deal," "be a good fellow," "put it over," etc., are bound to have their motives and emotions molded toward the fundamental ideal of American democracy—the ideal of an equal opportunity for each person to develop himself as far as he has capacity, so long as he does not interfere with every other person's equal right so to do. The constant use of fresh, virile language helps to make vigorous, alert, resourceful citizens of repressed subjects.

3. *Common education*.—Our compulsory attendance at school until the age of fourteen years, and the habit of newspaper reading have contributed largely to produce what Bryce says is a higher level of general education than exists elsewhere. Couple this condition with the present-day results of a "free press" and "free speech," and an educated public opinion results which becomes exhilarating ozone to the low-toned nerves of our immigrants. The necessary years in our primary and intermediate schools are very important, also, in furnishing the impressionable child with practical experiences of fundamental democracy with its individual independence and the leveling fact of childhood equality. The bully and the snob do not last long in the average primary and intermediate grades of our public schools; they become democratic, or enter private schools.

4. *Common religion*.—Americans have had so many things "in common," or, to put it in another way, so very few things not in common, that the disadvantages of diverse religions within a single nation are difficult to realize. America is essentially Christian, and the religionist finds scant cause for belief in serious friction even in closest scrutiny of the distant horizon. The protracted and deadly wars and persecutions of Europe within the so-called Christian faiths and between Christianity and Mohammedanism help us to see more clearly the assimilating factor of our common Christianity. There are lines of religious cleavage in America, to be sure, but the fundamental ideal of democracy is fast becoming at home in the sphere of religious belief, practice, and life, as

it is in the sphere of business, government, social intercourse, and education.

5. *Common attainable aspirations*.—With the exception of relatively small numbers of persons who come to America to escape political or religious pressure, our immigrants at all times belong to the class which with high hope and great courage come, after years of hard sacrifice, to seek an expectant fortune. America is still *el Dorado* for most immigrants. Very few among them do not rise in the social scale after coming to America—very few fail to find a “fortune,” that is, it is common for our immigrants to have aspirations which are reasonably attainable. Success in one’s undertaking engenders loyalty to the cause. Successful immigrants are loyal American boosters.

6. *Citizenship*.—I used to think the ballot should not be given to any person not born in the United States. I now believe one of the most important causes of America’s success in assimilating her vast numbers of immigrants is citizenship with its duties and privileges. Every man knows that in time he may become a part of that young, successful nation to which he has come. And though voters are herded in places at times, an immigrant citizen or prospective citizen is much more likely to be alert and responsive to American conditions than an alien would be in the country he had adopted but which would not reciprocate. Undoubtedly our immigrants somewhat modify Americanisms; undoubtedly, also, our potent Americanisms assimilate almost completely our immigrants as citizens. Just what the percentage of gain in assimilation is when our immigrants become citizens over what it would be if they remained aliens is, of course, only conjectural. But, in spite of the evils of herded voters, I do not favor making citizenship more difficult to secure than now. A horse bought on trial is generally criticized and his “good points” often minimized; a horse bought outright is defended, and his weaknesses, though discovered, are often minimized or cured. It makes a great deal of difference in the loyalty of most men whether a horse or a country “belongs.”

7. *Physical and human environment*.—There is no question about the tonic effect of American climate. The sudden drops in

temperature over most of the area of the United States produce in a wholesale way the therapeutic effect frequently sought and artificially induced at the instance of physicians for certain individuals who need "toning up." Americans are usually enthusiastic about the climate of their vicinity, whether they live in Washington, D.C., with its hot humid blanket of summer; or in Arizona with its summer days registering 120° in the shade; or in the interior valleys of California with their dripping and penetrating land-fogs in winter; or in Dakota with its blinding, often fatal, blizzards. In all those areas there are compensating conditions. American climate lacks deadening monotony. It has the quickening spice of variety.

The climate of America, and the magical resources of her vast domain, are irresistible in producing a new type of man. He is recognized the world over. He is restless, tense, vigorous, resourceful, confident, courageous, ready, and generous, with the habit of success.

It would be possible, probably, to exaggerate the influence of ethnic groups in America in the assimilation of our immigrants and yet not exaggerate the social influence. However, I wish to speak briefly of the ethnic group. George Burton Adams called attention to this matter as early as 1897. He said:

It is probable that the larger part of those [immigrants] who appear in our census reports as of foreign parentage are foreign in no proper sense. They are an important part of our Americanizing force. As we know by daily observation, the Americanized foreigner is a powerful aid to us in assimilating the recent foreigner (*Civilization during the Middle Ages*, p. 30).

Immigrants most commonly find homes in the vicinity of their friends and relatives who have preceded them to America. There the process of transformation—the ruthless slaying of the past and the careful implanting and nurture of the present—is the absorbing interest. This making of Americans often reaches prospective immigrants in their old homes. A foreign-born Minnesota woman wrote her friend who was about to migrate from Europe to America, "Buy yourself a hat in New York. Don't you dare get off the train in Minneapolis with a shawl over your head." So the effort is often made by our immigrants at once to resemble the Americans among whom they are to live.

The chief factors of assimilation in America have been named. They are: environment, citizenship, aspirations, religion, English language, and volition. What is meant by assimilation in the Philippine Islands? Does it mean assimilation of the Filipinos by Americans in the Islands, or does it mean the making of a homogeneous Philippine people out of the diverse ethnic and cultural groups now there?

I start with the assumption that knowledge of the two factors, environment and volition, is sufficient to convince one that the handful of Americans in the Philippines can never, against the Filipino's will, make typical Americans of the Filipinos living in the Philippine Islands. Today it is known that the environment in time perfects its own type of man. The American has introduced into the Philippines many new artificial environmental conditions, but the permanent factor of natural environment will eventually override all artificial environment which is not permanent. Since the Philippine Archipelago lies entirely within the tropics, and, since 7,000,000 of the 8,000,000 Filipinos live in the tropical lowlands (rather than in the more temperate highlands), it will not be possible for the Filipinos to come under the influence of such stimulating temperate-zone environment as exists in the United States. The Filipinos must remain a tropical people.

The phrase, "Assimilation in the Philippines," must mean the making of a homogeneous people out of the diverse groups in the Archipelago. I shall consider the making of that people under the influence of the artificial environment introduced by the American.

In the Philippines today under the influence of Americanisms are found beginning to operate the same factors that so dominantly operate in American assimilation. With no attempt to focus attention solely on the seven factors of assimilation named above I shall present the important conditions making for assimilation in the Philippines and present them under the same headings.

1. *Volition*.—It is impossible to know the exact desire of the people in the Philippines toward the adoption of Americanisms, though there is little reason to doubt the statement that an overwhelming vote against the American would be cast if the question was one of continued occupation of the Islands by America.

That the readers may have clearly in mind the peoples of the Archipelago, they will be presented briefly under this section, and characterized in terms of volition. There are about 8,000,000 natives in the Archipelago. They are divided into four distinct culture groups. First, the 7,000,000 christianized people, composed of eight dialect groups¹ (commonly called tribes). These groups occupy solely the coastal lowlands, except the Cagayan group whose home is from the coast of Northern Luzon far up the Cagayan River. All, except the Visayan group, live in the island of Luzon; all, except the Tagalog group which centers about Manila, may roughly be located by provinces which share their names. The Visayan peoples occupy the central islands lying between the two large islands of Luzon on the north and Mindanao on the south.

These various groups, christianized by the Spaniards, are in numbers, culture, and importance the Filipinos *par excellence*. They had no common desire toward the Spaniard expressed in common concerted action, though the various local insurrections proclaim that most of the groups felt and resented the pressure of Spanish treatment. The Archipelago was discovered by Magellan in 1521. Spanish domination really began in 1571. The following insurrections have been recorded against Spain: 1588, 1591-92, 1649, 1660, 1750-1827 by Visayans in Bohol, 1762-63 by three separate groups independently, 1823, 1841, 1872, 1896-98. This last insurrection was the one in operation at the time Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet, May 1, 1898. It was a Tagalog insurrection, and the Tagalog people believed that the American navy and army helped them throw off the Spanish oppression so they might be independent. When they discovered that the American was going to remain there occurred the most serious insurrection in Philippine history—the one begun against America February 4, 1899, and ending April 20, 1902. Within the next year began the very stubborn insurrection of the Visayan people of Samar and Leyte which continued for some three years.

All these insurrections were of the nature of defense, none were aggressively offensive. Not one of the insurrections was sup-

¹ Christianized groups: Bikol, Cagayan or Ibanag, Ilokano, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Tagalog, Visayan or Bisayan, and Zambal. Besides these eight there are three small interior towns of Gaddan people in Central Luzon—perhaps 5,000 persons.

ported by even all of the people of a single dialect group—to say nothing of all the people of two or more of the eight christianized groups uniting against Spain or America at the same time. In 1809 the Napoleonic crisis in Spain caused her to grant the Filipinos the right of two deputies to the cortes. In 1812 Spain proclaimed a new constitution, and this allowed the Filipinos to send about 40 deputies; only three or four were usually sent however. In 1814 the constitution was revoked—even this did not awaken united opposition in the Philippines. The Ilokanos of Ilokos Norte at once revolted, but they were all. Each insurrection, however, may truly be said to have been the result of a determined effort on the part of some local group to resist a common pressure, but at no time was there an expression of the consciousness of common interest or of the value of concerted action.

The second large culture group is the “Moro.” These people are the five Mohammedan tribes² which occupy all the coastal area of Southern and Western Mindanao, and all the other islands of the Archipelago to the southwest including the southern coast of Palawan. They were never conquered by the Spaniards, and are breaking out against the Americans a number of times each year now. In their historic scourges over the Visayan Islands and even to the northern coast of Luzon villages from two or more of the five tribes sometimes united, though co-operation among all the tribes never occurred, nor did all the people of even a single tribe appear ever to have joined in such an expedition. The Moros were fast conquering the Archipelago when the Spaniards established themselves in Manila in 1571—Manila itself being in their hands. I do not know a man who is intimately acquainted with the Moros who believes the living adults will ever be assimilated by the American or christianized Filipino ideals.

If America was ever justified in closing her doors against an alien people, she is justified in closing the Philippine Islands against the Arab, because it was he who, as a trader, brought Mohammedanism to the five pagan tribes now Mohammedanized, and it is still the straggling Arab who brings it and keeps it alive in the Archipelago. With no more Mohammedanism introduced,

² The Moro peoples are: Lanao, Magindanao, Samal, Sulu, and Yakan. They number about 300,000 persons.

with the present generation dead, there is good reason to believe that the cause of the unabated fierce enmity of the Moros toward all other peoples in the Philippines would soon cease. So long as Mohammedanism continues assimilation will be impossible, because the Mohammedan will not be assimilated with the Christian.

The third group is the pagan Malayan. These people are brothers of the Moros who were pagans Mohammedanized, and brothers of the christianized groups who were pagans brought under the influence of Spain. They number about 700,000 persons in a score of tribes occupying all of Mindanao, except the coastal areas held by the Moros, and occupying the greater part of Northern Luzon. They are also found in most of Palawan and Mindoro, and in the mountainous interiors of many other islands where the Spaniards did not reach them.

Among many of these peoples I believe an overwhelming vote in favor of American control as against christianized Filipino, and, certainly, against Moro control would be cast if such a vote were taken. This is the view of many men who know them well. It must be said that so far the treatment of natives of the Philippines by other natives of a higher grade of culture has not been benevolent. And the pagans of Northern Luzon remember well the treatment they received at the hands of the *insurrectos* (mainly Tagalog people, under Aguinaldo) who passed through their country in 1900-1901. The fairest treatment, their greatest peace, and prosperity they have had under American control. So far as they know what Americanisms mean, it is believed they would wish them to be developed. I have no knowledge that they desire assimilation with the christianized culture of their kin. They have always resisted it, and the christianized groups had a wholesome fear and deferential respect for the pagan hillman. The development of Americanisms among these pagans, which is going on rapidly now, will draw them and the christianized Filipinos together by virtue of cultural similarities.

The fourth group is the Negrito. These people are a remnant of aborigines numbering some 25,000, who have not culture enough to possess clear or persistent desires toward assimilation with any other culture. They must be ignored in this discussion.

Besides these four groups of Filipinos there are Chinese, probably less than 100,000, and Japanese, probably some less than 200,000, all of whom will need to be reckoned with in the making of a united people in the Philippines. What the Japanese desire no man can say—at least no man can believe all that is said. As to the Chinese, it does not much matter what they themselves desire; but what their descendants desire will go far toward answering the whole question of the Filipino's volition toward assimilation, because they are *the* Filipinos. To be specific: During the latter days of my residence in the Islands in 1905 Governor-General Wright one day told me that he had recently personally received from one of the most distinguished Filipinos of the time, and a member of the Insular Civil Commission, the statement "that there was not a single prominent and dominant family among the christianized Filipinos which did not possess Chinese blood." The voice and the will of the Filipinos today is the voice and the will of these brainy, industrious, rapidly developing men whose judgment in time the world is bound to respect. Today I do not believe the wisest among them are in a position to agree on a reasonably permanent desire in the present problem.

2. *English language*.—First it should be noted that though the groups of people christianized by the Spaniards were all Malayan, yet the dialects of the eight groups were so different that intercommunication was next to impossible. In 1590 a council of Friars decided to teach each dialect group of natives to read and write its own dialect instead of Spanish—thus intensifying the dialect differences. During the governorship of Anda (1770-76), a royal decree was issued that Spanish should be taught the Filipinos instead of their own dialects. In spite of that fact it was said that only 5 per cent of the Filipinos could read or write Spanish at the time of American occupation. A Manila experience may serve to illustrate this lack of a common means of intercommunication. One evening in 1903 I was riding my horse in company with Judge D. R. Williams in the eastern outskirts of Manila when we came upon a large crowd of people in the street watching a man put a struggling woman into a covered caretilla. He bundled her over the tail-board, climbed in after her while the driver of the cart

whipped up the horse, and they disappeared in the dusk down the road. We tried for some time to learn the cause of the, to us, unique spectacle, but no one in the crowd could understand either my "pidgeon-Spanish" or the Judge's Castilian. At last someone brought up a crippled old man who could talk with us; he had been many years a house servant in a Spanish family. Through him we learned that "some man was stealing a woman"—that was all! This was in the outskirts of Manila, the capital of the Archipelago where Spanish influence was at its highest and where it had existed since 1571.

Today the English language has been acquired so extensively by means of the primary schools which exists in all provinces, and by high schools, normal schools, and trade schools that in June, 1910, the University of the Philippines was opened to take care of the numbers of English-speaking students who demanded a college training. In 1912 the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs said that at least 3,000,000 Filipinos have had instruction in English in the public schools of the Philippines. There are now in the neighborhood of 700,000 pupils enrolled annually in these schools. This number is about one-third of the population of school age.

The English language has gone more widely over the Islands, however, than simply within the schoolroom. That English words are quickly ingrafted into the Filipino's vocabulary was forced home upon the American in the Islands during early days of American occupation. Several times we found a few words of the American brand of profanity to be the only English spoken by Filipinos. The use of such memorable English was at times naïve and startling. I shall not forget the surprise I experienced on a beautiful October morning in 1902 when, getting an early start on a hike in the Upper Cagayan Valley, I met a smiling Cagayan belle whose trail crossed mine on stones over a shallow stream. She came gliding barefoot down the stony bank balancing a load of fruit on her head; and in her "best" English, as a sincere salutation, greeted me with the most cheery and pleasant-voiced American profanity I have ever heard.

Today one may go everywhere in the Archipelago among the 7,000,000 christianized Filipinos and find fifty or more natives in

each province familiar with high-school English, and on every hand there are children talking English on the streets. The English language is a common means of communication between the diverse dialect groups in the Islands such as the Spanish language had not become after more than 350 years of occupation, and such as the different Filipino dialects could not become. The government official last quoted said on this matter in 1912: "The hope of developing any real idea of nationality among the Filipino peoples of the future lies more probably in the spread of a common language than in any other one thing, and English offers the only hope to be raised in this respect." English, then, will be an important assimilating factor in the Philippine Islands, provided its growth continues as at present for a couple of generations more. Since January 1, 1913, English has been the official language even of the courts of the Archipelago.

3. *Common education.*—During the Spanish régime the christianized Filipinos were well taught in school, social life, and by example that physical work was undignified. The ideal and ambition of the youth of Manila during the first six or eight years of American occupation was to learn enough English so he could use a pen in a government office, wear pointed patent-leather American shoes, a black oven of a derby hat, clothing of American cut, and be considered an *elegante*, a Spanish dude.

Probably the most important fact developed by American education in the Islands is that the above view of life is false for a modern developing nation. Even the acquisition of the English language is probably of secondary importance to the development of moral fiber, physical strength, and general toning up in health and manhood through a man's earnest effort to earn his bread in the sweat of his brow—and to be proud of the sweat as well as of the abundant bread.

When the native teacher was first started in the American public schools it was the common thing for a servant to follow the dapper young teacher from his home to the school in order to carry his master's book. It was almost impossible to get young men to enter the first school of telegraphy established by the Americans. The Trades School languished for a long time because

no one wanted to learn to work. Now these things have greatly changed.

Every boy and girl in every primary school throughout the Philippines spends a considerable portion of each school day in work with his hands. In every manual exercise he is engaged in making some article of real value, either for use or ornament in his own home, or for sale. . . . A half-finished article, or a poorly finished article, is not acceptable; the work must be well done, completely done, and done to a definite purpose. . . . In every case the lessons of patience, perseverance, and honest work are drilled into the fiber of the child's mind until they become essential features of character.

Thus wrote Frank R. White, the late director of education, in 1911. Of another aspect of the education Mr. White wrote the same year as follows:

The model young man of earlier days was spotlessly clad; his occupations were sedentary, calling for no physical exertion and permitting of no soiling of linen or rumpling of personal composure. For physical exercise, it was proper to march seriously in school processions and take the evening air; and how much more rigidly were the standards of outward propriety enforced with respect to the young woman of the country! But now this new spirit of athletic interest has swept in upon the boys and girls with a force that is actually revolutionary, and with it come *new standards, new ideals of conduct, and, what is far more important, new ideals of character. These sports put red blood into the veins, new energy into body and mind, and establish new ideas of life's purpose and value.* For what boy can be satisfied with a dawdling, idle, careless, purposeless existence, if, for even a season or two, he has experienced the stirring discipline of public censure and public applause in hard athletic battles? Application, perseverance, and fair play may be words unfamiliar to such a boy, but he has learned the lessons which they represent and they will stay with him longer than any maxim learned from a book.

Today a common education is under way which will not only tend to add strong muscle, clear brain, and sterling character to the Filipino, but will produce abundantly the economic resources of life, enabling the people to satisfy an ever-increasing number of wants. Thus is being laid the foundation for a general rise in social status, a knowledge that culture is based on material prosperity and well-being, and an ambition in all men for an individually larger part in the common interests of the Islands.

Filipinos used to say that the Philippines contained a class of citizens which knew how to govern, and a class which knew how to obey. I believe history belies both statements. The new common

education in time will tend to produce a Filipino people which knows how to govern itself and how to obey its own laws. Then and only then will they be approaching assimilation.

4. *Common religion*.—There is no reason to doubt the statement that Christianity introduced by the Jesuits and the several orders of Friars was the most important assimilation factor in the Philippines in pre-American times. It operated in two ways. It brought a common economic culture to a remarkably uniform level among the eight dialect groups it converted from paganism. And, in its later harshness, as expressed by various religious orders, it assisted greatly in uniting the people against the church; several of the insurrections against Spain were really insurrections against the strangle-hold of the church.

Christianity still operates as an assimilating factor, and it is more important than before. The church orders which had so often been distrusted, and had irritated so many of the Filipinos, are gone forever, and an American archbishop is at the head of the Roman Catholic church. American Protestants are working among the christianized and pagan groups, and they have wisely divided the field, except urban residence centers of Americans, among the several different denominations—thus largely avoiding the probable confusion of the people. Paganism will not be more than a temporary check to the otherwise successful operation of Christianity as an assimilation factor. Mohammedanism apparently will be a permanent check; it is believed that Mohammedanism will be an unassimilable religion. A solution of the difficulty has been previously suggested.

5. *Common attainable aspirations*.—The most common aspiration in the Philippines now is for knowledge of the English language. Chinese, Japanese, pagan, Mohammedan, and christianized Filipinos eagerly strive to learn the language. This aspiration will be attainable for the youth as soon as sufficient revenue is available so that the remaining two-thirds of the children may be given instruction. It seems a reasonable and attainable aspiration. The next most common aspiration is that, shared probably by all christianized Filipinos, of an ever-increasing participation in the governmental control of the Archipelago. This aspiration is being attained in a magically short time; the frequent fear that it is too

short will probably be retained by the world until lapse of time proves, if it does so prove, that stages of culture may now and then be taken as a hurdle. The next most common aspiration is probably that for a Philippine protectorate under the United States; and the next, probably, is that for an out-and-out national independence. These two are not shared by all christianized peoples, and their corollary, that of a nation composed of all the diverse groups in the Archipelago, is not shared by Moros or pagans.

All these aspirations will assist the assimilation process just so far as they are shared by the diverse peoples.

6. *Citizenship*.—It should be clear by this time that the peoples of the Philippines are not of homogeneous culture. In this section attention will be placed upon the two classes of christianized Filipinos as they existed at the time of American occupation. Those classes should be defined not as "the class which knew how to govern and the class which knew how to obey," but as the class with wealth and superior culture, with Chinese and often European blood, which, because of its innate superiority, aspired to make itself the governing body of the Archipelago; and the other class, composed of some 95 per cent of the christianized people, which naturally took leadership from its superiors, and was so uncultured that it could not compete in any way except in numbers with those same superiors.

That the desired freedom from Spanish control would have brought any further duties and privileges of citizenship to this second class of Filipinos no one who has lived in the Philippines believes. The withdrawal of Spain from the Islands would have meant no shifting or lightening of the burden from the second class, but only a change of the masters who would place the burden. That the leaders of the last insurrection against Spain desired simply to make such a change of masters, that, at the time, the conception they had of citizenship was still mediaeval—a copy of Spanish Middle-Ages method—is seen in the following entry in the diary of Aguinaldo's physician made only one week before the capture of that leader:

After supper the honorable President [Aguinaldo] in conversation with B., V., and Lieutenant Carasco, told them that as soon as independence of the country was declared he would give each one of them an amount of land

equal to what he himself will take for the future of his own family, that is, he will give each one of the three gentlemen 13,500 acres of land as a recompense for their work.

Thus did the freebooters divide spoils among their henchmen; the acres of modern nations belong to the citizens, not to the "President."

In my judgment the work of assimilation in the Philippines will be slowest right here. Because of the relative fewness of the pagans, Moros, Negritos, Chinese, and Japanese, let us ignore them in this section—though the actual political problem cannot be solved by such a simple way of elimination. There are left the two classes, the superior and natural leaders, and the natural followers. Those leaders have an inherited superiority which has been enhanced by culture. Some of those leaders (what percentage I make no pretense of even guessing) know that national prosperity cannot endure in competition with modern nations unless the majority of the people have, as individuals, an intelligent conception of their privileges, responsibilities, and duties as members of that nation. Some of those leaders have no such conception; they may never have it—natural aristocrats exist in all cultures, as do natural democrats.

There is the other class, the majority class; they are the problem. They must be educated away from more than 350 years of quasi-peonage, must be taught to speak, and to reason, and to demand and get their rights as citizens among those who have been so long their superiors. More than that, they must learn the hard lesson that rights entail duties and responsibilities. While making all this development they must get economic independence due to individual training and honest efficient toil. To accomplish all this against their natural inertia of race, and the inertia of social and physical environment is not a task that can be completed by the year 1921, or, it seems to some well-informed and not altogether vicious Americans, not within less than the lifetime of two generations of men developing under favorable conditions.

7. *Physical and human environment.*—The Philippine Archipelago stretches for fifteen degrees through the tropics, and though there are about 3,000 islands, they are all geographically, climatically, culturally, and ethnically more interrelated than any of them

are to any other land areas. The physical environment should make for assimilation.

However, history has not recorded a case of a tropical people with a tropical environment such as the christianized Filipinos live in that of its own initiative has attained a relatively high level of culture. Such culture must have a foundation of material well-being which is maintained by perpetual toil by a majority of the people. Probably the chief reason for this backwardness is because people naturally do not long work hard in such an environment. Again, no stable democratic government has flourished in such a tropical environment, to say nothing of such a government having originated there. Perhaps the chief reason is found in the fact that only as conditions favor the majority of the people will the naturally superior few relinquish their grip on authority over the many. Tropical conditions seem never to favor the majority of a people, but only the most gifted few.

It seems natural, then, to expect that tendencies toward democracy, if found in lowland tropics, are due to alien introduction, and that they would flourish only under artificially induced conditions. In other words, though one might not be surprised to find a lowland tropical people assimilated enough to attempt to throw off a foreign yoke, he would not, in the present world-stage of the development of popular government, expect such a people to initiate and perpetuate a stable democracy.

The problem of assimilation in the Philippines, so far as the human environment is concerned, is practically nil. All the Filipinos, except a few thousand Negritos, are Malayan. There are the Japanese and the Chinese, but the latter with few exceptions marry Filipino wives and raise Filipino children. So that the only true aliens there are the Japanese, who may or may not amalgamate, and the few thousand Americans and Europeans whose future in the Archipelago is hemmed closely about the laws deliberately made by the Americans to preserve "the Philippines for the Filipinos." Everything ethnically should favor assimilation. The human hindrances are cultural; they are largely religious and governmental.

CONCLUSION

Continued assimilation in the Philippines is problematic. I see no reason for believing that assimilation in the Philippines would carry far if the implanting of Americanisms there should now cease. That they would cease today upon the withdrawal of America, even under guaranty of Philippine national independence by the powers or the establishment of an ordinary protectorate by the United States, is evident to those who know the present status of cultural conditions in the Archipelago. There is naturally little unanimity in matters of volition, language, education, aspirations, religion, or in equipment for citizenship. There is very uniform natural and ethnic environment, but these alone cannot, as has been proved by the past, overcome the cultural conditions that are now quite natural to the several groups of people.

I do see reason for believing that continuation of the American policy in the Philippines for at least two generations more will result in a marked degree of assimilation. As has been said, the natural and ethnic environment is favorable. The English language by that time would have furnished a well-nigh universal means of oral and written intercommunication. A relatively high level of education would have become common, carrying with it, not simply facts of modern culture, but a developing economic sense and ideals of physical, mental, and moral health—all of which would greatly raise the social level of the majority of the people. The religious differences would not be greater than now, and they could be minimized. A people so developing would have, on the one hand, ever loftier aspirations for one another, and, on the other hand, an ever fuller expression of citizenship as those aspirations were realized. If a young and fecund people, such as the Filipinos most certainly are, is given sufficient tutelage in the fundamental principles of democracy, I see no reason to doubt that it can profit by it. Further, I see no reason to question that after such tutelage the factors of assimilation will have so far operated that the Filipinos can long maintain a level of individual attainment and a status of social justice that will greatly enrich humanity.

THE PLAYGROUND SURVEY

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Before a doctor can treat his patient he must diagnose the case. Before a tailor can make a suit of clothes, he must measure his customer. It seems reasonably evident likewise that, if a play system is to be made to fit the actual needs of a city, it must be built upon a study of the city's needs. A system that is less than this cannot be better than a custom-made suit at best, and is often no more appropriate than the dress of a five-year-old girl would be for a boy of twelve.

If a tailor is to make a suit of clothes there are certain definite measurements which he takes, because he has found these dimensions are essential in order that he may produce a fit. In recreation surveys, no such definite and fixed measurements have yet been reached. Different authorities will not agree entirely as to what it is desirable to know about a city before the playground system is cut out. Different people also differ very much in their ideas as to how much time it is worth while to spend on making such a survey, and some are of the opinion that they already know all that is necessary about the city in order to plan for its recreation. But it would certainly be a moderate statement to say that the tailor could cut out a suit of clothes quite as well by looking at his customer, as to say that any man, however familiar, could plan an appropriate play system for any city, without first making a study of the conditions that the playgrounds must satisfy.

THE SURVEY A NEW BUSINESS AND SOCIAL METHOD

Ever since the Pittsburgh Survey was made by the Russell Sage Foundation, it has been the accepted doctrine that every large undertaking should be preceded by a careful study of the conditions. There is now a Bureau of Surveys under the Russell Sage Foundation that will undertake any sort of a social investigation in any

city. The Men-in-Religion Movement instituted a survey, very superficial to be sure, as the base of its campaign in each city. The various vice commissions in the different cities nearly always base their recommendations on a rather careful study of their problem. Since the study of Gulick and Ayers in New York, the educational survey has been the proper thing. The Y.M.C.A. is conducting a rural survey in most cases before the location of its county secretaries. The agricultural colleges are attempting to carry on agricultural surveys in all the states, and, in general, the survey may be said to be the orthodox beginning of any well-considered project. Stated in its simplest terms, it is an attempt to find out what the problem is before its solution is undertaken. As such it is a requirement of the commonest of common sense. The first recreation survey made in this country was, I believe, made by me in Washington, for the Playground and Recreation Association of America, but since that time such surveys have been undertaken in a number of cities. The play movement is usually begun by private individuals with a very limited amount of money to spend. They do not expect to carry through the enterprise, but to start it, and then turn it over to the city. Under the circumstances, local associations usually do not feel that they can spend much time or money on a preliminary survey.

WHAT THE SURVEY SHOULD DISCOVER

There are at least four things that every careful playground survey should seek to discover. They are the number and ages of the children, the present activities of the children in their leisure time, and the effects of these activities as shown in their physical and social development, the present play facilities, and the possible sites that might be secured in acquiring a system of recreation grounds. In securing the numbers and ages of the children, the school registration, or, better, the school census, serves as a fairly satisfactory guide. The present activities of the children and young people will have to be a matter of personal study, and for the effects of these conditions, physical tests and the records of the juvenile court may be taken. The present recreation facilities and the facilities that might be secured will have to be a matter

for personal study. Different people would be likely to disagree as to just how far it is desirable to go in the investigation of the details of each of these items, but there would be little disagreement that the survey should include them at least.

THE AGES OF THE CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE

Before a play system can be wisely planned, it is necessary to know not only how many children it is to accommodate, but also what the approximate ages of these children are; as entirely different facilities will need to be provided for the young men and women from those furnished to the small children, and the working boys and girls will have to be provided for at night. As has been said, the school census, which records every person in the city under twenty-one, serves as a fairly good guide, both to the number of children in any section and to their ages.

It may be supposed that the proportion of children to adults is pretty much the same in the different parts of the city, and that the most crowded part of the city is the place where the playgrounds are most needed, but this is frequently found not to be the case. The younger families with the smaller children tend to gravitate toward the outer edge of the city where rents are cheaper and there is more room for the little people. The old and wealthy parts of cities will often be found to contain surprisingly few children. Permanent colonies of foreigners will often be found to have a high percentage of children, while a transient colony of those who come and go will be found to contain very few. Also the proportion of those over thirteen differs greatly in different communities.

HOW THE YOUNG PEOPLE ARE SPENDING THEIR LEISURE TIME

Having found out the numbers and ages of the young people, the next subject of inquiry should naturally be how they are spending their leisure time. The problem naturally divides itself into three parts. What are the little children doing that have not yet entered school? What are the school children doing after school and on Saturdays and Sundays, and what are the working boys and girls doing in their leisure? Here the problem is largely one of recreation

in the evenings or Sundays. There are no records that will help much in securing this information, yet the method is very simple and interesting: the investigator need only go about the city where the children are found and put down on a pad of paper what each child is doing. The activities of children are easily classified, for the most part, and the records are easily made. The results are almost sure to be interesting. There is no phase of the work which more strikingly illustrates the need of the survey than the opinion of adults in this regard. The people who object to supporting the playgrounds usually call themselves practical people, but it is wonderful how unpractical and almost feeble-minded their suggestions look when confronted with the actual facts. In a town of Northern Illinois, a number of people said that they did not believe in furnishing playgrounds for the children because the children ought to work. In a number of trips over the city, I was not able to find a single child that was working outside of a very few boys who were carrying papers. It was evidently not a case of play or work, but a question of play or idleness. Again a number said, "Playgrounds are not needed in this city; the children can play in ——— Pasture." Observation showed a large pasture well within the city. It had a high barbed-wire fence around it, and never at any time did I find a single child there. People are very blind to things in which they are not especially interested.

In the city of Houston, Texas, there were a number of people who felt that playgrounds were not needed, because "there were plenty of places where the children could play." In two trips about the city in the time after school, in the observation of 123 children, the first night I found 3 were riding bicycles, 5 were running errands, 4 were chasing each other, 70 were loitering up and down the street, and 40 were loafing or playing listlessly in front of their houses. A second evening, I was able to locate 229 children; of these, 1 was studying, 5 were reading, 2 were looking at pictures, 2 were caring for babies, 4 were going errands, 7 were carrying papers, 1 was watering the lawn, 2 were swinging, 3 were playing with pet rabbits, 5 were playing at keeping house, 2 were roller-skating, 9 were bicycling, 4 were playing catch, 46 were playing ball (as a

result of organized contests going on in a near-by school-yard), 40 were strolling on the street, and 90 were loafing. Thus 131 out of the 229 were doing nothing of advantage to anyone, and the baseball, which was found only in this section, was apparently directly due to a series of school contests which were going on in a neighboring school-yard every evening.

THE NEED OF THE EVENING PLAYGROUND

Should playgrounds be lighted for use at night? There are three kinds of information that are of prime importance to the solution of this problem. What proportion of the young people are working during the day, so that they cannot use the playground then? Is the ground shaded enough and cool enough so that the children will enjoy using it by day, and what are the children at present doing in the evenings? Here the question comes largely to a study of the poolrooms, dance halls, moving-picture shows, pleasure parks, ice-cream counters, saloons, etc. What is likely to be the result?

THE NEED OF THE SUNDAY PLAYGROUND

One of the acute questions of the play world is whether or not the playground is to be open on Sunday. The information that is needed is, first, the nature of the community in which it is placed. If it is in the midst of a colony of orthodox Jews or Seventh Day Adventists, Sunday will be the day when the community itself will most desire the playground to be open. In a number of communities, where the inhabitants are largely recent immigrants from the Continent of Europe, the same will be true. Nearly all the great athletic events and play festivals in Germany take place on Sunday afternoon. On the other hand, if the playground is in the midst of an orthodox Protestant community, it would probably be very unwise to open the playgrounds and ball field on Sunday forenoon at least. But after all, the real conclusive answer to the social desirability of having the playgrounds and ball fields open on Sunday is what the young people are doing on Sunday under present conditions. What do the police records for Monday morning show? Where are the young people, and what are they doing?

WHAT ARE THE YOUNG PEOPLE DOING IN THE SUMMER VACATIONS?

It would be very interesting to know, if possible, how many parents take their children out of the city for a longer or shorter period during the summer and why they do it. Every such trip takes out of the city much money, and often spends the savings of a year. It is desirable that children should know the country and spend a good deal of time there. But conditions are seldom wholesome for them around summer resorts. It is surely bad business policy for a city to drive its people to the resorts for their recreation, because it has failed to make proper provision for it. I am confident that more money goes out of most cities for this reason every summer than it would cost to maintain a whole system of recreation grounds. These figures are not easy to secure, but in any typical school it is not hard to find how many weeks were spent out of the city in the aggregate and the total for the city can be estimated from this. If these weeks of absence from the city are estimated to mean, in railroad fares, board, and amusements, \$5 a week, which is surely a very moderate estimate, the amount of money thus taken out of the city will be found to reach an enormous total.

RESULTS OF THE LACK OF PROPER PLAY FACILITIES

We have, at the present time, no satisfactory measure or statement of the results of inadequate play facilities upon children. There have been no studies that much more than hint at what the results may be. It is probably the lack of these statistics that has made the play movement go more slowly than many other social movements have done. The results must be recorded on the physical, intellectual, and social side. The only study that has thus far yielded much that is definite was the study in Chicago, which seemed to show a decrease of nearly 50 per cent in juvenile delinquency. It is not at all impossible, although it would take time and money, to get a measure of the physical results of these conditions upon children.

The year following the introduction of organized play into the curriculum of the schools of Prosheim, Germany, the number of days' absence on account of sickness was reduced nearly one-half.

Our school hygiene departments ought to be required to show for every city the percentage of absences due to sickness. This is, of course, a direct measure of the things that they are supposed to promote, and is the only way of estimating the need of and the efficiency of the department. These facts would be also the facts which would be most useful to the play promoters.

There can be no question but that the development of motor skill and grace comes largely through play. It is doubtful if one ever gets the buoyant, elastic step and sprightly carriage by any other means. The peasant peoples of Europe, whose physical development has come mostly from work or formal gymnastics, have often seemed like awkwardness personified. But neither awkwardness, grace, nor motor skill are easily measured, and it is well-nigh impossible to secure statistics of grace.

On the side of physical development, it should not be so difficult, as we have three methods of measurement. The one is by direct anthropometric and dynamometer test of physical developments and strength, a second by the test of the Public School Athletic League, and the third by pedometer records of activity. We are getting a series of anthropometric records from a number of cities now, and we already have standards fairly well worked out for height and weight for the different ages and races. It seems to be fairly well determined that exercise and food are the two external factors which condition growth. So far as I know, we have no careful and full dynamometer records of the strength of school children. These would take a considerable time to secure, but would be very valuable, as they would give a direct measure of the effects of the child's daily life in terms of strength. The test of the Public School Athletic League is more easily tried and is an advantage in itself. The standard test, as originally promoted in New York, was for boys under thirteen to jump 5 feet, 9 inches standing, chin a bar four times, and run a 60-yard dash in $8\frac{1}{2}$ seconds. At the time I went to Washington to have charge of the playgrounds there, we tried the test in all the playgrounds, and did not find a boy who could do the three things. After four summers of organized play, we tried the test again. There were five hundred boys who could do the three things. There were more than two thousand

boys who could do one or two of the three things. Doubtless the same progressive development has taken place in a number of other cities. Of those passing a creditable physical examination on entrance to the German army, the numbers were found to vary in the different cities from 28 per cent in Berlin to 65 per cent in Mulheim. This was in almost direct ratio to the play facilities that were available in the different cities.

Probably the most valuable test that could be secured, however, would be a pedometer record of activity. I am myself convinced that in closely built up cities that make no provision for play, the average activity of the children is two or three miles a day less than it is in the cities that make ample provision. This opinion is based on a brief pedometer study of activity of school children which I made in Worcester several years ago, and on my observation of the activity of children in all parts of the country. It was my observation of the listlessness of the play in Washington that led us to start a series of contests and try to make them exciting. I am convinced that the daily activity of the children during the warmer months in the South is two or three miles a day less than it is in the North. The chances are, I suspect, that when the nervous system has become habituated in childhood to the daily development of a certain amount of energy, mainly through the nature of the play engaged in, it will be difficult for it greatly to increase this rate later in life. In other words, this would mean, in general, that if the child did not have an opportunity for energetic play, his later life would not be as energetic as it might otherwise have been. This is, of course, the same principle of development through training that lies at the basis of all education. Joseph Lee has said the same thing in another form when he said, "The child without the playground is father to the man without a job." If pedometer records should show that the average activity of the children of one city is nine miles a day and that the average activity of the children of a second city is only six miles a day, I think we may safely infer that the children of the second city will show only a little more than two-thirds of the physical development of the children of the first city, that they will not be as graceful or have as good a carriage, that they probably will not be quite as tall or heavy, and that the

number of absences from school, on account of sickness, other things being equal, will be considerably greater. I believe also that when the boys and girls of the second city grow up they will not be as energetic as the children of the first city. No body of citizens would be willing to have it said that all of these things were happening in their city because they had failed to make provision for the proper play of the children. Hence I am inclined to think that if this data could be secured from enough cities to fix a standard, it would solve the question of play propaganda.

THE STUDY OF THE EXISTING PLAY FACILITIES

The problem of any city is naturally divided into three parts, corresponding to the ages of the young people. These three parts are: play for the little children who have not yet entered school, play for the school children, and play for adolescents. The three corresponding types of playgrounds are: the door-yard, the school ground, and the park, athletic field, and municipal playground by day and the social center and municipal gymnasium at night for the adolescents. A study which will determine the actual need must study the yards of the houses and their size and condition, the size and condition and use of the school-yards, and the presence of athletic fields, swimming-pools, etc., in the parks, social centers, in the schools, etc.

SIZE AND CONDITION OF THE DOOR-YARDS

Parents will often say in the beginning that they do not believe in the playgrounds as the children ought to play at home. However, it will be found, in most cases, that there has been no provision made for the children's play at home, and that the front yard is inhabited by flower beds and the back yard by ash cans. Probably not more than 1 per cent of city door-yards contain any considerable equipment for the play of the children. It will often be found that a lot two hundred feet deep will not bring any more than a lot one hundred feet deep, showing how little value parents put on play opportunities. Many city blocks are so small that when a good-sized house is put back a reasonable distance from the street there is almost no space in the rear for play. Where the blocks are only

an acre and a half to two acres in size, it may be taken for granted that there can be almost no play in the door-yards, unless the lots are very wide or all the residents will turn their back space into a common for the children. It will be found, in general, that almost no children are playing in the yards of the houses where the blocks are so small. On the other hand, where the blocks are three or more acres in size and are kept in reasonably good condition, these yards often offer an excellent place for the play of the little children who have not yet started to school. The children who are under six have all their time for play. Their health is largely dependent on their being much in the open air. They cannot go to a distance by themselves for their play. Every yard should provide them with the necessary equipment. This should consist, first of all, of a sand bin five or six feet square, a small slide, one or two low swings, not more than eight or ten feet high, and a garden swing.

The yard should provide quoits, croquet, and tether-ball for the older children, if it is of good size, but it can hardly provide any other games for them.

If the yards of the houses then are adequate, it will mean two things of importance for the play system of the city. It will mean that the city in that section is scattered and that consequently there will not be a large child population per acre. It will mean also that little if any provision needs to be made for the children of less than six years of age.

The survey should indicate the approximate size of the blocks, the width of the parking line in front, and the size and condition of the back yard; also whether or not there is any equipment for the play of the children there, although, in general, it can be taken for granted that there is none. The back yard is the proper place for the sand bin, the slide, the see-saw, and the swing, but if the parents will not provide these for the little children, it is probably best for the community to furnish them in the playground. It must be remembered that the door-yard in general can provide for the play of the little children only, and effects the problem of play for the children of school age very little. There can never be vigorous games, such as the older children should play, in the door-yard. Doubtless this survey of the door-yards seems formidable as it is

written down, but in actual fact a mere stroll through the neighborhood with eyes open and pencil in hand will reveal most that needs to be known.

THE SIZE AND CONDITION OF THE SCHOOL GROUNDS

In some cities the schools themselves furnish fairly adequate space for the play of all the school children, but, in not a few cases, this space is entirely unutilized. No new playground should ever be purchased until it has been determined that there is no city-owned property that is already available, and the school-yards should naturally be investigated first. Where the school-yards are an acre or more in extent, it would be folly to proceed to the purchase of other small grounds about the city for the play of the school children. It is a good thing, wherever possible, to get a mechanical drawing of every school-yard in the city. This can often be done by the upper classes as a lesson in mechanical drawing. It will be as valuable a lesson as they could possibly have, as it will deal with actual conditions, and will appeal to the children as useful. The drawings should indicate directions, distances, the size of areas, presence of trees or shade, nature of surface, presence of fences, and the like, also the condition of the yard and whether or not there is any play apparatus in it, the number of children in the school, and the number of square feet of playground for every child. I secured such a set of drawings of the Washington school-yards when I first went there. We used them constantly, and the Superintendent sometimes sent down to borrow them. These figures show at once whether any further play facilities are needed in that section. By adding all these areas and registrations together, it is possible to find the average number of square feet per pupil furnished by the school-yards of the city, though here it is necessary to avoid the vitiation of the results from adding in large outlying tracts in connection with new schools with small registration. In some cities such a study will show such a gross deficiency that it will be good campaign material for immediate enlargement of the school-yards or the provision of other playgrounds. In general it may be said that every school should have at least one block of ground, if the blocks are less than four acres in size. There should be not less

than one hundred square feet of playground for each child connected with the school. Anything less than this is inadequate; but there are many places where it is impossible to obtain this much ground on account of the location of the building.

Wherever the school grounds are reasonably adequate, the play of the school children belongs there, and the plan need make very slender provision for their play outside, except that it must furnish a place for swimming, wading, baseball, and tennis for the older children.

If, for any reason, it is impossible to get the mechanical drawing of the school-yards, the estimate of the superintendent of schools may be taken as to the size and suitability of the yard for play, and the registration of the school may be put in by the school clerk.

The condition of the school grounds is of importance as a large part of these throughout the country will be found to be in wretched condition. Often they have never even been leveled off after the cellar was dug, but the soil has been left in heaps. Ashes will often be found to be strewn about the yard as well as brick bats, stones, paper, etc. The ground is frequently gullied out by the rains and obstructed by the projecting roots of trees. If all the schools of the country should be dismissed early this afternoon, and the older boys set with hoes, rakes, and shovels to putting the ground into condition, probably 25 per cent of them would be improved 100 per cent thereby.

VACANT LOTS

To most people who have not thought much about it, a playground is a place to play, and there is no problem if there are vacant lots available. These people have almost completely misunderstood the play movement and its meaning, for it has not grown out of the congestion of our cities but out of the new psychology. It makes no difference from which angle you turn the search-light upon the child, you will find that play is the most fundamental thing about him. The vacant lot makes almost no difference in the need of playgrounds, but it makes a very great difference in the possibility of securing them. In the first place, the vacant lot does not belong to the city, and the child is generally a trespasser and often a nuisance there. These vacant lots will soon be built up in

any growing city, if they are not speedily purchased by the city. In my study of available sites in Washington in 1908 I found 113 sites large enough for playgrounds. Sixteen of these were built up the next year, showing that six more years at the same rate would put an adequate playground system almost beyond the reach of the district. The vacant lot is little attended by the small children or by the girls who need the play facilities more than the boys do, because they have less already and receive less encouragement from their parents and the community. If anyone will keep track of the attendance on any particular vacant lot he may choose, I think he will find that it will average less than 1 per cent of the school registration from the neighborhood. Such a ground is often used by the big boys as a place in which to play baseball in the spring and football in the fall, but it will be found in most sections that a large proportion of the games break up in some quarrel or dispute. It will be found also that a great deal of the language would not be allowed to go through the mails. The presence of such vacant lots in the neighborhood makes scarcely any difference in the attendance at the playgrounds.

CONDITION OF THE STREETS

Most people imagine that if the playgrounds are provided it is going to keep the children off the streets, and in fact it does to a large extent. All of the children who are on the playground are obviously off the streets, and most of them would probably have been there if the playground had not been provided. But the street is so much more accessible than the playground that the children will probably always play in front of their homes on the street, if the street is suitable, more than they do in the playground. There is nothing inherently demoralizing in street play in a good section of the city. It is the play in the alleys and stables and lumber yards that is apt to be harmful. If a street is little traveled, fairly wide, asphalted, and reasonably well shaded and cleaned, it serves for much play, and the playgrounds for such a section do not need to be as large as they do in a section where the street is paved with cobblestones, unshaded, and left in a filthy condition, or as they would if the street were much frequented by automobiles, so that it would be unsafe for the children to play upon it.

PARKS AND THEIR FACILITIES FOR BASEBALL AND TENNIS

One objection that was usually made by some member of Congress to the playground appropriation for the District was that there were so many parks in the District that the playgrounds were not needed, but anyone who knows anything about the small circles and triangles of Washington must know that while they may answer more or less for romping or horse play, they are not adapted to games and that no organized play can be carried on there. The same things can be said of any of the small ornamental parks of our cities. In the larger parks there generally are facilities for sports and games, and if there are adequate baseball diamonds, tennis courts, and swimming places, these with ample school-yards may provide for all the play needs of the city. It should be the policy to locate tennis grounds, ball fields, and swimming places within about a mile of each section if possible, and in general these should be along car lines, as the older young people use these facilities and can often afford to pay car fare. All of these available sites should be summed up and listed before new facilities are purchased by the city.

SWIMMING FACILITIES

All available natural facilities for swimming should also be listed, and, if possible, the statistics of drowning from swimming in these places should be secured.

When all of this data have been obtained, it should be possible to tell the need of the playgrounds and approximately where they should be located and what facilities they should contain. If the yards are large, there will need to be little provision for the small children, and the playgrounds will not need to be so large because there will be fewer children within a given radius. If the school playgrounds are large, there will not need to be much provision for the ordinary play of the school children, and the problem will mainly be to reach the working boys and girls and the young men and women, who still have a love of games, but there will have to be provision also for tennis, baseball, and swimming for the older school children, unless the school also has space for these games. If the streets are asphalted and well paved, the children will have much of their play there, and the playgrounds need not be as large

as would be necessary in a section where the streets are paved with cobblestones.

DANCE HALLS, POOLROOMS, AND SALOONS

These have no direct relationship to the playground, but the playground will be a new and effective rival of all of these institutions, especially if it is open at night and really suitable to the social enjoyment of the young men and women.

If a city shows a surplus of such institutions—and a very few may well be a surplus—this may be the best possible reason for opening public gymnasias, reading-rooms, swimming-pools, and public dances in order to draw the young people away from these other institutions. It is certainly an abundant reason for asking that all the play facilities of the city should be open at night as well as by day.

THE LOCATION OF POSSIBLE PLAYGROUND SITES

All the studies that have been made of playground attendance indicate that the maximum range of playground effectiveness is not more than one-half mile, but that the younger children do not go regularly much over a quarter of a mile. This would indicate that there should be at least as many playgrounds as the city has square miles of territory. This does not imply, however, that so many playgrounds need to be purchased unless the schools are practically without playgrounds. Where the schools have grounds that are large enough to use, these should always be taken into consideration, and, it may be that all the outside playgrounds that will be needed will be ones which have a range of a mile—which is fairly true of baseball fields, tennis courts, and swimming-pools. This would be one of these for each four square miles of the city's surface, but the location of car lines should always be considered in selecting these sites. It is generally wiser to enlarge the existing school grounds whenever this can be done at a reasonable price, than it is to purchase separate grounds.

In the actual selection of sites, the first thing to determine is the availability of present property belonging to the city. It is seldom possible to take a present park for play purposes, because the people who live around it object, and because there are none too many

parks in our cities as they are. There is, however, in most cities some public property that has been forgotten, and in some cities there is much such property. This property is difficult to find, because it is seldom listed in any one place. It may be land that was purchased earlier for stables, water works, schools, hospitals, or other purposes, or it may be land that has reverted to the city for the non-payment of taxes or for other reasons. The tax-exemption sheets were the only ones that showed us the public and semi-public property that might possibly be used in Washington.

CEMETERIES

It is well to look into the cemeteries. In the older cities there are often a number of cemeteries that have been abandoned for burial places and frequently all the bodies have been removed. We found in Washington that thirteen cemeteries had been abandoned within the district during the last thirty years. These sites are taken sooner or later for business purposes in most cases. Nearly all the cemeteries that are well within the city are doomed as such. London has secured more than sixty of these for playgrounds during the last forty years, and it is said that there are five hundred others that will soon be taken for this purpose. The cemetery sites, in general, will have to be purchased, but they can usually be had much cheaper than any other similar piece of property. It would be difficult to say how many of these have been secured in American cities during the last decade, but it is certainly a large number. One is reminded of the request of Mayor Johnson, of Cleveland, that they should bury him where the children might play over his grave.

There are many who would doubtless think of this as a desecration. But we feel very differently about this now from what we did a few years ago. Almost any millionaire would be ashamed to invest any considerable proportion of his fortune in a mausoleum, and more and more our wealthy men are erecting tombstones in the shape of public libraries, fountains, and similar public gifts. From the nature of the case it is not less fitting that children should play over the graves of the dead than that flowers should grow there, and it must be remembered that in any case the graves have

generally been vacated, the tombstones destroyed, and all traces that might serve to identify the graves removed. It will be found also that these neglected graveyards soon become a tangle of luxuriant vegetation, which is likely to become the worst sort of resort for drinking and vice, so that they are often the chief "hang-outs" of gangs of tramps and loafers, and the place of seclusion sought by immoral boys and girls. A careful study will also generally find a constant usurpation, at least in the South, by the surrounding property owners and tenants, so that the size of these neglected cemeteries is likely to grow less from decade to decade.

RESERVOIRS

Nearly or quite all reservoirs that are located within the cities must be abandoned or covered in the near future. They are subject to all sorts of defilement within the city, and the land is really too valuable to be devoted to such use. These old reservoirs, with their sloping sides, make a natural athletic field and stadium in many cases. Pittsburgh and Baltimore have each secured one of these abandoned reservoirs for a playground. The city of Reading, Pennsylvania, has covered one of them for a rink for the roller-skaters.

PONDS AND MARSHES

The low places around a city can often be filled in so as to remove a nuisance and make a splendid pleasure ground very cheaply. There is an enormous amount of waste material that is being produced by every city every year. In a hundred years, I suppose, the waste of New York City would make solid land of New York harbor, if it were all deposited there. Several years ago sixty-five acres were built on to Rikers Island from ashes alone in a single year. If a city would develop before hand some plan for the depositing of the ashes, dirt from cellars, and streets excavated, cans, bottles, and other solid waste, it could fill in valleys, ponds, and lakes, make embankments, and build mountains at will, though these might be unsightly in the process of formation. A few years ago I climbed a high hill, with a good observatory on top, in the outskirts of Leipzig, which I was informed was built in this way. It was covered with grass and flowers and even some good-sized trees. The

children of many of our prairie cities would appreciate such an artificial slide and playground. Chicago has been very successful in building Grant Park from waste materials, and the new Chicago Plan calls for a whole series of outlying islands and lagoons that are to be largely constructed in this way. Outlying islands protect a harbor from storms and add greatly to its scenic attractiveness. They furnish the most delightful and accessible pleasure grounds that a city can have. Many cities might develop a whole series of islands in this way without its costing the city a cent. Belle Isle Park, Detroit, is an example of how attractive an island might become. A large part of the parks and playgrounds of Boston have been made in this way by filling in the ponds and marshes. The hydraulic dredge works so cheaply now it may often be possible to make a harbor for a city, suppress a mosquito marsh, and make a splendid park and playground at the same time.

VACANT PROPERTY

It is well then to put in from the city plat-books or insurance maps all of the sites within the city that are large enough for playgrounds, together with such notes as may be made concerning the condition of the ground.

DEMOLISHING SLUM TENEMENTS

It is not strictly necessary that the site selected for a playground should be vacant. Mulberry Bend and Seward Park Playgrounds on the East Side of New York were made by demolishing slums. There is often a section of a city in a most unsanitary and unsavory condition, where existing conditions are a grave menace to the health and morals of the city. Sometimes this property is so cheap, that it will cost little more than if the ground were vacant and it is thus possible to demolish a slum and secure a playground in a congested section at the same time. This will, in nearly every case, cause a great increase in the value of the surrounding property as well.

OUTLYING SITES

Everywhere today people are lamenting that the cities have not been planned, and that they have thus grown without leaving sufficient space for public purposes. The condition of the centers

of such cities as New York and Chicago is well-nigh incurable, but it is still possible to plan the suburbs. No new section should be allowed to come into the city without setting aside at least one-tenth of its area for parks and playgrounds, and, in the outer edge of growing cities, it is surely the part of wisdom to secure, as soon as possible, a chain of small parks and playgrounds, encircling the city at intervals of not more than a mile, that can be used as ball fields for the present and developed into playgrounds or restful little parks as the city develops and increasing population demands increasing use.

When all the possibilities have been located, these should be put in on a school or outline map of the city and preferably in different colors, so that one can see at a glance the nature of the areas indicated. After we had prepared such a map in Washington, we found that there were several sites that belonged to the city that we could secure at once without purchase, but our ideas changed completely as to what sites were desirable. We found that some that we had hoped to secure were too near to others that we already had, while other sections were fairly well covered by large school-yards and that still others were in sections where there were few children. The city that goes ahead to spend \$100,000 on playground sites without first making a careful study of needs and resources probably wastes, on an average, about half of the money and has only a hodge-podge at the end, because it failed to spend the preliminary \$500 or \$1,000 that was needed for the survey.

WHAT SORT OF SITES SHOULD BE CHOSEN?

Here park boards often make a serious mistake. A piece of hilly and uneven ground may do very well for a park, but play requires ground that is nearly level, and it is likely to cost more to level a plot of uneven ground than it would to purchase a piece of level ground in the first place.

A ravine may be a delightful place for walks and drives and shady benches. It may be a delightful place for children to stroll by themselves or in groups, but it will be almost valueless for an organized playground in all probability. Similarly, if there are no school grounds of importance, it may be worth while to purchase a plot of land not more than an acre in size, but such an area will not

be worth while if the school sites in the neighborhood are of similar size. Where a playground is selected for such a city and mostly for the use of the young people, it should be not less than five acres, and twenty would be a great deal better. Twenty acres is the size that has been taken by the South Park Board for the standard in its future purchases. In a ground of this size there is room for a field house, a swimming-pool, athletic fields, ball fields, tennis courts, etc.

WHERE SHOULD A PLAYGROUND BE LOCATED?

It may seem that this topic has already been covered, but it has not in actual fact. Perhaps it may be clearer if we point out some places where playgrounds should not be located. In general they should not be located on the edge of a settled section or on a point of land. If a playground draws from a territory one-half mile in radius, all of which is inhabited, there will naturally be four times as great an attendance at the playground, as there will be if it draws from the quadrant of such a circle only. A playground that has a built up section on one side only will have only half of the attendance of a playground that is in the midst of a well built up section. The playground is essentially a neighborhood affair, and it should be located in the midst of a neighborhood so far as possible.

A playground should not be so located that the children will have to cross the railroad tracks or a boulevard that is much frequented by automobiles, or a street that is congested by traffic. This should be fairly evident, but is often disregarded in the selection of a site.

A playground site should be in the midst of a homogeneous population. Sections of the city often have to be regarded as separate entities, because the people from these different sections live to themselves and do not mingle with the people of adjacent sections. Children will not go from a well-to-do section into a slum to attend a playground, or vice versa. Children often will not go from an Irish section into a Jewish section, and so forth. All of these considerations must be held in mind. In the South the playgrounds for white and colored children have to be absolutely distinct. A white playground on the edge of a colored section will draw only from the white side, and while it may be in the midst of

a densely settled section, so far as attendance is concerned, it is on the edge of the city. There is always a likelihood of race conflicts on these playgrounds that are situated on the edge of a section of the city in this way. Such a playground may be the best way in the world to overcome race antagonism and probably will be in the long run, if the two races are races that might possibly mingle, but it will be sure to reduce the attendance at first.

WHAT SORT OF PLAYGROUNDS ?

If the door-yards are providing for the play of the little children, then the playgrounds need not make much provision for them. If the school grounds are providing for the school children, then the municipal grounds need only reach the older people. If there are many working boys and girls, then the playground that will be most needed will be the evening playground, which suggests the social center, the public gymnasium, the swimming-pool, the municipal dance hall, and the like, and for the use by day, baseball, tennis, and swimming are almost sure to be the popular things.

THE MAKING OF SURVEYS A PROPER FUNCTION OF A PLAYGROUND ASSOCIATION

It will be seen that the making of such a survey as has been indicated, if done thoroughly, will involve a considerable expenditure of time and money. There has been an attempt to indicate a maximum and minimum survey, but nothing should prevent a systematic examination of the size of the school-yards and registration of the schools, the location and extent of existing property belonging to the city, and the making of a map which will show these things as well as all the pieces of property which might be purchased or borrowed for recreation purposes. If half-mile circles are drawn around these proposed sites and the school registrations from within the circle are examined, a good idea of the probable attendance at the playground can be obtained. The making of such a survey is a piece of work that belongs logically to a playground association. Associations cannot hope to maintain a playground system. All that can well be expected of them is to demonstrate the need and help the city to begin right. This means, for the most part, a survey of actual conditions.

EFFECTS OF GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS UPON SOCIAL REALITIES

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Prevalent social activities are molded by conditions of four kinds: (1) geographic conditions, or the natural physical environment; (2) technic conditions, or the artificial physical environment; (3) psychophysical conditions, or the hereditary and acquired traits of the population; (4) social conditions, or the causal relations between the activities of associates.

Geographic conditions, or the natural physical environment presented by the country inhabited, must be recognized as including aspect, soil, water supply, other mineral resources, flora, fauna, and topography.

The less conspicuous geographic differences socially important.—We are all familiar in a superficial way with the obvious fact that the activities of a people are largely determined by their geographic environment. Life cannot be the same in arctic regions as in the tropics; nor upon deserts of drifting sand as upon the grassy steppes which afford the natural home for wandering shepherds and their herds; nor upon the seacoast with its fisheries and commerce as among the mountains with their forests and mines. But it is not alone the extreme and unusual manifestations of nature which affect the life of man. It may be that the very absence of extremes has served to make Europe the seat of the richest civilization. So relatively inconspicuous a fact as the absence of a creature adapted to be domesticated and milked might cause one incipient social type to be crushed out in the struggle for existence; or the presence of a creature adapted to become a beast of burden might enable one people to grow into a triumphant race, contributors to a dominant civilization, and the absence of such a creature might condemn another race to backwardness and

final extinction. The following effects of geographic conditions deserve particular mention:

1. *Geographic conditions determine the size of populations.*—Thriving cities are found at points of geographic advantage. And in the original development of civilization populations first assembled in considerable density where nature was especially lavish of food. Thus the valleys of the Nile, Euphrates, Ganges, and Peiho became cradles of civilization. The familiar differences between city and country life illustrate the importance of different degrees of density of population in determining the character of society. Far more, in the earlier stages of development, when social activities were mainly indigenous, any great advancement was conditioned upon considerable number and density of population. Where the numbers were large the chances of invention were proportionally increased, as well as the chances that such inventions as occurred would not be lost but would spread, and become fertile combined with other elements of progress. Moreover, the permanence and accumulation of a strain of social development has been largely conditioned upon the military strength which enabled a group to maintain itself and to absorb other groups, and this in turn depended largely upon numbers.

2. *The economic occupations of a people are determined by their geographic environment.*—Geographic situation determines both demand and supply. For example, the economic products demanded in a cold country are not the same as those demanded in a hot country. Supply and the occupations of production are determined by the raw materials and natural advantages available. In one region the men will be farmers, in another herdsmen, in another fishers and sailors, in another hunters, trappers, woodsmen, in another miners. The business of one locality is determined by the presence of deposits of coal and iron, of another by the presence of water power, of another by the presence of lumber or quarries, or clay for the making of pottery and bricks. Thus, we have steel mills at Pittsburgh, and textile factories where the rivers that pass the Appalachians to empty into the Atlantic afford abundant power. The correspondence between the economic occupations of a people and the geographic character

of the region in which they live is complete during all the earlier stages of development, and diminishes only very gradually, until the railroad makes it possible to redistribute raw materials, fuel, and finished products, and never disappears.

Moreover, whatever determines the way in which a people get their living largely determines the way in which they live, so that the geographic conditions which prescribe their economic activities thereby indirectly determine to a very large extent all the other departments of their social life. It affects their form of government, as will presently be explained. It influences the domestic organization—polyandry in Tibet is attributed to poverty of soil; woman has rights and influence among fisher folk of the seashore, where men are much away from home and leave its management to their spouses; the pastoral life of the steppes has for its correlate the patriarchy and as a rule polygamy. The occupations of a people give direction to their intellectual interests and to their aesthetic and recreational tastes, and even to their religious creeds.

3. *Stagnation or progressiveness are conditioned largely by geographic surroundings.*—Mountain barriers, swamps, forests, and deserts hinder the intercommunication which is the first condition of social progress, while rivers which are "highways that carry you," good harbors inviting a people to put to sea, mountain passes, and other natural routes of travel, promote rapid social progress in favored regions. However, under some circumstances a certain degree of remoteness may aid progress. Thus Egypt early acquired a large enough population for fertile intercommunication through the lavish gifts of the Nile, and the wealth and progress there accumulated were, during the earlier stages of civilization, more easily defended from marauders by reason of the distance of other centers of population, which was caused by the surrounding desert. Egypt, however, was successively visited and peopled by various folk wanderings. Isolation tends everywhere to stagnation, which in the case of primitive peoples settles down as soon as the most urgent natural wants have found a customary mode of satisfaction. On the other hand, the crust of custom is broken up where contact with other groups brings the

indigenous modes of thought and practice into frequent competition with those of other people, allowing not only a survival of the fittest but also a fertile combination of diverse inventions.

4. *Lawlessness is the natural consequence of geographic inaccessibility.*—This is true for two reasons: both because the people of an inaccessible region feel little need of protection from invaders, and so do not desire and will not tolerate a strong guard over them; and also because offenders in such a region are not easily caught and punished. Banditti and feuds and other forms of violence survive longest in mountain fastnesses where the arm of the law can with difficulty reach the offender, while in the open plain order is established with comparative ease, not only because all men are within the reach of the law, but also because all men desire that the law shall be strong, since their accessibility renders them open to the attacks of marauders. If a fertile plain exists in the neighborhood of mountain wilds the inhabitants of the plain tend to develop a government strong enough both to hold at bay their poor and envious neighbors of the mountain sides, and also to repress the disorders of their own unruly members. Geographic conditions *indirectly* affect the rapidity with which order is developed in that a region which is favorable to the accumulation of wealth calls for strong government to protect its treasures. Thus, in the case just supposed, the poverty of the mountaineers combines with their inaccessibility to postpone order, while the wealth of the plainsmen combines with their accessibility to hasten it. When a rich land has been successfully invaded the conquerors tend to form a governmental organization strong enough to hold the conquered in subjection, and also to repel other invaders. Such appear to have been the typical conditions of origin of strong states.

5. *The form of government is affected by geographic conditions.*—Exclusively agricultural regions are nearly always aristocratic because land is a natural monopoly, and where agriculture is the only, or chief, source of wealth, power goes with the possession of land. Immigrant agriculturalists taking possession of a new territory may remain democratic or become increasingly so, as long as free land is obtainable. But as soon as population increases

so that land is costly, then those who possess land may readily obtain more, but the landless laborer can rarely obtain land enough to support him, and such persons tend to become tenants or hired laborers if not serfs. In an old agricultural community the rich and powerful, by gradually increasing their holdings, widen the gulf between them and the landless.

There are two forms of agrarian aristocracy. First, and least familiar to us, is that which gradually replaces common ownership of land among a long-established agricultural people; and second, that in which the possession of land is seized by the chiefs of an invading people.

Commerce, on the other hand, tends to democracy. If people are settled about a favorable harbor or route of trade, and if they develop any industry the products of which can be exchanged and that depends upon skill and industry and not upon the utilization of a raw material that is liable to monopoly, then they tend to become democratic, as did the maritime cities of Greece and Italy, and the halting-places of the caravans that connected Europe with the Orient. These did not become democratic in the modern sense of the word. That consummation waited for the development of popular ideals concerning the universal rights of man, and could not be brought about by mere geographic influences. But they were democracies in the sense that many were well to do, and the well-to-do were free. Commerce breaks down aristocracy not only because a larger number become well to do, but also because social classes are no longer separated by an impassable line of stratification. Where commerce exists the poor peddler may become the rich merchant, and the son of the once wealthy bankrupt sinks into poverty. On the other hand, landed estates (especially before the advent of a money economy favorable to borrowing and mortgages) are not so easily dissipated, and descend from generation to generation, so that the stratification of society becomes permanent, and the illusions of caste grow up. Not only does the noble claim to be of different clay from the peasant, but also the peasant, who was born in a hut, is attired in hodden gray, speaks the dialect of the furrow and not of the hall, and plods through a life of toil in the habit of obedience,⁸ admits that he is

of inferior stuff and does not aspire to equality with those who sit in state or ride in armor and are taught from childhood to feel themselves born to command. The early democracies are limited to dense populations collected within a small area among whom communication and co-operation are easy, for without facility of communication the many cannot combine to form and express a common will.

6. *Tastes and social and domestic customs are influenced by geographic conditions.*—Football is out of place in the tropics, and ice-skating is impossible. Athletic sports are indigenous to cool climates, and are the objects of amazement to inhabitants of torrid regions. The long evenings of the northern winter call into being suitable pastimes. The working-hours of torrid regions are interrupted at midday, and the siesta is an established custom. Hours for calling and for social reunions and for work differ from place to place. Still more marked are the differences in dress, in houses, in household furnishings, and in conveniences. These practical differences occasion differences in the fancies of fashion, in dress, and in architecture, and in the art crafts which furnish the aesthetic elements in household goods and articles of personal use. So great are these differences that the arts and fashions of one people, to another seem strange and fantastic. The materials available in a given locality for making articles of use and beauty also affect the development of tastes. Clay makes possible ceramic arts, and marble was necessary to the Grecian taste for temples and statues. The art of Greece is due in part to the quarries of Mt. Pentelicus.

7. *Ethical differences are largely influenced by geographic environment.*—The study of comparative sociology reveals the fact that the conscience codes of various peoples differ amazingly, and these ethical differences are largely influenced by geographic environment.

We are all familiar with the fact that the commercial and manufacturing North, with relatively little use for the clumsy labor of the slave, found it comparatively easy to see the moral objections to slavery, while in the agricultural South, refined, gentle, and Christian people were long able to regard slavery as a divine in-

stitution. Certain environments tend to pastoral industry and patriarchal society. There filial duty is the supreme obligation; child-bearing is the wife's ambition; sexual irregularities are seriously condemned, but the increase of the family of the great by polygamous marriages is thoroughly approved. Such was the family of Abraham. Under the feudalism naturally resulting from predominant agriculture, obedience and loyalty form the central pillar of the ethical structure, each prays that he may do his duty in his lot and station, in becoming obedience to his betters. But in commercial democracy, independence and individual pride are the motives of honor, and the test of honor is not a loyalty to one's own patriarchal or feudal superiors which may sanction treachery and pillage to all outsiders save the accepted guest, but an honesty that extends even to the merchant from over seas.

In northern latitudes the sharp alternation of the seasons demanding that each season's work must be done at its proper time, necessitates foresight, promptness, and energy that does not wait for impulse; and nature, which enriches man by accumulated margins of saving but is never lavish, enforces thrift and economy, and these become customs of society, habits of the individual, and prized virtues. But the thrift of the northerner often looks to his southern brother like niggardliness, and the ease and lavishness of the southerner to the northerner may seem like laziness, disregard of obligation, and prodigality.

8. *Mythologies and religions are influenced by geographic environment.*—What the nature-myths of a people shall be depends in part upon what aspects of nature in their neighborhood are most impressive, whether they live by the sea, upon the banks of a great river, among the mountains, in the depths of the forest, or on a plain where the overarching sky with sun and stars chiefly command the gaze. Moreover, geographic environments affect religions indirectly through the other social forms to which they give rise. The existing form of earthly power and authority tends to shape man's notion of divine rule. Cruel despotisms are wont to have bloodthirsty gods, and the patriarchal as compared with other equally early forms of government seems the most favorable to belief in a God interested in the welfare of his people. Indeed the

patriarchate through the development of reverence and worship for the spirits of departed ancestors opens wide the way to belief in a father-god.

9. *Geographic conditions affect the moods and psychic tendencies of a people.*—It is a fact familiar to us all that in humid weather the vital flame seems to burn with little draft, while in a crisp atmosphere it leaps up brightly. The rapidity or slowness of evaporation seems to affect directly the chemistry of the vital processes. Not only are the general vital processes, upon which the action of the brain and nervous system depends, affected by conditions of heat, light, and moisture, but the nerves themselves are directly stimulated or depressed. To this cause has been ascribed the fact that the cradles of civilization have been found in dry regions like the Egyptian oasis in the desert, and the plains of Iran and of Central America.

The original seats of civilization have been in climates that were warm as well as dry. But as man acquired the arts of clothing and housebuilding he tended to move toward regions that were relatively dry but with less extreme heat. In the earth's warm belt only occasional spots have sufficient dryness and rapidity of evaporation, and these are said to have been the original seed plots or nurseries from which the germs of civilization have spread. Though food was abundant, yet it was probably quite impossible that indigenous civilization like that of Egypt should arise in the dank heat that prevails in certain other portions of Africa. The wine of America's "translucent, transcendent, transplendent" atmosphere quickens the life of her people.

Not only does climate affect the permanent tendencies of races, but passing changes of the seasons affect the moods of men. Alterations of the seasons give variety to life and stimulation to the imagination. Further, the experienced teacher or prison warden knows that there are muggy days when his wards are restless and capable of more erratic mischief than concentrated endeavor. The curve of the statistics of crime shows a regular alternation of rise and fall corresponding to the change of the seasons, crimes against the person increasing in summer and crimes against property in winter. Even suicide, the causes for which would seem

perhaps more peculiarly personal than the causes of any other human act or experience, fluctuates regularly with climatic changes. And the darkness of night everywhere gives to crime its chief opportunity.

10. *The routes followed* by migration, war, and commerce have been marked out by geographic highways, and these have been the great distributors of human populations, customs, and commodities. The other determinant of the distribution and present location of societies has been the presence of natural resources. Furs lured the Russians, though not a migratory people, around the world through trackless frozen wastes of Northern Canada, Alaska, and Siberia. Africa was little visited by Europeans until the supply of ivory drew them, and that mainly to furnish the means of playing the games of chess and billiards. The demand for billiard balls had much to do with the addition of Africa to the practically known world. The discovery of gold in Australia and California suddenly peopled those, till then, neglected regions. These are exceptionally striking illustrations of the general rule that natural resources, as well as natural pathways, determine social distribution.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS

The importance of studying the geographic conditions of social activities is due largely to two considerations: first, they afford a part of the demonstration that social activities are not to be explained by reference to subjective motives or to the arbitrary decrees of man's will, but that the specific desires and volitions of men are themselves to be explained by reference to conditioning environment, so that, like other realities, human activities belong to that network of cause and effect which is the order of nature; second, the geographic conditions afford a very considerable part of the general explanation of the course of social evolution, especially in its earlier stages and in the rise of indigenous cultures.

What great historic movement or epoch can be adequately accounted for without reference to geographic conditions? If, for example, we seek an explanation of the efflorescence of Greece in the age of Pericles, must we not take account of the third, fifth,

sixth, eighth, and ninth of the principles of geographic causation above enumerated? We must observe how the Ionian Islands stretched out like eager fingers for contact with other peoples; how the ships of Athens¹ brought back strange goods and strange ideas, till there arose one of those rare eras in which the crust of custom was thinned and broken, and men instead of hating and dreading change or innovation were eager to hear "some new thing"; how the commerce resulting from the peninsular and insular position did away with agrarian monopoly of place and power and aided in establishing an oligarchy of the well-to-do which, though more or less allied with ancient rank, and more or less perpetuating its form by a fiction of identity between the rich and the well-born, was nevertheless a type of democracy; and how the aesthetic tastes, and the inspiration of Greek life all had a necessary geographic background.

A knowledge of the influence of geographic environment on social activities has a bearing, not only upon the explanation of present situations and historic movements, but also upon the judgment of proposed plans for the future. Such knowledge is suggestive of lines of profitable enterprise in opening canals, dredging harbors, and otherwise providing conditions similar to those which nature has in places bestowed. And this knowledge has special application to projects of migration and colonization.

LIMITATIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS

Three considerations, however, set limits to the importance of geographic conditions of social phenomena.

First, they are after all only one out of four sets of determining conditions. The geographic conditions set negative limits to the possible forms of social activity, and play an important part in positively occasioning their rise and character, yet they no more suffice for their complete explanation than one substance which the chemist mixes with others in a retort to secure a complex reaction explains the total effect. Various writers have been disposed to seize upon some one factor in sociological explanation and to treat

¹ Earlier the ships of Phoenicia were the missionaries that brought awakening to the harbors and islands of Greece.

it as if by itself it afforded complete solution. Thus, some, of whom Buckle is the most famous, have exaggerated the relative importance of geographic conditions. Buckle writes as if he came near to thinking that they afford the complete explanation of the life of societies. Others, of whom Karl Marx is the most famous, teach that the economic activities by which people get a living determine their moral standards, their forms of government, their scientific progress, and their entire life. Tarde would find well-nigh the whole explanation in social relations, especially in suggestion and imitation. An activity becomes a social phenomenon, he says, when it has spread, by means of imitation, till many participate in it. Spreading waves of imitation meet and modify each other, and combine into customs and institutions, and to understand how they do so is, according to him, to comprehend the life and development of society. De Greef finds the essential social reality and the chief factor in sociological explanation in the motives which associates furnish each other, by which their association becomes a sort of exchange or implicit contractualism. Giddings bases his explanation primarily upon the fact of racial and temperamental similarities, which lead certain groups to similarity of response to stimuli, "consciousness of kind," and sympathetic and practical likemindedness. Simmel finds the universal social reality, and the essential clue to explanation, in the fact of leadership, and of superiority and subordination. Ross gives chief emphasis, not to the leadership of the dominant individual, but to the molding of individuals by the gradually developed activities of the mass. Ward finds the "social forces" in the inborn traits of human nature. According to Gumplowicz any isolated society, especially during the early stages of development, settles down into a customary way of satisfying its pressing wants, and stagnates until it comes into contact with some other group. Then the stagnation of custom is broken up and a period of progress may follow, again to settle down into the stagnation of custom, until once more brought into contact with some group having contrasting ways. Thus, he says, the clue to social evolution is in the conflicts of peoples. Such writers are correct in emphasizing the factors in explanation to which they have given particular

study, but wrong in so far as they slight other truths, and these examples show the complexity of complete sociological explanation, which must include them all. Though Greece has kept her geography she has lost her Periclean grandeur; for geographic causes are far from being the only ones that affect society.

Second, it is in the earlier stages of evolution that geographic conditions are most dominant, and after the conquest of nature has been carried far, especially when transportation, intercommunication, and migration have played their part, activities are practiced in regions where for geographic reasons they would never have originated, as the plants that fill our fields and gardens are carried and fostered far from their natural habitats. Thus the relative importance of geographic causes diminishes as civilization advances, while the technic and social factors steadily increase in importance.

Third, geographic conditions¹ are laid down by nature, and there is no practical problem for man in determining what they shall be, except as he determines his geographic environment by travel and migration. On the other hand, the remaining conditions of social life are largely products of man's own activities, indeed the social and technic conditions are activities of man and the direct result of man's activities, and, being shaped by man, present to man the practical problem of so shaping them that they will result in securing the prevalence of desirable and not of undesirable social consequences. The geographic conditions are one set of factors indispensable to the explanation of social activities, and it is practically important to understand them since man must adapt himself to them. Nevertheless, for the three reasons just suggested, the geographic conditions are less important than either of the three remaining sets of factors, especially as we must take into account the comparative practical importance attaching to the study of those conditions of social realities which are laid down by nature and of those which are subject to human control.

¹ Canals, bridges, dredged harbors, and the like are not geographic but technic.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF RECREATION

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Play was once looked upon as an evil necessary but incident to childhood and youth. It was a matter which parents, guardians, and teachers had to put up with as best they might and with the consolation that, like children's diseases, it would tend to disappear with the advent of manhood and womanhood. Therefore, it was a tendency which must be treated in as tolerant a fashion as was consistent with the temper of the adult who had to contend with it. The great goal in life was work. Therefore, the proper thing was for wise parents to teach children to work. This was done with a rigor corresponding with the seriousness and inflexibility of the person in charge of the child. In adults, play—childish, useless play—was not only foolish; it was sinful.

It must be admitted that there is something to be said for that philosophy which has given to the world so many useful men and women. It may be said even now that a judicious mingling of work with play is not at all undesirable.

Mingled with the conviction that play was only to be tolerated, however, there was a quite clear conception, in spite of the emphasis upon work, that "all work and no play makes Jack a dull boy." That empirical judgment has been justified by modern psychology and sociology. Moreover, for adults, the practice was not consistent with the theory. They did not call it play, but what were those pageants, May Day festivities, and religious activities, such as Passion plays and feast-day frolics, which accompanied, if they were not a part of, the religious ceremonies of all peoples down to a very short time ago? They may not have called them plays, except in the case of the Passion plays, but all that great body of pageantry, holiday customs, the frolics attendant upon fairs and markets, upon marriages and even funerals, upon trials of strength, and skill of arms, and in most countries upon even skill of hand and

voice and brain, giving expression to the unusual in legerdemain, oratory, song, and the music of handmade instruments of greater or less perfection—all these were forms of play. The dances in a thousand mediaeval courts, the religious dances around a million smoking altars of primitive people, the ceremonies of court and temple, both pagan and Christian, the activities connected with all the great events of life are rooted in the same impulse as gives life to the play of men. Joyous occasions they were all. Pleasure-giving was an outstanding characteristic of everyone. At birth of a child, at the time which marked the coming of that child to man's or woman's estate, the occasion which marked the consecration of the pubescent youth to the god of the tribe, and thus his consecration to the purposes of the tribe, at the marriage of that child, and on the occasion of his being prepared after death for reception into the company of the immortals gone before by funeral rite and ceremony, in short, at every time of crisis in the life of man from birth to death, we find play.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PLAY

The history of the theory of play is marked by three distinct stages. They may be called the physical, the psychological, and the sociological explanations of play. Herbert Spencer gave us one of the first of these theories in his thought-provoking *Principles of Psychology*. Like so many of the theories of that revolutionary thinker, it was not adequate, but it stirred men to think out the problem which he had forced upon their attention. Spencer said that the young of man and animals played because they had a surplus of energy, which in some way moved them to exert themselves in the seemingly useless activities of play. That theory survives today in the expression sometimes used as an apology for the playful spirit of childhood and youth that "he must work off some of his surplus energy." It is the "common-sense" explanation of play. Really it can hardly be called a psychology of play, because it deals with an explanation which can be called psychical only by accommodation. It might better be called a *physical* explanation of play. While there doubtless is some such physical fact as Spencer's theory assumes, it does not explain psychically why the expenditure leads to play. Labor certainly works off surplus energy.

A much more important theory is that of Karl Gross, who in his two books, *The Play of Animals* and *The Play of Man*, now translated into English, argues that play is a preparation for life and therefore it has been established in the life of animals and man, and also for that reason survives. This theory has the advantage in that it explains play on the basis of natural selection, by showing that, since it is advantageous to survival, natural forces account for it. This theory, while more strictly scientific than Spencer's, is not strictly psychological. It marks a great advance over Spencer's theory but needs to be supplemented. It explains why the desire for play is almost an instinct, and why no one for so long could justify rationally this impulse. The child, the youth, and even the man demanded play, in spite of the opposition of philosophy, religion, and the economic motives, which reluctantly indulged it in the child, frowned upon it in the youth, and permitted it in the adult only when it was called something else.

Recently two other writers have added to and developed the psychology of play. Professor G. T. W. Patrick of Iowa State University, in a magazine article, suggested that play was not merely a preparation for life. He cited the fact that some games were not adapted to the better preparation of the individual for the work of life, indeed were actually opposed to efficiency. These plays, not to be accounted for entirely on the theory of Gross, were explained as survivals from old race habits, surviving from a time when they were useful, and persisting because they answered to the psychological demand for rest on the part of the nervous organism. This rest is due, according to Professor Patrick, to the fact that, being established by race habits, they are more or less automatic, and thus demand a minimum of attention to establish the co-ordinations necessary to perform the acts they demand. The nervous energy required for their performance flows along brain-tracks well worn by the habits of ages. That fact makes such actions pleasurable in their effects on the nervous centers, whether they are advantageous to that person or not.

This theory has the advantage that it accounts for many games which are survivals from an earlier period of culture and are not "either mimic work or mimic war." But it does not explain why

the games which are new and are not survivals from old race habits are as desirable as those which are.

Professor Addington Bruce in an article on the "Psychology of Football," while adhering to Spencer's "surplus energy" theory, has added another suggestion of value. He criticizes Professor Patrick's theory by observing that if the rest theory were all there is to the explanation of play, then how account for the fact that people like to sit still and see games? He suggests that the *pleasurable emotion* resulting from the dissipation of energy either in play or in seeing play is an explanation necessary to account at least for the fact that people enjoy seeing games and probably also for the joy of playing.

This is a suggestion which is very significant, but Professor Bruce has failed to make the use of it which its importance demands. He has incidentally referred to the pleasurable emotions stirred in the player and the beholder by the dissipation of energy in the activities of play, yet he does not make any use of that fact to explain the activities of play. Why should he not answer the question why animals and men play, by saying that playing stirs the emotions? Then all he would have to do is to describe the psychology of the emotion of pleasure.

Play is rooted in the emotions. Children and adults play because play stirs the emotions. It is a form of stimulation which gives pleasure and therefore is desired. It is a kind of pleasure which contributes, moreover, to activities which are biologically and socially useful, though not always as preparation directly for the activities of after life. It prepares in many cases indirectly, however, for later life by promoting a sound physical development and that mental quickening which counts so much in the struggle for existence, and for that social co-operation which has played so great a part in survival of all the social animals in their struggle against inanimate nature, hostile animals, and other groups of men. As Lester F. Ward has shown, the activities of men are rooted in the emotions. That is the motivating part of man's psychical make-up. From the psychological side the suggestions of these various writers make up the development of the theory of play up to date.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF PLAY

That does not, however, exhaust the matter. In fact the psychological explanation of play does not go far enough. Before a complete explanation can be made sociology must be invoked. Only when the psychology of the crowd is taken into account can we understand fully the reason for play in spite of its apparent foolishness. Starting with the pleasure arising from the activities of play either actually participated in or shared in imagination, one can understand some of the play activities of children and of men. It is possible that such solitary games as those played sometimes by children and the few in which adults occasionally indulge could be explained by psychology alone. Nevertheless, is it not a fact that even these are played with reference to an imaginary partner or spectator? When such are left out of account there remain a great many games whose attractiveness is unaccounted for. The suggestibility of people in crowds, the greater depth of emotion and therefore the greater pleasure experienced by plays which are engaged in by a number of people must be taken into account. There is no doubt that our great national games owe their attraction to these facts of social intercourse and interstimulation.

It is a well-known fact that this stimulation is felt to be necessary by the players and coaches in order to get the best work out of the players themselves. A team which is poorly supported by "rooters" has not the same chance as one which is properly supported. The emotions of a large crowd in the bleachers are much deeper than those of a small one. Moreover, all sorts of artificial stimulation are devised by those who have the game in charge both to stimulate the players to do their best and also to help the on-lookers to get the worth of their money. Bands play, colors are waved, songs are sung, yells and calls are voiced. What for? Simply in order to stir the emotions, that the players may play their best and that the crowd may enjoy to the full the possibilities of the game. By such means the emotional stimulation is increased, which is the same as saying that the pleasure experienced is likewise augmented. Like any sort of stimulation, emotional stimulation demands even more and sharper stimulants. The crowd gives this result. It gives the thrill even to the jaded nerves of the

hard-worked "fan." This, together with the pleasurable sensations which arise from relapsing into the activities established in the habits of the race, makes the combat-games, in more or less primitive forms, the source of the great emotional outbursts which characterize the great games and sports. As this emotional excitement due to the crowd is the explanation of the horrible activities connected with emotional outbursts of lynchings, of the grotesque jumpings and "fallings" formerly so often connected with religious revivals, so the emotional "sprees" of the games of great popular interest afford the explanation of their hold upon the people. Moreover, these outbursts now common in connection with our sports are the emotional equivalents of these outbursts which in the absence of such sports characterized people in other days. Consider the dulness of men's lives once the necessity of defending their lives and property from the onslaughts of wild beasts and hostile men had passed away. Is it any wonder that under those circumstances the dull monotony of life was relieved by emotional outbursts in religious revivals, in political debates, in such rude games as barbecues, annual orgies, and alcoholic debauches? Is it any wonder nowadays that one constantly hears the complaint that there is but little interest in the old-fashioned political debates, that revivalists have great difficulty in securing a hearing, that the ecstatic phenomena of religious conversion is no longer to be found, when people find their emotional satisfactions in art, music, society, business and political intrigue, and in games which give occasion for outbursts of emotional frenzy by the individual corresponding in intensity and satisfaction with those other frenzies? Games produce the emotional equivalents of ancient gladiatorial combats, mediaeval pageants, and tournaments; of modern political barbecues, religious revivals, primitive social orgies, alcoholic "sprees," and religious persecutions.

This theory of play throws a great light upon the social purposes which play serves. It also explains why play has been a continuous accompaniment of civilization, constantly more refined in its expressions. There is no doubt that play contributes something to the social efficiency of the race, else it would tend to disappear, except as a fossilized vestige. This it is by no means today. It does

meet the needs of men. One of these most fundamental needs is the need for emotional expression and satisfaction. It breaks the prosy humdrum of human existence, now incidental to the making of a living for many people. It adds to the task of making a living the joy of making a life. It rests the wearied attention to a certain task by shaking it free in the old race habits, and allowing the consciousness to glide along grooves worn deep by the activities of unnumbered progenitors. It supplies the joyous abandon once to be found in the hunt, the primitive way of making a living. It provides the creative gladness now so often denied the worker in the shop where division of labor is so completely realized that it is only by a stretch of the imagination too difficult for the ordinary worker to make that he can see the thing of which he is the maker of only an infinitesimal part. It provides the means of an emotional "spree" which otherwise he can secure only by means of drugs or alcohol, or by activities in which too often he takes no part, like those of art, or religion.

More important, however, is the fact that play strengthens the intellectual processes. Language originated, we are told, in the cries accompanying the emotional outbursts incident to the chase or the games of animals. There is no doubt that quick thinking is necessary to successful play. Adjustment of means to ends is demanded, quick thinking and the making of a decision on the spur of the moment are *sine qua non* of the successful player. In addition to that there is the stimulus to quick thinking, right decisions, and proper adjustment of means to ends which the social approval or disapproval brings.

The practical bearing of this fact is seen when it is remembered that in some cities 50 per cent of the children have never learned to play. An investigation in Milwaukee made in 1911 showed that of the children seen on the streets, playgrounds, and in parks only half were playing at anything. Is it any wonder if such children are dull in school, if they lag behind in the work required of them there, and if they fail in the struggle of life? While we must not forget that some laggards in our schools and in after life are such from congenital causes, and while some children do not play or learn readily because of undernourishment or from physical defects such as bad

eyesight, defective breathing, adenoid growths, and such things, it must not be forgotten that some perfectly normal children are sub-normal in their development because they have never been stirred out of the lethargy of their uneventful lives by the splendid enthusiasm of play. Their minds, like their bodies, are asleep, so to speak, and await the touch of emotional pleasure which will cut the leashes that hold them bound.

Furthermore, play produces the excitement which casts off the reserve that separates men from each other. This reserve protects a child from his fellows before he knows them well enough to be perfectly at home with them. It is one of the devices of nature to perfect selection. Nevertheless it often stands in the way of socialization. Watch children on a playground when there are some present who have never been there before. There is a reserve which constantly interferes with free intercourse and happy play. Watch that reserve melt away in the rhythm of play. Before the heat of the emotions aroused in play it disappears as frost before the rising sun. The painfulness of cautious reserve gives place to the freedom of intercourse and pleasure of social co-operation produced by play. The same is true with respect to men and women. No matter whether it is a case of hostile tribes of savages who have come together for the purpose of perfecting a treaty of peace, or of a gathering of new students from all parts of a state or nation for purposes of getting acquainted, or of a body of business men who have come together to form either a combine or a commercial club, some form of ceremony which has in it many of the same elements of play is always present. In one case it may be a corborree, in another a pipe of peace, in another "a smoker" or a banquet, in another a dance, in another a procession, yet in every case there is a form which has for its purpose the dissipation of that reserve which divides men from each other as by a Chinese wall and prevents co-operation. In play the soul reveals itself. This makes for social co-operation and unity of thought, feeling, and purpose.

Now, in our great centers of population, whither have come people from all the countries of the earth, there is vast need of socialization. The middle wall of partition between Jew and Gentile still needs to be broken down. Religion now, as in the first

century, may break it down, but there are other things which will do it more quickly and much more extensively. One of these is play. Religion now often separates and divides. Play has no creed centuries old and intrenched in prejudice to keep high the wall of division. Race characteristics may keep men apart, but play arouses feelings which rush over these barriers of race, for it arouses feelings common to all races. How important, then, that our cities at least should provide means of play for all the people. The folk dances will bring to the attention of all of us appreciation of the riches of culture and pleasure-producing means which all these nationalities possess. Under the excitement of common play we shall forget that they are "foreigners," and see in them fellow-men. Under the impulsion of the same common activities and pleasures they will cease to feel that we are snobs. Here we have one of the most powerful agencies of socialization. Let us use it more effectively in securing that unity of thought, feeling, and purpose which will make us a strongly united people.

Moreover, play is needed very much in the church. Historically, the play element in religion has been a very important part. The pomp and ceremony of the historic churches are to many people the attractive parts thereof, and the best sermon is the one which, other things being equal, has the most of that emotional stimulus which excites the individual in play.

Altogether aside from this aspect of the matter, however, there is the social need for play in the church. Healthful recreation is absolutely essential to the proper development of our young people. Commercialized agencies will provide it with none too much respect to the quality of it, if other agencies do not. Other agencies, like the parks and the schools, will provide it in many parts of the country. If the church wishes to hold its young people and to develop their social life under the best influences, it cannot ignore the recreation of its young people. The church of the future must give much more attention to the recreation of its children and youth than it has in the past, for numerous other agencies are its competitors for their social development. If the other agencies provide the means of recreation in connection with such non-religious institutions as the school, the parks, and commercial

amusements, ought not the church see to it that religion as well as education use this instinct to further its purpose to teach religion and morals? Certainly a wise Tom Sawyer could make religious services as interesting as white-washing a disagreeable old aunt's white palings. Has not the church too often in our day ignored the splendid dramatic possibilities for her young people in those graphic stories of the Old Testament? Is she insensible to the possibilities wrapped up even in the Book of Job, devoid even though it be of movement? Has she failed to profit by the recorded activities of those great teachers of men, the Old Testament prophets, who constantly were resorting to symbolic actions? At once there occurs to the mind Jeremiah going about the streets of Jerusalem, like Diogenes with his lantern in the daylight streets of Athens, looking for a man, or hiding his girdle by the Euphrates, or wearing a wooden yoke about his neck. Others who made use of "the acted parable" occur to the mind like Ezekiel, and the Master himself. The latter congealed some of the things he wanted remembered into actions, such as baptism, the Last Supper, and the foot-washing, which have become established as sacred rites in the church. Why has the church not learned from some of its most moving activities further lessons in making use of the play impulse? Youth forever dreams its dreams, fashions its ideals of future manhood and womanhood, and re-creates the world in the rhythm and excitement of play of some sort. As the youth playeth so he fashioneth his future and that golden age of humanity of which youth is forever dreaming.

THE EUGENIC-EUTHENIC RELATION IN CHILD WELFARE

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Modern social theory has long recognized that sociological systems should afford eugenics a position co-ordinate with eugenics, but social emphasis has hitherto so centered in the environment that the necessary changes in theory have not taken place. This expression of a sociological system based on eugenics and eugenics may be admirably instanced in the child-welfare movements, since eugenics affords the genetic basis for this highly significant eugenics complex of social movements in behalf of the child. Eugenic applications of Mendelism permit the reinterpretation of childhood from an entirely novel point of view; not that eugenics limits itself to the Mendelian theories, but it is further enlarged and rendered secure through the application of biometrical methods to its many problems. Not only do nurtural movements in child-welfare become genetic in so far as they accept eugenics, but the latter, by improving the innate quality of children, itself assumes a child-welfare phase.

Child welfare may be defined as the synthesis of those modern movements in social reform which relate to child problems. It is impossible to analyze this complex fully, since such a constant thread runs through all that one movement merges into the other. For purposes of convenience, however, aside from eugenics, at least nine movements may be differentiated. There is a wide campaign for the prevention of *infant mortality*, ramified into movements for pure milk, and the protection and education of motherhood. A further field in child welfare is differentiated as *somatic hygiene*. This is grouped into movements for school medical inspection, free medical treatment, school nurses, dental clinics, free baths, school lunches, open-air schools; sex hygiene; the anti-tuberculosis movement; the hygiene of the home; care and prevention for blind,

deaf, and crippled children. A third important phase of child welfare is in *mental hygiene*, dealing with neuropathic, epileptic, backward, and mentally defective children. Still another movement provides, through placing-out, supervision, and institutions preferably on the cottage-system, for *dependent* children. This movement is interwoven with that in behalf of the *neglected* child. The evils in *child labor* have resulted in a wide national preventive movement. A further accepted movement is for the *delinquent* child, through juvenile courts, probation, and prevention. Those in child *recreation* are for playgrounds, or children's organizations, as Clubs or the Boy Scouts. Finally, pregnant in possibilities are movements for *school extension*, voiced by the socialization of the schools, or in vocational education and guidance.

Regarded from the purely genetic standpoint, as processes of development, these movements are a social phase in the growth of the child. Essentially they seek the child's adjustment to its environment. The relatively long childhood period, characterized by plasticity, serves to enable them to fulfil this function of developing to the full all genetic potentialities. Within the limits of heredity, potentialities are wholly plastic. Adolescence in particular is the most plastic of the developmental periods, and for children handicapped by heredity a dangerous stage. In the absence of hereditary determiners for super- or subnormality, the child is largely molded as fit or unfit in accordance as its environment releases, unfolds, or represses its heredity. Upon the basis of its innate reflexes, instincts, tendencies, and capacities, its entire mental life is built up through environmental experience; while the dependence of physical development upon the *milieu* is self-evident.

Eugenics, on the other hand, has been defined as the science of better breeding. In the classical definition, as expressed by Sir Francis Galton, eugenics is viewed as "the study of agencies under social control that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations, either physically or mentally." It is evident that in this generally accepted definition no contradiction is involved if "the racial qualities of future generations" be interpreted in simpler form as "the racial qualities of children." If

the child be "the key to the evolution of man," studies in eugenics must proceed from the child. For the purposes of the child-welfare movements, eugenics might therefore be defined as the science of the improvement of children by breeding; or, in greater detail, as the science treating with all influences which, through the biologic processes of heredity, develop a more perfect inheritance in children. Eugenics rests upon the fact that it is genetically possible to secure for new-born babies an innate mental and physical nature superior to that of the present generation of children. Through this primary aim of genetically *better* children, resulting in increased child welfare and happiness, eugenics is essentially a child-welfare movement.

In these definitions, the line of demarkation between eugenics and the remaining movements for child welfare is revealed. Eugenics is dealing with the child before conception; the remaining movements treat its environmental adjustment after conception. Child-welfare movements, other than eugenics, lie strictly within the province of eugenics, since they deal with the environmental conditions, characterized by Galton as *nurture*. For Galton, *nature* is all that a child brings with himself into the world; *nurture* is all the influence from without. According to Davenport, nature is thus concerned with germinal determinants, to be repressed or furthered by nurture. An equal, identical nurture for all children is impossible in our complex modern environment, nor is it warranted by genetic facts. But a *suitable* opportunity should be afforded every child, until the potential responses ensue. In particular, special opportunities are essential to children possessing exceptional hereditary endowment or children of defective nature. Children of the present subnormal classes, who are normal at birth, must be allowed a nurture far superior to that of their parents in order to avoid similar reductions to subnormality. "It is probable that special environments will be as necessary for types of children as they are for our specialized plants and animals." Child welfare is inseparably bound with the home, the school, and all euthenic reform.

Infant mortality causes so crude a wastage in infant life as to eliminate or effectively weaken the offspring of even strong stocks.

Thus a vast amount of genetic values is lost, and still more far from realized. So detrimental is such a process of natural selection that safer eugenic methods should be substituted. Child hygiene, by adequately safeguarding environment, secures to the child a realization of its inherited assets. Even those movements on behalf of the grossly defective, in so far as they remedy these grave inborn defects, bear an obvious genetic relation to eugenics, since they tend to relieve these handicaps to a fulfilment of the child's heredity, whereas unsocial treatment would have inhibited whatever natural gifts existed. In so far as movements for dependent and neglected children confirm natural gifts guaranteed by eugenic principles they realize their genetic function for this large group of children. With respect to the problems of child labor, no nation should dare risk the resultant deterioration of its childhood of eugenically sound stock, with all the latent potentialities implied therein. The potentiality of the delinquent child often is perverted by the adverse *milieu* juvenile courts and allied movements seek to prevent, the greater part of juvenile delinquency being caused by the warping of normal tendencies. The recreation movement by unfolding and developing the child through the free expression of natural instincts fulfils its eugenic function. Eugenics relies to an impressive extent upon the school for the development or repression of heredity. With the present ineffective development of child welfare, eugenic values in the majority of children are arrested or misapplied. "Fit opportunity in infinite variety" through child welfare and allied movements is a necessity for a full realization of the eugenic program.

Though the overshadowing influence of environment upon the child be recognized, it is also true that man is able to reshape this environment by forming a social heredity which includes all material and cultural achievement. As Dugdale points out, the tendency of biological heredity is to produce an environment which perpetuates that heredity. The vast social heritage into which the child is born has been achieved through the innate capacities of earlier generations. The child-welfare movements themselves are originated by men of inherently high-grade stock, whose insight should be followed as social policy in preference to timid adherences

to past custom; while as Thorndike has shown, in large measure the child creates its own environment by cherishing this or neglecting that opportunity offered. The influence of nurtural forms such as child welfare is thus a measure of heredity.

But even the intelligent modification of the *milieu* is unavailing, if the child be "marred in the original making" through a lack of eugenic foresight. "If the foundation plan of his being is distorted and confused in heredity before his unfoldment begins, then the problem of healthy normal development is rendered insoluble before it is presented." If of an inferior ancestry, children avoid the stimuli to proper adjustment as necessarily as the children of sound parentage seek them out. Traits should be classified, however, rather than children, since the child is not a unit but a bundle of unit characters. The child is defined as a mosaic of dissimilar combinations of definite unit traits, each with their particular determiner, inherited in Mendelian fashion. Apart even from "incurably degenerate stocks," many children lack various advantageous traits or are inferior combinations, and so readily incline to inferiority. Eugenics thus demonstrates that a "single microscopic cell from which one great human being springs is of greater importance to the race than the painstaking efforts of a hundred thousand child-rearers and educators with a child-material below par." A child-welfare movement is "of small consequence so long as it is lavished on a human material constantly shrinking in value because produced by physically and psychically inferior parents."

As Davenport points out, only the children of sound stock carry the determiners for socially desirable reactions; and children who rise to meet a "superior opportunity" must possess determiners adapted thereto. "If a child is well-born, if he springs from sound, sane stock, if he possesses high endowment potential in the germ, then the problem of his unfoldment is well-nigh solved long before it is presented. Such a child is easily protected from adverse influences; and he is delicately and abundantly responsive to the positive influences of education."

Children vary in their original nature. The very forces which eugenics seeks to control create them "bound by their protoplasmic make-up and unequal in their powers." Psychological clinics,

constituting one of the most brilliant phases of applied psychology, utilize the psychology of these individual differences. The experiments of Thorndike upon American school children and the statistical studies of Heron in England, though tempered by the fact that they compare single aspects of the environment with the total force of heredity, nevertheless demonstrate the importance of original nature, secured by eugenics. Child-welfare movements must so relate themselves to the child that they actually become a genetic phase in the evolution of its nature. In proportion as they intelligently conserve traits genetically valuable, they realize their eugenic function. They must approach the child as it *is*, with full knowledge of the limits of its particular heredity, and increasingly depend upon the genetic values secured by eugenics. Dealing with the actual origins of the traits of children later developed by these movements, eugenics must be regarded as the genetic basis for child welfare.

As the genetic basis for other child-welfare movements, and because of the higher, broader standards of racial and child hygiene which it entails, eugenics is by far the most important and most far-seeing movement in child welfare. So fundamental is it, as genetically the basis in this field, that to regard it as a mere movement within child welfare is impossible. Its theoretical importance transcends the entire child-welfare complex, and is comparable only to the total environmental influences of the child. Since eugenics is fundamental to every movement in behalf of the child, these movements conceivably rest upon different eugenic foundations, whose unity in a great eugenics movement is appreciated only when the child-welfare movements as such, are connoted as a unified movement. The child-welfare movements may well be regarded as by-products in the evolutionary process of inherent physical, mental, and so-called moral qualities in children.

Although both eugenics and the child-welfare movements are a unit in dealing with the problem of the child, yet at present the child-welfare factor is not only more generally recognized, but unfortunately to a far greater extent than the hereditary factor. As Pearson suggests, "the whole trend of legislation and social activity has been to disregard parentage and to emphasize environ-

ment," and the relatively recent eugenics reform is still experiencing strenuous opposition. "There seems at present much more danger of forgetting that the biological ideal of a healthful, self-sustaining, evolving human breed is as fundamental as the sociological ideal of a harmoniously integrated society is supreme." "When both policies are admitted to be beneficial and when no one asks that one shall be carried out at the expense of the other, it is a waste of energy to compare their relative justification and urgency." Even if the theory of inheritance of acquired characters, at present considered untenable by experimental biology, be accepted; the influence of child-welfare movements upon the following generation would still be too unstable and too lightly impressed, to compare within such a brief period of time with the permanent genetic advances of selective eugenics. The child-welfare movements may thus rise above their present narrow individuation, and, controlled by the eugenic idea, may attain their full social realization. Though maintaining adequate environments for the unfit, they should "prefer" the children of sound, normal stocks; and insist that by maturity the innately inferior children should be, through education, segregation, or sterilization, placed upon a celibate basis.

Because eugenics directs attention to posterity and children, the "eugenic argument" is one of the strongest incentives to child welfare. Because eugenics points clearly and authoritatively to the necessity of developing genetic potentialities, it offers a most scientific and definite basis for the child-welfare movements. Its relation to the child-welfare field is essentially an optimistic one, since it is the function of eugenics to secure in the inborn nature of the child the tendencies and capacities for a normal development under child welfare. The genetic aspects of this highly important field in social reform thus afford a most admirable illustration of the sociological relationship between eugenics and euthenics.

REVIEWS

The Theory of Social Revolution. By BROOKS ADAMS. New York: Macmillan, 1913. Pp. 240. \$1.50.

This book purports to present a theory of revolutions, and a conception of revolutions, apparently well formulated in the author's mind, underlies the several essays of this small volume. Its main thesis, however, is not an explanation of revolutions. Throughout the first three chapters the reader is supposed to divine, or in some way to understand or surmise, the true explanation of revolutions without the assistance of any formal analysis of the nature of a social revolution. The title of the book is therefore somewhat misleading. Taken as a whole, it might be called "A Plea for the Reorganization of American Law Courts." More specifically, it is a plea for withdrawing the function of legislation from the American law courts; particularly, for withdrawing the function of federal legislation from the Supreme Court of the United States.

The central thought of the book appears to be that, in any given society, some economic or social class is dominant and constitutes, for the time being, a ruling class. When this existing ruling class is displaced and must give place to a new class, revolution takes place. If the transition from one ruling class to another is made by force, revolution is catastrophic, or violent; if it develops by concession or compromise, revolution is evolutionary, noiseless, and peaceful, though not without its conflicts. This theory of revolutions is expounded in chap. iv. In the preceding chapters such an explanation of revolutions seems to be regarded as so easy and natural that it is taken for granted. "In the experience of the English-speaking race, about once in every three generations a social convulsion has occurred; and probably such catastrophes must continue to occur in order that laws and institutions may be adapted to physical growth. Human society is a living organism, working, mechanically, like any other organism." This is a bold mixing of metaphors: a mingling of biology and mechanics. Brooks Adams out-Spencers Spencer. "Society has members and circulation, a nervous system, and a sort of skin, or envelope, consisting of its laws and institutions." This skin, we are then told, does not expand automatically, but only after painful and conscious effort.

In his selection of facts to support his contentions, Mr. Adams seems to be wholly unconscious of a parallel group or body of facts that could be cited to maintain an exactly opposite thesis; for example, Mr. Adams represents the American Revolution as the outcome of social development in conflict with law, instead of regarding the American Revolution, as we may regard it, as itself the outcome of applications of old English law based on precedents freshly reasserted on colonial soil. Mr. Adams (p. 12) wholly ignores the fact that both English and Roman systems of law possessed within themselves the machinery by which the law could readjust itself to new and changing economic and social conditions. I suppose the statement (p. 12) that society has "passed into fourth dimension of space, where it performs its most important functions beyond the cognizance of law, which remains in a space of but three dimensions," is intended to announce some principle in social science. But would not Mr. Adams, on reflection, agree that the fourth dimension is conjecture which belongs to the region of the higher calculus, hardly applicable in the study of law or sociology?

Mr. Adams is inaccurate in his sketch of the development of the public regulation of railways; he overlooks the fact that the conflict of decisions is itself a chapter in the evolution of the law of carriers, which antedates the appearance of the railway. We agree with Mr. Adams when he writes (p. 17), "Obviously, capital cannot assume the position of an irresponsible sovereign, living in a sphere beyond the domain of law, without inviting the fate which has awaited all sovereigns who have denied or abused their trust"; and he may be right when he anticipates that the state must presently own railways. But is he reading history correctly when he identifies the monopoly of the mediaeval gild with the kind of monopoly condemned in the great case of monopoly of 1601, *Darcy v. Allen*? The reviewer believes that the long chapter of economic history relating to gilds from the eleventh to the opening of the seventeenth century, or even the shorter chapter from the middle of the fourteenth to the opening of the seventeenth century, cannot be so curtly summarized or so curtly dismissed. The case of *Darcy v. Allen* itself excepted from its condemnation one species of monopoly, that of granting patents for new inventions, and it did not stand in flat contradiction to all preceding history. What it condemned was analogous to the preceding condemnation of regrading or forestalling. What it permitted was analogous to much that was before permitted to be done by incorporated gilds.

The declaration that capital must accept responsibility for the exer-

cise of its power may be taken as a truism: the United States government, in its prosecution of combinations in restraint of trade under the Sherman anti-trust law during the administrations of Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, has been engaged in determining the question whether private capital is stronger than the American government. But the fact that the United States government has lately shown its ability to bring a high class of advocates to present its case to the courts, and the fact that the Sherman anti-trust law has gained new significance, and that without any statutory amendment to the law, seems to bring no encouragement to Mr. Adams. He agrees with Roosevelt's declaration of principle in 1912, that the courts must be reformed or reconstituted as expounders of the Constitution. But his book must not be interpreted as a defense of the proposal to recall judges; it is designed, rather, as a warning against such a measure, because such a measure would result in establishing political courts pure and simple.

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La conception sociologique de la peine. By MIECZYSLAW SZERER.

In "Bibliothèque sociologique internationale." Paris: Giard et Brière, 1913. Pp. 205. Fr. 4.

In this work the following subjects are treated: vengeance in primitive society; the appearance of punishment; the theory of punishment considered under five heads—the sociological conception of punishment, the altruism of punishment, punishment and the offended party, transitory phenomena, punishment and vengeance; and punishment and the family.

The two typical consequences of wrong acts, vengeance and punishment, have their respective foundations in human nature and in the desire to maintain a social structure. Vengeance is found under conditions which admit of individual freedom and violence. Punishment is found precisely in the negation of this liberty and this force.

Vengeance consists in the manner in which human nature reacts to wrong. Punishment is also a reaction provoked by wrong, but it is supported by the need of maintaining a given form of relations among men who co-operate in certain groups. In place of destroying the force of injustice, vengeance only doubles it and adds to the existing injustice a new injustice. There is no instrument less effective to regulate the common life of men than vengeance. Thus there is a fundamental opposition between punishment and vengeance.

Man is a social being and the co-operation of men to the end of satisfying vital needs and facing the perils of existence is the foundation of social life. Organization introduces an automatic reproduction of co-operation. It is a force which reduces individuals to uniformity without utilizing visible constraint. It acts by suggestion upon the minds of the members of the group by means of the idol of "social order." Since organization is established to conserve the social structure, it follows immediately that there ought to be some means of reacting against a violation of a given social form. Organization cannot content itself with positive direction in the sense of consolidating the social order; it ought to act negatively, to repress attempts which are made to disturb it. This form of reaction is punishment. Punishment is an institution responding to the needs of social relations. Thus we can deduce punishment from the evolution of social relations without the aid of the idea of vengeance.

The conception of punishment will be sociological when we have abstracted from all the changes of time and place that which persists through all modifications and is unquestionably repeated in each concrete phenomenon of punishment.

When the group is organized by the dominant class it divides into those who submit themselves to the social order and those who act contrary to the social order. Acts which up to this time are considered only as personal wrongs are now called by the name of offenses.

Punishment becomes the means employed by organization to make out of the anti-social individual a being who has become social, in the sense that he is resigned to living according to the rules of the existing social structure. A reprehensible action disturbs ordinary co-operation and causes the social structure to tremble. By punishment this equilibrium is re-established. Thus understood, punishment is a correlative of organization. It is possible to conserve the social structure only by discouraging deviation from type. Thus, where there is organization, punishment becomes the means of conserving the life of the social group.

In the measure that society develops, punishment becomes milder. In early times punishment is necessarily severe because of the independence of the individual with regard to the group. In a high stage of civilization the individual is more closely adapted to his proper medium and finds in this special medium the complement of his imperfection. Social dependence is based upon the division of labor. As it becomes more and more difficult for the individual, specialized according to the form of co-operation in a certain group, to live satisfactorily without

it, individualistic acts become improbable and the severity of punishment diminishes.

Although punishment would seem to react exclusively for the benefit of the dominant class, it is never purely egoistic. It often serves the interest of the subordinate class. Only when there is an irreconcilable conflict between the interests of the dominant and the subordinate classes, does punishment act entirely without altruism. This constitutes the natural limits of the altruism of punishment.

While vengeance has a physical source, punishment has a social source. The analogy between vengeance and punishment as forms of reaction against wrongs is superficial. Vengeance is the elementary discharge of a passion. Punishment, on the contrary, is an institution. It is not a movement of a reflex nature, but is a means of conserving a certain social formation.

Only in a complete anarchy is there no place for punishment. But the positive study of society shows us that social evolution is not toward anarchy, but on the contrary that the relations of men are becoming increasingly complex.

Although this work adds nothing new, it is a stimulating and interesting discussion of the sociological aspect of punishment. The subject is approached with unusual philosophical insight. The treatment is clear and penetrating.

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Encyclopédie socialiste, syndicale, et coopérative de l'internationale ouvrière. Edited by COMPÈRE-MOREL. Vol. VI. *Le mouvement socialiste international.* By JEAN LONGUET. Paris: Quillet. Pp. 648.

There is probably nobody, either in France or in the whole world, more capable of making an able résumé of the International Socialist movement than Jean Longuet. As one of the two surviving grandsons of Karl Marx, he has not only been brought up in the Socialist movement from the cradle but he has been equally familiar with the leading parties, those of Germany, France, and Great Britain. As one of the three secretaries of the French party and occupying a position in the center of the movement free from entanglements with either wing, he can speak officially for the French party.

Unfortunately a separate volume of the encyclopedia deals with France. Indeed this is the chief defect of the present volume from the international standpoint—namely that France is omitted entirely from

the treatment. Other defects are of secondary importance. It is needless to point out that little can be said even about the backward Socialism of Asia, for example, in 30 pages. The same is true of the small amount of space given to the Socialism of South America and the Balkan states. Certain other countries are also treated very briefly, in which the economic and political conditions and, therefore, the Socialist movement are less undeveloped. Illustrations are the discussions of the Italian and Scandinavian movements.

On the other hand, 100 pages are given to Germany, 58 to England, 44 to Russia, 38 to Austria, 33 to Belgium, and 22 to Finland, enabling the author to give very interesting and authoritative statements of the situation in all these countries. By far the most valuable part of the work, however, is the 84 pages given to a sketch of the international movement. This is largely original and from the first-hand knowledge of M. Longuet, and includes of course a discriminating selection of important documents.

From the scientific standpoint the only really serious defect is the rather hastily thrown together bibliography. It is good as far as it goes but omits a number of important works and includes others of comparatively little significance.

On the whole this volume of the encyclopedia ought to have a considerable value to all students of Socialism as a world-movement. It is the most useful international review yet published, and does about all that could be expected in a very limited space.

WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING

CEDARHURST, L.I.

Sexualisme. By PIERRE BONNIER. Paris: M. Giard et E. Brière, 1914. Pp. 150+24.

A dozen articles contributed to various socialist journals at intervals from 1884 to 1913 have been re-edited and bound together in this small volume. There is no logical or chronological arrangement, nor any progress of thought to be discovered, for while there are different titles, such as "Sexualism and Socialism," "The Child," "The Masculine Spirit," "National Adoption," "The Political Equality of Man and Woman," etc., the subject is one and the same in all, and even the phrasing is repeated over and over.

For centuries man believed the universe was created for him. By slow degrees he has abandoned this idea, but he still regards himself as the pivot of society and woman as made for him, whereas if she is made for anyone but herself it is the child. "The interests of the species

should dominate those of the individual in space: this is the socialist doctrine. They ought also to dominate in time: this is the sexualist doctrine." Social evolution shows three stages, individualism, socialism, and sexualism. Hitherto we have had a masculine world, where man's superiority of muscle and weight was sufficient to give him control. He impressed his individualist philosophy, his dry, often fantastic religion, his one-sided moral code, upon society. With the coming of the age of machinery, however, his physical superiority has lost its significance and today socialism is superseding individualism. The interests of the family are put above those of the individual, those of the state above those of the family; eventually internationalism will be recognized as greater than patriotism. As surely will sexualism be accepted and woman placed in her rightful position above man, since she is the true creator of the species and its host and protector. Socialism is bringing about the emancipation of the proletariat, the producers, industrially and politically, and in a similar way sexualism will free woman, the reproducer. "All social forces converge toward the constant production of the species," and under sexualism the relative value of individuals will be expressed child, woman, man, the reverse of that under individualism. In body and mind woman is a higher, less animal type than man, a more creative thinker, a greater contributor to the higher forms of human life. She is the truly social being.

Here is feminism beyond a doubt, feminism raised to the *n*th power! There is a Gallic flavor about it that carries the reader's calm interest along in spite of the somewhat labored style which has changed as little in the thirty years as the form of presentation. As an argument it fails to be wholly convincing to an American.

HANNAH B. CLARK POWELL

CHICAGO, ILL.

A Model Housing Law. By LAWRENCE VEILLER. New York: Survey Associates, Inc., 1914. Pp. viii+343.

As in his previous publications, the writer conceives that "the housing problem is the problem of enabling the great mass of the people who want to live in decent surroundings and bring up their children under proper conditions to have such opportunities. It is also to a very large extent the problem of preventing other people who either do not care for decent conditions or are unable to achieve them from maintaining conditions which are a menace to their neighbors, to the community, and to civilization." In pursuance of this aim there is presented in carefully weighed phraseology the essentials of a housing law which

reformers and legislators are urged to accept without unnecessary alteration, since the various items have been found by long experience to stand the test of judicial interpretation and of comprehensiveness. The author contends that it is better, wherever feasible, to work for a *housing* law to cover both the type of buildings associated with the word "tenement" and the dwelling-places of the well-to-do in the more desirable districts of cities.

Six chapters are devoted to the provisions of a model law. Chap. i gives general provisions and offers exact definitions of the terms used. Chap. ii relates to new buildings and includes regulation of light, ventilation, sanitation, and fire protection. Chap. iii is given to alterations, chap. iv to maintenance, chap. v to improvements, and chap. vi to requirements and remedies. A complete index, copious notes on the separate provisions, numerous illustrative figures, and suggestions for the use of the model law in different communities make this book useful. A good feature is the insertion of clauses detailing possible concessions in localities where peculiar circumstances require such modifications. Further, Mr. Veiller has not failed to suggest that higher standards than he has presented in the text of the law may in some cases be introduced. However, although a model law is outlined, it is not a model in the Platonic sense, for throughout the writer is governed by practical considerations drawn from intimate acquaintance with the difficulties of introducing and enforcing reasonable standards under present conditions in municipalities.

E. L. TALBERT

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

An Introduction to the Study of Social Evolution; the Prehistoric Period. By F. STUART CHAPIN. New York: Century Co., 1913. Pp. xxii+306. \$2.00 net.

The general plan of this work may be best seen by a brief statement of its contents. The first two chapters discuss the various theories of variation, heredity, and evolution. The third takes up the origin and antiquity of man, including the embryological and paleontological evidence, with a brief outline of prehistoric times. In the next three chapters are discussed the factors regarded as influencing man's mental and moral development, i.e., association, physical environment, and social heredity. The seventh treats of the origin and classification of the various races and peoples of the globe. After discussing these various topics, which occupy about four-fifths of the book, the author takes up social organization proper and devotes the next chapter to a description

of certain phases of primitive or tribal society, such as the clan, totemism, religion, and property, as illustrated especially in the American Indians and the natives of Australia. The final chapter is an attempt to trace the main steps in the transition from tribal to civil society, with historical examples when possible. Each chapter is followed by a list of authorities on the subjects treated.

The generous scope of the book makes it necessary that the treatment of each topic be brief. The chief weakness is a lack of coherence, and of a critical estimation of the various topics and their interrelation. The last chapter especially is disappointing, as, after devoting special chapters to the factors influencing development, one would expect to see them worked into the developmental scheme, instead of the old single-line development, though the author does say that we must not think of the agricultural stage, "as *always* following upon the nomadic." Some of the theories also seem a little far-fetched, as when the neolithic culture is explained as due to conditions brought about by the advance of the ice sheet, when it is generally admitted that the latter part of the paleolithic age is postglacial. One would also like to know the authority for the statement that the food of paleolithic man was "mainly uncooked."

The diagram on p. 228 gives the Polynesians as an offshoot of the black race, which is incorrect, and also does not correspond to the text. The characteristic of kinky hair is not "more extreme" in Australia than in Africa (p. 213). The head form is given too much weight in the racial classification where it is made equally characteristic with color and hair.

Some might take exception to a number of other things, but the book on the whole gives a fairly accurate summary of the chief topics treated, and is of distinct value in showing the field to be covered, and the necessity of a broad and comprehensive knowledge in the treatment of social development.

A. B. LEWIS

FIELD MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY

Directory of Speakers on Municipal Problems.

This book suggests a program for greater New York, and is published by the Brooklyn Bureau of Charities. This admirable syllabus of lectures is very suggestive not only for the problems of New York City, but for other communities in the nation. It deserves attention.

C. R. HENDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Origin of Property and the Formation of the Village Community.

By JAN ST. LEWINSKI. London: Constable & Co., 1913.

Pp. xi+71. 3s. 6d.

This book contains a course of lectures delivered before the London School of Economics. It is confined to property in land, and is an account of the general evolution, rather than the origin, of property in land among less advanced peoples.

The author's thesis is that individual property was developed from a state of no-property and that the village community was a secondary and later development. He agrees in this with the old Roman theory that individual property was the "natural and primitive form of property" and opposes the communistic theories of Maine and Laveleye. This attitude is apparently due in part to the definition of property as a permanent possession.

Four principles are presented as governing the evolution of property: the economic principle, or the desire to secure the greatest satisfaction of wants with the least effort; the numerical strength of the parties affected; the growth of population; and the relation of nature to human wants. The relation of nature to human wants may be influenced by changes either in the natural surroundings or in the human wants. Under equal conditions of density of population and of natural surroundings—supposing always the existence of the economic principle and the principle of numerical strength—the same forms of property necessarily originate. Consequently race, imitation, legislation, and similar non-economic factors have no important effect on property, as is sometimes contended. The assumption on which this theory is evidently based is that the form of property is always in the interest of the majority of the population, that it is determined by the intellectual appreciation of results, and that such intellectual appreciation is inevitable and infallible.

The logical method is, first, to state the principles of this evolution as hypotheses, secondly, to illustrate these principles from scattered sources, and thirdly, to conclude that the hypotheses have been verified. More than half of the linear space of the book is devoted to such illustrations, dealing principally with the property systems of Russian peasants. Such a method, while adapted to lecture purposes, does not furnish a body of data which enables the reader to verify the conclusions of the author.

E. H. SUTHERLAND

WILLIAM JEWELL COLLEGE

The State: Its History and Development Viewed Sociologically. By FRANZ OPPENHEIMER, Privat Docent of Political Sciences in the University of Berlin. Authorized translation by John M. Gitterman. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1914. Pp. vii+302. \$2.00.

Everyone who is trying to keep pace with sociological and economic thought must read this book. For several years it has been evident that the author was due to make an impression upon traditionalism, and in this volume he presents a digest of his argument.

The publishers claim too much when they say: "It is, indeed, nothing less than an entirely new theory of the origin and development of all state formations." In fact there is nothing in the book on the process of civic evolution which has not been familiar for a long time to all well-informed sociologists. The author frankly credits the substance of that part of his theory to Gumplowicz (p. 20). The contribution which Oppenheimer has actually made to social theory is a thesis which amounts to a revolutionary assertion as to the relation of civic to economic evolution.

The author's own epitome is in these words:

"To the originally purely sociological idea of the state I have added the economic phase and formulated it as follows:

"What then is the state as a sociological concept? The state, completely in its genesis, essentially and almost completely during the first stages of its existence, is a social institution, forced by a victorious group of men or a defeated group, with the sole purpose of regulating the dominion of the victorious group over the vanquished, and securing itself against revolt from within and attacks from abroad. Teleologically this dominion had no other purpose than the economic exploitation of the vanquished by the victors [p. 15].

"I propose in the following discussion to call one's own labor and the equivalent exchange of one's own labor for the labor of others, the 'economic means' for the satisfaction of needs, while the unrequited appropriation of the labor of others will be called the political means. . . . All world history, from primitive times up to our own civilization, presents a single phase, a contest namely between the economic and the political means; and it can present only this phase until we have achieved free citizenship" (pp. 25 and 27).

If anyone imagines that the sociologists have been unproductive, since Schäffle scandalized the German economists by his attempt at a

functional account of society, he would be jostled into a different state of mind by reading the array of evidence and the interpretation of it that follows. He who runs may read in it the *reductio ad absurdum* of both the classical and the socialistic economic interpretations of history. It is no new idea to the sociologists, but no one has before put it in such conclusive form, that the function of political control is virtually co-ordinate with physical cause and effect in shaping economic institutions. In the antithetic terms the "economic means" and the "political means," Oppenheimer has not merely done a piece of phrase-making. He has invented a master key to sealed vaults in capitalistic theory.

In the name of students who have no time to waste, we protest against the nuisance of uncut leaves in this class of books.

A. W. S.

Between Eras: From Capitalism to Democracy. By ALBION W. SMALL. Kansas City, Mo.: The Intercollegiate Press. Pp. 731. \$1.65.¹

Dr. Alexander has asked me to review *Between Eras*. I am sorry that my time does not permit the fuller review which the book deserves, but I do want to say most emphatically that this is an extraordinary book.

Professor Albion W. Small, LL.D., is head of the Department of Sociology in the University of Chicago, and ranks as one of the foremost men in his special field of science. This book is evidently an effort on his part to speak the language of the common man, and he does it with immense success. In fact, his language is so vivid, so much the language of the street, that I wonder that our magazine editors have not long ago been after him. Not only does it sparkle with epigrams and racy modern expressions, but it is put in the form of conversations, and runs along a clearly defined thread of narrative, so that the book is actually a sort of novel. At the same time, it is packed with ideas and takes hold of a man's intellect with a firm grip from beginning to end.

The characters who carry on the conversation in the book are all upper-class people, business men, professors, and so forth. I surmise that some of them at least are snapshots of typical men whom Professor Small knows personally. They are all wandering in the maze of our present situation and seeking an honest way out of it. The story carries them forward to a real solution of troubles.

¹ This notice appeared in the *Methodist Review*, April, 1914. It is quoted by permission of the editor.

No, that is not the case after all. No solution is propounded in the book. It is simply an analysis of our present conditions. It cuts up and reduces to foolishness the usual arguments made on behalf of our capitalistic society, without at all proposing a socialistic organization. The author has evidently, for good and satisfactory reasons, limited himself in this book, and we must accept his self-imposed limitations. But within those limitations this book is the cleverest, the most incisive, and the best-equipped analysis of the capitalistic system of industrial production which has appeared within our time. No one can afford to pass it by. And I will promise the reader that he will find it so entertaining that he will delight to finish it, and that his wife and the highly intelligent children of his family will be eager to read it too. Besides that, you get your money's worth. It is a very bulky volume, handsomely printed, and there are enough ideas in it to equip half a dozen ordinary writers.

WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH

ROCHESTER, N.Y.

RECENT LITERATURE

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

Depopulation and Aid for Large Families.—Among the various devices for increasing the French birth-rate by favoring families having at least three children, those which have fewest objections are grants and premiums. Although such aids involve heavy pecuniary sacrifice by the well-to-do, the leisure classes with their low birth-rate have nevertheless a real interest in making the sacrifice. Other useful population measures would be improved housing for the working classes and the suppression of criminal abortion.—Gros-Mayrevieille, "La dépopulation et l'assistance aux familles nombreuses," *La revue philanthropique*, October, 1913. R. H. L.

The First Results of the New English Law for Social Unemployment Insurance.—A great proportion of the demands for the insurance do not receive benefits, for many of the workers are soon given employment. There is optional as well as obligatory insurance. The first year of the insurance has seen a decrease in the amount of unemployment. The right of the worker to benefits depends upon the amount of his assessments and benefits and his state of unemployment, capacity for work, and inability to secure suitable employment. There should be quicker transfer facilities from regions where work is scarce to places where it is abundant. Whether the new insurance decreases the sufferings of the unemployment can better be answered when a period of industrial depression comes, which the insurance system, as yet, has to confront. A surplus of £1,610,000 in the Insurance Fund will help meet these future emergencies.—Maurice Bellom, "Le premier résultat de la nouvelle loi anglaise d'assurance sociale," *Journal des économistes*, February, 1914. P. E. C.

The Value of the Sanatorium in the Social Struggle against Tuberculosis.—In Germany the pivot of the struggle against tuberculosis is the sanatorium. After fifteen years of experience with it, the results afford a chance to measure its usefulness. In France the sanatorium has not been pivotal in the struggle against tuberculosis. Comparison shows, however, that the rate of deaths from tuberculosis has diminished in the same proportions in the two countries. Hence the inference is justified that the sanatorium is of minor importance.—Mathieu-Pierre Weil, "De la valeur du sanatorium dans la lutte sociale contre la tuberculose," *La revue philanthropique*, October, 1913. R. H. L.

International Labor Legislation.—The homogeneity of human nature, the same general mental life, and, under the influence of railroads and telegraph, the same industrial processes and system of labor have brought about an economic and politico-social solidarity of all civilized nations. All are following the same democratic evolution and the same ideals of welfare, justice, and dignity for industrial workers. This solidarity is strongly evidenced by statistics of accidents and mortality. The coefficients for each cause in the same trade is singularly the same in whatever country taken. The necessity of including stipulations relative to industrial workers in international treaties is becoming apparent. Nations protect the personal rights of their citizens in other countries. By universal international legislation the level of the working class could be effectively raised. In past years France has entered into separate agreements with Italy, Switzerland, and Belgium, giving their citizens mutual industrial rights and protection in whichever country they are. In other cases two or more nations have agreed upon the following points: prohibition of night work for women in industry, prohibition of night work for adolescents under sixteen, limitation to ten-hour day for day-laborers and workers under sixteen, prohibition of the manufacture and sale of white phosphorus matches. At the first conference of the International Association for the Legal Protection of Laborers at Bern, Switzerland, in

September, 1913, fourteen European states were represented. The two important measures deliberated were, (1) universal ten-hour day for women and for children under sixteen, (2) prohibition of night work for children under sixteen. The first was signed by the delegates of twelve nations; the second by the delegates of thirteen. If their respective governments ratify their action a great step in international labor legislation will have been taken.—Arthur Fontaine, "La législation internationale du travail," *Revue politique et parlementaire*, February 10, 1914. F. S. C.

Puericulture.—By puericulture is meant the culture of the child, its preservation, rescue, and conservation. This involves the protection of the mother; the care of the child before and after birth. The death-rate among children has declined in France from 178 per 1,000 in 1871-75 to 130.1 per 1,000 in 1906-9. In Norway where the struggle against tuberculosis and alcoholism has gone hand in hand with puericulture the death-rate among children has fallen to 71 per 1,000. In a study by Budin, Balestre, and Giletta de Saint-Joseph it is concluded that 66 per cent of infants dying under one year of age die of preventable diseases. Co-operation among all forces fighting infant mortality is essential to success. The two principal forces in the struggle against preventable diseases of children are the doctors and the women.—Paul Strauss, "La puericulture," *La revue philanthropique*, November, 1913.

R. H. L.

Eugenics and Euthenics.—There are three phases of the problem of human betterment—culture, eugenics, and evolution—and these need to be carefully distinguished. They are commonly confused in the minds of those who have given little thought to the biological aspects of the problem, and such confusion is likely to lead to misdirected effort. While wonderful advance in individual conduct and social relations has been secured through the cumulative effect of the cultural effort that has been made, there has been little if any advancement in innate human character. The problem of human culture is social, not biological. The problems of eugenics and evolution are primarily biological. It is necessary to emphasize cultural effort, for it is essential that the good breeding of the future human race be in the midst of a controlling atmosphere of highest altruistic idealism.—Maynard M. Metcalf, *Popular Science Monthly*, April, 1914. J. E. E.

The Investigation of School Systems: Principles Which Should Govern Them.—(1) Teaching is a spiritual process of personal influence. Conditions of lighting, ventilation, cleanliness, convenience, and general hygiene; arrangement of programs, and general hygiene; arrangement of programs, and methods of teaching can be measured by standards, but this personal influence is still unmeasured and unmeasurable. (2) Investigators must be equals of those managing the system, both in theory and in practical knowledge and experience. (3) The criticism must take into account the social, economic, and political difficulties under which the system has developed. (4) The social atmosphere as well as the pedagogic factors of the schoolroom must be considered, for the social spirit cultivated is most important and far reaching. (5) The effects on the community, as well as on the educational process, must be considered. Has the school fulfilled its function in influencing the common life of the people? (6) Investigations should not result in sensational newspaper reports, but in confidential aid to the board in correcting faults and bettering the work. (7) Investigations must be deliberate and thorough. (8) One group of professional people should not be allowed to turn "batteries of criticism" on another group, thus bringing undeserved ill-feeling on both sides.—Samuel T. Dutton, *Educational Review*, January, 1914. F. S. C.

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
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